Chapter 96 Criticism of Zhou Enlai 1972-1973

Journalist: “If Zhou Enlai doesn’t listen to you, what do you do?”

Mao: “If he doesn’t listen, I criticize him. On September 14, 1971, after Zhou Enlai learned about Lin Biao’s death, he said, ‘Good! Good! He died from falling!’ He spent three days and three nights dealing with the aftermath, only sleeping for a few hours. After a brief moment of relaxation, he burst into tears in front of Li Xiannian and Ji Dengkui, crying out loud, ‘You don’t understand, things are not that simple, it’s not over yet.’

I heard about Zhou Enlai crying uncontrollably while facing the wall in the East Hall of the Great Hall of the People. It was said that Ji Dengkui was present, and I believe it to be true. Why was Zhou crying? It puzzled outsiders because he wouldn’t cry over Lin Biao’s death. As soon as I heard about it, I understood. He was crying for his own difficult and dangerous situation. When Lin Biao was alive, Lin was the second most powerful figure, and my opponent was Lin Biao. Now that Lin Biao was gone, Zhou became the second most powerful figure, and my opponent was him. Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao had both died, and now it was his turn. He was afraid of me targeting him.

I won’t show any compassion just because he cries. I have always been focused on struggle, and compassion has no place in my life. Since he refused to assist Jiang Qing in taking over, I will continue to target him, criticize Lin, criticize Confucius, criticize Zhou Gong. In the next step, I will launch a new criticism against him, aiming to criticize him thoroughly, make him unable to hold his head up, obediently follow my orders, and do things for me.”

Journalist: “After Lin Biao’s death, you targeted Zhou Enlai again?”

Mao: “Yes, half a year after Lin Biao’s death, I started targeting Zhou Enlai. I said that his past self-criticism materials should be made into 29 audio tapes as historical teaching materials. I applied pressure on him, and he had to accept it reluctantly. The old cadres and senior generals regarded Zhou Enlai as their spiritual pillar, so I wanted to break down his spiritual pillar. Zhou Enlai was forced to spend three nights speaking to more than 400 senior officials at the provincial and military level, confessing his past mistakes to the point of sobbing. Most people couldn’t bear to listen. I held onto his ‘Wu Hao’s Resignation from the Party’ and wouldn’t let go, like a tight hoop squeezing him.”

Journalist: “What is your attitude towards Zhou Enlai’s cancer?”

Mao: “In May 1972, I learned that Zhou’s urinary test might develop into bladder cancer, but they said there was an 80-90% cure rate. I instructed Wang Dongxing with four points: first, keep it confidential, don’t tell Zhou or Deng Yingchao; second, no examination; third, no surgery; fourth, strengthen nursing and nutrition. In my heart, I hoped for his condition to worsen.”

Journalist: “Don’t you want the American nuclear umbrella? Criticize Zhou Enlai for right-wing tendencies?”

Mao: “Yes, on November 12, 1973, Kissinger visited China. Based on reports of the Soviet Union planning a nuclear strike against China, Kissinger inquired about the possibility of Sino-American military cooperation, including intelligence sharing, arms sales to China, and establishing a hotline for nuclear war. Zhou Enlai was cautious and said he would discuss it with me after seeking my approval.

After hearing this, I deliberately criticized Zhou for his right-wing tendencies. On November 17, I summoned Zhou and other diplomatic officials for a discussion and harshly criticized the joint communiqué of the Sino-American talks, saying it wasn’t satisfactory. The American side wanted to lend me an umbrella, but I didn’t want that umbrella, a nuclear umbrella. I criticized Zhou for being right-leaning and weak in the meeting with the American side.

Jiang Qing escalated the situation, accusing Zhou of losing power and humiliating the country, making him kneel before the Americans. This forced Zhou to slam the table and say, ‘The hat of right-wing surrender cannot be put on my head!’

In 1974, the Politburo specifically held a meeting to criticize Zhou’s personal life. It lasted for several days and required him to personally write a self-criticism. He wrote a self-criticism of over 30 pages and requested to have a face-to-face discussion with me, but I flatly refused and insisted on him making the self-criticism at the meeting.”

Journalist: “Didn’t Zhou Enlai repeatedly express his loyalty to you?”

Mao: “Yes, in 1975, I read his self-criticism letter, and it seemed sincere. But I said, Zhou was just saving face for me. He disagreed with my ideology. During the Cultural Revolution, he opposed it, but he did so cleverly. He had a foundation within the party, government, and military, and the people also respected him. He and Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping were basically on the same path.”

Journalist: “Did you bring up Zhou Enlai’s ‘Wu Hao’s Resignation from the Party’ again?”

Mao: “Zhou Enlai’s ‘Wu Hao’s Resignation from the Party,’ I had it as a handle to occasionally use against him. I deliberately reprinted it for the entire party to see when I saw it in the Jiangxi Soviet Area in 1932, leaving him with a great suspicion. I neither denied nor confirmed the ‘doubtful points’ about Zhou, but kept them hanging, occasionally using them against him. Xiang Zhongfa was appointed as the General Secretary by Stalin. Like me, he was a rogue who liked visiting brothels, engaging in revolution while pursuing women. He was arrested in a brothel and quickly confessed and turned traitor. Similar to my arrest and confession in 1927.”

Journalist: “Even in Zhou Enlai’s final days, you still held onto the ‘Wu Hao’s Resignation from the Party’?”

Mao: “Yes, the ‘Wu Hao’s Resignation from the Party’ is ambiguous. It’s the tight hoop in my hands for Zhou. In order to prove his innocence, at the end of 1975, he even defended his ‘Wu Hao’s Resignation from the Party’ and wrote a report to me, requesting that his report be sent to the top leaders of provinces and cities across the country, one copy each, to demonstrate his lifelong loyalty to the party and the people.”

Journalist: “Zhou Enlai has never been disloyal to you, right?”

Mao: “No, he has never had the intention to replace me. But I just held onto him and didn’t let go because he removed me from my positions and even became my leader. I couldn’t tolerate him. Even until death, Zhou maintained his loyalty to me, never speaking ill of me. In the end, he murmured, ‘China has produced a Mao Zedong.’ He saw me as a protective umbrella. Zhou, unlike Deng Xiaoping, never opposed Jiang Qing. Obeying her was equivalent to obeying me.”

Journalist: “Zhou Enlai dealt with Gu Shunzhang ruthlessly and brutally?”

Mao: “Zhou Enlai dealt with the arrest and confession of Gu Shunzhang, who betrayed the party, with great decisiveness and brutality. He led 40 to 50 members of the Red Special Bureau, including Chen Yun, Kang Sheng, and Deng Yingchao, to enter Gu’s home in the middle of the night. They couldn’t shoot to avoid alarming others, so they used hammers, axes, knives, clubs, and sticks. They wiped out the entire family of 16 people and quietly buried them in various courtyards that night, just like the underworld. Shanghai’s newspapers extensively reported it, tarnishing the reputation of the Communist Party. It became difficult to continue in Shanghai, so the Party Central Committee relocated to Jiangxi.”

Journalist: “Oh, are you planning to launch a new criticism against Zhou Enlai?”

Mao: “Yes, after Richard Nixon’s visit to China in February 1972, China quickly established diplomatic relations with many new countries, and Zhou Enlai’s diplomatic achievements cannot be ignored. However, I became suspicious of his domestic and foreign policy accomplishments after Lin Biao’s incident.

In May 1972, I asked Zhou to speak about the mistakes he made during his six struggles against incorrect lines. From May 29th to June 7th, Zhou locked himself in and wrote self-criticisms every day. His face swelled, and his feet swelled above his shoes. After he finished writing, he submitted it to me for review. On June 9th, he made additional modifications. From June 10th to 12th, for three consecutive evenings, he spoke during the Politburo meetings, expressing his desire to make amends. Finally, he stated, ‘I can never steer the ship, I can only be an assistant. If you find that I cannot make improvements and continue to make significant mistakes, you have the power to bring it up for central discussion, ranging from warnings to dismissal.’

I wanted Zhou Enlai to engage in self-criticism to diminish his momentum for succession. I have never trusted him. If he were to succeed me, he would have to deny the Cultural Revolution. Internationally, I advocated for upheaval, division, and major restructuring, promoting revolution. Zhou Enlai’s diplomacy, on the other hand, aimed at improving relations in various aspects. I accused him of being too cautious and forced him to engage in self-criticism.”

Journalist: “Isn’t Zhou Enlai’s self-criticism enough? How will you deal with the international situation?”

Journalist: “Oh, are you planning to launch a new criticism against Zhou Enlai?”

Mao: “Yes, on June 12, 1973, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, and I realized that the world was still divided into two poles, and I couldn’t sit on an equal footing with them. Furthermore, my anti-American image plummeted, and Enver Hoxha became the sole Marxist-Leninist beacon, while I was seen as right-leaning opportunistic.

In November 1973, during Henry Kissinger’s sixth visit to China, he revealed that the Soviet Union was preparing to destroy China’s nuclear capabilities and expressed a willingness to cooperate in intelligence warning systems. This initially seemed favorable for China. Zhou said he needed to consult with me and study it. I took this opportunity to criticize Zhou. After Kissinger left, on November 17th, the Politburo, according to my decision, held a meeting to criticize Zhou Enlai’s revisionist line. Jiang Qing accused him of right-leaning capitulationism and humiliating the country by kneeling to the Americans. Zhou Enlai slapped the table and said, ‘Throughout my life, I have made many mistakes, but the hat of right-leaning capitulationism cannot be placed upon my head.’”

Journalist: “Why didn’t you allow Zhou Enlai to have surgery for his cancer? And you criticized him for two weeks?”

Mao: “In 1973, I didn’t approve the surgery for Zhou Enlai’s cancer, and his treatment was delayed. In my heart, I didn’t want him to recover; it would be better if he died before me. After Lin Biao’s death, he stood out as the sole figure and became the mainstay and spiritual leader of the old cadres and generals. He had a soft and charming demeanor, with a deceptive nature.

I seized the opportunity to criticize Zhou, to criticize Lin, Confucius, and Duke Zhou. In 1974, I approved Jiang Qing’s suggestion, and the Politburo established a ‘Support Zhou Group,’ consisting of Jiang Qing, Hua Guofeng, and six others. For two consecutive weeks, we held expanded Politburo meetings, criticizing him ten times for right-leaning opportunism in his six struggles against incorrect lines.

As Zhou Enlai’s cancer grew worse, in 1975, he had to be admitted to the 305 Hospital. His days were numbered.”

Journalist: “Zhou Enlai became frustrated with Jiang Qing, and you intensified your criticism against Zhou?”

Mao: “Yes, I ordered the convening of an expanded Politburo meeting, moving the location from Diaoyutai to the Great Hall of the People, with Wang Hongwen presiding. With my approval, a special ‘Support Zhou Group’ was formed, consisting of Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and six others. I also designated Deng Xiaoping and others to participate in criticizing Zhou. My liaison officers, Wang Hairong and Tang Wensheng, conveyed my instructions during the meeting, speaking for eight hours.

The criticism of Zhou began on November 21, 1973, and continued for over ten consecutive nights until early December. Zhou Enlai was verbally attacked and denounced, with language similar to that used against Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao. Jiang Qing referred to it as the eleventh struggle against incorrect lines, accusing Zhou of being impatient to replace Chairman Mao. Xu Shiyou stood on a chair and accused Zhou of promoting revisionism and aspiring to be an emperor. Whenever Zhou Enlai left the meeting hall, his face turned pale, and his eyes filled with sadness. His entourage also felt neglected, as no one dared to greet them.

Deng Xiaoping delivered the final speech during the criticism meeting, warning Zhou: ‘You are just one step away from the Chairman’s position, which others can only hope for but cannot attain. You are both hoped for and within reach. I hope you remain extremely vigilant.’

Deng Xiaoping’s words hit the key point of the criticism against Zhou and reflected my concerns, which pleased me greatly. On December 15, 1973, during an expanded Politburo meeting, I specifically introduced Deng Xiaoping and praised his decisive approach, a combination of flexibility and firmness.”

Journalist: “You must be pleased with Deng Xiaoping’s criticism of Zhou. Are you praising Deng Xiaoping?”

Mao: “Yes, on December 4, 1973, Zhou Enlai delivered a self-criticism during the criticism meeting, with lofty rhetoric and shedding tears. Prior to that, Jiang Qing had ordered him to write the self-criticism himself. Zhou claimed his eyes were blurry and his hands were trembling, but Jiang Qing didn’t let him off the hook. At the end of his self-criticism, Zhou emphasized that he could only be an assistant and that someone else should preside over the work of the Politburo.

I saw that Zhou Enlai had lost his prestige, and my objective had been achieved. However, the handling of state affairs still relied on him. On December 9, 1973, I teasingly said to Zhou, ‘You’ve been criticized to your heart’s content. The Premier is pitiful, being criticized by a few women. Facing these harsh words from me, he could only force a bitter smile.”

Journalist: “You’ve achieved your objective in criticizing Zhou. Are you pleased?”

Journalist: “What are your thoughts on Zhou Enlai’s death?”

Mao: “I have mixed feelings. I am glad that he didn’t cause trouble for me and departed before me, relieving a major concern. However, I worry that his influence lingers, with a large number of people following him, harboring discontent and constantly seeking to reverse the verdict. I had Mao Yuanxin convey my six-character instruction: ‘Mourn the fictitious, restore the reality.’ On January 12, I told Wang Dongxing, ‘Why should I attend the Premier’s memorial service? I have the right not to attend. I have struggled against him no fewer than ten times. Don’t force me.’ I decided to intensify the criticism against Deng and designated the ‘honest person’ Hua Guofeng as acting Premier. I instructed them to seek Jiang Qing if there were any issues. Then, on April 4, during the Qingming Festival, the incident of millions of people mourning Zhou Enlai put immense pressure on me.”

Journalist: “Zhou Enlai has passed away. What do you still hold onto regarding him?”

Mao: “Throughout his life, he wrote dozens of self-criticism documents for me, which I have treasured and kept in a safe. If necessary, I can publish a collection of Zhou Enlai’s written self-criticisms, some of which were handwritten by him personally, not by secretaries. If someone tries to protect Zhou and oppose me, I will bring out these self-criticisms.”

Journalist: “Do you consider Zhou Enlai to be a wise prime minister, a powerful prime minister, or a treacherous prime minister?”

Mao: “Zhou Enlai was 30% wise prime minister, 30% powerful prime minister (like Cao Cao), and 40% treacherous prime minister. There are many controvertial debates on this matter.”