On his second day in Moscow, Mao went to pay respects to Khrushchev.

Khrushchev’s grave lies in the Novodevichy Cemetery in southwest Moscow. When he died in 1971, he was not buried inside the Kremlin wall as was customary for Soviet leaders. Whether this was due to objections within the Party leadership or Khrushchev’s own wishes remains inconclusive. His tombstone is distinctive: unlike the usual busts of great figures, it features only a solitary head, cut off at the neck. Beneath it stand six slabs of black and white marble, arranged upright. The design—by an artist—symbolizes the mixed judgment on his legacy: both praise and blame.

Mao’s wandering spirit lingered before Khrushchev’s grave, as if greeting his spirit. That night, Khrushchev’s spirit indeed came to Mao’s villa to chat.

Khrushchev greeted him: “Hello! Thank you for coming such a long way to see me today. I hardly deserve it!”

Mao replied: “In the 1950s, you visited China three times, and I visited you in Moscow. You left me with unforgettable memories. I am deeply grateful for your help to China. I remember your first visit in 1954. Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and I all went to the airport to receive you. You had just come to power, and you generously agreed to assist us with more than one hundred projects and extended a long-term loan of 500 million rubles. Under Stalin, such things were unimaginable. He was always cautious, afraid he could not control me. From your time onward, Sino-Soviet relations entered a more relaxed era. How could we forget?”

Khrushchev responded: “Assistance was only proper. Do you remember? After your National Day celebrations, we held high-level talks at Yinian Hall in Zhongnanhai. After discussing war and peace and the world situation, I asked: ‘Do you have any further requests?’ You said you were interested in atomic energy and nuclear weapons and hoped we would help you develop them. I was stunned. I immediately refused, saying: ‘That thing is too expensive. In our family, one nuclear umbrella is enough; not everyone needs one.’ But I did agree to help you build a small research reactor.”

Mao answered: “Yes, I had my eye on that treasure. The United States dropped two atomic bombs on Japan, and the war ended. I could not go without it. If you refused this time, I would raise it again.”

Khrushchev smiled: “I admired your persistence.”

Mao continued: “In 1956, you delivered the ‘Secret Speech,’ exposing Stalin’s purges and criticizing the cult of personality. You released millions of political prisoners and rehabilitated tens of millions. Its impact was enormous. In China, I could hardly bear it. You criticized Stalin in the first half of the year; in the second half, at our Eighth Party Congress, ‘Mao Zedong Thought’ was removed from the Party Constitution. If it went further, they would have criticized my own cult of personality. I had carried out purges, rectification campaigns, and class struggles; many had died. After 1949 there were land reform executions and campaigns against counterrevolutionaries—millions in total. If all that were exposed as you exposed Stalin, how could I endure it? So I had to defend Stalin. To defend Stalin was to defend myself. I said he was seventy percent correct, thirty percent wrong.”

Khrushchev said: “In 1957, when you came to Moscow for the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution, you again asked for atomic bomb technology—and this time I agreed.”

Mao recalled warmly the lavish reception in Moscow, the stay in the Kremlin—once the Tsar’s palace—the customizations made to suit his habits, even replacing the Western toilet with a squat one. Khrushchev laughed at the memory, calling him “a fighter from the forest.”

Mao then described his dramatic speech at the international communist meeting, where he speculated openly about nuclear war, suggesting that even if half of humanity perished, socialism would prevail. Many delegates were shocked. Khrushchev admitted that few took Mao’s words seriously.

Mao insisted he meant them. He explained that China needed population strength and that he rejected birth control in preparation for possible nuclear war.

Khrushchev noted that after agreements were signed, Soviet experts helped train thousands of Chinese nuclear specialists. Mao acknowledged this was why he invited Khrushchev to visit China again in 1958.

But tensions grew during the Great Leap Forward. Mao accused Khrushchev of “revisionism” and softness toward the West. Khrushchev promoted peaceful coexistence; Mao spoke of inevitable confrontation. Mao described the 1958 shelling of Kinmen (Quemoy) as a “political cannon,” aimed at both the United States and the Soviet Union to pressure Moscow for advanced military technology, including submarines.

Khrushchev admitted he had been alarmed but ultimately agreed to assist China’s military modernization. Agreements followed for advanced weapons systems.

However, distrust deepened. Khrushchev recounted the incident of an unexploded U.S. Sidewinder missile that fell into Chinese territory. When he requested joint study, the Chinese claimed it was missing. Later it was found—dismantled. Khrushchev felt insulted. Soon after, in 1960, he withdrew over a thousand Soviet experts from China and halted assistance on 155 projects.

Mao conceded this was a heavy blow, though China had already grasped atomic bomb fundamentals. He sought temporary reconciliation in the early 1960s, but ideological conflict intensified. Mao denounced Khrushchev’s “revisionism” and published the “Nine Commentaries.”

Khrushchev pointed out that during China’s famine years he had loaned grain and sugar and even adjusted debt terms favorably for China. Mao did not dispute the facts.

He then remarked: “In 1964, I personally revised the congratulatory telegram for your seventieth birthday, softening references to disputes and emphasizing unity. Yet soon after, on October 16, 1964, China exploded its first atomic bomb. We celebrated with ‘The East Is Red.’ Officially, we claimed self-reliance, though Soviet assistance had been decisive.”

Khrushchev said wryly: “Two days before your explosion, I was removed from power in Moscow. I do not know whether your bomb celebrated my downfall—or ten years of my assistance.”

Mao laughed: “Perhaps both. Stalin was an era of rigidity; you were an era of relaxation. I was rigid; Deng Xiaoping was relaxed—more like you.”

Seeing the hour was late, Khrushchev rose, said farewell, and departed.

NEXT: 14. Leonid Brezhnev (1906–1982)