Chapter 88 Mao and Lin’s contradictions exposed at the Ninth Congress Meeting 1969

Journalist: “During the Cultural Revolution, you took Stalin as your teacher. How many high-ranking party officials did you purge?”

Mao: I said, “We must not discard Stalin’s knife. We should learn from the Soviet Union. In 1956, Khrushchev’s secret report exposed that out of the 1,225 party representatives elected at the 17th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1,105 were persecuted. I took up Stalin’s knife again during the Cultural Revolution. By 1969, we purged 22 members of the Politburo, 96 Central Committee members and alternate members, 13 Central Secretaries, 12 Vice Premiers, 74 Standing Committee members of the National People’s Congress, and 34 members of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection.”

Journalist: “Was it not your intention for Lin Biao to be your successor?”

Mao: “No, in September 1968, during the 12th Plenum of the 8th Central Committee, which was preparing for the 9th Congress in 1969, Jiang Qing suddenly proposed that Lin Biao be designated as the successor in the party’s constitution. Many thought Jiang Qing was representing me and expressed their support. Lin Biao, understanding the situation, immediately called me and expressed his disagreement. Whether he was sincere or not, his attitude pleased me. I summoned Jiang Qing and scolded her angrily, saying, ‘To write the successor into the party’s constitution, are you seeking death? You are being arrogant and forgetful. You are playing a losing move, and you will have to eat the shit you’ve produced. Tomorrow, take back your words at the meeting!’ Jiang Qing tried to justify herself, saying that Lin Biao only had a few more years to live and it was just a temporary transition to stabilize the situation.

I said, ‘At any time, we must not go to extremes. You foolish sow, good performance, but you think you’re clever.’ Lin Biao praised me, and I supported him in return. It was a transaction without losses or gains. However, during the meeting, after Jiang Qing raised the issue of Lin Biao, his designation as the successor was written into the new party constitution. But it doesn’t matter. The party constitution is dead, while my words are alive. My highest instructions can change at any time.”

Journalist: “How did you view Lin Biao in your heart?”

Mao: “How did I view Lin Biao? He was full of ambition, similar to me. I scored 100 points, and he scored 80-90 points. Our character was the same – lacking empathy, without sympathy for the people. In 1948, during the siege of Changchun, where 300,000 people starved to death, he was the one who came up with the idea, and I supported it. We were both responsible. In 1962, during the 7,000-person conference, he spoke in my defense, but he never sympathized with the tens of millions who died of starvation. He was an old sick man, half-dead, but still obsessed with seizing power. He praised my ‘Four Greats,’ and I elevated him to the second position. However, people below would curse Lin Biao openly but praise him behind his back.

I rewarded him by making him the number two figure, but I also remained vigilant that he might surpass me. He and I did not have the same intentions, unlike Liu Shaoqi. Liu Shaoqi was relatively honest and had much better character. He belonged to the ‘cultivation faction.’ Lin Biao belonged to the ‘power-hungry faction.’ He didn’t show up for work, just like me. The only difference was that his health deteriorated, and he couldn’t indulge in women like I did. He fled, which was a power struggle between him and me. He couldn’t defeat me and didn’t submit to me domestically, so he escaped. Who was more correct? Perhaps he was slightly better. In the political report of the 9th Congress, he emphasized production development, while I advocated continuing class struggle to the end.”

Journalist: “Did Lin Biao have his own set of ideas?”

Mao: “Yes, Lin Biao had his own domain at Maojiawan, just like me. He had around 60-70 people, including secretaries, administrators, servants, medical staff, and more. In addition, there was a guard detachment of over 200 people living in nearby barracks. In his living room, he had inscriptions written by himself: ‘The helmsman navigates the vast sea,’ ‘The most important thing is to conquer oneself and restore propriety.’ He was good at thinking about major matters, using strategies, and attracting flatterers. Although he couldn’t indulge in women due to his health, he turned a blind eye to others’ promiscuity and even recommended the best quality condoms. His loyal core subordinates would kneel and pledge their loyalty to him.

The senior generals under Lin Biao all knew that I would eventually support Jiang Qing to succeed me, with Zhang Chunqiao as her strategist. As long as I was alive, they would just go through the motions with her. But if I died, they probably wouldn’t pay her any respect. Lin Liguo actually used my name to boast about the four milestones of Marxism: the Paris Commune, the October Revolution, the Rectification Movement in Yan’an, and the Cultural Revolution. Who knows, there might be a fifth milestone in the near future. Let them put on their performance.”

Journalist: “What was the story behind the Ninth Party Congress? Was it a united conference?”

Mao: “The Ninth Party Congress was held in April 1969. It appeared to be a perfectly united conference, singing praises and glorifying achievements. But in reality, the conflicts between me and Lin Biao gradually surfaced, leading to division.

The Ninth Party Congress was an unprecedented secret meeting. The delegates were designated by provinces and the military. All the delegates were secretly concentrated in provincial guesthouses for 2-3 months before the meeting, cut off from the outside world, and prepared to go to Beijing for the conference at any time. The delegates arrived in Beijing in late March and were not allowed to go out. Telephone lines were disconnected. They entered the Great Hall of the People for the conference, which was also kept secret. The congress lasted for 24 days, and the official report was only released after the meeting.”

Journalist: “Oh, so the delegates were designated, not elected?”

Mao: “That’s right. The Ninth Party Congress opened on April 1, 1969, with 1,512 delegates in attendance. The opening ceremony was not held at the usual time of 9 a.m. but at 5 p.m., according to my habitual schedule. My opening speech was very short, less than 800 characters, but almost every sentence was interrupted by a series of adoring slogans. I spoke for over 20 minutes but was interrupted dozens of times.”

Journalist: “Were the slogans adoring you longer than your opening speech?”

Journalist: “Why did you and Lin Biao have a split? Everyone thought you were the commander-in-chief, and Lin was the deputy commander-in-chief. Even the Ninth Party Congress Charter mentioned the successor, but it ended up with him fleeing and dying in a plane crash.”

Mao: “The split between Lin Biao and me started with the drafting of the political report during the 9th Congress. I asked him to draft it, but he had Chen Boda write it instead. The main theme was to develop production, as he believed that after three years of the Cultural Revolution, the Ninth Party Congress should be a summary of the victory, shifting the focus to economic construction. I disagreed with his report. I wanted to continue the revolution, so I had Zhang Chunqiao draft another report. He wanted to end the Cultural Revolution, while I wanted to continue it. That’s when the split began.”

Journalist: “What do you mean by continuing the Cultural Revolution?”

Mao: “I conducted the Cultural Revolution with the ultimate goal of promoting Jiang Qing and Mao Yuanxin as my successors. Lin Biao was only a transitional figure. Therefore, I wanted to continue the revolution, continue the class struggle, and gradually let Jiang Qing replace Lin Biao’s position. Mao Yuanxin was young, and he would come after Jiang Qing.”

Mao: “Yes, the differences during the 9th Congress were not publicly exposed at the time. It was a dispute between two drafts of the political report. Lin Biao and Chen Boda drafted a report with the main theme of developing production, which I disagreed with. I asked Zhang Chunqiao to draft another report with the main theme of continuing the revolution. Lin Biao had no choice but to reluctantly read Zhang Chunqiao’s report, abandoning his original plan to give a speech. Chen Boda spent a month writing the report, but I didn’t even bother reading it. I criticized him for holding a productivity-centered view. I deliberately created negative remarks about Chen Boda, saying that a gentleman takes revenge, but ten years is not too late. I accused him of being disloyal by serving as both my secretary and expressing his willingness to serve as Zhang Wentian’s secretary. When we went to Moscow together in 1950, he also served two masters without my approval by meeting with Soviet leaders. Did he think my ship was sinking and decided to make a big move? I mainly said these things to Lin Biao.

Zhang Chunqiao’s drafts were sent to Lin Biao three times, but Lin Biao didn’t read them once and didn’t make any changes. Zhang Chunqiao requested him to sign the report, but he refused to sign and simply read the draft as it was, showing passive resistance.”

Journalist: “So, Lin Biao wanted to focus on developing production, while you wanted to continue class struggle?”

Mao: “Yes, our different attitudes towards the political report during the Ninth Party Congress signaled the beginning of our split. Frankly speaking, Lin Biao and his military faction didn’t want any more chaos in the army. They responded to the people’s demands to end the disorder of the Cultural Revolution, stabilize people’s lives, and focus on economic development. On the other hand, I wanted to continue the struggle endlessly, calling it the continuation of the revolution, which was not popular among the people.

Senior military leaders, led by Huang Yongsheng, often talked behind Jiang Qing’s back, expressing their dissatisfaction with her. This dissatisfaction was also evident in the voting for the Ninth Party Congress, as they intentionally cast fewer votes for Jiang Qing to embarrass her. I was aware of the secret activities opposing Jiang Qing within the Military Commission’s working group, but I kept it hidden for the time being. Wang Dongxing also disliked Jiang Qing but didn’t dare to speak up. He spread false information about me being unhappy with Jiang Qing.”

Journalist: “So, the military’s dissatisfaction with Jiang Qing was actually a dissatisfaction with you as well?”

Mao: “Yes. During the preparation for the ‘Ninth Party Congress,’ the composition of the Politburo members was being discussed. I crossed out Jiang Qing’s name twice, and when Lin Biao saw it, he crossed out Ye Qun’s name twice. Zhou Enlai understood the situation well and knew that Jiang Qing and Ye Qun must be included in the Politburo. Zhou told the military leaders that the central politics is not complicated, it simply means dealing with the relationships between Mao, Lin, and Jiang. When I crossed out Jiang Qing’s name twice, it was just a gesture.

Once, Zhou Enlai was about to chair a meeting, and Jiang Qing said, ‘The toilet in my room is too cold to use. Every time I go to the toilet, I catch a cold.’ Zhou Enlai canceled the meeting and took people to solve Jiang Qing’s toilet problem first.”

Journalist: “Oh, so Zhou Enlai flattered Jiang Qing, which is equivalent to flattering you, right?”

Mao: “Yes. On May 17, 1970, I instructed Jiang Qing to convene a meeting at the Fishing Pavilion with Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Qiu Huizuo, Li Peng, Li Desheng, Xie Fuzhi, and others. She spoke for three hours, talking about her married life with me. She made individual evaluations of Zhou Enlai, Chen Boda, and Kang Sheng, the three standing committee members. She said Zhou Enlai couldn’t handle the overall direction and could only do some specific work. Historically, he supported the East Wind when the East Wind blew, and supported the West Wind when the West Wind blew. She also said that Chen Boda was a bookworm who couldn’t handle practical matters and had no ideas.”

Journalist: “What Jiang Qing said is what you wanted to say, right?”

Mao: “Yes, Huang Yongsheng and the others didn’t know that the meeting was convened by Jiang Qing on my instructions. They thought it was not normal for Jiang Qing to convene a meeting of the Politburo members to speak. They reported their concerns to me. I acted as if nothing happened and said that it was okay to have such a meeting. You know, Jiang Qing is also authoritative.

I wanted Jiang Qing to speak and let some rumours circulate. Mainly, it was directed at Zhou Enlai. After the 9th Congress, Zhou took charge of the daily work of the central government, and the Cultural Revolution under the central leadership became secondary. It seemed like Jiang Qing’s influence had diminished. I wanted her to come out and let some information circulate to put pressure on Zhou. Not only did he have to listen to me, but he also had to listen to Jiang Qing. She and I were in charge of the overall direction, while Zhou only managed the day-to-day specific work.”

Journalist: “Huang Yongsheng didn’t understand you, but Zhou Enlai did. So Zhou flattered Jiang Qing?”

Mao: “Yes, in August-September 1971, during my Southern Tour speeches, I praised Jiang Qing and said that she had made great contributions in her struggle against Liu Shaoqi and Chen Boda. I said that Jiang Qing had a clear mind, listened to me, had sharp insights, and was very accurate in analyzing problems. She was the first to notice Lin Biao’s mistakes. I should learn from her, and you should learn from her too. Sometimes, I also publicly criticized Jiang Qing, but it was just a superficial move. The most important thing is that she and I were in solid agreement.”

Journalist: “So at that time, you brought Jiang Qing out?”

Mao: “Yes. In reality, the ‘Ninth Party Congress’ was dominated by the military. Out of the 21 Politburo members, 11 were military personnel. In the leadership of the urban bureaus in Tianjin, more than 70% were military personnel, with 60 out of 86 cadres being from the military. In 61 counties in Jiangsu Province, the top party and government officials in 68 counties were military personnel. I felt that Liu Shaoqi was finished, and Lin Biao had significant influence.

During the ‘Ninth Party Congress,’ when the Party Constitution was revised, I requested the removal of the provision for the honorary chairman. Everyone understood that I would not become the honorary chairman; I would hold the position until I die. Lin Biao was very sensitive to this; he couldn’t take over my position halfway.”

Journalist: “So you won’t hand over power during your lifetime, you’ll hold onto it until death?”

Mao: “Yes. On May 31, 1969, after the ‘Ninth Party Congress,’ I went to Meiling Villa in Wuhan and saw my photos and quotations everywhere on the walls. Quotations were Lin Biao’s invention, but the more I looked at them, the more I disliked them. I immediately ordered the staff to take them all down. Everyone saw that I was in a bad mood, and my suspicions about Lin Biao were growing deeper.

In October 1969, Lin Biao drafted the first military preparedness order, and Wang Dongxing reported it to me. I didn’t comment much, but I was afraid of losing power. On October 19, in Wuhan, when I saw the first urgent circular from Wang Dongxing, I frowned and said, ‘Burn it!’ I lit a match and burned it.”

Journalist: “Were you afraid that Lin Biao would force you to hand over power midway?”

Mao: “Yes, I suspected him.”

Journalist: “Have you thought about what options Lin Biao had?”

Mao: “In my struggle with Lin Biao, there were three possibilities: first, I die early, and he peacefully takes over; second, he dies early, and I let Jiang Qing and Mao Yuanxin take over; third, he secretly acts to eliminate me and finds a scapegoat, holding a nationwide memorial ceremony, and Lin becomes the supreme leader. In the third scenario, he failed and fled but died in a plane crash. I ordered the plane to be shot down.”

Journalist: “During the evacuation of Beijing, you enforced exile?”

Mao: “In October 1969, after the conflict on the Zhenbao Island, the Sino-Soviet struggle intensified, and the Soviet Communist Party seemed to be launching an attack. I took the opportunity to plan the evacuation of Beijing and eradicate the social base of the anti-Cultural Revolution forces. I evacuated all the right-wing old generals and marshals in Beijing to various locations in the south. I enjoyed the pleasure of exiling the civil and military officials of the entire dynasty. Lin Biao was pleased too. It was called an evacuation, but it was actually an exile. It was equivalent to a political purge. Beijing became clean. They were given 5-7 days to leave Beijing, and the locations where Liu, Deng, and Tao were detained were kept secret, except Deng Xiaoping was treated more leniently.

The plan was drafted, and Huang Yongsheng created the ‘Vice Chairman Lin’s First Order.’ Five million troops and fifty million armed militiamen were put on high alert. When I saw it, I felt like I had been stabbed. I immediately scolded Huang Yongsheng, ‘I’m Mao Zedong, and I’m not dead yet. How dare you try to sideline me!’ I ordered Wang Dongxing, ‘Burn it! Burn this order!’”

Journalist: “When Liu Shaoqi died, you were ecstatic, jumping up and down?”

Mao: “Yes, on November 12, 1969, at noon, when I woke up, Zhang Yufeng brought me a telegram. I almost jumped out of bed, asking, ‘Liu Shaoqi is dead? Is it true?’ Little Zhang said, ‘Look at how happy you are. He deserved to die. He died cleanly.’ Along with the telegram, they sent me photos, specially flown to me. Wang Guangmei, Jiang Qing, and Ye Qun were eager to have her executed. I said that both women were combative and foolish. I showed leniency toward Wang Guangmei and spared her life as evidence. I let her continue to confess about Liu Shaoqi.”

Journalist: “In December 1969, you returned to Beijing for your birthday, right?”

Mao: “Yes, on December 26, 1969, during my birthday banquet, I scolded Zhou Enlai. I invited Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai, and a few other Standing Committee members. I said, ‘Let’s have a Standing Committee meeting, a brief meeting, and then a Party group meeting.’ I brought out two bottles of whiskey that Field Marshal Montgomery of the United Kingdom gave me as a gift and asked everyone to drink. I said, ‘First, let’s toast to Zhou Enlai. You want me to step down and retire to my hometown, recommending Liu Shaoqi to take over the central leadership.’ Zhou Enlai repeatedly said, ‘I’m guilty, guilty. Please forgive me, forgive me.’ Lin Biao quickly raised his glass to wish me eternal life, resolving the awkward situation. I continued, ‘Enlai supports Runzhi, but he lacks ambition. On my birthday, I’m venting years of accumulated resentment. When I was removed from my position in Jiangxi, I held deep resentment. Old grievances are hard to dispel. No matter how many self-criticisms Zhou Enlai makes, I will still save face for him in front of everyone.’”