Chapter 13
Truman’s Delusion of Kuomintang–Communist Cooperation

I. America’s Strategic Design Toward the Soviet Union

In 1949, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s successor, Harry S. Truman, fantasized about “cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party.” He pressured Chiang Kai-shek to halt military action, which ended up enabling Mao Zedong to swiftly communize all of China. In effect, Truman handed China over to the Soviet Union’s lapdog, Mao. This laid the groundwork for both the Korean and Vietnam Wars.

After Roosevelt’s death, Truman came to power, and George F. Kennan (1904–2005) — the so-called “father of the Cold War” and proponent of a hardline stance toward the Soviet Union — sent a sweeping 8,000-word cable that made it seem the U.S. had finally turned away from Roosevelt’s appeasement of Communism.

This was the famous “Long Telegram,” dated February 22, 1946 — a reply by acting U.S. chargé d’affaires George Kennan in Moscow to a question from the State Department about how the Soviet Union might respond to U.S. postwar plans for Europe, and what the future of U.S.-Soviet relations might hold.

In July 1947, Kennan followed up with a now-famous article titled ‘the Sources of Soviet Conduct” in Foreign Affairs magazine, under the pseudonym “Mr. X.” After his long telegram caught the eye of Secretary of State George Marshall, Kennan was recalled to the U.S., made deputy commandant at the National War College for six months, and taught international relations and strategic analysis. The State Department even created a new office — the Policy Planning Staff — for him to lead.

During that time, under the pseudonym “X”, Kennan wrote an article laying out what would become the foundation of U.S. Cold War strategy. In it, he introduced a key concept: that pressure from the Soviet Union on the free democratic world could be effectively contained. Though it was a strategy of patience and endurance (sometimes mocked as ‘turtle logic”), it at least showed more backbone than Roosevelt’s earlier appeasement. The eventual collapse of the Soviet Union is often seen as vindication of Kennan’s “containment strategy”, especially since he had vaguely predicted internal contradictions might lead to the USSR’s downfall.

Logically, with such a solid foundation, things should have improved. But in 1949, Truman clung to the illusion of forcing cooperation between the Nationalists and the Communists. This resulted in Mao Zedong quickly taking over China, effectively turning the country red under the Soviet camp. In 1950, Stalin struck again by greenlighting Kim Il-sung’s invasion of South Korea. Truman, instead of eliminating the Communist forces, reined in General MacArthur, prohibiting him from crossing the Yalu River and eventually dismissed him — thus giving Mao a second chance at survival. Truman had, once again, saved Mao Zedong.

To truly understand the bitterness behind this chapter of history, one must look back at how these events unfolded.