Chapter 93 Nixon saved me from breaking the ice in Sino-US relations 1972

Journalist: “Did Nixon come to see you and give you a shot in the arm?”

Mao: “In the summer of 1971, US President Nixon conveyed messages to me through Pakistani President Yahya Khan multiple times, requesting the establishment of a hotline between Beijing and Washington. Henry Kissinger would be in charge, and it was to be kept secret. They were quite anxious and repeatedly requested direct negotiations in Beijing. I saw an opportunity not to be missed, but while they were in a hurry, I was not. I wanted to slow down the enthusiasm of the Americans. The more difficult it was for them to obtain, the more desperate they would become. The US wanted to break the ice and improve relations with me, mainly to leverage China against the Soviet Union. Now the Soviet Union also wants to continue border negotiations and try their best to ease tensions between China and the Soviet Union, so that the US-China card won’t have too much impact. I also want to play this card. If he plays the China card, I’ll play the US and Soviet cards. With this, I can free myself from being caught between two enemies.

Improving relations with the United States and breaking the ice doesn’t mean being friendly with the United States. My international struggle against the US will continue. The upcoming Four-Party Summit (North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos) is being prepared and intensified. We will hold a secret meeting in Guangzhou without making it public and form a unified front in the anti-US struggle. This way, I will have another card in Indochina to fight against the United States.

Back in 1956, US Secretary of State Dulles predicted that communist regimes would undergo peaceful transformation. Dulles sounded the alarm to me, which led me to launch the Cultural Revolution and bring down Liu Shaoqi, thus causing his prediction to fail.”

Journalist: “Did Kissinger’s visit save you?”

Mao: “Yes, in July 1971, Kissinger came to Beijing to discuss improving Sino-US relations. It was a special shot in the arm for me, as the Cultural Revolution had left me weakened due to years of internal struggles. Kissinger wanted to travel on a US plane, but I refused, so he had to use my Air Force plane, flying from Pakistan to Beijing. I told Zhou Enlai, ‘Kissinger is a famous playboy. We’ll play the beauty card and have Wang Hairong, Tang Wensheng, and Zhang Hanzhi, the three beauties, receive him.’

I agreed to remove the term ‘Red Sea’ from the name of the Diaoyutai guesthouse where Kissinger stayed. I took the opportunity to vent my frustrations about Lin Biao, saying, ‘There are still the “Four Greats.” Who crowned themselves with those four titles? They were so arrogant back then, but now they are as timid as mice. They shout “long live” but what are they really thinking?’

When I reached for a cigarette, several people rushed to light it for me. Hua Guofeng was the fastest, striking a match and lighting the cigarette for me.

Kissinger’s visit immediately had international effects. Japan and the UK wanted to upgrade their relations to embassies, and more than 20 countries in Western and Northern Europe expressed their desire to establish diplomatic relations with us.

Even that stubborn Enver Hoxha from Albania, who accused me of betraying Marxism-Leninism and becoming pro-American, actually, behind the scenes, I still insisted on the international struggle against imperialism and the United States.

While I focused my attention on the international stage, I did not forget the internal affairs. Before the National Day celebrations on October 1st, I appointed several Vice Chairmen, sidelining Lin Biao. Even if he still wants to be the President, it’s nothing special. Last time it was Liu Shaoqi, this time it’s him. Let’s wait and see. I’m not afraid even if he holds military power.

Jiang Qing said that Zhou Enlai’s loyalty is 60% towards me and 40% towards Lin Biao. He straddles two sides. It’s almost like having one foot in each camp. Between the two command centers, I still need him to serve as a buffer and maintain stability.”

Journalist: “Does Jiang Qing have a special lover?”

Mao: “Yes, Jiang Qing has a little fellow from her hometown who specializes in gathering internal intelligence. I appointed him as the Deputy Director of the Wang Central Office so that he could serve as an internal monitor and provide me with intelligence. At the same time, he became Jiang Qing’s lover. I have received reports from the Diaoyutai, saying that they are quite passionate there. I told Jiang Qing that she has her physical needs and can seek satisfaction, and I don’t mind. However, she must not bring shame upon herself. Jiang Qing mentioned that the little fellow is afraid of being cuckolded by the Chairman. I said we haven’t had any intimate relations for a long time; we are only politically married. I don’t care about the cuckoldry or not, but it must not be exposed outside. I’m tired of Jiang Qing’s sexual services; I have many more young and beautiful women to enjoy.”

Journalist: “Did Nixon’s visit to Beijing save you?”

Mao: “Yes, on February 21, 1972, Nixon came to Beijing to meet me and provided me with a political shot in the arm, which rejuvenated me. We discussed ‘philosophical issues,’ where Nixon advocated the idea of ‘living and letting live’ while I believed in ‘class struggle, a fight to the death, irreconcilable.’ Nixon asked me, ‘Where is your Vice Chairman Lin?’ I said he fought against me, but I couldn’t defeat him, so he ran away and died in a fall. This was the first time I revealed the Lin Biao incident to the outside world. It had been kept secret before, and people didn’t know why Lin Biao had disappeared and gone into hiding.

In February 1972, US President Nixon’s visit to China broke the ice, which was the only correct major action I took during my 27-year rule. Nixon came to meet me, and since then, China and the US transformed from enemies to friends. We obtained nuclear protection from the US, freeing me temporarily from the nightmare of Soviet threats. I set aside my major concerns for the time being.

As early as 1964, when Zhou Enlai and He Long visited Moscow, the Soviets took the opportunity to test Zhou Enlai and conspire with him to remove me from power. Fortunately, Zhou Enlai remained loyal to me and immediately reported the situation to me. From that point on, I felt that the Soviet Union posed the greatest practical threat to me. They had a million troops stationed along the Sino-Soviet border, and their tank forces were formidable. They could advance to Beijing within a few days. I found it extremely terrifying. In December of that year, I instructed the construction of artificial mountains along the Sino-Mongolian border to hinder the advancement of tank columns. I said, ‘If there are mountains, dig tunnels; if there are no mountains, build them.’ It was like a new Great Wall. The artificial mountains were 20-40 meters high, 250-400 meters wide at the front, and had a depth of 120-220 meters. They were reinforced with steel and cement, with one battalion guarding each mountain. Many engineering troops were assigned to the construction.

I also instructed the construction of ten artificial mountains around atomic bomb and missile bases to specifically defend those bases. It took at least seven years to construct these artificial mountains, which involved massive engineering work. One battalion of troops and mechanized construction techniques were deployed for several years, costing 50 million yuan to complete just one mountain. Pi Dingjun and Su Yu had both inspected the project and believed that it couldn’t stop tanks. The border was too long, and tanks had too many possible routes to choose from. Zhou Enlai told me about it, and later, it was abandoned and left unused.”

Journalist: “What happened during the Zhenbao Island incident?”

Mao: “Since 1960, Sino-Soviet relations had deteriorated, and border clashes occurred frequently. In 1969, before the Ninth Party Congress, I approved the Northeast Military Region to engage in a battle on Zhenbao Island (Black Cow Island) as a victory for the congress and to demonstrate unity against external forces. The battle took place in March 1969, and we won. However, the Soviet army counterattacked and took it back. The casualties on both sides were roughly equal. We publicly declared it as a defensive counterattack, but in reality, we initiated the offensive.

After the Zhenbao Island battle, relations between the two sides worsened further. In August 1969, the Soviet Union deployed helicopters, tanks, and armored vehicles in the Xinjiang Tarbagatai region, a disputed area several tens of kilometers wide, and annihilated dozens of our border defense troops in a major victory. We had no choice but to endure and not take any action.

The Soviet Union also created public opinion domestically, with the military claiming to permanently eliminate the Chinese threat and threatening to use missiles and nuclear warheads for surgical strikes on China’s military and political important targets.”

Journalist: “Wow, the Soviet Union planned to launch a nuclear strike against you?”

Mao: “Yes, on August 20, 1969, the Soviet Ambassador to the US urgently met with Kissinger and informed him of the Soviet Union’s intention to carry out a nuclear strike against China, seeking the US’s opinion. The next day, Kissinger reported to President Nixon, who expressed opposition and instructed the information to be revealed to China. On August 28, a Washington newspaper published the headline ‘Soviet Union Plans Surgical Nuclear Strike against China.’ I received this information from Zhou Enlai and immediately ordered the entire country to enter a state of imminent war, implementing the strategy of ‘mountains, dispersion, and tunnels.’ In October 1969, the central government in Beijing initiated an emergency evacuation. I went to Wuhan, Lin Biao went to Suzhou, and Zhou Enlai set up an underground command post in western Beijing.”

Journalist: “Did the US support the Soviet Union’s strike against you?”

Mao: “The US not only verbally supported me, but in October 1969, Kissinger met with the Soviet ambassador again and conveyed that if the Soviet Union attacked China, it would mean the start of World War III and the US would retaliate. The US intentionally used codes that had already been deciphered by the Soviets to issue presidential instructions for the preparation of nuclear strikes against 134 Soviet cities and military targets.

Because of such strong US expressions, the Soviet Union was deterred. Brezhnev angrily said, ‘The US has betrayed us.’ This time, Nixon saved me. If he had said, ‘You two communist countries fight, I don’t care, remain neutral, don’t bring the fire to my side,’ then I would have been finished. How could my two newly developed atomic bombs withstand that?”

Journalist: “Nixon saved you?”

Mao: “Yes, from then on for several years, the Soviet Union no longer dared to make any major moves. Even though Sino-Soviet relations remained tense, I didn’t feel any substantial threat of invasion.

As for the US, as early as November 1969, I approved Zhou Enlai to send a message through Romania, welcoming Nixon to Beijing. But the timing wasn’t right, and the US didn’t respond.”

Journalist: “Oh, in November 1969, you expressed your welcome to Nixon’s visit to China?”

Mao: “Yes, on October 1, 1970, during the celebration of National Day, I specially invited American journalist Edgar Snow to stand beside me on Tiananmen Square. It was the first time I sent such a signal to the Americans, expressing gratitude to the US, a friendly attitude towards the American people, and a hope for improved relations with the US.”

In March 1971, I approved the table tennis team to participate in a competition in Japan, and in April, a Japanese newspaper published a photo of Zhuang Zedong shaking hands with American table tennis players by chance. When a nurse showed me this news, my eyes brightened, and I praised, ‘This Zhuang Zedong not only plays well, but also handles diplomacy.’ At that time, the American team expressed a desire to visit China. I quickly decided to extend an invitation through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, welcoming the American table tennis team to visit Beijing and opening the channel of friendship between China and the US.

On April 21, 1971, I approved Zhou Enlai to invite Nixon to visit China, and Nixon replied on April 29, expressing his agreement.”

Journalist: “So, it was through ping-pong diplomacy that China-US relations opened up?”

Mao: “Yes, in July and October 1971, with the assistance of Pakistan, we secretly arranged two meetings with Kissinger to discuss the arrangements for President Nixon’s visit to China.

On September 13, 1971, when Lin Biao fled and died, the whole country was shocked. People’s confidence in the Cultural Revolution wavered, and I suffered a great blow mentally. My health was very poor, and I resembled a critically ill old man lying in bed. On January 10, 1972, I reluctantly attended Chen Yi’s memorial service with my illness and felt slightly better mentally. The decision for Nixon to come to Beijing in February was a great stimulant for me. I received medical treatment, hoping for a better recovery to meet Nixon.

On October 25, 1971, with the support of the US, China entered the United Nations Security Council, replacing Taiwan. I was very pleased.”

Journalist: “The US supported your entry into the United Nations, and Chiang Kai-shek was about to withdraw. Were you very pleased?”

Mao: “Yes, on January 21, 1972, my heartbeat and breathing began to return to normal, but I was still very ill. In front of Jiang Qing, I said to Zhou Enlai, ‘I am seriously ill and may not recover. After I die, you will be in charge of everything.’ I said this to test Zhou’s attitude and observe Jiang Qing’s reaction.

On February 12, 1972, I suddenly went into shock and was on the verge of death. If I had really passed away, Zhou Enlai would have truly succeeded me.”

Journalist: “You mentioned handing over power to Zhou Enlai to test his reaction?”

Mao: “Yes. On February 21, 1972, Nixon arrived in Beijing. I saw his motorcade on television entering Diaoyutai. I was already impatient and immediately informed Zhou Enlai to come and see me. At that time, Nixon was preparing to take a shower. I finally managed to wait until he walked into my study. With the support of Zhang Yufeng, I approached Nixon and shook his hand tightly. From that moment on, the world’s dynamics changed.”

Journalist: “When Nixon came to Beijing, were you eager to meet him immediately?”

Mao: “Yes, on February 21, 1972, President Nixon flew to Beijing, and I was particularly excited and no longer in a drowsy state. His visit was the biggest source of comfort for me since Lin Biao’s defection. I was anxious to meet him. In the afternoon, at 6 o’clock, I would ask every two hours: ‘Where is Nixon now?’ Zhang Yufeng asked the duty room at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and said he might already be over Alaska. By 8 o’clock, I asked again: ‘Where is Nixon?’ The answer was that he had arrived in Tokyo.

At 10 p.m. in the evening, I asked again: ‘Where is Nixon?’ The answer was that he had left Tokyo, and my air force escort planes were already providing escort over the Bohai Sea. At half past 11 in the evening, I asked again: ‘Has Nixon arrived?’ The answer was that he had arrived at the Capital Airport, and Zhou Enlai was there to welcome him.

At half past midnight, I asked again: ‘Where is Nixon staying?’ Zhang Yufeng replied that he was staying at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse. I said: ‘I want to meet Nixon now.’ At that time, Zhou Enlai had already sent Nixon to Diaoyutai and was on his way back to Zhongnanhai. Upon receiving my request, he immediately turned around and returned to Diaoyutai to invite Nixon. At that moment, Nixon was in the bathroom, preparing for a shower and getting ready for bed. At Zhou Enlai’s request, he didn’t mind the diplomatic formalities and accompanied Zhou Enlai in the Red Flag bulletproof car straight to Zhongnanhai.

I was standing at the entrance of the study, supported by Zhang Yufeng, eagerly waiting to greet Nixon. When he arrived, he was filled with reverence towards me. Originally, the scheduled meeting was only supposed to last for 15 minutes, but I was in high spirits and ended up talking for over an hour. When I’m excited and unrestrained, I often talk about women. I said to Kissinger, ‘What about giving you 10 million Chinese women?’”

Journalist: “Giving 10 million Chinese women? Wouldn’t that degrade Chinese women?”

Mao: “Yes, it’s my habit from the past to talk freely and without taboo when I’m in a good mood. I enjoy discussing women with my comrades. That’s how it was with Gao Gang, but I couldn’t have that kind of conversation with Liu Shaoqi.”

I knew Kissinger was a playboy and thought he must have an interest in women. Unexpectedly, when he heard my words, he only smiled without saying anything. Nixon also just smiled. It was no fun for me, and I couldn’t continue to engage. I didn’t expect that my remark would degrade Chinese women. I have always believed that women are there for us big shots to enjoy, and casual conversations about them are no big deal. My rogue tendencies unconsciously surfaced once again.”

Journalist: “Did Nixon ask you anything?”

Mao: “He only asked me: ‘Where is your Vice Chairman Lin Biao?’ I felt he was checking with me and deliberately asking. It was impossible for his intelligence not to know that Lin Biao had already died in a plane crash. So, I answered candidly: ‘He fought against me, couldn’t defeat me, took a plane and fled, and died in a crash.’ It was the first time that I revealed this secret of the Communist Party to the whole world. Previously, the CCP had never said anything about it, and the ordinary people were still kept in the dark.”

Journalist: “Did Nixon come to Beijing to save you?”

Mao: “On February 21, 1972, Nixon came to Beijing to see me. He did give me a political boost, revitalizing me. We discussed ‘philosophical issues.’ Nixon advocated ‘live and let live, I live, you live.’ While I believed in ‘class struggle, either you die or I die, irreconcilable.’ Nixon asked me: ‘Where is your Vice Chairman Lin?’ I said he fought against me, couldn’t defeat me, ran away, and died in a crash. It was the first time I disclosed the Lin Biao incident to the outside world. It had been kept confidential before, and people didn’t know why Lin Biao had disappeared and stopped appearing.”

Mao: “Nixon brought up serious topics several times, wanting to discuss the proper issues between our two countries. I interrupted him and said that those matters should be discussed between him and Zhou Enlai. As for me, I prefer to talk about philosophical issues and Kissinger’s love life. I asked Kissinger if he liked Chinese women and suggested giving him 10 million Chinese women. How about that?”

Journalist: “Oh, so Nixon wanted to discuss serious matters, and you said you would give Kissinger 10 million Chinese women?”

Mao: “Yes, I only care about talking freely. Zhou Enlai and Nixon held discussions for several days, and on February 28, a joint communiqué was issued. There wasn’t much common ground in the communiqué. I still had to speak revolutionary words, and there needed to be a touch of revolutionary spirit in the international anti-imperialist discourse. So, we had to adopt a ‘each says their own’ approach.”

Journalist: “Oh, so on one hand, you talked about Sino-U.S. friendship, and on the other hand, you talked about international anti-imperialism?”

Journalist: “In 1972, when U.S. President Nixon visited China, did you have high school students dress up as monks and nuns to show him in Hangzhou?”

Mao: “Yes, since the start of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, the temples had been destroyed, and they were in darkness and silence. The Red Guards forced nuns to marry monks and have children. When Nixon went to Hangzhou, he wanted to see a Buddhist temple to demonstrate religious freedom in China. But how could the Lingyin Temple in Hangzhou function without incense and monks? Zhou Enlai and the Zhejiang provincial government were anxious. They invited back some monks, but their numbers were not enough. Zhou Enlai came up with a clever idea. He suggested selecting several dozen high school students with good backgrounds and reliable political status to attend a study class for them to become monks. I thought it was a good idea. But what if the students refused to engage in superstitious activities? So, I had them briefed. After completing the political task, they would become political monks, bringing honor to the Party and Chairman Mao. After completing the task, they would be allowed to return to secular life, get married, and have children. It was like performing a play, a show for Nixon and Kissinger. The play was indeed a success, and Nixon believed that China still had religious freedom.”

Journalist: “The Party controls religion, and in practice, it has all been sinicized, right? Temples have also been standardized and ranked within the Party system?”

Mao: “Yes, all religious groups are organized under administrative ranks. The Chinese Buddhist Association is at the ministerial level, and its chairman, Zhao Puchu, is a vice chairman of the CPPCC. However, Zhao is not a monk. He is a loyal dog of the Party. The Chinese Taoist Association, the Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association, the Three-Self Patriotic Movement of Protestant Churches, and the Chinese Islamic Association are all considered ministerial-level units. Their immediate superiors are the United Front Work Department of the CCP, and the heads of each religious association are appointed by the United Front Work Department. The annual funding is allocated by the State Council’s Bureau of Religious Affairs.

Yonghe Temple in Dongcheng, Dazhong Temple in the north of the city, Baiyun Temple in the south of the city, are deputy ministerial-level units, enjoying deputy ministerial treatment. Xiangshan Temple, Wofosi Temple, Tan Tuo Temple in the Western Hills are bureau-level units, all supported by the Party, following the Party’s leadership. Being at the bureau level is equivalent to being a prefectural party committee secretary. Since religious personnel are eating the Party’s meal, they naturally become tools tamed by the Party. Temples have underground Party branches, not publicly disclosed. The abbot is the Party secretary, and they have to report to the United Front Work Department and receive instructions. The Party operates Buddhist colleges, with abbots being Buddhist masters, embodying the Party’s leadership over religion and transforming religion. Senior eminent monks also have ministerial and deputy ministerial ranks. There are also bureau-level priests and deputy bureau-level imams, as well as division-level nuns.”

Mao: “Yes, Nixon’s visit to China opened the door, but if we look at it from the perspective of national relations, the people were still closed off, and they didn’t benefit much. On his last day in Shanghai, it happened to be during the Spring Festival when the educated youth were returning to Shanghai to celebrate. I was worried that something might happen to them if they encountered Nixon, so I instructed them all to leave Shanghai and return to their hometowns.”

Journalist: “Nixon’s visit opened up international doors for you, and you gained significant benefits?”

Mao: “Yes, in October 1972, with the influence of the United States, I entered the United Nations and expelled the representative of Chiang Kai-shek. It was effortless for me, achieving a great accomplishment. In 1973, there were significant diplomatic achievements, with 18 countries establishing or upgrading diplomatic relations with us, with Japan being the most prominent.

In late September 1973, Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka came to Beijing for a week to establish diplomatic relations. He was eager to meet me, and Zhou Enlai reminded me every day to schedule a meeting time. I neither confirmed nor denied it. I had my own agenda, and unless I felt like it, I wouldn’t see him. I delayed it until the 6th day at 3 a.m. when I finally met him. He got up from his sleep and saw Zhou Enlai receiving him and accompanying him to meet me. Liao Chengzhi, an advisor from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was also present. He was born in Japan. I said to Tanaka, ‘If you want him, take him back!’ Tanaka mentioned that Liao was running for senator and was certain to be elected. I said, ‘Then let him become a senator in Japan.’”

Journalist: “With the establishment of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations and Tanaka’s visit to China, did China seek war reparations?”

Mao: “Prime Minister Tanaka intended to offer war reparations to China, reportedly prepared to compensate with 4 billion US dollars. But I told him directly that their Imperial Army did not invade China, and we were already devoured by Chiang Kai-shek. We should be thankful to Japan. I refused to bring up war reparations again. Japan felt embarrassed, and later, they offered long-term low-interest loans instead.”

Journalist: “Nixon gave you so many generous gifts. Did you have any response for him?”

Mao: “As soon as Nixon’s visit to China ended, I sent Zhou Enlai to Vietnam to inform them of the new developments in Sino-U.S. relations and advised Vietnam to cooperate in ending the war and allowing the safe withdrawal of American forces. However, by this time, Vietnam had shown signs of independence and no longer relied on the CCP. They even said that their relationship with the United States was their own business and that they didn’t need China to interfere. In March 1972, Vietnam launched the ‘Easter Offensive,’ mobilizing its entire military force to attack the American and South Vietnamese troops. The U.S. forces strongly resisted and heavily bombed many important areas in Hanoi and North Vietnam, resulting in a disastrous defeat for the North Vietnamese offensive, with a loss of 100,000 soldiers. The North Vietnamese Commander-in-Chief, Vo Nguyen Giap, was removed from his position. At this point, I had almost lost my influence over Vietnam.

In March 1973, all U.S. forces withdrew from Vietnam according to plan. In 1975, North Vietnam captured Saigon, and the South Vietnamese regime collapsed.

As soon as Nixon left, I quickly instructed Zhou Enlai to go to Vietnam and coordinate their peaceful withdrawal in cooperation with the United States. Le Duan complained, questioning why China had to negotiate with the United States about Vietnam’s own affairs. To appease him, we had to increase our assistance. Albania also had objections, and Enver Hoxha wrote a long letter to me, criticizing my dealings with the U.S. as a dirty matter. According to him, I had become a revisionist, while he remained the most orthodox Marxist-Leninist. Therefore, we had to increase our assistance further to appease them. Later, even appeasement didn’t work, and Hoxha became the most revolutionary and the most Marxist-Leninist. My anti-imperialist prestige was no longer as high as his.”

Journalist: “So, Hoxha criticized you as a revisionist and tried to please the U.S.?”

Mao: “Yes, but regardless of that, with the United States deterring Soviet revisionism in the north, and no enemies from the United States in the south, we could rest easy on both fronts. Nixon’s visit brought a peaceful international environment for us.”