Chapter 11
Roosevelt Risked His Life to Attend the Yalta Conference

IV. America Let Victory Slip Away

In September 1945, a delegation of U.S. congressmen led by Mississippi Representative Colmer, along with Senator Pepper, visited the Soviet Union. Regarding the issue of loans, the U.S. proposed several political conditions: the Soviets would need to disclose details about their national economy, including military industry; withdraw occupation forces from Eastern Europe; and guarantee freedom of speech and movement in the region.

According to Harriman’s records, during separate meetings with Colmer and Pepper on September 14, Stalin complained that the Soviet Union had requested a $6 billion loan but had yet to receive a response from the United States. He noted differences between the two nations on interest rates and said pricing would be an even greater challenge. Stalin outlined in detail the aid projects needed for postwar Soviet reconstruction and said the USSR could repay the loan with grain, meat, raw materials, and gold. He emphasized that the two sides needed to first agree in principle on granting the loan before letting experts discuss the details.

At the end of the meeting, Stalin pulled aside George F. Kennan and privately said: ‘tell your friends not to worry about those Eastern European countries. Our army will leave, and everything will be fine.” This “extra line” was clearly meant to allay the U.S. delegates’ political concerns. Clearly, even after Roosevelt’s death, Stalin was still trying to deceive the United States into providing aid.

On September 21, Senator Pepper told Vyshinsky that the American people understood the massive losses the USSR had suffered during the war, but there were indeed voices in American society critical of the Soviets. Some believed that the USSR wanted to receive loans from the U.S. without giving anything in return. Pepper also stressed that the U.S. hoped the USSR would continue a friendly policy toward its weaker neighbors and avoid giving the impression that it intended to seize their territory.

It was evident that the United States was increasingly using loans as leverage to push its foreign policy agenda and to force a change in the Soviet Union’s approach to Eastern Europe — despite the USSR’s repeated, intense desire for loans. That round of negotiations also yielded no results. According to Russian archives, on October 15, a U.S.-Soviet agreement was signed: the United States would pay a loan to the Soviet Union to cover payment for postwar equipment and materials previously supplied under the Lend-Lease Act. However, the amount granted was only half of what the USSR had requested: the total value was $240 million, and after deducting undelivered goods and mismatched equipment, only $200 million remained.

Even so, it was enough to encourage Stalin to sweep through Eastern Europe and China — and to launch the Korean War.

Afterward, the U.S. adopted a much tougher stance. In November, the U.S. Congress’s Special Committee on Postwar Economic Policy and Planning, led by Colmer, issued a report outlining six preconditions for economic cooperation with the USSR: Aid must not be used for military purposes; The USSR must “completely and transparently disclose” its production statistics; The USSR must withdraw its occupation forces from Eastern Europe; The USSR must disclose the terms of its trade treaties with Eastern European countries; The USSR must not extract relief materials from Eastern Europe; Before any loans to Eastern European countries, U.S. property in those regions must be protected.

The report also mentioned multiple matters related to the “Open Door” policy. In effect, this amounted to closing the gate on any loans to the USSR.

Bernays admitted that the Soviet request for a $1 billion loan was never seriously discussed within the U.S. government: ‘the State Department has maintained a policy of discouraging active discussion of the matter, and it is currently in a dormant state.”

Faced with America’s position, on November 15, Ambassador Maisky warned Molotov that Lend-Lease and loan negotiations were simply tools of American imperialist “expansionism.”

At the same time, there were dissenting voices within the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Dean Acheson believed there was no fundamental conflict of interest between the U.S. and USSR. Commerce Secretary Henry Wallace stated that those who sowed distrust of America’s allies and stirred hostility between nations were enemies of the United States. Former chairman of the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, Lamont, called on Americans to recognize that the USSR’s new Five-Year Plan demonstrated its “peaceful intentions,” and he emphasized that this could also be an opportunity for U.S. businesses.

Ambassador Harriman felt that current U.S. policy toward Soviet economic cooperation was increasing Soviet misunderstanding of America and encouraging the USSR to adopt a “go-it-alone” attitude. It might even contribute to their “greedy policies” in the countries liberated or occupied by the Red Army. The Soviet Union still needed loans — it just could not tolerate American political preconditions and coercion.

On January 23, 1946, during his farewell meeting with Ambassador Harriman, Stalin stated clearly that the USSR was willing to begin negotiations with the United States on the loan issue. However, he said the Soviet government would not accept the conditions raised by the congressional delegation during their September 1945 visit, calling them “insulting” and not even worth considering.

It is clear that the pro-Soviet faction within the U.S. government at the time were the remnants of Roosevelt’s legacy. These individuals would later assist the Chinese Communist Party in launching the civil war and seizing control of the Chinese mainland.

By the 21st century, these forces and their ideological descendants had once again lent support to the Chinese Communist regime — helping Deng Xiaoping rise from the bloody ruins of the Tiananmen Square Massacre and aiding post-Deng leadership in maneuvering into the World Trade Organization. Thus, the CCP became an international rogue force that dominated headlines for a time.

Zhong Wen remarked: In February 1945 at Yalta, Roosevelt met with Stalin and Churchill 20 times over just a few days. Roosevelt even avoided Churchill several times to hold private talks with Stalin, trying his best to satisfy Stalin’s unreasonable demands — legitimizing Soviet control over Eastern Europe and interference in China. Hoping to maintain good relations with Stalin during the war, Roosevelt, to avoid offending him, even refrained from assisting the Polish uprising in Warsaw, allowing Stalin to occupy Poland and cover up the Katyn Massacre — thus fully enabling Stalin’s deceptions to succeed.