Chapter 55 February mutiny and Lin Biao military control 1966

Journalist: “Before the Cultural Revolution you mobilized troops to surround Beijing?

Mao: “He Long said: ‘the President and Lin Biao set up another command in the south and played us in Beijing.’ At February 1966, he had a few insights, Liu Shaoqi said: ‘let the 38th Army stationed in the northeast suddenly transferred to surround Beijing, what is the nature of the problem.’ He panicked, he said to Zhou Enlai: ‘you and I have become a turtle in a jar.’ Zhou Enlai rounded up for me and said: ‘The 38th Army is just passing through Beijing on its way to change its defense. But the Standing Committee are nervous, Buddha’s palm of the god power has been bracketed to everyone’s head.’

Deng Xiaoping said: ‘soldiers outside the city is not normal, no partisan, the use of the field army to resolve internal conflict.’ Peng Zhen said: ‘can not think of any excuse to transfer the 38 army into the city.’ He Long said: ‘I manage the day-to-day affairs of the military commission, uninformed, I should take leave to rest.’ Xu Qianqian said: ‘cannot solve the internal conflicts of the party by military means, please ask the President to return to Beijing to sit down.’ Liu Shaoqi said: ‘March-April as arranged with Chen Yi to visit Pakistan and other three countries, it is best to ask the President to return to Beijing to sit. Hey, hey.’

I just wanted to make them feel uneasy in Beijing, while enjoying myself with Lin Biao and Jiang Qing in the south, planning the Cultural Revolution. I intentionally said, ‘The medical team did not approve, but I have already received an invitation from Marx’ (symbolizing that I am about to die). Once everything is ready, I will soon go to Wuhan to tour the Yangtze River, showcasing the state of my health and leading the banner of the Cultural Revolution. I will first make hypocritical retreats, deceiving everyone, meticulously planning, and succeeding step by step. Before each major action, I always leave Beijing, claiming that I cannot tolerate my illness and must immediately meet Marx. This is using illness as a threat to others.”

Journalist: “You transferred the 38th Army into Beijing to implement military control?”

Mao: “Yes, in March 1966, 38th Army was inserted into Beijing in the middle of the night from the suburbs in all directions, and took over the Beijing garrison, the municipal party committee, the Central Organization Department, the Propaganda Department, the radio station, the Xinhua News Agency, the People’s Daily, the Capital Airport and more than 30 other key departments in two hours, without firing a single shot. It was a ‘military and political earthquake,’ unprecedented in the new China. In this way, all the Central Standing Committee have become my turtle in a jar, do not listen to me also can not be.

Liu Shaoqi got up in the morning to hear, angry face white, trembling, said: ‘we relief, they are busy military control.’ Zhou Enlai excuses to go to Hebei around the investigation, hiding from the wind to leave the burden for a month. Peng Zhen said: ‘woke up and found that the original guard class disappeared, replaced by the 38 Army newcomers, foreboding soon to be under house arrest.’ The 38th Army is to prevent the mutiny of Peng Zhen and Luo Ruiqing.”

Journalist: “You relied on Lin Biao and also beware of Lin Biao?”

Mao: “Yes, I brought the 38th Army with Lin Biao to take military control of Beijing, but I also remained cautious of Lin Biao. I deployed the 63rd Army led by Fu Chongbi and the 65th Army led by Yang Chengwu to Beijing for duty, balancing the power of the 38th Army. Lin Biao resided in Maojiawan with his own security squadron, and I had Wang Dongxing dispatch another squadron to provide him with security. This ensured that Lin Biao would be unable to make any moves even if he contemplated a mutiny.

Behind my back, Lin Biao harbored grievances, claiming that I comfortably held the position of power and had the option to advance or retreat, while others were mere pawns with no way out. This was the case with Gao Gang, Peng Dehuai, Peng Zhen, and Luo Ruiqing. Gao Gang accused me of abandoning him halfway and refusing to take responsibility, which led him to take his own life. Before Lin Biao emerged and came to Beijing, he once told Zhou Enlai that he wanted his security forces to be increased from a company to a regiment, fearing that someone might attempt a mutiny and capture him. However, the additional company I provided was under my command, not under Lin Biao’s authority.”

Journalist: “Guo Moruo was intimidated by you and took the lead in burning books?”

Mao: Yes, in February 1966, Guo Moruo had a premonition that I would launch the Cultural Revolution, which would bring great disaster. He requested that all of his writings and manuscripts be burned without leaving a single copy, clearing the way for the people to study Mao’s works. Guo Moruo took the lead in self-immolation of his books, so let them burn. Following Guo Moruo’s example, book burnings took place across the country, becoming a new spectacle. Zhou Enlai intervened, suggesting that private books be left alone, while books belonging to the government be temporarily sealed. I said, “You handle it as you see fit!”

Journalist: “Did you arrange Beijing opera performances only for yourself?”

Mao: “Yes, I enjoyed listening to operas alone, not allowing anyone else to be present. Song Baolu performed exclusively for me for 40-50 shows, with me being the sole audience member. The small theater was empty. Song performed for countless warlords and politicians, creating a lively atmosphere. Once, while Song was performing for the troops in the Zhoushan Islands, I requested his presence, and he promptly came.

Once, Wang Dongxing said, ‘Deng Xiaoping called three times, urgently needing to speak with you. You were watching a play, so I didn’t disturb you. I told Xiaoping to wait.’ After half an hour, I took the call. Deng Xiaoping reported that the 38th Army had entered the city unexpectedly in the middle of the night, and no one knew what was happening. I got angry and said, ‘As the Chairman of the Military Commission, when I mobilize troops, why should I notify others? Don’t worry too much.’ and send them back.”