Over the past hundred years, the United States has won three major wars. The first was World War I in the 1910s, the second was World War II in the 1940s, and the third was the nuclear arms Cold War against the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Broadly speaking, a major war has occurred about every thirty years. Now the United States is facing an economic and trade war with China that may develop into a comprehensive Cold War—one that will affect the entire world. This would be the fourth great war, a decisive struggle tied to the final burial of the communist system.

The United States is not an imperialist country that delights in external aggression. Its involvement in World War I and World War II came only after it was attacked by Germany and Japan, forcing it to enter the wars in self-defense. The third Cold War against the Soviet Union was also forced upon it. Brezhnev reversed Khrushchev’s reform and opening, retreated toward Stalinism, treated the United States as an enemy, and pursued a massive nuclear buildup to surpass America. The United States had no choice but to respond, engaging in a nuclear arms race that ultimately exhausted the Soviet Union and led to the collapse of the Soviet bloc. In broad terms, Xi Jinping today is comparable to Brezhnev.

The current fourth confrontation—an economic and trade war against China—is likewise a forced, reactive move. Originally, for more than thirty years after Deng Xiaoping’s reform and opening, through the eras of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, the United States exercised great forbearance. It allowed China to enjoy a peaceful “strategic opportunity period” for development, accepted massive Chinese exports, enabled China to earn huge profits, and pursued a policy of “engagement and integration.” For decades there was relative peace, allowing China to grow smoothly into the world’s second-largest economy.

However, in recent years since Xi Jinping came to power, China has changed course, abandoning Deng Xiaoping’s direction and retreating toward Mao Zedong. It has全面 embraced Mao-style authoritarianism and personal cult politics, sought to become a world leader, confronted the United States, and challenged American global leadership. In the South China Sea, it abandoned Deng’s principle of “shelving disputes and maintaining the status quo,” unilaterally militarized islands, threatened neighboring countries and maritime security, aggressively expanded cyber forces, stole American intelligence and technological secrets, and promoted the Belt and Road Initiative as a form of external economic expansion, binding other countries with debt.

Xi Jinping’s turn has produced a rare consensus across the U.S. political spectrum—hawks and doves alike—that China policy must shift to a strategy of “containment.” Chinese officials and scholars attending this year’s U.S.–China trade forums have already felt a chill unlike before. There is now virtually no one speaking on China’s behalf, and even the “old friend” of forty years, Henry Kissinger, has changed his tone. This is not merely the decision of Trump’s outspoken personality; it is a forced response by the United States, an act of self-defense.

The current tariff-based trade war is only the beginning. In the coming years it is likely to escalate from a trade war into a comprehensive economic war and even a political confrontation. Starting with tariffs, it will inevitably spread across all areas of the economy. China has already shown signs of economic and political instability. Xi Jinping recently called nationwide for “stabilizing employment, stabilizing foreign trade, stabilizing foreign investment, stabilizing finance,” and other forms of “stability,” which in fact suggests the emergence of multiple forms of instability. Some foreign-invested enterprises have begun to withdraw, foreign trade imports and exports have fluctuated, the renminbi has continued to depreciate, exports have declined, and employment is bound to be affected.

Beyond the U.S.–China trade war, an even more severe challenge for China is the emerging framework of U.S.–European coordination against China, which is likely to take clearer shape over time. At the same time, Trump has worked to draw Putin into restraining China. The world’s major powers fall into five blocs: the United States, Europe, Japan, China, and Russia. Japan aligning with the United States poses no problem. Even if Russia remains neutral, most smaller countries will side with the U.S. and Europe. China’s isolation is an inevitable trend. Recently, even China’s “iron brother” Pakistan experienced an electoral change, and it may well shift its stance toward China. The overall international situation is extremely unfavorable to Beijing.

An American economic war against China will inevitably trigger domestic turbulence within China. Recently, voices calling for Xi Jinping to abandon another term have already appeared. Xi’s authority has been weakened by the trade war, and more unforeseen developments may follow. China’s economy could fall into disorder, affecting public confidence and stability. Xi may hold on until 2022 and step down on schedule, perhaps installing a trusted successor and ruling from behind the scenes as a paramount leader. Alternatively, he may cling to power and seek another five-year term. In any case, China’s economy and people’s livelihoods will inevitably suffer under prolonged confrontation with the United States and Europe.

The prospects of U.S.–China confrontation are likely to resemble those of the U.S.–Soviet struggle: China will find it increasingly difficult to sustain itself, internal instability will grow, dissenting voices may lead to changes at the top, and the Xi system could collapse. China may then return to Deng Xiaoping’s path of reform and opening, or go even further—like the Soviet Union—toward democratic constitutional transformation, abandoning Mao Zedong, whose policies caused the deaths of 70 million compatriots, abandoning communism altogether, and becoming a democratic nation.