Mao went abroad only twice in his lifetime, and both times he went to Moscow—once to meet Stalin, and once to meet Khrushchev. Mao especially cherished the memory of Stalin. On that earlier trip to Moscow, he had stayed for two months. Now he resolved to go to Moscow again, hoping to see Stalin and Khrushchev once more. After arriving, Mao’s wandering spirit returned to the suburban guesthouse where he had once stayed.

That night, Mao kept reliving the unforgettable moments of 1949 when he had lived there and met with Stalin. Stalin’s image turned over and over in his mind. But the day’s journey had tired him; in a haze, he fell asleep.

At midnight, Mao dreamed that someone came to summon him to the Kremlin, saying that Stalin was waiting to see him. Overjoyed, Mao immediately followed the messenger. Entering the Kremlin, he was led into Stalin’s office—the very same office as before. As soon as Mao stepped inside, Stalin warmly came forward, shook his hand enthusiastically, invited him to sit, and offered tea. With only one interpreter present, they exchanged greetings and pleasantries.

Stalin spoke first: “It has been more than sixty years since we met in 1949. I have been in the spirit world for over sixty years, and you for over forty. Though we are both in the afterlife, I can see everything. After sixty years of reflection, I have gained many new insights. I believe you have as well. Tonight, we can speak freely, without restraint, about anything.”

Mao replied: “I very much appreciate your frankness and sincerity. I have always learned from you and have been your loyal student. It can be said that without you, there would be no Mao Zedong. Without the Soviet Communist Party, there would be no Chinese Communist Party. Your kindness toward us was immense; we can never forget it. From the founding of our Party, you sent representatives to help us build it, provided funds and guidance—everything was organized according to your instructions. At that time, we understood nothing.”

Stalin said: “China’s revolution had favorable objective conditions. Before you, there was Hong Xiuquan’s Taiping Rebellion tradition. Your ‘forerunner of revolution,’ Sun Yat-sen, even called himself the ‘Second Hong Xiuquan,’ taking him as a model in the anti-Qing struggle. And further back, Zhu Yuanzhang of the Ming dynasty rebelled for fifteen years, fighting his way to Beijing and seizing power—he was your example. China had such precedents. India did not. I also sent people to organize a party in India. Like China, India formed communist groups around 1920. China established its Party in 1921, but India did not formally establish the Communist Party until 1933. And even then, they did not pursue armed struggle. After your First United Front collapsed, you immediately launched the Nanchang Uprising and the Autumn Harvest Uprising. India was too moderate. Gandhi’s nonviolent movement had a profound influence; they disliked taking up arms and preferred legal parliamentary struggle. Gandhi’s successor, Nehru, even visited the Soviet Union in the 1920s, but he learned only socialist planned economics, not armed revolution. The Indian Communist Party gained legal status in 1942 and entered elections. You, however, followed us in armed struggle. You truly were my good student.”

Mao asked: “What was good about Gandhi’s nonviolent movement?”

Stalin answered: “Fewer deaths. A handful, dozens at most. Less destruction, lower cost. After more than twenty years—about the same length of time as your struggle—they achieved independence from Britain. For seventy years India has practiced parliamentary democracy. A very different path from yours.”

Mao said: “But in China we believed in fighting. Sun Yat-sen began with uprisings. I firmly believed in the gun.”

Stalin replied: “Sun’s method did not work. He raised funds to buy weapons, recruited secret-society fighters, launched surprise attacks hoping to spark wider revolt. He tried ten times and failed ten times. You learned from his failures. You learned from bandits—you were clever. You reasoned that if bandits could survive long-term in the mountains, why couldn’t you? But you were different. You wore a red star and had a grand objective: to seize national power. Bandits just linger in the hills for a lifetime.”

Mao responded proudly: “You’re right. I learned bandit survival methods—going door to door with guns demanding grain. If they said they had none, we searched. If we found it, we accused them of deceit before taking it away. But we followed procedures and issued receipts—even though we knew they were worthless.”

Stalin laughed: “You also learned agitation. I call it ‘incitement’; you call it ‘mobilization.’ Same meaning. Perhaps you think ‘mobilization’ sounds more elegant. But ‘incitement’ is more precise. Incitement requires fire—and guns. Words alone are not enough. You believed in the gun. With strength, you stirred the masses and built your army. You were adept at using the people. That was your secret of success.”

Mao replied with satisfaction: “All that I learned from you! You were the mentor; I was merely the student.”

Stalin continued: “You also had patience and ruthlessness. I ended my civil war in two or three years. You fought for twenty and did not mind. You insisted on fighting to the end. As your proverb says, ‘A man must be ruthless to be a true man.’ You were ruthless. Zhou Enlai submitted to you—he lacked that edge.”

The conversation continued at length, touching upon Chen Duxiu, the Comintern representative M. N. Roy, the Xi’an Incident, Soviet strategy during the Sino-Japanese War, Stalin’s fear of U.S. intervention, Mao’s insistence on fighting the civil war to total victory, and the delicate diplomacy leading to Mao’s 1949–1950 visit to Moscow.

They discussed the 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty, Soviet interests in Manchuria, Outer Mongolia, and the protracted negotiations that eventually led to the signing of the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance. Mao recounted his strategic maneuvering—his “leaning to one side” declaration, his article “Farewell, Leighton Stuart,” and Liu Shaoqi’s extended talks in Moscow.

They spoke of the Korean War. Stalin explained his caution in avoiding direct confrontation with the United States. Mao described his determination to intervene, despite heavy casualties, including the death of his own son. Stalin admitted that he feared strengthening China too much, lest Mao become another Tito.

Finally, Mao raised the question of the so-called “Plekhanov Testament,” which allegedly predicted the degeneration of Bolshevik rule into dictatorship, crisis, and collapse.

Stalin replied: “I never heard of such a testament while alive. If it existed, even if secret, I would have known. I believe it is fabricated. Yet it reflects the sentiments of many people today, formed through decades of historical development.”

Their conversation had been frank and satisfying to both. Seeing that it was late, Mao rose to take his leave.

NEXT: 13. Khrushchev (1894–1971)