Chapter 13
Truman’s Delusion of Kuomintang–Communist Cooperation

III. Truman’s Shortsightedness and Betrayal of an Ally

Truman was remarkably shortsighted. He had long since decided to abandon the Republic of China, his wartime ally — without realizing that doing so would sow the seeds of a protracted Cold War and lay the groundwork for the Korean and Vietnam Wars. Had the United States supported China earlier in resisting Soviet aggression, it might have avoided paying a hundredfold in blood and treasure in Korea, Vietnam, and elsewhere around the world.

In August 1949, on the eve of mainland China’s fall, Truman issued the White Paper on United States Relations with China, attempting to whitewash the truth and shirk responsibility. He claimed: “Within the bounds of reasonable judgment, nothing that the United States did or could have done would have changed the outcome; the situation was the result of internal forces within China; the outcome was determined by the Chinese themselves and caused by the failures of one party.”

This excuse was clearly an act of self-debasement and amounted to a confession of defeatism.
However, the Truman administration cannot escape responsibility for the fall of mainland China. Just as U.S. aid had been a decisive factor in helping Britain, France, and the Soviet Union defeat the Axis powers, the same logic applied to China’s civil war. From the outset, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was a Soviet puppet, receiving overt and covert support from Stalin. In this broader geopolitical context, America’s betrayal — or support — of the Republic of China became a matter of decisive importance.

Among other things, Roosevelt had already betrayed China through the Yalta Agreement, inviting Soviet intervention in Manchuria and helping the CCP establish a base of rebellion there. After Japan’s surrender, Truman failed to undo the damage of Yalta and instead committed another blunder by sending General Marshall to China, further undermining the Chinese government.

Militarily, the United States restrained the Nationalist government from launching campaigns against the Communists. It allowed bandits to resurface in the Northeast, and later pressured the Nationalists to halt anti-Communist operations in the interior, tying up the Nationalist army with layer upon layer of restrictions — even threatening to cut off military aid. Trapped on two fronts and repeatedly missing strategic opportunities, the Nationalist forces found themselves in a desperate and untenable situation.

Economically, U.S.-led mediation prolonged the conflict indefinitely, shattering the Nationalist government’s hope of “eliminating the Communists in one year and restoring the country in two.” With transportation systems destroyed and the burden of massive military expenditures, the economy ultimately collapsed.

Even in intelligence operations, U.S. officials acted as accomplices to the Communists. Zhou Enlai once left behind a notebook on Marshall’s private aircraft containing top-secret information from Communist spy Xiong Xianghui, who was embedded with Nationalist General Hu Zongnan. Instead of turning it over to Nationalist intelligence for investigation — an act that would have exposed Xiong and severely crippled Mao and Zhou—Marshall returned it untouched and sealed with wax, handing it back intact.

If the Nationalist government was besieged from all sides, the Communists were beneficiaries on all fronts. It was not by “millet and rifles” that the Communists won the civil war, but by relying on Soviet-supplied heavy weapons and the incorporation of technical specialists from the defeated Japanese military. Their victory was not due to the brilliance of Stalin’s Communist strategy, but rather the stupidity of Truman and Marshall.

As Chiang Kai-shek wrote in his diary: ‘this failure to suppress the bandits (the Communists) was not due to being defeated by them, but by Stalin; and not even so much by Stalin, but ultimately by the ignorance and obstinance of America and Marshall.”

While Marshall’s mission to China ultimately caused more harm than good, the root of the problem lay with Truman himself. Since Roosevelt, most U.S. presidents had been morally unworthy of their positions, following appeasement policies that severely undermined the interests of the free world — Truman among them.