III. DISASTER 1949-1962
Anti-Rightist Great Leap Forward Famine Rightist Great Leap Forward Famine

Chapter 21 Khrushchev’s Second Visit to China 1958

Journalist: “If you despise Khrushchev, why did you invite him to visit again?”

Mao: “In 1958 I engaged in the Great Leap Forward, to food, steel up, I pursue communist utopia, the Soviet Communist Party said I ideal socialism. 1959 issued an article satirizing my Great Leap Forward, I inwardly want to catch up with Moscow, I than Stalin bold, copy the Soviet Union I do not feel comfortable, I copy the Soviet Union killed people, talk about Stalin suppressed the Chinese Communist revolution. I copied the Soviet Union to the detriment of people, like a 3-year-old child, who had to be supported everywhere, lost his soul, and ran a newspaper called Pravda. I had to criticize the Soviet Union for 40 years in 13 years. Marx’s mainstream has arrived in the East, and communism can arrive earlier than the Soviet Union. I can catch up with all the countries in the world in 20 years, and may surpass the United States.

I told Chen Boda to ‘unite the countryside and the community,’ and turn the small community into a big one. I said that collective ownership was obsolete, and that the transition to communism was universal, and that I was one step ahead. I was the international communist leader, and I was on top. Khrushchev asked me to ‘check my watch’ and look at the time, but I ignored him.

My Great Leap Forward and People’s Commune …… made the Soviet Union go from enthusiastic support to cautious opposition through the aid of science and technology. experience when you hit your head on the ground. Khrushchev’s said: ‘commune is a word used in the French Revolution, the Chinese system is reactionary (Reactionary) the Soviet Union tried communes,’ it does not work, Khrushchev also said that it is not correct to jump to communism at once.

My communalization had a bad effect on Eastern Europe, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic wanted to follow suit, and Kim Il Sung in North Korea wanted to start the ‘Thousand Mile Movement,’ and I was proud that I was leading the worldwide communist movement, and I was getting more and more dizzy.

In June 1958, I asked Zhou Enlai to send a telegram to Khrushchev asking for nuclear submarine production technology and equipment, as well as aircraft carriers. Khrushchev did not agree to it as written; he suggested a common fleet so that China would have nuclear submarines and the Soviet Union would have direct access to the Pacific. on July 21, Soviet Ambassador Eugene offered us Khrushchev’s proposal for cooperation.”

Journalist: “When Khrushchev came to Beijing, what did you say to him?”

Mao: “At the beginning of 1958.8. when Khrushchev came to Beijing, I said to him, ‘I was happy to have China in 1949, but I was poor and penniless, and later I was happy and unhappy with the transformation of industry and commerce and the victory in the Korean War, and I was only completely happy with the Great Leap Forward this year.’ I was most happy when people said that the center of communism had shifted to China, and those who fully supported my Great Leap Forward were North Korea, Vietnam, East Germany, Poland, and the Czech Republic, and Mongolia, Albania, Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union, who were suspicious of not taking a stand, and I only made achievements, but the results were miserable.

At the Lushan meeting, I wanted to hold a ‘meeting of the gods’ and could not be forced to give the ‘edict of guilt,’ but Peng Dehuai’s opinion made me angry and I linked Peng with Khrushchev.

In 1959.12, Khrushchev said in Hungary that the Communist parties should ‘not lag behind and not take the lead, but face each other.’ How could I be in the same position as him? I just wanted to be first.

When Khrushchev visited China in 1958.8, I proudly said to Khrushchev as soon as he got off the plane that China has an unprecedented bumper crop of grain and a lot of grain reserves, I feel very difficult about how to deal with this grain, please give you some advice. Khrushchev, embarrassed on the spot, replied with a smile: ‘The Soviet Union has never had a surplus of grain, I believe you are finding a solution.’”

Journalist: “Isn’t it good that Khrushchev proposed to build a joint fleet and send you nuclear submarines?”

Mao: “It would have been good. But as soon as I saw the proposal, I was so smug that I had to take the opportunity to play on the issue, to be deliberately angry, to give Khrushchev an infinite upscale, to rise to the level that he would come in and control me and undermine my national sovereignty. I have no desire to cooperate with him at all, he and I are walking two paths, he wants a peaceful transition, I want a revolutionary war, I want to take advantage of the opportunity to intimidate him, and then ask him for weapons and equipment.

Khrushchev’s visit in 1958 raised the furor over long-wave radio and the Common Fleet. I took the opportunity to rant and rave that Khr wanted to play the role of the Pacific Fleet, which at that time had no communication satellites and relied only on radio to contact command. The Soviets wanted to build a long-wave transmitter on Hainan Island and one in India. He vetoed India, recognized Hainan Island feasible, need 110 million Rubles, the Soviet Union to pay 70 million, China to pay 40 million, common use. I replied that the cost would be fully covered by China, ownership China, but the Soviet side insisted on joint venture, I was impatient. In fact, in 1957, three long-wave radio stations had been built, all funded by both sides and jointly used, according to the past program to build another one, it is reasonable, I am deliberately picky. In fact, in 1954, the Soviet Union returned the port of Lushun, which was the sincerest, and in 1958, the Soviet-aided atomic reactor was already in operation.

In 1958, the Soviet-aided atomic reactor was already in operation. Huynh mentioned the common fleet and the use of the port, and said that Vietnam could also participate, which was a good intention, but I opposed the ‘cooperative.’ My navy was in its infancy, and the Soviet-Chinese alliance would have helped me, but I deliberately said he wanted to control China, using the issue to vent my discontent, speaking in a tone of voice above the Soviet Union, and I spoke at length as if lecturing Soviet Ambassador Eugene, for five hours, so that Khrushchev said to Eugene on the phone excitedly: ‘I don’t understand,’ so that Khrushchev was shocked and upset. Khrushchev said ‘I took the initiative to return Lushun port, still afraid to control you?’ The Soviet Union was originally for the submarine fleet can be anchored in the Chinese port to rest.

Long-wave radio, Hirsch also said ownership belongs to China, the Soviet side to provide loans only, I insisted that no loans, refused to Soviet submarines to refuel and recuperation.

He said the advisers are like pus on the body, to squeeze it out, suggesting that all advisers withdrawn, I said: we need experts.

He had thought: courtesy, the Chinese fleet can also use the Soviet base, the Soviet side is not malicious. The key is that my mentality has changed, from Stalin’s old son party, to I became the old son, relegating Khrushchev down, listen to me, let me command it. Objectively speaking: that the Soviet side violated China’s sovereignty, untenable, was distorted, exaggerated, venting my anger.

In August 1958 Khrushchev came to Beijing and talked with me four times, saying again and again that it was a misunderstanding, that there was no intention of joint command of the Chinese fleet, that there was no idea of two countries sharing, and that it was sad to say that I had raised it to the level of infringement of sovereignty. I had to say that I would never mention this issue again.

Journalist: “Oh, you’re going to use the issue to scold Khrushchev before asking him for weapons?”

Mao: “Yes, on July 22, 1958, I called Eugene in and deliberately lashed out at him, saying: You guys pissed me off so much yesterday that I didn’t sleep all night, you made the atomic bomb, you want control, you want lend-lease rights. After I got angry, I said to Eugene: You are helping us to build the navy, and we intend to build two or three hundred submarines. Finally I asked Khrushchev to come to Beijing to talk.”

Journalist: “Khrushchev came to Beijing on your word?”

Mao: “Yes, on July 31, 1958, Khrushchev came to Beijing at my request, I went to the airport to meet him with a stern face, no honor guard, no red carpet. The next day he came to Zhongnanhai to see me, I met him in my bathing suit, I asked him to go down to the swimming pool, he could not swim, but casually took off his suit, put on his swimming trunks, put on his swimming ring and went into the water, followed me and barely struggled to swim, I saw that he even drank a few mouthfuls of water, I looked very proud. He wretchedly did not swim, climbing up the side of the pool to sit.”

Journalist: “Oh, you deliberately snubbed Khrushchev, but he was easy-going, took off his suit and swam with you?”

Mao: “Yes, I vented to Khrushchev, on purpose, my past grievances against Stalin, to show that I too had been aggrieved. I accused the Soviet Union of wanting to control China and tie our hands. I smoked whatever I wanted, kept spitting smoke at Khrushchev, spoke excitedly, and pointed my finger at Khrushchev’s nose. He explained: the Western NATO countries supply each other, cooperate, there is no problem, and we can not agree on such a simple thing? Indicated that the withdrawal of the proposal, do not misunderstand, and will not mention the matter in the future. Finally Khrushchev, or promised to help establish a large submarine manufacturing plant to produce submarines.”

Journalist: “Khrushchev good talk, the United Fleet does not engage on the strike, and give you to build a submarine factory?”

Mao: “Yes, because it was a secret visit to discuss the issue, the original was not prepared to issue a joint communiqué. But I asked for a joint communiqué, and before Khrushchev left on August 3, China and the Soviet Union issued a joint communiqué, saying that international issues had been agreed. In fact, we did not discuss international issues at all. I merely had to use the joint communiqué to make things worse. Khrushchev was kept in the dark, I was smug, I tricked him into coming to Beijing, and everything was done according to my intentions.”

Journalist: “Khrushchev was tricked by you into coming to Beijing and giving you aid, what’s your next step? “

Mao: “August 23, 1958, I seized the opportunity to fox the tiger, ordered the shelling of Kinmen, 30,000 rounds of Soviet-made artillery shells, triggering the second Taiwan Strait crisis. I shelled Kinmen, Khrushchev is even more confused, do not know what my mystery. The 10,000-artillery shelling of Kinmen put Khrushchev in an awkward position. I am very angry, he was confused, I am dissatisfied with Her weakness to the United States, hit the United States to show him that I hard, Taiwan is too far to hit, hit the Jin, Ma fire reconnaissance, see the American decision, so that the United States and Taiwan tension a little, tension situation in my favor, to engage in large military operations, landing Jin Ma, etc., I also have countless in mind, temporarily powerless. Creating tension air only, playing a psychological war. The first thing you need to do is to get a good idea of what you want to do.

1958.8, When he came to China, I did not even talk to him about the issue of fighting Kinmen. I decided only after he left. I asked Ye Fei in Beidaihe on August 20, the shelling would kill the Americans? Ye said the American advisers equipped to the battalion level, will be, I considered for more than 10 minutes and said: can we avoid hitting the Americans? I was afraid to hit the Americans to cause trouble. I decided not to hit the ground targets, only hit the surface ships, not to hit the command airfield, not to hit the U.S. warships and the island Americans. But Peng still wanted to hit the command airfield, and soon after the shelling began, I saw the most unwanted result: the White House adopted a limited intervention stance, and the U.S. 6th Fleet and four destroyers were transferred from the Mediterranean to Taiwan to join the 7th Fleet, and a number of other carriers and destroyers came to Taiwan from Pearl Harbor. The U.S. aid Taiwan, Chiang can increase troops Kinmen.

The United States, based on the Sino-Soviet joint communiqué published this month, thought it was an action discussed between China and the Soviet Union and thought I was going to hit Taiwan. The U.S. fleet sailed into the Taiwan Strait, saying it would defend Kinmen and threatening to bomb the mainland. Khrushchev got nervous and sent Foreign Minister Gromyko (Gromyko) to Beijing to see me the next day. In fact, I just wanted to scare Khrushchev that a war would destroy the Soviet Union as well. I deliberately asked Foreign Minister Gromyko: After such a war, where should we build the capital of the socialist world? I proposed to build a small island in the Pacific Ocean as the new capital of the socialist world. By this I meant that Moscow would no longer exist. Foreign Minister Ge was so horrified that he sent a telegram back to Moscow, drawing special attention to it. Later I gave Foreign Minister Ge the reassurance that I would not drag the Soviet Union down and that China would go around the United States alone, provided: the Soviet Union helped us and we dealt with the United States alone.

To make me even more nervous, the White House issued a policy statement stating that the United States had an obligation to defend Taiwan. President Eisenhower even opened a special meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, proposing not only to escort navigation, if I launch a large-scale attack, to give Chiang assistance in order to attack my coastal military bases, if I attack Taiwan, the U.S. President will decide to use nuclear weapons, to make me regret it and risk great danger. I realized the complexity and seriousness of the international struggle, I stipulated that no attack on U.S. forces, I became cautious and prepared to resume negotiations with the United States. Seeing that the U.S. had decided to take five actions ranging from escorting to dropping the atomic bomb, the Soviet Union became anxious, and Khrushchev called the embassy in China and said that he was ready to send Foreign Minister Gromyko secretly to Beijing to talk. Gromyko came, I said if the U.S. military uses nuclear weapons, I will lure the enemy deep, I retreat to Yan’an, and then ask the Soviet Union to hit the U.S. military with the atomic bomb and close the door to fight the dog, I said what is so terrible about the atomic bomb? I took full responsibility and would not drag the Soviet Union down, and the Soviet Union thanked me for not involving the Soviet Union in the war.

Khrushchev was good, he declared that an invasion of China was an invasion of the Soviet Union and asked the United States to stop interfering in China. But the Soviet Union and China made common cause was the outward appearance, the inner divide concealed, the Soviet Union wanted to send missile troops and air divisions to the front in Fujian, I did not agree, I only want ground and air missiles sold to me by my use.”

Journalist: “You shelled Kinmen, mainly for the Soviet Union to see? To Khrushchev added blackmail to ask for weapons?”

Mao: “Yes. On September 27, 1958, Khrushchev wrote to me saying, ‘Thank you for your willingness to take the blow alone and not involve the Soviet Union in it.’ Expressing agreement to help so that I would be able to confront the United States. My request was met, Khrushchev was blackmailed by me, and in my triumph, I announced a halt to the shelling.”

Journalist: “The Rattlesnake missile incident, how did that happen?”

Mao: “On September 24, 1958, there was an air battle between China and Taiwan over the Taiwan Strait, and Taiwan launched several Rattlesnake missiles, shooting down one of our warplanes, and one missile landed in a rice paddy in Fujian without exploding. We were given a treasure and immediately hauled it off to study this advanced missile. When the Soviets learned of this, they demanded that they be given the missiles to study. We deliberately delayed, saying that we would share the information with the Soviet Union after the study. The Soviets got angry and impatient and informed us to suspend a medium-range missile technology transfer.”

Journalist: “You are petty not to give the baby, the Soviet Union is angry?”

Mao: “Yes. We passed a month or so, special planes to take the rattlesnake, which had been disassembled, to Moscow. They found that the critical infrared sensor was missing, and we lied and said it was not there in the first place. This incident made Khrushchev feel tricked, saying that the Soviets gave everything, but the Chinese would not cooperate with such a small problem. I did not want to cooperate with him in the first place, but just tricked him into giving something. Khrushchev wrote back that the matter had hurt feelings and pointed out that the Soviet Union advocated détente, China stressed tension, and the Chinese Communist Party acted on its own. Khrushchev speaks of peaceful coexistence, I speak of nuclear war is not afraid, my big “war on the brink of policy,” the tension can mobilize the world to fight the United States, I intentionally concealed from Khrushchev in advance to the Golden Horse shelling, I independently to solve the Asian problem, when the situation is out of control, I also count on Khrushchev to support. Dragged down and incorporated into his general policy of peaceful coexistence. My lawlessness led to Khrushchev’s decision to stop nuclear technical assistance to me.

In 1958, when Khrushchev was negotiating with Eisenhower to ban nuclear testing and shell the Golden Gate, I threw cold water on Khrushchev. Khrushchev felt a rift between China and the Soviet Union and regretted signing a nuclear technology aid contract with me. In fact, the design data of the atomic bomb samples were installed in 3 carriages with seals half a year earlier, and guards watched them day and night until mid-1954, when Khrushchev decided to suspend them. But Khrushchev is not bad, in 1959 also agreed to sell my navy 5 kinds of ships, including missile ships, 2 kinds of missiles, my admirals excited. 1959 Lushan meeting, I also decided 8 years to get the atomic bomb, the Soviet Union full stop nuclear aid, withdrawal of experts in August 1960, I approved late, 1964 explosion of the atomic bomb.

Khrushchev also saw that I was challenging Moscow’s leadership and that I would make all the decisions. I also knew that Khrushchev did not want to control China, he was trying to control the situation and was afraid that the Soviet Union would be dragged down.”