Mao’s wandering spirit left Anqing and headed straight for Jiujiang in Jiangxi, then climbed Mount Lushan.

Mao had gone up Lushan many times before—sometimes to rest, sometimes for meetings. This time, there was no official business, nor did he intend to see anyone. He simply wished to relax and revisit old memories. Lushan had always been his favorite retreat. In the past, he often stayed at Meilu, the villa once occupied by Chiang Kai-shek and Soong Mei-ling.

In 1960, Jiangxi built a new villa specifically for Mao, choosing the most scenic spot beside Lulin Lake. The two-story building covered 3,000 square meters and was named Lulin No. 1. It was even more imposing than Meilu. Formerly called the Mao Zedong Former Residence, it is now known as the Lushan Museum. The structure remains unchanged, with its main halls converted into exhibition rooms displaying bronzes, ceramics from various dynasties, and famous calligraphy and paintings.

Mao’s bedroom was in the center of the first floor, spacious and elegant, furnished much like Fengze Garden in Zhongnanhai. When Mao first moved in in 1961, he was somewhat startled and said, “Why is it made so exquisitely?” Returning to the old place today, Mao felt cheerful. Passing by the former site of the Lushan Conference, he stopped to stroll around. The famous 1959 Lushan Conference, where Peng Dehuai was brought down, had been held there.

As Mao’s spirit wandered about Lushan, thunder suddenly roared at midnight. Lightning split the sky, fierce winds howled, and torrential rain poured down. Mao was so frightened he nearly cried out. He had never encountered such a violent storm in the middle of the night. As the rain subsided slightly, amid gusts of cold wind, a ghostly figure emerged in the distance, followed by a large troop of soldiers. Mao thought a debt-collecting spirit had come for him and shrank back in terror. Before he could steady himself, the spectral figure drifted up to him. Mao looked closely—he did not seem so terrifying after all, and even looked somewhat familiar.

Mao spoke first: “Who are you?”

The figure replied, “Don’t you recognize me? Greetings. You’ve come up the mountain again.”

Regaining his composure, Mao said, “Old Peng?”

“Indeed,” the spirit answered. “Sorry to have startled you. That thunder and lightning just now— the Jade Emperor specially dispatched the Thunder God and Lightning Mother to clear the way for me, fearing mishap on the journey. A troop of soldiers accompanied me for protection.”

“Where have you come from?” Mao asked.

“From my hometown. Fallen leaves return to their roots. More comfortable than lying stiff in Tiananmen Square.”

“I’ve long grown weary of lying there,” Mao replied. “And besides, I’ve returned to being an ordinary man. Don’t call me Chairman anymore. I’ve grown tired of personality cults.”

“Then shall I call you Old Mao?”

“Yes. Old Mao sounds more intimate. We can speak heart to heart without official airs.”

Peng said, “You finally abandoned the personality cult. At the Lushan Conference, you targeted me because you tolerated only adulation, not criticism. Yet my suggestions were meant to support you as leader. The accusations of ‘colluding with foreign powers’ to overthrow you were pure fabrication. Do I look capable of colluding with foreign powers?”

“I understand now,” Mao said. “All the charges against you were false. History has proven the truth was on your side.”

Peng recalled March 1959 in Shanghai, when he spoke at an expanded Politburo meeting, stating that the Great Leap Forward was fundamentally mistaken. Mao had rebuked him for interfering in matters beyond the military, calling him alarmist. Peng insisted he was acting for Mao’s prestige. Days later, at the Seventh Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee, Mao lashed out in his opening speech, declaring that many hated him—especially Peng Dehuai—and that if attacked, he would retaliate. Peng was stunned. Later at Lushan, Peng wrote Mao a 3,500-character letter urging correction of exaggeration and petty-bourgeois fanaticism. Mao twisted it into a “ten-thousand-word petition attacking the Party,” removed him from office, and isolated him in Xishan.

Mao admitted he felt pressured by others who echoed Peng, especially Zhang Wentian, and feared for his authority. So he labeled them an anti-Party clique.

Peng accused Mao of pursuing the Great Leap Forward to surpass the Soviet Union and become leader of world communism. When famine ensued and millions died, Mao refused to admit fault.

Mao confessed that after forty years of torment and reflection, he realized following Stalin’s path had harmed the nation. After Stalin’s death, he sought dominance in the socialist camp. In 1956 in Moscow, he spoke expansively at an international communist conference. Back home, he sought a Chinese model—thus the Great Leap Forward and People’s Communes. The result was famine, and he could not step down.

Peng acknowledged Mao’s new understanding. Mao admitted Deng Xiaoping was a more capable leader. Mao’s steel targets in 1958 caused chaos; Deng later achieved far greater output pragmatically. Mao conceded Deng’s realism surpassed his own grandiose ambitions.

They discussed Lin Biao’s flattery and duplicity. Mao admitted Lin’s propaganda bolstered his cult.

Peng expressed regret over Mao’s son dying in Korea. Mao said it was his own stubbornness; Peng had warned that bullets had no eyes.

On the Cultural Revolution, Mao admitted trusting Jiang Qing was a mistake. Fortunately, Hua Guofeng, Ye Jianying, and Deng Xiaoping resolved matters peacefully.

Asked whether the Korean War was worth it, Mao said that forty years ago he would have answered yes, but now he could only say it was not worth it—and was a mistake.

Mao confessed personal ambition drove his decision to send troops. Stalin’s “grand strategy” sought to divert U.S. power to Asia while consolidating Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union abstained in the UN vote condemning North Korea, allowing U.S. intervention to proceed legally. China’s intervention then appeared unjust internationally. Stalin sent no Soviet troops, letting China bear the cost.

China lost 400,000 dead and over a million wounded. Soviet weapons had to be paid for later with goods. Mao concluded they had been used.

Peng realized it was less “defending the homeland” than fighting for Stalin’s strategy. Mao admitted the slogan was propaganda; the U.S. had not planned to invade China.

Mao recounted bargaining with Stalin—seeking arms aid, military industry, atomic technology, and leadership over Asian communist parties. Stalin stalled. Only after Stalin’s sudden death did Khrushchev agree to sell China ninety military factories. Atomic technology was still withheld.

They discussed the Hundred Regiments Offensive and the Xi’an Incident. Mao admitted Stalin’s strategy often prioritized Soviet interests over China’s. In hindsight, Peng’s patriotic stance was correct.

On Zhang Xueliang, Mao acknowledged his crucial role and the irony that history now judged matters differently.

Finally, Mao expressed deep remorse for Peng’s persecution and secret cremation under a false name during the Cultural Revolution. Peng replied that what comforted him most was their candid conversation.

Peng spoke of observing modern China: people now had enough to eat, yet frequent mass incidents troubled him—especially cases where thousands protested financial fraud, only to be suppressed. Vast resources were spent on internal security exceeding military budgets, turning the Party against the people.

Mao admitted responsibility lay with him at the root and that he awaited judgment from the Jade Emperor.

At last Peng said he had truly returned to his roots and must go back. Thunder rolled again, though more gently than before. The Thunder God and Lightning Mother escorted him away. His figure gradually receded, the sky calmed, and Mao let out a long breath, closing his eyes, his soul unsettled for a long while.

NEXT: 41. Yang Kaihui (1901–1930)