Chapter 14
Eisenhower’s Strategic Misstep on the Global Stage

III. McCarthyism and the Reshaping of America

From the perspective of the American Left, the popularity of McCarthyism at the time was due to two main factors:

First, the inadequacies of U.S. libel laws allowed the media to publish unverified accusations without punishment. The media turned abuses into scandals, just as they later amplified the Watergate incident in the 1970s into a political witch hunt.

Second, certain institutions displayed moral cowardice in the face of the irrational social climate of the time, especially in Hollywood and Washington.

In truth, this was just another instance of the recurring left-right pendulum swing in American politics —a phenomenon that would repeat itself during 1965–1975, when universities surrendered to student violence. However, it is illuminating to compare McCarthyism with the despotic tyranny of the Soviet Union.

McCarthy had no police force. He had no enforcement power. On the contrary, the administrations of Truman and Eisenhower both did everything in their power to obstruct him. Notably, McCarthy had no role in the judicial process. He had no court. In fact, the courts were entirely unaffected by McCarthyism. They resisted it — unlike the hysterical overreaction they showed two decades later during the Watergate scandal. McCarthy’s only real weapon was publicity. And in a free society, publicity is a double-edged sword. Ultimately, McCarthy was destroyed by the very same media frenzy he had wielded. His well-intentioned crusade backfired.

Eisenhower was arguably the most deceptive American president of the 20th century. While the period of his presidency (1953–1961) appeared on the surface to be some of the most prosperous years in America and the world, tens of millions were persecuted to death in mainland China. Clearly, Eisenhower left a mess in the United States, just as he had done in Europe. He tried to create the impression that he was merely a constitutional monarch, delegating decision-making to his colleagues and Congress, while dedicating as much time as possible to playing golf. He was often seen as kind-hearted but intellectually limited, ignorant, inarticulate, frequently indecisive, and chronically lazy.

But the cunning Eisenhower practiced a form of false delegation. He did not truly entrust foreign policy to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Instead, he received “advice” from many shadowy sources unknown to Dulles and kept a secret rein of control firmly in his own hands: Dulles would call him daily to report in, even when traveling abroad. Eisenhower read vast amounts of official documents and maintained frequent correspondence with his “high-level friends” in diplomatic, business, and military circles. He treated Dulles like a servant. The perception that Dulles and Sherman Adams were the central figures was deliberately cultivated by Eisenhower, allowing him to blame them when mistakes were made — thus shielding the president himself. On the flip side, Eisenhower, that old fox, used his reputation for political innocence to “take the fall” for his subordinates’ mistakes when it suited him.

For instance, when Dulles made a string of blunders in appointing Winthrop Aldrich as ambassador to London in 1953, Eisenhower often feigned ignorance. In reality, he was extremely shrewd, and when dealing with difficult foreign counterparts, he would deliberately pretend to misunderstand his own interpreter. His secret meeting transcripts reveal a mind that was sharp and forceful. His revisions to speech drafts and edits to Dulles’s remarks showed that, when he wanted to, he had full command of polished, effective English. Churchill was one of the few people who truly appreciated Eisenhower’s value. One could say they were the two most counterfeit “great statesmen” of the mid-20th century.