Chapter 91 Pressured Lin Biao to flee during my southern tour, resulting in his fatal plane crash 1971

Journalist: “What will you do if Lin Biao refuses to bow down and self-criticize?”

Mao: “If Lin Biao doesn’t self-criticize, I will never let him go. Even someone as stubborn as Wang Ming bowed down and admitted his mistakes in front of me. Even if it was insincere, he still had to say something to save face, or else he couldn’t survive. But Lin Biao refuses to say anything, how can I spare him?

On October 13, 1970, Ye Qun wrote a letter to me, a lengthy self-criticism. I wrote many comments criticizing her severely and gave it to Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai, Kang Sheng, and others to read. But Ye Qun’s self-criticism cannot replace Lin Biao’s. I must have Lin Biao personally come forward and self-criticize.”

Journalist: “Oh, so Ye Qun has self-criticized like you requested, but Lin Biao hasn’t come forward?”

Mao: “Yes. On March 21, 1971, Huang, Wu, Li, and Qiu, the Four Diamonds, also submitted their self-criticisms to me. But Lin Biao remains silent and refuses to self-criticize. They still have their backers.

On March 24, 1971, taking advantage of the Four Diamonds’ self-criticisms, I asked Zhou Enlai to take them to Beidaihe and report to Lin Biao, pressuring him to make a written self-criticism. With his confession in my hands, I can have control over him. However, on April 1, Zhou Enlai came back and reported to me that Lin Biao was still defending his speech at the Lushan Conference and showed no intention of self-criticizing. I said, ‘He’s on the edge of a cliff.’”

Journalist: “Oh, so you had Zhou Enlai try to persuade Lin Biao, but he still didn’t self-criticize?”

Journalist: “In 1971, on Labor Day, there was a final photo of Mao Zedong and Lin Biao taken at Tiananmen Square.”

Mao: “Yes, the top leaders of the Military Commission advised Lin Biao to make a self-criticism, otherwise, he wouldn’t pass the test. But Lin Biao insisted that there was nothing for him to self-criticize regarding the Lushan issue. He argued that it was unnecessary to expect anything from his self-criticism. He even mentioned that the Lushan issue couldn’t be resolved through self-criticism alone.”

Journalist: “How was your last meeting with Lin Biao?”

Mao: “During the May Labor Dayholiday in 1971, Lin Biao claimed to be ill and didn’t show up at Tiananmen Square. Zhou Enlai invited him, but I didn’t look at him directly. He had no expression on his face and sat stiffly. I completely ignored and publicly humiliated him. After sitting there silently for 10 minutes, he left.

The last time I saw Lin Biao was in mid-May 1971 during a Politburo meeting. He said he was currently experiencing chills and fever and couldn’t attend. I was angry and told Zhou Enlai that Lin Biao was being too arrogant, thinking he could be treated like Zhuge Liang. I even sent experts from the Health Bureau with a stretcher to carry him to the meeting. Finally, Zhou Enlai managed to bring him in. He was supported into the meeting room, trembling and sweating profusely. I completely ignored him and delivered my speech for an hour and a half, while he continued to tremble and sweat. I didn’t even look at him once. He was assisted out of the meeting room and sat alone on the sofa, trembling and sweating. I felt extremely pleased and relieved.

In June 1971, Lin Biao went to Diaoyutai, and Jiang Qing took a photo of him imitating my pose. It was titled ‘Industrious and Tireless.’ The atmosphere seemed to have eased.”

Journalist: “So, Jiang Qing taking a photo of Lin Biao imitating your pose seemed like a sign of easing tensions?”

Mao: “Yes, but I couldn’t just look at the surface. From July to August 1971, during my tour, I met with military generals along the way and indirectly criticized Lin Biao more and more severely. I even mentioned the high positions of the two command headquarters, almost openly mentioning his name. My remarks reached Lin Biao’s ears through various channels, and he realized that the days ahead would not be easy for him.”

Journalist: “During your conflict with Lin Biao, both sides escalated their actions?”

Mao: “Yes, in the summer of 1971, Lin Biao claimed to be ill and refused to attend the ‘criticism and rectification’ meeting where I arranged to criticize his wife, Ye Qun, and the four senior generals under him. He said to Zhou Enlai, ‘Even if Chen Boda is a bad person, who has employed him for 30 years? Who is clinging onto my wife and subordinates? I can’t even protect my own wife, and I am subjected to criticism from everyone.’ His son, Lin Liguo, was prepared to flee to Outer Mongolia and establish an exile government if their uprising failed. The unfortunate thing was that his daughter, Lin Liheng, was disloyal and reported to Zhou Enlai.

Lin Liguo sees through me. He says that there is only one master in China now, and everyone else has become slaves, including Lin’s father and Zhou Enlai. He claims that my class struggle and ideological struggle are about using one group of slaves to eliminate another group of slaves. He also says that Lin Biao has control over the military and won’t be as foolish as Liu Shaoqi, who was powerless.

Indeed, I isolated Lin Biao by convicting Chen Boda, criticizing Lin’s wife and the four senior generals. I shook the mountain to frighten the tiger, isolating Lin Biao, preparing to finish him off.

I have already prepared to hold a Central Committee meeting before the National Day on October 1st to appoint several more Vice Chairmen and sideline Lin Biao. As an elderly man nearing eighty, I am full of fighting spirit and derive great pleasure from struggling against others. Let’s see who can match me in the fight. What worries me the most is the military, so I will dispatch more civilian officials to take up positions and manipulate them. I will throw stones and mix sand.”

Journalist: “Lin Biao’s son organizing an ‘armed uprising’ puts you at odds with each other?”

Mao: “Speaking objectively, the ‘571 Project Memorandum’ (a homophone for ‘armed uprising’) initiated by Lin Biao and his son Lin Liguo is more favorable for the common people than my theory of class struggle. They propose ‘prosperity for the people and strength for the nation,’ replacing my ‘rich country, poor people’ approach. Their focus is on developing production, prospering the economy, and improving lives. I, on the other hand, am least concerned and even opposed to improving people’s lives. According to my theory of class struggle, improving lives should come after the success of the world revolution. At present, I don’t care about the life or death of the people.

Lin Biao has come up with a plan for an ‘armed uprising,’ not just on paper but in action as well. He has reached a point where he is at odds with me and is doing everything possible to get rid of me. He says that if he doesn’t eliminate me, I will eliminate him. If I don’t fall, he is waiting for his own demise.”

Journalist: “During your Southern Tour in the summer of 1971, did you intentionally leak information to Lin Biao?”

Mao: “In August 1971, when I was planning the Southern Tour, I hinted to the top military leaders that we needed to deal with Lin Biao. I intentionally leaked information to Lin Biao to observe his reaction. I had Xiao Xie (Xie Jingyi) relay the message to Lin Liguo. She had a close relationship with Lin Liguo as they had joyful encounters in the Xianrendong of Mount Lu. I didn’t mind her serving both sides as long as she could be useful to me. I saw her loyalty to me.

Since Lin Biao wouldn’t bow down to me, I had to bring him down. If he were to lower his head, we would see what the outcome would be. In the end, of course, he would be eliminated. The method of his death would be considered later, but I couldn’t allow him an opportunity to make a comeback.”

Journalist: “Was the purpose of your Southern Tour to completely crush Lin Biao?”

Mao: “Yes, in August 1971, I embarked on a Southern Inspection Tour by special train, informing the top military leaders along the way about Lin Biao’s hidden agenda and urging them to prepare for criticizing and fighting against Lin Biao. I exposed his intentions to seize the position of State Chairman from me and engage in a power struggle. He wouldn’t correct his mistakes. I decided to appoint more Vice Chairmen to marginalize him. I told Hua Guofeng, ‘Your mind is filled with agriculture, while mine is filled with struggle.’ Liu Shaoqi said that I was responsible for the three years of famine and the resulting deaths. I launched the Cultural Revolution to crush him. Now, Lin Biao wants to establish the position of State Chairman, opposing Zhang Chunqiao, but in reality, it’s a challenge against me. During my Southern Inspection Tour, the situation changed for Lin Biao, and even Zhou Enlai stopped referring to him as Vice Chairman, instead calling him ‘Lin Zong’ (Lin, the General).”

Lin Biao was right: ‘the Americans did me a favor. Nixon’s visit to China loosened the encirclement of China by the United States. The Americans betrayed their anti-communist allies, including Chiang Kai-shek.’

During my southern tour, Lin Biao was constantly trying to find out what I was saying. He realized that his position as my successor would be undermined and delayed for two years. However, he stubbornly resisted and said, ‘I am not Liu Shaoqi. I won’t sit and wait for death.’ Lin Liguo and his group even planned to surround the Diaoyutai and Zhongnanhai with the Air Force and Tank Corps, and execute San Di Shui, Eyeglasses Snake, and Yao Pianzi on the spot. They wanted to leave Zhou Enlai to maintain the situation.”

Journalist: “How did Chen Yi and Zhou Enlai view your conflict with Lin Biao?”

Mao: “Even Chen Yi doesn’t comply with you. He says that you just eliminated Liu Shaoqi and now you’re at odds with the newly appointed successor. Why did you choose Lin Biao as your successor in the first place? And now you’re eager to get rid of him? The older you get, the more you enjoy it? Lin Biao does have some guts! He’s a tough guy. Zhou Enlai complains about being caught between the two chairmen, like walking on thin ice or standing at the edge of a cliff.

Chen Yi saw through me. He suggested adding several Vice Chairmen to have them fight against Vice Chairman Lin Biao. That way, I wouldn’t have to personally take the frontline. He also said, ‘My approach is similar to Lin Biao’s. Lin Biao didn’t promote ‘self-cultivation’ like Liu Shaoqi; he relied on armed forces to seize power.

I was born in the Year of the Snake, while Lin Biao was born in the Year of the Horse. Zhou Enlai said he had nightmares about being chased by a snake or trampled by a horse.

My Southern Tour involved speaking and singing along the way. Speaking meant exposing Lin Biao’s true nature, and singing ‘The Internationale’ to oppose Lin Biao’s claim that I’m a ‘genius.’ Singing ‘The Three Main Rules of Discipline and Eight Points for Attention’ was to emphasize the importance of discipline and unity.”

Journalist: “During your Southern Tour, did you infiltrate Lin Biao’s camp and obtain intelligence?”

Mao: “Yes, Xie Jingyi’s husband worked in the Air Force office. Through Xie Jingyi, I learned about Lin Liguo’s secret plan to establish the ‘United Fleet’ and prepare for an armed uprising to kill me.

When I arrived in Hangzhou in September 1971, General Bai Zongshan of the Fifth Air Force secretly informed me that some people were not welcoming my visit to Hangzhou. They were secretly equipping aircraft and advised me to be cautious. While staying in Liu Zhuang, someone reported to me that Chen Liyun was secretly arranging to report my daily activities to someone else. I became more vigilant and noticed unusual circumstances. I felt like I had entered a ‘den of thieves’ and decided to shorten my trip and quickly return to Beijing. In Shanghai, I designated Wang Hongwen to represent me and invite Xu Shiyou for a meal at the Jinjiang Hotel. I also had Lin Liguo’s associate, Wang Weiguo, accompany them. I avoided Wang Weiguo and quietly departed Shanghai on the special train, heading directly to Nanjing.”

Journalist: “Lin Biao’s son organizing an ‘armed uprising’ puts you at odds with each other?”

Mao: “To be fair, the ‘571 Project Memorandum’ (a homophone for ‘armed uprising’) initiated by Lin Biao and his son Lin Liguo, is more favorable for the common people than my theory of class struggle. They propose ‘prosperity for the people and strength for the nation,’ replacing my ‘rich country, poor people’ approach. They emphasize developing production, prospering the economy, and improving lives. I, on the other hand, am least concerned and even opposed to improving people’s lives. According to my theory of class struggle, improving lives should come after the success of the world revolution. At present, I don’t care about the life or death of the people.”

Lin Biao has come up with a plan for an ‘armed uprising,’ not just on paper but in action as well. He has reached a point where he is at odds with me and is doing everything possible to get rid of me. He says that if he doesn’t eliminate me, I will eliminate him. If I don’t fall, he is waiting for his own demise.”

Journalist: “How did Lin Liguo and his group plan to assassinate you?”

Mao: “Based on the intelligence I later obtained, Lin Liguo and his group plotted various methods to assassinate me. For example, they planned to announce a military rebellion around me, claiming they wanted to assassinate me, and then deploy troops to suppress the rebellion, creating chaos and killing me. Another plan was to bribe insiders in the villa in Hangzhou where I was staying and set it on fire, causing an explosion. They would then rush in under the pretense of rescue and shoot me amidst the chaos. They also planned to directly launch rockets and use flamethrowers to attack the villa, blocking the escape routes and killing me in the confusion. They even plotted to ignite an oil depot next to my train, send troops to extinguish the fire, and take advantage of the chaos to assassinate me. They also planned to blow up bridges and destroy the train while it was traveling, creating a new ‘Huanggutun incident.’ Hearing all this, I broke out in a cold sweat.”

Journalist: “Did you issue any orders in response to Lin Biao’s fight against you?”

Mao: “On September 8th, 1971, Lin Biao signed a document: ‘Follow the orders conveyed by Comrade Lin Liguo. Lin Biao, September 8th.’ He completely relied on his son’s actions and engaged in a struggle of ‘either you die or I die’ with me, desperately struggling.

On September 8th, 1971, Lin Biao even sent four large watermelons to Jiang Qing.

On September 11th, 1971, at home, Lin Biao said to Ye Qun, ‘Anyway, I won’t live much longer. If I die, it will be either in prison or facing death calmly.’”

Journalist: “Did you know that Lin Biao planned to assassinate you, prompting your hasty return to Beijing?”

Mao: “Yes, as a sly old fox, I became aware of Lin Biao’s plan to harm me. To disrupt his plan, I decided to take sudden actions. On September 9th, 1971, my special train arrived in Hangzhou. Originally, I planned to disembark and enjoy three leisurely days there. However, I changed my mind, stayed only one day in Hangzhou, and did not leave the train. I stayed on the train with tight security provided by my guards.”

At that time, Lin Biao’s trusted Air Force General, Chen Liyun, had arranged for someone to carry out a bombing mission to attack the train. However, that person suddenly claimed to be sick at the critical moment, which saved my life. Later, I learned that this person was afraid of failing to kill me with the bombing and losing his life in the process. Lin Biao had spent those years in the military constantly studying my works, neglecting training, and his combat abilities had declined. Lin Biao’s promotion of studying my works actually saved me. In Hangzhou, they had another plan, which involved setting fire to an oil depot near the airport while my train was stopped there. They would then send troops under the pretense of firefighting and attack the train to eliminate me.

On September 11th, my special train arrived in Shanghai. Originally, I planned to disembark and rest there for two days, but I changed my plan and didn’t disembark. Lin Biao’s trusted Shanghai garrison commander, Wang Weiguo, concealed a handgun and planned to board the train to assassinate me. However, he was stopped by Wang Dongxing and my guards. Wang Weiguo was taken away by Commander Xu Shiyou, who was present at the scene, to have a drink at a restaurant. Sensing the danger, I suddenly ordered the train to start and escaped from Shanghai. They also planned to select a bridge to blow up after my escape, intending to kill me on the spot. However, I managed to escape. I realized it was dangerous to stay in the south for too long, so the special train quickly reached Nanjing. I promptly changed the locomotive and stayed for half an hour before leaving Nanjing, heading straight to Jinan. In Jinan, I changed the locomotive again, stayed for half an hour, and then traveled day and night, heading directly to Beijing.”

Journalist: “Did you immediately return to Zhongnanhai in Beijing?”

Mao: “No, on September 12th, at noon, my special train arrived at Fengtai Station in the southern suburbs of Beijing. I didn’t dare to enter the city recklessly because I was afraid that Lin Biao and his group had set up an assassination plot in the city, even in Zhongnanhai. I came up with an unexpected idea and headed straight to the residence of Chen Yi, who had been removed from his position. I stayed there and established contact with Zhou Enlai. The first thing I said to Zhou was, ‘Enlai, when the heavens don’t destroy Cao, I almost became a dead dog. Immediately find the top leaders of the Beijing Military Region and bring them to Chen Yi’s place.’ After that, I quickly convened a joint meeting of the leaders of the Beijing Military Region and Garrison District, reorganized and deployed tight security. Only then did I feel at ease returning to Zhongnanhai.”

Journalist: “Those four days must have been quite tense and thrilling. What about Lin Biao and his group?”

Mao: “Yes, it was quite thrilling. At that time, Lin Liguo was stationed at Beijing West Airport, eagerly awaiting good news from the south. When I returned to Beijing without their knowledge, he was sleeping with a beautiful woman. On September 12th, he suddenly learned that I had safely returned to Beijing, and he realized that the coup and assassination plot had failed.

Immediately, he flew by helicopter to meet his parents in Beidaihe. They quickly decided to escape by plane. In the early hours of September 13th, they forcibly broke into Shanhaiguan Airport, boarded the Trident plane, and took off to save their lives. At 2:30 a.m., Lin Biao and his group died when the plane crashed.”

Journalist: “Your southern tour allowed you to evade the pursuit of Lin Liguo, and Lin Biao was left with no way out, leading to a hasty escape?”

Mao: “I didn’t have prior knowledge of Lin Liguo’s ‘800-mile chase plan in the south.’ I relied on my natural suspicion and sensed danger. I quickly left Hangzhou and Shanghai, heading to Tianjin and Beijing. They couldn’t catch up with me in their pursuit. I escaped their dragnet and returned to the swimming pool in Zhongnanhai. In Beijing, following my instructions, tight surveillance and monitoring had been put in place over several key generals under Lin Biao. I could rest assured.

When I returned to Beijing, Lin Biao and his group wanted to retreat to Guangzhou, establish a separate central authority, and engage in armed separatism. They had prepared eight transport planes to fly to Guangzhou. However, under my instructions, the Guangzhou Military Region, led by Liu Xingyuan, had already conveyed my speech to more than 2,000 senior officers, expressing their firm support for me. Their plan to retreat to Guangzhou fell through, so they flew to Ulan Bator in Mongolia or the Soviet Union, seeking an alliance with the Soviet Union and Mongolia to establish an armed separatist regime. Afraid that I would take action against them, they hastily decided on September 13th, 1971, to escape by plane. They found that Trident plane, and only four of the expected seven crew members boarded. The plane hastily took off from Shanhaiguan Airport and flew to Mongolia. I decided to shoot it down with a missile. Lin Biao and his family died in the plane crash.

It was embarrassing for me that Lin Biao died. It dealt a severe blow to my spirit. Others saw it as me forcing him to leave. I claimed publicly that the aircraft had crashed due to fuel exhaustion, but the Mongolian people witnessed the plane catching fire and burning in the sky before crashing.”

Journalist: “Oh, when Lin Biao realized that you wouldn’t spare him, did his resentment intensify to the point where he didn’t want to live anymore?”

Mao: “Yes, but Ye Qun, Lin Liguo was unwilling to accept it. They wanted to go all-in, make a final attempt, but their plans of a small fleet remained only on paper.

On midnight of September 13th, 1971, Lin Biao and his family fled by plane. It seems they were forced onto the plane by his wife and son. I received reports before takeoff, and if I wanted to stop them, there was still time. However, I said, ‘If it’s going to rain, let it pour. Let him go.’ My consistent approach has always been to let things develop to the extreme, reach rock bottom, and then I come out to clean up.

He chose to run, so let him run. Running makes him a traitor, which actually makes it easier to handle.”

Journalist: “You allowed Lin Biao to fly away, and the plane exploded in the air and crashed, killing everyone on board. Did you give the order?”

Mao: “Yes.”

Journalist: “Have you considered any alternative outcomes for Lin Biao?”

Mao: “In my struggle against Lin Biao, there were three possibilities: first, I die early, and he takes over peacefully; second, he dies early, and I let Jiang Qing and Mao Yuanxin take over; third, he takes secret action to eliminate me and then finds a scapegoat, leading to a nationwide mourning and Lin as the main mourner ascending the throne. In the third scenario, he failed and ended up fleeing and dying. The plane was shot down on my orders.”

Journalist: “Did Lin Biao’s death have a significant impact on you?”

Mao: “Yes, after Lin Biao’s death, I had the Party and the military convey his ‘571 Project Memorandum,’ his ‘Armed Uprising Memorandum,’ which accused me of being a ‘tyrant of a thousand years,’ ‘feudal fascist,’ ‘persecutor,’ ‘political meat grinder,’ claiming that ‘sending cadres to the countryside is a disguised form of labor reform,’ ‘sending educated youth to rural areas is a disguised form of unemployment,’ ‘the nation is impoverished and the people are in distress,’ and so on. It exposed my dark side and shattered my myth.

I said to Jiang Qing, ‘Lin Biao is finished, and he has made my life miserable. You all play with pens while others wield heavy weapons. I have to rely on Zhou Enlai to stabilize the situation. Can you and Zhang Chunqiao, among others, hold up the situation?’ With Lin Biao’s downfall, the entire Cultural Revolution camp suffered a major blow, and it greatly affected me as well. It brought me to the brink of collapse, and I went into shock, barely surviving with medical intervention.”