Chapter 64 Deception leads to the capture of Wang Guangmei, overthrowing Liu Shaoqi 1967

Journalist: “You had been dissatisfied with Liu Shaoqi for a long time, but when did you actually decide to bring him down?”

Mao: “Yes, my dissatisfaction with Liu Shaoqi started from the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949. He took my concept of ‘New Democracy’ that I proposed in 1945 as the guiding principle for the country. At that time, I presented ‘New Democracy’ as a slogan against Chiang Kai-shek’s dictatorship, but internally, I still advocated for dictatorial rule by the party. Liu Shaoqi, on the other hand, wanted to implement New Democracy as it was, allowing capitalists to exploit more, emphasizing the benefits of exploitation, distributing land to farmers to become prosperous, and gradually promoting collectivization while allowing the free formation of mutual aid teams. I criticized Deng Zihui as a ‘small-footed woman,’ and Liu Shaoqi supported him behind the scenes.

In 1956, during the 8th Congress, we criticized personality cults, and even the portraits of leaders were not displayed at the venue, only the party flag. The party constitution removed ‘Mao Zedong Thought,’ and I tolerated it. In 1958, I launched a counterattack and held the Second Session of the 8th Congress, bringing back the 1,500 delegates. I wanted Zhou Enlai to make a ‘self-criticism’ of the excessive enthusiasm in the Great Leap Forward, but I didn’t force him to do it, giving him face. Even when I initiated the Great Leap Forward, he followed. In 1959, during the Lushan Conference, we criticized Peng Dehuai, and he followed. In 1960, when I continued the anti-rightist campaign and the Great Leap Forward, he didn’t oppose it either. In 1961, when millions of people starved to death, he supported the ‘Household Responsibility System’ to save the lives of farmers, but he didn’t openly criticize me. My prestige hit an all-time low. It was time to conduct a summary of experiences through the Ninth Party Congress, but I didn’t force him to convene it.

It was not until the 7,000-Person Assembly in February 1962, when he saw that I wasn’t engaging in serious self-criticism, that he couldn’t hold back any longer. Near the end of the assembly, he deviated from his prepared speech and shockingly proposed ‘three parts natural disasters, seven parts man-made disasters,’ negating my ‘nine good points and one bad point.’ From that point on, I was convinced that he was no longer on the same page as me, and I secretly resolved to bring him down one day.

Journalist: “Liu Shaoqi’s statement of ‘30% natural disasters, 70% man-made disasters’ was actually a euphemism for ‘no natural disasters, all man-made disasters.’ The weather during those years was normal, without any significant floods, droughts, or pest infestations. You made up your mind to bring down Liu Shaoqi since early 1962. When did you find a way to accomplish that?”

Mao: “After the failure of the Great Leap Forward, which resulted in three years of famine and the deaths of tens of millions of people, Liu Shaoqi’s prestige rose unprecedentedly while mine plummeted. It was challenging for me to bring him down because I realized he didn’t have the intention to overthrow me; he simply wanted me to change or reduce my involvement in state affairs. Additionally, I found that he was a “cultivated” person who didn’t confront me directly. I saw him as weak and easily manipulated, which increased my confidence in overthrowing him. Within just half a year after the 7,000-Person Assembly, I regained my breath.

In August 1962, during the Beidaihe Conference, I launched a surprise attack, shifting the focus of the meeting to class struggle, completely changing its direction. I first dismissed Peng Dehuai’s 80,000-word appeal, then targeted the right-leaning Deng Zihui and Xi Zhongxun. Liu Shaoqi didn’t utter a word and fully accepted my decisions. I was extremely pleased and took advantage of the situation. I expanded the Politburo meetings to the Central Committee Plenum, which extended from Beidaihe to Beijing. Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, and others didn’t dare to speak up. I realized that Liu Shaoqi and his associates were all weaklings and not my opponents. However, the severe setback caused by the three years of famine couldn’t be reversed immediately, and I couldn’t completely dismantle Liu Shaoqi’s influence. Therefore, I had to target Deng Zihui and Xi Zhongxun first. It was a case of ‘remove the threat to the ruler’s side.’

From 1963 to 1964, I continued to launch attacks, emphasizing class struggle nationwide, initiating the Four Cleanups movement, and purging the party of capitalist roaders. The movement was particularly intense in rural areas, and even Liu Shaoqi was forced by Wang Guangmei to go to the countryside to participate in the Four Cleanups. In 1965, Liu Shaoqi and I openly debated during a meeting. He was unhappy with my crackdown on capitalist roaders and questioned which department in the central government had such individuals. In a moment of inspiration, I casually mentioned Zhang Linzhi, the Minister of Coal, as an example. Zhang Linzhi became the first named capitalist roader in the country, although I couldn’t really explain why he was considered as such. During that meeting, I even brought up the constitution and party regulations, asserting my right to speak based on them, and demonstrated my strong-willed protest against Liu Shaoqi, which forced Zhou Enlai to mediate and urge Liu Shaoqi to make self-criticisms for not showing enough respect towards me. However, I couldn’t find any more grounds to pursue him.

It was already evident within the party that Liu Shaoqi and I had diverged in our paths, but I couldn’t find a way to overthrow him. The majority, from the central to local levels, supported him, making it difficult to shake his position. I was anxious but couldn’t find a solution until 1966 when, under the instigation of Jiang Qing and her faction of the Cultural Revolution, the Red Guards emerged in middle schools. That’s when I found the precious tool to bring down Liu Shaoqi. In May and June, Jiang Qing sent big-character posters from Hangzhou, written by the Red Guards of Tsinghua University High School, supporting rebellion. I saw the potential in these young revolutionaries and found the means to destroy Liu Shaoqi. When I returned to Beijing in July and on August 1st, I wrote a letter to the Red Guards of Tsinghua University High School, expressing my enthusiastic support for their rebellion. From that point on, the Red Guards took action.

A red storm erupted in Beijing in August, with activities such as smashing, looting, seizing, searching, and even physically assaulting school principals. They forced people to crawl underground. The violence escalated and spread throughout society, targeting intellectuals and academic authorities. Lao She, the renowned writer, committed suicide by jumping into a lake. Dozens of people were beaten to death in Beijing in a single day. I even said that the chaos wasn’t severe enough, that it was too civilized. I instructed the Ministry of Public Security not to interfere with the students’ actions. On September 1st, more than 200 people were killed in a single day in Beijing. I felt extremely delighted. With the Red Guards in action, they swept away all opposition, destroying Liu Shaoqi’s social base. I allowed the Red Guards to criticize and confine him in Zhongnanhai, subjecting him to arbitrary criticism until his health deteriorated, and he was sent to Kaifeng, where he eventually died. I didn’t bear any responsibility, and I didn’t officially imprison him. Liu Shaoqi and his associates across the country were purged, and the entire Cultural Revolution resulted in the deaths of 20 million people, who became sacrifices for Liu Shaoqi.”

Journalist: “How did you gradually bring down Liu Shaoqi?”

Mao: “In 1966, Liu Shaoqi kept self-criticizing, so I sidelined him and removed him from decision-making. However, I wanted to gradually push him into a corner. On December 18, 1966, Jiang Qing instructed Zhang Chunqiao to talk to Kuai Dafu about thoroughly discrediting Liu Shaoqi. Kuai Dafu understood the message and, on December 25, led a demonstration with 5,000 students from Tsinghua University, marching through the city with two broadcasting vehicles, chanting slogans such as ‘Down with Liu Shaoqi’ and ‘Down with Deng Xiaoping.’

On January 6, 1967, there was the ‘ingenious capture of Wang Guangmei’ at Tsinghua University, orchestrated by Jiang Qing. On that day, Liu Shaoqi’s chief bodyguard received a phone call from someone claiming to be from a hospital, saying that Liu Shaoqi’s daughter, Pingping, had been in a car accident and needed urgent surgery, requiring a parent’s signature. The bodyguard asked Liu Shaoqi’s two children to go and check, allowing them to sign on his behalf. After more than an hour passed without any news, the hospital called again, urging them to come. The bodyguard had to report this to Wang Guangmei. Wang Guangmei informed Liu Shaoqi, who believed it to be true and immediately went to the hospital.”

Journalist: “Did Jiang Qing instruct the Red Guards to deceive and capture Wang Guangmei?”

Mao: “Yes, when Liu Shaoqi arrived at the hospital’s emergency room, he saw that it was filled with Red Guards from Tsinghua University. Liu Shaoqi’s three children were taken hostage, with the aim of luring Wang Guangmei out and subjecting her to struggle sessions at Tsinghua. Wang Guangmei, infuriated, protested, saying, ‘I protest against you creating this deception.’ The Red Guard leaders responded, ‘We captured you under Jiang Qing’s instructions, and the methods were devised by us.’ Wang Guangmei, realizing that Liu Shaoqi’s safety was the priority, said, ‘Since this is directed at me and not Wang Guangmei, everyone else can go.’ Liu Shaoqi and his three children, escorted by the guards, returned home”

Journalist: “So, Wang Guangmei was captured?”

Mao: “Yes, Wang Guangmei was taken to Tsinghua University for struggle sessions but was later released under the intervention of Zhou Enlai.”