Chapter 96 Going on a pilgrimage to Moscow to pay homage to Stalin 1949-1950

Journalist: “When you built the new China, the first big event was to meet the big boss, right?”

Mao: “Yes, once my new China was established, the first big event was to go to Moscow to meet Stalin and realize my dream for several years.

It’s a long story, but it started in 1947, when I was eager to fight Chiang’s civil war when victory was in sight.

I wanted a Snow-like figure to help me with propaganda. Moscow had forbidden me to contact Snow again. I turned to Anna Louise Strong, a second-rate American journalist. Strong had no reputation in the West as Snow, she was merely a Communist sounding board.

In 1947, I sent Strong on a propaganda tour around the world. Before leaving, I gave her a set of documents and instructed her to pass them on to the Communist Party in each country, but not to take them to Moscow.

Strang complied and wrote ‘The thought of Mao’ and ‘Dawn out of China’, saying that ‘the whole of Asia could learn more from China than from the Soviet Union,’ and that my writings ‘might well influence the pattern of some European governments. may influence the pattern of some European governments. These words stole Stalin’s heart. Strawn’s book could not be published in the Soviet Union, but it was published in India and Eastern European countries, including Yugoslavia.’”

Journalist: “You used American Strang as your sounding board? Her propaganda put you over Stalin?”

Mao: “Yes, Stalin had the idea to teach me a lesson and show me who the big boss was. on November 30, 1947, feeling that victory in the civil war was in sight, I proposed to Stalin to visit the Soviet Union. on December 16, Stalin telephoned back that I was welcome to visit the Soviet Union. The telegram was forwarded to me by Dr. Alof. I was very happy and prepared to leave in three months.

Three months passed, but no invitation came from Stalin. On the day I regained Yan’an, I mentioned again to Alof that I was going to leave on May 5. Stalin called back and said ‘Yes.’ I asked to bring both Soviet doctors with me, and Stalin replied that it would be all right, but not that I would visit Eastern Europe.

On May 10, 1948, after my scheduled departure date, Stalin suddenly called to postpone the visit. As spring went on and summer came and went, Stalin never mentioned my invitation to visit the Soviet Union. I was anxious to leave, but by this time I had already gathered with other leaders in Xibaipo, and everyone knew that I was going to meet Stalin, but Stalin still did not invite me.

On July 4, 1948, I sent another telegram to Stalin, saying that I intended to leave in 10 days, and that I would leave on the 15th in any case. I wanted Stalin to send two planes to pick me up.

On July 14, a telegram from Stalin came from Pavlov: ‘Tell Mao that the grain harvest is approaching and that the senior leaders of the Party are going to the provinces and will return only in November. Therefore, please ask Comrade Mao Zedong to postpone his visit until the end of November to have the opportunity to meet all the comrades of the central leadership.’

Journalist: “Haha, Stalin repeatedly postponed your visit to Moscow, he didn’t want to meet you?”

Mao: “I wondered. Did my visit to the Soviet Union have to be postponed until midwinter? Is Stalin joking with me? I was so confident that I had packed my suitcase, had my shoes made, and had a tweed coat made.

When I realized that my ambition had annoyed Stalin, I took measures to remedy the situation, and on August 15, 1948, when I learned that the North China University was going to propose “to study Maoism”, I immediately rejected this proposal and ordered that ‘Maoism’ be changed to ‘Marxism-Leninism.’ I ordered that the term ‘Maoism’ be changed to ‘Marxism-Leninism.’

On September 28, 1948, I sent Stalin an ingratiating telegram in which I addressed him for the first time with the ‘Big Boss’ that Stalin liked to hear: ‘Please let me see the Big Boss and report to him personally.’”

Journalist: “You called Stalin Big Boss yourself, and he was happy?”

Mao: “Yes. Stalin saw that I had bowed my head and, on October 17, 1948, telephoned me back, saying that I was welcome to come at the end of November. I took a chill pill. I had to postpone my visit to the Soviet Union on my own initiative only because of the rapid development of the war in China.

At the end of 1948, the civil war was drawing to a close, and in January 1949, Chiang’s government demanded peace talks. Stalin asked me to reply and agree to the negotiations. I was furious. The next day Stalin sent me an additional telegram explaining that his proposal for peace talks was for show, to show the world that the responsibility for the continuation of the civil war lay with the Kuomintang.”

Journalist: “Stalin still wants you to make peace with Chiang Kai-shek?”

Mao: “Yes, but my consistent idea was that not a day of peace would be given to the Kuomintang, not even for show. I said to Stalin that I wanted the Nanking government to surrender unconditionally, without the need for a circuitous strategy. At that time, Chiang’s government asked the Soviet Union to mediate, and people around Stalin felt that Stalin had been trained by me.

Stalin gave me a long lecture on the second day, saying that refusing peace talks would damage the public image and that it might lead to an armed Western intervention. I didn’t believe in Western intervention, but I didn’t want to dislodge Stalin, so I issued a statement with a set of conditions for peace talks, which was tantamount to telling the Kuomintangs to surrender unconditionally. Stalin also obediently stepped down and telephoned back on the second day saying that we were in complete agreement.”

Journalist: “Stalin was still afraid of U.S. interference, so he asked you to make peace?”

Mao: “Yes. Stalin once again felt that I was not a simple person. On January 14, 1949, Stalin asked me to postpone my visit to the Soviet Union again, saying that the situation at this time, China can not do without me. He also proposed to send an authoritative Politburo member to see me.

Stalin wanted to postpone again, my first reaction, throwing the telegram on the table: ‘Let him be!’ On January 17, 1949, I sent a telegram back saying that Stalin’s emissaries were ‘very welcome.’”

Journalist: “Stalin is still delaying, did he send high-ranking officials to initial the talks?”

Mao: “Yes, Mikoyan came to Xibaipo on January 30, 1949. I was very happy that Mikoyan met me and thanked Stalin for his careful attention.

The day after Mikoyan arrived, the Kuomintang government moved from Nanking to Guangzhou, and the only foreign ambassador who moved with it was Soviet Ambassador Roshen. on February 1, 1949, I did not attend the meeting with Mikoyan to show my displeasure. Zhou Enla was instructed to ask Mikoyan to explain, and Mikoyan argued, ‘This is normal, the ambassador moved to Guangzhou to gather intelligence.’

Despite my discontent, I told Mikoyan again and again that Stalin was the tutor of the Chinese people and the people of the world, and that I was a believer in Stalin and was ready to receive instructions. That I had not made a new contribution to Marxism.”

Journalist: “You are one to promote Stalin and depress yourself?”

Mao: “Yes, Yugoslav Tito (Tito) had just been expelled from the communist camp by Stalin because of too much independence. I made every effort to say that I would not become a Tito-type figure and deliberately criticized Yugoslavia in front of Mikoyan.

Mikoyan mentioned to me the relations between the Communist parties in Asia. I immediately proposed the creation of an ‘Asian Intelligence Bureau.’ I told Mikoyan that I had already planned the membership of the Asian Intelligence Bureau, including North Korea, Indochina, the Philippines, etc., and that it would be established as soon as China came to power.

Mikoyan proposed the establishment of an ‘East Asian Intelligence Bureau’ with me as the head, which would start with three members: China, Japan, and North Korea, and would gradually increase in size. The scope was much smaller than I had expected.

The day after Mikoyan and I discussed the scope of influence, Stalin ordered me to arrest Sidney Rittenberg. Rittenberg was a colleague of Strong’s, and both of them helped me with propaganda. Stalin lied that they were both American spies, and Pravda had published the news of Strong’s arrest in Moscow.”

Journalist: “Oh, Stalin wanted you to have Lee Dunbai arrested, what was Lee’s crime?”

Mao: “Nothing incriminating. But I had to do what Stalin wanted and arrested Li Dunbai, who was in Xibaipo at the time. In the Soviet Union, along with Strang in prison, there was Borodin, who was in the limelight in China. Strawn asked Borodin to help her publish her book in the Soviet Union in praise of me, and Borodin worked for it. Now he’s in trouble, too. He’s being interrogated about his relationship with me.

I understood Stalin’s warning, and I saw that Stalin gave in and gave me East Asia, and did not want me to reach out to other regions. Stalin and I divided the sphere of influence and I had a sense of accomplishment.”

Journalist: “Oh, Stalin was lecturing you not to go too far?”

Mao: “Yes, Wang Ming knew at this point that he could not compete with me and turned to me with compliments, saying that Mao Zedong Thought “is the concrete application and development of Marxism- Leninism in the colonies and semi-colonies. Not only in East Asia, Asia, but also in the global colonies and semi-colonies. Wang Ming scratched my itch, and I was extraordinarily comfortable. According to Wang Ming’s way of speaking, there is a taste of dividing the ‘market.’ Once divided, Stalin only cared about the industrially developed places, and the colonies and semi- colonies belonged to me, thus dividing the world with Stalin.”

Journalist: “Wang Ming also helped you at this time?”

Mao: “Yes. Liu Shaoqi visited the Soviet Union that summer and euphemistically tried to get Stalin to put into practice the idea of establishing an East Asian intelligence bureau. Liu Shaoqi introduced the subject by asking Stalin whether China should join the ‘Communist Intelligence Bureau,’ in which only European countries participated. Stalin replied: ‘I don’t think it’s necessary, China should organize an East Asian Communist League.’ This seemed to be a confirmation of my leadership in East Asia, but it was not, and Stalin followed it up by saying, ‘The Soviet Union, which straddles Eurasia, will also participate in this alliance.’Once the Soviet Union came in, what kind of leader did I have to be? Apparently, Stalin changed his mind and was not willing to let go of it at the moment.

Stalin continued to send me warnings by arresting people. Alof, who was my personal physician, went to prison. The head of the KGB personally interrogated him about his relationship with American spies and me. The Soviets specifically approached Shi Zhe, who was an interpreter, and told him to expose Alov. In this way, Stalin used my ‘black materials’ to signal me to restrain my ambitions. All the Soviets who worked with me later died in vain. Arlov died in a plane accident. After accompanying me on my visit to the Soviet Union, M.D. disappeared without a trace. Borodin died of torture in 1951. Sun Ping, who was stationed in Yan’an, died in 1953. Sun Ping was poisoned by the KGB, with a slow poison.”

Journalist: “Oh, Stalin got all those Soviets you had a relationship with, killed?”

Mao: “Yes, he warned me by that means. The first international communist conference after the founding of our country, the Asian Australian Trade Union Congress, was scheduled to be held in Beijing in November 1949. Stalin gave his nod in advance, but later wanted to hold it somewhere else. Liu Shaoqi responded that the conference should be held in China as scheduled. Preparations were underway, and the venue should not be changed. We promised that the conference would only be a general call to action, without any organizational work, and that we would not take the opportunity to establish overseas networks.

Liu Shaoqi spoke at the conference about ‘Mao Zedong’s Way,’ without mentioning Stalin or the Soviet example. Liu said, ‘The road that the Chinese people have taken is the road that the colonial and semi-colonial people should take, and whoever tries to evade it will make a mistake.’ On November 23, 1949, Liu Shaoqi announced that a ‘Liaison Bureau’ would be set up, with headquarters in Beijing. I could use this agency as a command. I didn’t care what I had promised Stalin earlier.”

Journalist: “Stalin was not comfortable with you, so you went ahead and did it anyway?”

Mao: “Yes, I did what I wanted, and what could Stalin do to me? He can’t deal with me like he did with Tito. I have China, I have 1/4 of the human population, and I have greatly increased the weight of the communist camp. And I’m going to make Stalin work for me and help me expand my ambitions.”

Journalist: “Oh, you’re going to overtake Stalin? Make Stalin work for you?”

Mao: “Yes. People think that it is the West’s fault that the U.S. and the West do not recognize the Chinese Communist regime. In fact, I deliberately took hostile actions to make the West not recognize the CCP. After the Communists took Shenyang, I set up a policy to ‘squeeze out’ these consulates, and Zhou Enlai told Mikoyan: ‘We’ll make it impossible for them to live, and they’ll have to go.’ The Northeast was kept behind the Iron Curtain and did not deal with any foreign countries except the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The U.S. Consul General in Shenyang and members of the consulate were placed under house arrest, and Consul General Wald was accused of espionage and deported. The Communists entered Nanking and we had a hostile break-in into the residence of U.S. Ambassador Stanton.”

Journalist: “You had long made up your mind about the United States to go hostile?”

Mao: “Yes, to Britain, I also pyromaniac. When the Communist army crossed the Yangtze River, the British warship Purple Quartz stopped on the river, and our troops were seriously wounded by shelling, and 42 British sailors were killed. In England, angry seamen beat up the British Communist leader Harry Pollitt so badly that he was hospitalized with injuries.”

Journalist: “How dare you! Beating up 42 British Navy men?”

Mao: “Yes. Stalin was afraid of an armed Western intervention that would involve the Soviet Union. He ordered the Soviet Far East forces to go into full combat readiness, while sending me a telegram telling me not to publicize my relations with the Soviet Union. I understood his meaning and toned down the tone, asking the troops to avoid conflict with foreign countries and to protect diplomatic personnel. At one point I ordered a halt to the attack on Shanghai, considering Western interests and fearing that it might cause Western intervention.

But I soon resumed the advance and took Shanghai at the end of May 1949. I was convinced that the West would not intervene recklessly and armed. On May 30, 1949, I asked Zhou Enlai to find an intermediary to bring a letter to President Truman, saying that the Communist leaders were divided into two factions, the pro-Soviet ‘radicals’ represented by Liu Shaoqi and the pro-Western ‘liberals’ represented by Zhou Enlai. ‘If the U.S. supported Zhou, he might influence the Communist Party into the arms of the West.’”

Journalist: “Oh, you sent a message to President Truman to confuse him?”

Mao: “Yes, and I sent someone to negotiate with U.S. Ambassador Stanton. Stanton was wishful thinking that he could be a peacemaker. In fact, I pulled the U.S., a card to show Stalin that I had the U.S. back, so that he would treat me better and I could bargain.

On June 30, 1949, I published an op-ed announcing that diplomacy was ‘on one side’. China belonged to the Communist camp and would not establish diplomatic relations with Western countries in the near future. To reinforce the effect, a few days later, William Olive, the U.S. Deputy Consul General in Shanghai, was arrested and beaten in the street and died shortly thereafter. At the end of July 1949, when the Amethyst was fleeing, I ordered a fierce attack on the Amethyst, which was hit in several places and took cover next to a Chinese passenger ship, which was sunk by shells.”

Journalist: “You hit hard, and killed the U.S. vice consul general, and hit the British warship, a show absolutely one-sided?”

Mao: “Yes, I declared to Stalin that I wanted to wait and not rush to establish diplomatic relations with Western countries. Stalin was pleased. Severing relations with the West was my gift to Stalin, and was conducive to making a deal with Stalin.

At the end of October 1949, I asked Zhou Enlai to tell the Soviet ambassador that I wanted to go to Moscow to celebrate Stalin’s 70th birthday on December 21. Stalin nodded his head. I had just brought 1/4 of the world’s population, into the communist camp, and Stalin did not welcome me as a hero. I went to Moscow to celebrate my birthday, just one of the leaders of the Communist Party.”

Journalist: “Oh, you went to Moscow to congratulate Stalin on his birthday, not some promised visit to two countries?”

Mao: “Yes, to celebrate his birthday, and on December 6, 1949, I left for Moscow, which was my first trip abroad. No other leaders accompanied me, and the biggest official was Secretary Chen Boda. I thought Stalin might humiliate me, and I did not allow Wang Jiaxiang, the ambassador to the Soviet Union, to attend the first meeting with Stalin. The first meeting was the day I arrived in Moscow. I reiterated to Stalin the ‘one-sided’ policy, saying, ‘Several countries, especially Britain, are trying to recognize the new China, but we are not in a hurry to establish diplomatic relations.’

I wanted to sign a new Sino-Soviet friendship treaty to replace the old treaty between the Soviet Union and Chiang Kai-shek. However, Stalin said that the abandonment of the old treaty would involve the Yalda agreement and that the Soviet Union had decided ‘not to change any of the provisions of this treaty for the time being,’ to which I immediately agreed: ‘We will do whatever is good for our common cause.’ I agreed that the Soviet Union would continue to maintain the territorial privileges granted to the Soviet Union in the old treaty. In return, I made a request: help me build a strong army, a comprehensive system of military industry.”

Journalist: “Isn’t the war over? You focus still on asking Stalin to help you build a strong army, a military-industrial system?”

Mao: “Yes, this is my lifeblood. But Stalin was non-committal. A militarily strong China would have advantages and disadvantages for him: advantages in that it would strengthen the communist camp he led, but he was afraid that I would have global ambitions and that I would be like a tiger that would threaten his position.”

Journalist: “Stalin saw that you had global ambitions?”

Mao: “Yes. I was sent to Stalin’s villa No. 2, a large house with a wiretap, far from Moscow. I was left there for days to watch the snow, and I lost my temper with the staff. Stalin knew that I was ‘very angry and anxious.’ He told his staff, ‘We have many foreign guests here, there is no need to give special treatment to Mao Zedong.’ Stalin also refused to let me see any foreign party leaders.”

Journalist: “Did Stalin just leave you feeling neglected like that?”

Mao: “Yes, but on the day of the celebration of Stalin’s 70th birthday, I applauded for him strikingly. Stalin was extraordinarily gracious to me and seated me at his right hand as the guest of honor. I was the only foreign leader whose speech was followed by a standing ovation. At the end of the cultural performance, the whole crowd stood up and cheered at the box where Stalin and I were sitting: ‘Stalin! Mao Zedong!’ Such a scene had never been seen before. I called out slogans to the audience: ‘Long live Stalin!’ ‘Glory to Stalin!’

The next day, I asked for a meeting with Stalin; I had come not only to wish him a birthday, I had come to do something. Two days later, I met with Stalin. But Stalin kept his mouth shut about my demand to build a military power, only about my relations with the Communists in Vietnam, Japan, India, etc. He seemed to be observing how ambitious I really was. The conversation did not go anywhere, and again there were many days without news. In the meantime, my 57th birthday passed without a word. I stayed in the villa all day, dealing with domestic issues by telegram. When I was asked if I would visit, I said I was not interested. Stalin called me a few times, but they were only a few words and not enough. I could do nothing about it and was in a very depressed mood.”

Journalist: “Oh, after the birthday celebration, Stalin still left you neglected?”

Mao: “Yes, I was so helpless that I tried to mobilize Stalin by ‘playing the Western card.’ In the bugged room, I talked about China’s readiness to do business with Britain, Japan, the United States and other countries. I instructed to accelerate negotiations with Britain, which soon recognized the new China on January 6, 1950. The British news agency said: Mao was under house arrest by Stalin.

On New Year’s Day, 1950, I told Stalin’s people that Britain was going to recognize China. On that very day, I received a draft of Mao’s Talk to the Press, signed by Stalin. Stalin had changed. He drew up a draft of my talk, and he worked for me as a secretary. Still Britain helped me by recognizing my China and prompting Stalin to change his attitude.”

Journalist: “Stalin drafted your talk for you to publish to the public?”

Mao: “Yes, from the answer to the press drafted by Stalin, it was clear that Stalin was willing to make a deal with me. I immediately summoned Zhou Enlai and the ministers in charge of industry and trade to Moscow for specific negotiations.

On January 12, 1950, because of the rumors in the West that Stalin had placed me under house arrest, Secretary of State Acheson made a speech in Washington accusing the Soviet Union of annexing the northern provinces of China and incorporating them into the Soviet Union, and that Outer Mongolia had been completely annexed, the northeast was semi-annexed, and Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang were on the verge of being annexed. Stalin immediately sent Molotov to tell me that I must issue a statement in the name of the Chinese Foreign Ministry refuting Acheson. I agreed, but I was having Hu Qiaomu, the head of the General Administration of Information, issue a statement to express it.”

Journalist: “You’re playing your Western cards well! The U.S. came to your aid?”

Mao: “Yes, on January 21, 1950, as soon as the talk appeared in the People’s Daily, Stalin invited me to the Kremlin, and Molotov side-stepped me, calling me “China’s Tito. After giving me a lecture, Stalin wanted to get back together and invited Zhou Enlai and me to a dinner party at his villa. The dinner was still cold and boring, not cheerful and festive.

On February 14, 1950, the Soviet Union and China finally signed a new treaty. The Soviet Union gave China a loan of $300 million, to be delivered in five years, with $20 million in the first year, all of which was to be used for military purposes, called the ‘military loan.’ Half of the loan, $150 million, was earmarked for equipping the navy. In addition to help restore and renovate 50 large industrial projects, steel, coal, railroads, electricity and other infrastructure.”

Journalist: “Oh, all that was given to you was a military loan to meet your requirements?”

Mao: “Yes, but Stalin helped less and took away more, hidden in secret additional agreements and contracts. Industrial, financial, and commercial activities in the Northeast and Xinjiang were only allowed to the Soviet Union. I actually gave the Soviet Union all the major mineral exploitation rights. We became a ‘colony’ of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union took half of Xinjiang as its sphere of influence, and the Northeast was the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence. China’s valuable tungsten, tin and antimony were only allowed to be sold to the Soviet Union for 14 years. Ninety percent of China’s exportable minerals could not be sold on the world market. These secret terms were called ‘traitorous’ and if the young students knew about them, they would have taken to the streets in protest.”

Journalist: “That means that the Soviet Union was given many privileges?”

Mao: “Yes, at the Soviet Union’s insistence, China not only paid Soviet experts with generous salaries and gave their families excellent living conditions, but also paid Soviet work units as compensation for their ‘losses.’ The experts also enjoyed ‘extraterritorial jurisdiction’ and were always dealt with by the Soviets if they committed crimes.

After the signing of the contract, I begged Stalin to attend the appreciation banquet for the Chinese side. Stalin gave me face and exceptionally accepted the invitation to attend. Stalin also came to warn me and mentioned Tito in his toast, saying that Tito had left the communist camp family and wanted to go his own way, but that this way would not work. Stalin was planning Tito’s assassination. But I did not feel afraid. The visit to the Soviet Union was fruitful but far from satisfying my appetite. Nor did it make much progress in dividing the sphere of influence, except to give me the Viet Cong (Vietnamese Communist Party).”