Chapter 25 Khrushchev’s third visit to China 1959

Journalist: “Khrushchev came to China for the third time, what did he want you to do?”

Mao: “On September 30, 1959, Khrushchev just finished a 13-day visit to the United States, he hurriedly led a party and government delegation to Beijing to participate in China’s 10th anniversary of the National Day. At this time, the Great Leap Forward had failed and the Lushan meeting to rectify Peng Dehuai had just ended. Khrushchev had openly opposed communalization. He was trying to pull me along the line of peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition to make peace with the United States. I already had a draft and would not go with him. So the atmosphere was much less than his first, second visit to China.”

Journalist: “How did you receive Khrushchev?”

Mao: “I still follow the principle of reciprocity, with several leaders of the Politburo Standing Committee, went to the airport to greet him, but only a cold handshake, I deliberately avoided the Soviet-style hug, I did not have a welcome speech. Khrushchev, however, wanted to speak, he spoke for 2 minutes, the loudspeaker was born faulty, deliberately slowing him down, he continued to raise his voice and spoke for 15 minutes.

That night, the National Day banquet, Zhou Enlai spoke for 5 minutes welcome speech, Khrushchev full of enthusiasm, spoke for more than half an hour.”

Journalist: “Oh, you deliberately make small moves to slacken Khrushchev, you guys are one hot and one cold?”

Mao: “Yes. In the summer and fall of 1959, when the Sino-Indian border was in armed conflict and the Soviet Union was neutral, Sino-Soviet relations began to deteriorate openly, and I declared war on Khrushchev in a thunderous rage, neither Khrushchev nor I could hold back our anger. The conflict between India and China was triggered by the Tibetan issue, and I criticized Tito, while Nehru defended Tito and also cracked down on the Indian Communist Party.

The first time I saw the Chinese government, I decided to fight back against India, and I was not afraid to provoke him, not afraid to fall out, and to fight to the end. However, the Soviets said that India’s granting of refuge to the Dalai was in accordance with international law. I was tough on India, India panicked, and the Soviet Union was surprised. Khrushchev came to China in 1959 and accused me of letting the Dalai escape. The Soviet Union, in order to prevent India from turning to the West, tried to show goodwill to India, giving 1.5 billion Rubles in loans, and the Soviet approach was extremely irreconcilable with mine. saying that I had disrupted peaceful coexistence and disturbed the exchange of visits between Khrushchev and Eisenhower, making me very unhappy. At the same time, Eisenhower sided with India and asked Nehru to be firm, asking how much assistance he needed.

Khrushchev stays neutral, take this to Washington to meet Eisenhower, I could not tolerate Khrushchev’s trip to the United States, and could not say. When Khrushchev came back from his visit to the United States to Beijing in triumph, he stepped off the plane in high spirits, but I took advantage of the issue to criticize him and broke out into talks and arguments. Declared war on Khrushchev, throwing a basin of cold water on him, I de-escalated anger at the Soviet Union and the United States, and excluded me from international affairs, embarrassing me, I criticized Khrushchev childish, do not understand Marx and Lenin, Soviet-US relations first reported sunny days, he had to speak at the airport for 15 minutes, the speaker was broken, he raised his voice to speak as usual, I was expressionless and far away from the sky, cold, unwilling to listen to his what peaceful coexistence Avenue.

During the meeting I said China needs nuclear weapons, Khrushchev said the Soviet Union already has, can defend China, I inconvenience again, do not help me it does not matter, my nuclear weapons bottom down.

I also said that your 20 anti-Stalin personal cult may not be reasonable, Khrushchev immediately excited up to refute, I insisted on criticizing Stalin rash subjectivity, the meeting did not end happily. The third day finally turned into a storm, Khrushchev said Eisenhower did not want war to break out in Taiwan, I immediately said that Taiwan must be liberated. Khrushchev again accused me of keeping 5 Americans in custody without releasing them, making the Sino-American meeting stuck and angering the Americans, and I said I just wouldn’t release the Americans now.

Khrushchev also accused me of taking matters into my own hands by not communicating with the Soviet Union beforehand about the shelling of Kinmen. Khrushchev also asserted that the Tibetan incident was my fault and that releasing the Dalai was a mistake. The meeting debated Khrushchev 3 people, I want Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai and other all out 9 people, obvious advantage, lip-synching, a chaos. I gave Khrushchev buckle ‘opportunist’ hat, He could not help but say ‘why you can criticize me, the big brother can not criticize you?’ He added: ‘When the Hungarian incident broke out, you sent Zhou Enlai to give us a lesson, we listened, you can accuse us, we can’t criticize you, and say that the Soviet Union is the leader, in fact, there is no minimum respect for the Soviet Communist Party.’”

Journalist: “China and the Soviet Union argued hotly?”

Mao: “It was October 2, talks in Zhongnanhai, where both sides spoke frankly and argued fiercely. Khrushchev wanted to de-escalate relations with the U.S. Talking about the five Americans in Chinese custody, Khrushchev apparently wanted us to release them and de-escalate tensions. I did not agree to release them, I did not want détente, détente was contrary to my goal of world revolution, contrary to my goal of world revolution. Talking about the Sino-Indian border conflict, he was not in favor of bad relations with India. Talking about the Tibetan incident, he said it was wrong to let the Dalai go. I argued that we could not stop him from escaping, that the border was long, that he could easily cross it, and that we could not catch him.

The meeting was fruitless, but it was just a matter of both sides stating their opinions and arguing. We have different routes and cannot talk together. I want to take advantage of his peaceful coexistence with the U.S. Empire to raise the banner of my anti-imperialist revolution and to win over radical organizations in Asia, Africa and Latin America that are bent on seizing power by violence, hoping that they will abandon the Soviet Union and come to me. The future center of the world revolution was established in Beijing.

A house, a car, a television, a piano, are not the goals I seek. I want to call for a revolution and to level imperialism first. Until then, whatever sacrifices, however many lives, will be worth it.”

Journalist: “Khrushchev wants peaceful coexistence, you want world revolution, can’t talk about one piece?”

Mao: “Yes. Khrushchev no longer trusts me because of the 1958-1959 Rattlesnake missile incident. I wasn’t surprised when he said he wanted to withdraw the atomic bomb experts. We had basically mastered the atomic bomb technology, but we had to rely on his assistance to build missiles and nuclear warheads, and my strategy was to divide but not split.

On the second day, Khrushchev informed me that there was an urgent matter at home and I had to return home early. The original arrangements for visits to various places were cancelled. I sent the Soviet delegation away coldly. Khrushchev went around to Vladivostok and Novosibirsk before returning to Moscow, and he was leaving early in silent protest. The meeting did not even have a communiqué to issue. This time Khrushchev’s final visit to China was the turning point of the open rupture between China and the Soviet Union, attacking each other, the sky appeared two suns, I had a great momentum to overtake the Soviet Communist Party, tearing up the face.

Khrushchev’s third visit to China, the escalation of Sino-Soviet differences, the talks were not fruitful, the Soviet Union assistance downgraded and cooled down, and the unhappy breakup, Khrushchev and his party also left Beijing early to return home.”

Journalist: “And Khrushchev just left in defeat?

Mao: “Yes. 1959 Khrushchev came on a high and left on a low. He was still angry on October 6 in Haisanwei, saying that some people are like roosters who are good at fighting and enthusiastic about war. Obviously criticizing me for being a rooster good at fighting.

But I knew that China and the Soviet Union could not break up, I still had to ask for Soviet assistance, I immediately convened a meeting of the Politburo, temporarily abandoned the argument, I changed my mind with the reception of the Soviet Chargé d’affaires Antonov: in favor of Khrushchev’s visit to the United States and full disarmament. Once I saw the fire, to contract a little, rounding off in favor of Khrushchev.

Although I think Khrushchev and Dulles ‘peaceful evolution’ consistent, I still want to please Khrushchev, or he cut off Soviet aid, I eat a big loss. Although since March 1959, I believe that the Soviet Union and the United States, India, Tito anti-mine chorus, I was isolated, but I had Marx and Lenin in my hands, I felt that Khrushchev was afraid of the United States, the second afraid of my Communist, I still have to take advantage of his assistance, although he criticized me for the Great Leap Forward overwhelmed, in the simple and backward countryside to build communism, but also criticized the Communist Party of China a series of mistakes caused by the cult of me personally.

In February 1959, Khrushchev proposed unilateral and unconditional disarmament of one million to 1.5 million people in order to fulfill the general line of peaceful coexistence, emphasizing Eisenhower’s sincerity in peaceful coexistence, ending the Cold War, making concessions and compromises, and avoiding tension and war, which were increasingly distant from my ideas. “I launched a national campaign to criticize the Soviet Union, taking advantage of the commemoration of Lenin’s 90th birthday to publish articles criticizing, making the Sino-Soviet divide fully public and previewing the great polemic: (As early as 1957 there were 2,400 Soviet experts in China, in 1958 there were half as many, only 1,200)

As early as August 1958, more than 200 Soviet experts in the nuclear industry assisting China were all withdrawn. (In December 1967, I received the General Secretary of the Communist Party of India, Ghosh, and the Leftists and said, “Once you come to power, I will not only recognize the McMahon Line, but also cede 90,000 square kilometers of land to the south to India.”