Chapter 14
Eisenhower’s Strategic Misstep on the Global Stage

II. The Korean War Delayed the Course of History

Roosevelt also did nothing to encourage Eisenhower to swiftly advance toward Berlin, Vienna, and Prague, as the British had hoped. Eisenhower refused to accept the idea that the extent of his army’s advance would, in effect, determine the postwar map. This blockheaded general insisted, “I am not willing to risk American lives for purely political purposes.” Clearly, he was a deaf and blind coward. Roosevelt appointed such a coward to be the Supreme Allied Commander precisely to devalue the sacrifices of the American people. In response, General Montgomery lamented, ‘the Americans do not understand that if we lose politically in this war, winning it strategically won’t mean much.” Submitting to Soviet opposition, Eisenhower ordered U.S. forces to halt just two hours from Prague, which allowed the Soviets to easily seize the city three days later. As a result, Czechoslovakia was absorbed into the Soviet bloc. Only after the sacrifices of the Prague Spring and the Velvet Revolution would the Czech people regain their freedom — 44 years later. Unlike the Soviets, who blatantly violated agreements, the United States foolishly and loyally “abided by” its agreements with the Soviets. Ironically, Soviet propaganda later portrayed the U.S. military as cowards who deliberately refused to march into Prague and allowed Nazis to slaughter Czech patriots.

During the liberation of Europe, any Soviet citizens who fell into Allied hands were forcibly repatriated to Stalin’s tyranny, regardless of their will. Ten percent of “German” POWs were actually Soviet citizens. Most of them did not want to return. As a result, hundreds of thousands were handed back to Stalin. Of the first batch of ten thousand, only twelve went back voluntarily — and all twelve were Communist political commissars.

Churchill, through the bargain he struck during his visit to Moscow in October 1944, single-handedly excluded totalitarianism from the Mediterranean — his final contribution to freedom in Europe.

The Korean War: On January 12, 1950, Dean Acheson gave an infamously treasonous speech at the National Press Club in Washington. In it, he excluded Taiwan, Indochina, and Korea from America’s defense perimeter. Acheson falsely claimed that China and the Soviet Union would soon be at odds. He ignored the vital fact that the Soviet “annexation” of China’s four northern provinces (Outer Mongolia, Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Manchuria) was already underway. He cautioned that the U.S. must not become an enemy of China and risk redirecting “righteous fury and the hatred of the Chinese people” away from the Soviets and toward ourselves. In reality, Acheson’s information was incorrect. He didn’t know that at the time of his speech, negotiations were underway for the Soviet return of the Manchurian railway and the port of Lushun. Stalin had already tied the Chinese Communist regime to the Soviet bloc — not through direct threats, but through indirect pressure by heating up the military situation in the Far East. The Soviets waged a limited proxy war in Korea, which delayed the Sino-Soviet split by a decade and postponed U.S.-China rapprochement by 20 years.

Another unexpected outcome of the Korean War was the acceleration of rearmament. Although the crises in Czechoslovakia and Berlin had already pushed the United States toward a collective defense system, it was Korea that triggered a full-scale arms race. This was Truman’s historical lesson: before the Korean War, securing congressional funding for the Cold War was extremely difficult. The defense budget for fiscal year 1950 was just $17.7 billion. The Korean War drastically changed both Congress’s and the public’s attitude toward defense: by FY1952, the budget had jumped to $44 billion, and the following year surpassed $50 billion. This growth funded tactical nuclear weapons development, the deployment of four new divisions in Germany, the rapid construction of overseas air bases, global expansion of the Strategic Air Command, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, and increased mobility of conventional forces. By February 1951, U.S. aircraft production had returned to its World War II peak of 1944. American allies also began rearming, and West Germany’s remilitarization became a reality. If the Cold War began in Poland, it matured in Korea — and dragged the entire world into its orbit. Stalin, propped up by Roosevelt, had finally turned the Soviet Union into a so-called “superpower.”