Chapter 92 The Battle of Pingjin and the Battle of Huaihai 1948-1949

Journalist: “After fighting the Northeast, how do you fight Tianjin, Beijing?”

Mao: “After the war in the northeast, I immediately ordered Lin Biao more than 1.3 million people into the customs, in preparation for the ‘Pingjin Campaign.’

There were 600,000 national troops in North China, and the commander-in-chief was Fu Zuoyi, who also had Communists around him, including his daughter. I specifically asked Fu’s daughter to move in with him and report his every move. Chiang Kai-shek was not completely unaware of Fu Zuoyi’s relationship with the Chinese Communists, but did not take any measures.”

Journalist: “Even Fu Zuoyi’s daughter was pulled over by you?”

Mao: “Yes, in November 1948, in the face of Lin Biao’s army, Fu Zuoyi thought about it and decided to conceal from Chiang Kai-shek and ask the Chinese Communist Party for peace. He felt that he could not win against the Chinese Communist Party, and that it was useless to fight, for in vain the cities and villages would be destroyed, and the lives of the people would be ruined. He was especially afraid of the merciless war of millions of troops that would reduce his beloved ancient city to rubble. He wanted to end the war as soon as possible. Fu had no illusions about Communist rule, which he said would bring ‘cruelty,’ ‘error and tyranny.’ He was so conflicted about handing over North China and 600,000 troops to the Chinese Communists that he often slapped himself and banged his head against the wall.”

Journalist: “It seems that Fu Zuoyi is not so heartless, he is very conflicted?”

Mao: “Yes, Chiang Kai-shek knew Fu Zuoyi’s mental condition, December 12, 1948 Chiang diary wrote: ‘Yisheng (Confusius styled aka of Fu Zuoyi) is greatly stimulated, his spirit is also under serious threat, seems to have the appearance of mental disorder.’ But he did not relieve Fu of his military authority, even when Fu requested to resign, and said: ‘It is difficult to approve.’

Through the report of Fu Zuoyi’s daughter, I understand Fu’s situation clearly. I found that there were many benefits to be gained from this sure-to- be-defeated opponent. From November 1948, Fu Zuoyi constantly sent people to contact, requesting “uprising”, I adopted delaying tactics, not to deny, pulling him and keep a distance. At the same time, I deployed troops to eat Fu’s army one by one. By this time, he had completely lost the mentality of being the commander-in-chief. During the critical battle of our siege of New Security, one of his army commanders called and asked, ‘Are we concentrating on Beiping, or are we going to fight on the spot?’ Fu said listlessly, ‘You see what you can do.’

It was not until Tianjin fell into my hands on January 15, 1949, that I nodded to Fu Zuoyi’s repeated requests to surrender Beiping and North China for peace. I said, however, that Fu Zuoyi accepted my ‘peaceful liberation’ only when Tianjin was lost and the troops were under the city, and there was no more hope. In fact, there could be no war in North China. The Pingjin Campaign did not need to be fought. Fu had already intended a peaceful solution, with tens of thousands less dead.”

Journalist: “Did you take Tianjin first and then settle Beijing peacefully with Fu Zuoyi?”

Mao: “Yes, lest Fu Zuoyi haggle. After the peaceful settlement of Beijing, in the early spring of 1949, I left Xibaipo in Pingshan County and lived in a courtyard in the western suburbs of Beijing in Xiangshan. For the sake of secrecy, this courtyard was called ‘Labor University’, or ‘Laoda’ for short. This is exactly same pronounciation ‘boss,’ giving people endless reverie.

One day, Zhou Enlai suddenly called the commander of the North China Military Region Nie Rongzhen, said that some people from Fu Zuoyi’s guard regiment to “labor university” trouble, ordered him to send a regiment quickly to Xiangshan, to carry out the task of defending me.

It turns out that when Fu Zuoyi was discussing surrender with us, he asked me to leave him an army not to reorganize, but I did not agree. Later he asked to keep his guard regiment, saying he was worried that he would be assassinated by Chiang Kai-shek after surrender. I agreed to this request and promised that his guard regiment would be treated the same as PLA officers and soldiers. This was just my delaying tactic. I wanted to wait for Fu Zuoyi’s troops to lay down their arms and then find an opportunity to disarm this guard regiment.

Subsequently, Fu Zuoyi 250,000 officers and soldiers, all integrated into the PLA, they all enjoy the same treatment as the PLA. Shortly afterwards, the officers and men of the guard regiment did not receive their pay for two consecutive months. The company’s main business is to promote the development of the company’s products and services. The officers and soldiers did not carry weapons because they knew that bringing weapons would be a mutiny and not bringing weapons would just be a petition. At this point, the ‘informers’ planted by the CCP in the guard regiment saw the situation and immediately reported to Zhou Enlai. This led to a phone call from Zhou Enlai asking Nie Rongzhen to send troops to suppress it.

When Nie Rongzhen’s troops arrived at Xiangshan, the disorderly officers and soldiers had submitted a petition and returned to the Cuiwei Road barracks. But I still wanted to disarm the regiment on the grounds of preventing a mutiny. The PLA surrounded the barracks, disarmed the entire guard regiment, and arrested the two battalion commanders who had led the petition, and three regimental officers of the guard regiment.”

Journalist: “You disarmed Fu Zuoyi’s awe as well, what happened to Fu Zuoyi?”

Mao: “Fu Zuoyi learned, first sent his secretary Wang Kejun to Nie Rongzhen to protest, and personally rushed to the mayor of Beijing, Ye Jianying, beat the table and scolded the Communist Party talk does not count. Later Fu himself went to Xiangshan and confronted me. I said, “I ask Mr. Fu to understand how we handled the situation. We know that Chiang Kai-shek is capable of anything, and I just don’t believe he won’t plant agents around us and spies around you. Your guard work should be taken up by the PLA.”

I ordered the release of the arrested officers and the reduction of Fu’s guard regiment to a guard platoon, retaining 35 men. For my approach, Fu Zuoyi is dumb to eat dumplings, he knew that not to pay the officers and soldiers of the guard regiment, is my idea, the purpose is to induce the officers and soldiers to mess with the pay, and then to ‘suppress the mutiny’ as an excuse to withdraw his guard regiment. Fu at this time is a fence, the heart has anger, can do nothing. Of course, I did not treat him badly in terms of political treatment, he originally wanted to be the director of water conservancy in Shanxi Province, but I made him minister of water conservancy, and also served as vice chairman of the National Defense Commission. I think the concentration in Beijing is good management and good care, I do not like to put the Kuomintang people in the province, they are in Beijing, but also a false position, so I can watch them.”

Journalist: “The Kuomintang surrendered, you also do not feel at ease?”

Mao: “The incident at Xiangshan was originally a peaceful petition by the officers and soldiers of Fu Zuoyi’s guard regiment, but was later exaggerated into a ‘Xiangshan mutiny,’ so that I can deal with it to my advantage. Otherwise, it will be said that I broke my promise. Fu Zuoyi also mentioned earlier that he wanted to participate in the Beijing city management, retaining part of the city’s power, I did not agree, and he could not.

Fu Zuoyi’s cousin Fu Zuogong, a water conservancy expert, was mobilized and persuaded by him to transfer to the Gansu water conservancy front in early 1950, and was classified as a rightist in 1957 and put on a labor farm, where he died of starvation in 1960. Fu Zuoyi was very angry, personally to Gansu to ask questions, by Gansu Province stalled. This matter I later learned, then I could not care less. This is an afterthought.”

Journalist: “Fu Zuoyi’s cousin, was also classified as rightist starved to death?”

Mao: “Almost simultaneously with the Ping-Jin Campaign, a blood battle, the Huaihai Campaign, was fought in central China from November 1948 to January 1949, with millions of troops on both sides. The battle ended with the defeat of the Kuomintang and the fall of Chiang Kai-shek’s regime became a foregone conclusion. There were also important Red agents in the Kuomintang Army during this great war. Forty-eight hours into the battle, the secret members of the Chinese Communist Party, Zhang Kexia and He Jili, who had lurked for more than 10 years, led an ‘uprising’ and opened the doors of the war zone.

I ordered the full use of civilian workers for the war effort. Most of the young and strong men in the liberated areas were mobilized to join the army to expand the troops, and the rest served the front line as civilian workers. In the Liaoshen Campaign, 1.6 million civilian workers directly supported the front. In the Pingjin Campaign, there were 1.5 million civilian workers. The Huaihai Campaign had 5.4 million civilian workers. This huge army of civilian workers repaired fortifications, transported ammunition, carried the wounded and delivered meals at the front line.”

Journalist: “You mobilized 5 million civilian workers to support the Huaihai Campaign?”

Mao: “Yes. Farm work was left to women at home, and children, the elderly and the disabled helped. At the same time, they took care of the sick and wounded, washed and mended uniforms, made shoes, and milled rice and flour for the troops to cook. During the Huaihai Campaign, peasants contributed 225 million kilograms of food. In order to provide fuel for cooking, peasants even demolished their straw houses. The troops-built bridges and paved roads, and there were many peasants’ house beams.”

Journalist: “You are going out of your way to get the peasants to contribute?”

Mao: “Yes, otherwise how can we win? The Huaihai Campaign was cold, the battle was miserable, at -10 degrees Celsius, some of the national army was trapped for a whole month, no food and no cooking, belts and shoe soles were boiled and eaten. The front-line positions shaved out frozen dead rats, but also eaten raw.”