The lifelong entanglement between Mao and Chiang was in fact a microcosm of the history of the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang. One day, Mao thought of his old rival, Chiang Kai-shek. Mao’s spirit drifted to Taiwan, to the Cihu Mausoleum in Taoyuan where Chiang’s coffin rests in the main hall. Chiang had willed that his remains return to his hometown of Fenghua, but because China had not been reunified, he had been temporarily laid to rest at Cihu. Forty years had passed, and he still had not moved. Mao’s ghostly arrival startled Chiang.

Chiang said: “Runzhi, you have come to see me. What advice do you bring?”

Mao replied: “Since you went to Taiwan, everything there has changed dramatically. I am curious.”

Chiang said: “After arriving in Taiwan, I reflected deeply, determined to redeem myself. Taiwan took off economically and became one of the Four Asian Tigers. I can die with my eyes closed.”

Mao said: “I know you achieved much in governing Taiwan in your later years. I envy that. Taiwan democratized and transformed politically. Back in Yan’an, we also spoke of following the American path—but that was only for show. We never meant it seriously. Yet you truly implemented it. And traditional Chinese culture has been well preserved.”

Chiang replied: “I lost many things in my life, but one thing I never lost was Confucius. Wherever I went, I carried Confucian teachings with me. In Taiwan, I continued to honor Confucius—propriety, righteousness, integrity, and a sense of shame; the Four Cardinal Virtues and Eight Moral Principles. Confucius helped me rise again.”

Mao said: “Generalissimo, you are exemplary. I did the opposite—I cast aside Confucius, shook the foundations, and ultimately left in decline.”

Chiang said candidly: “We have known each other for decades. Like brothers, we fought for the nation for many years. No fight, no acquaintance. Now we can speak openly. Looking back, where were the lessons?”

After a pause, Chiang continued: “I believe our original intentions were good—we both wanted the country to prosper. But we were deceived by Stalin. He funded your party, enabling your activities. He was the father; you were like sons, obliged to listen. He schemed to control China. Sun Yat-sen and I also fell for it. During the Northern Expedition, he provided money and weapons; we accepted them. He even tried to fund Wu Peifu, hoping to control whoever won. Wu Peifu refused foreign money and lost. Without Stalin’s aid, the Northern Expedition might not have succeeded. North and South might have negotiated peace and formed a coalition government, avoiding civil war.”

He added: “The Americans were better—they did not seek to control China’s internal affairs. It was Stalin’s interference that drove us to fight one another, causing heavy casualties.”

Mao said: “You are right. Looking back, that is how it was.”

Chiang brought up the War of Resistance against Japan: “During the war, you benefited from the Japanese. You sent Pan Hannian to negotiate with them and with Wang Jingwei, establishing tacit understandings—non-aggression and intelligence exchanges—so that Japanese forces would strike me instead. A borrowed knife to kill. That was calculating.”

Mao replied: “What you say is factual. At the time, the Communist Party was weak. To seize power from you, we needed external forces. We used Japan to weaken you, then grew stronger ourselves, and with Soviet aid, eventually defeated you and founded the People’s Republic.”

On the postwar period, Chiang said: “After victory, everyone hoped for peace and a coalition government. The United States mediated, hoping to unify China. But Stalin encouraged you to fight. He supplied vast modern weapons in Manchuria, increasing your confidence. Ceasefire agreements became scraps of paper.”

Mao admitted: “In 1945, when I went to Chongqing to negotiate peace, I did so under American and Soviet pressure. I did not want to go. I wanted to defeat you and rule alone. The American ambassador acted as mediator, and I had to go through the motions.”

Chiang said: “I could see you were stalling. Some in my party suggested detaining you in Chongqing, believing you would break agreements once you returned. But you had American and Soviet guarantees; I could not act.”

Mao reflected: “In 1947, when the United States pressured you into a ceasefire in Manchuria, it gave me time to regroup and counterattack. Even Stalin, fearing American intervention, urged me in early 1949 to negotiate with you and share power. I refused. I was determined to conquer all of China.”

Chiang replied: “In truth, the United States inadvertently helped you. Had it fully supported me, you would not have advanced so smoothly. You also had political tactics—land reform won peasants to your side. But soon after gaining power, you collectivized the land again. Instead of building, you pursued class struggle for thirty years, leading to famine and tens of millions of deaths. The Soviet model harmed China. Fortunately, after your death, Deng Xiaoping abandoned class struggle and befriended the United States. In thirty years, China became the world’s second-largest economy. Under the Soviet model, people starved.”

Mao said: “After forty years of reflection, I understand—the Russian path was mistaken. Stalin deceived us and harmed the nation.”

He continued: “In 1950, I again followed Stalin’s advice and entered the Korean War, fighting for Kim Il-sung and offending the United Nations. Kim initiated the war; the UN intervened. China lost hundreds of thousands of lives.”

Chiang responded: “In 1945, I lost Mongolia for similar reasons. To hasten Japan’s defeat, Roosevelt sought Soviet entry into the war and agreed to recognize Mongolian independence. I consented under pressure. Stalin delayed until after the atomic bombs were dropped and Japan was ready to surrender, then entered Manchuria and quickly occupied it. The Japanese offered little resistance; their elite Kwantung Army had already withdrawn. The Soviets dismantled equipment and transferred captured arms to your forces for the civil war. Without that move, perhaps we would have formed a coalition government.”

Mao agreed: “The Soviet transfer of weapons greatly strengthened Lin Biao’s forces. Their aid was decisive. Even former Kwantung troops joined us. They were instrumental.”

Chiang said: “Mongolia was lost that way. Later, I refused to recognize its independence formally, but it made little difference.”

Mao turned to Taiwan’s future: “How will the mainland reunify with Taiwan?”

Chiang answered: “The main obstacle is the political system. You still cling to Stalin’s framework. Deng reformed the economy but not politics. That system cannot be accepted in Taiwan. Once you reform politically, reunification will follow naturally. Even Russia has abandoned Marx and Stalin—why do you persist?”

Mao said: “If we do not change, we will fall behind global trends. Reform would make reunification easier.”

Mao concluded: “I envy you. You left writings behind—your diaries are instructive.”

Chiang said modestly: “I upheld Confucius and believed in Buddhism and Christianity. Faith restrained me. I still made many mistakes.”

Mao praised him: “During the Central Plains War, Li Zongren and Yan Xishan fought against you, yet later you appointed Li vice president and Yan premier. I could not have done that.”

Chiang replied: “I remembered two teachings of Confucius: when subordinates err, the responsibility lies chiefly with oneself; and when one makes a mistake, correct it. ‘The faults of a gentleman are like eclipses of the sun and moon. When he errs, all see it; when he corrects it, all admire him.’”

After speaking, Chiang took his leave, slowly retreating and fading into the distance.

Mao was deeply moved. He reflected that in life Chiang had cultivated discipline, wrote diaries daily, and left volumes behind—lessons for others.

NEXT: 20. Wang Jingwei (1883–1944) Chen Bijun (1891–1959)