II. SEIZE POWER 1935—1949
Appease Japan and Expand the Military

Chapter 90 Defemdomg northern Shaanxi turned into an attack 1947

Journalist: “Chiang is not hitting your Yan’an nest, what do you do?”

Mao: “At the beginning of 1947, it was not the same as before, Chiang’s army attacked again, and could not attack the Communist base in North Manchuria, Chiang knew it was bad. He wanted to capture Yan’an, to boost morale, for political and diplomatic strategy, both have great significance. Chiang gave the important task to General Hu Zongnan. Hu Zongnan received a telegram from Chiang on February 28. On the same day, I received this information.

On March 18, 1947, Hu Zongnan occupied Yan’an without a fight. The Kuomintang boasted that it was a great victory, but in fact they got an empty city, and Yan’an had been evacuated.”

Journalist: “So you have spy inside Hu Zongnan? Very well-informed?”

Mao: “Yes, I left more than 20,000 troops of Peng Dehuai in northern Shaanxi, and Hu Zongnan commanded 250,000 troops. I moved north unhurriedly only a few hours before the national army entered Yan’an, in a jeep left behind by the U.S. Army observation team. Zhou Enlai and my wife Jiang Qing accompanied me.

When I arrived at Qinghuazhen, 30 kilometers northeast of Yan’an, I looked around and saw that the road was along a narrow river valley flanked by loess mountains, a good place for ambush warfare. A week later, on March 25, Hu Zongnan’s 2,900 troops were ambushed by the Communists here and all of them were wiped out.

On April 14, 1947, Hu’s army was again similarly ambushed in the Yangma River, directly north of Yan’an, and 5,000 men were killed, wounded and captured, just like in Qinghuazhen.”

Journalist: “Wow, your inside intelligence is very good, you know all the moves of Hu Zongnan’s troops?”

Mao: “Yes. The third easy victory was to beat Panglong, 50 km north of Yan’an. There were more than 40,000 bags of flour stored there, more than 50,000 sets of uniforms, lots of weapons and ammunition, and it was Hu Zongnan’s supply base. Hu sent a regiment plus the brigade headquarters directly under the guard, Hu Zongnan transferred the main force to Suide to capture me, arrived in Suide on May 2, found an empty city. On this very day, I had surrounded the Panglong regiment and began to attack. Hu Zongnan did not believe that I would attack Panglong.

In two days I took Panglong and all the weapons and supplies from the supply depot fell into our hands. In less than two months after Hu Zongnan occupied Yan’an, we won three big battles and I stayed in northern Shaanxi. This is still my world.”

Journalist: “Hu Zongnan was confused by your fight?”

Mao: “Yes, Hu Zongnan occupied Yan’an for a year, Hu’s army moved around, could not find my main force, but was repeatedly ambushed, I still hold most of northern Shaanxi, in fact, I am not more than 150 kilometers from Yan’an. My entourage grew from 800 to 1,400 men, including a cavalry company and a large radio set, working 24 hours a day to keep in touch with the Soviet Union and troops throughout the country. Every day I sent instructions by telegram to the various battlefields.

Only once was I almost in danger. in June 1947, I was in Wangjiawan, staying in a peasant’s house for almost two months. on June 8, Hu Zongnan’s army commander, Liu Counter-insurgency, with his troops, suddenly appeared near me. It turned out that an elementary school teacher where I lived had escaped to report to Liu counter-insurgency that there were many radio stations in the village. Liu reckoned I was here. Liu’s unexpected arrival caused me to lose my temper with Zhou Enlai. We argued about what to do and where to flee. The only way to be completely safe was to go east, across the Yellow River into the base, where boats and cars were parked and on standby day and night. But the road was too far and we couldn’t outrun Liu’s men. I could only go west, towards the Gobi Desert. After the decision was made, the people of the village were gathered and “moved” in the opposite direction, trying to distract Liu’s counter-insurgency forces.”

Journalist: “Wow, this time you were almost in danger?”

Mao: “Yes, it was raining heavily that day, the road was slippery and I couldn’t ride a horse, so I picked a strong guard to carry me on my back. The radio was silent, in case they were discovered. I was in northern Shaanxi, the radio contact with the Hu army, never interrupted, the management of sending and receiving telegrams machine personnel said: “their actions, completely in our hands.”

Liu counter-insurgency was really transferred. on the night of June 11, Liu’s group was very close to us, but suddenly turned troops to security without touching a hair on our head. Hu Zongnan gave Liu counter-insurgency orders: assemble towards the Shuang’er River in Bao’an, limited to the 14th before dawn. Hu claimed that my main force was in Baoan, which turned out to be an empty city again.”

Journalist: “Let you escape again? Not caught?”

Mao: “No. In the midst of this false alarm, Stalin received an urgent request to send a plane to pick me up and take me to the Soviet Union. By the time Stalin called back on June 15, I was safe. I did not go to the Soviet Union, but instructed ‘immediate repair’ of an airfield on the Yellow River, just in case.

In February 1948, Hu Zongnan ordered him to take two divisions to reinforce Yichuan, which was under siege by Chinese communist forces. In February 1948, Hu appointed Liu to take the Luoyi Highway via Wazi Street. Peng Dehuai’s troops had already set up an ambush circle at Wazi Street. The advance party of Liu counter-insurgency found our army in ambush and asked to hit the ambushers first. But Hu Zongnan called back and said: ‘Yichuan situation is urgent, still according to the original plan, along the Luoyi highway quickly forward.’ As a result, they were ambushed, and in two days of fierce fighting, several generals were killed, and Liu counter-insurgency killed himself in the heavy siege.”

Journalist: “Another Hu Zongnan command error?”

Mao: “Yes, after the annihilation of Liu’s troops, Hu Zongnan’s group was disorganized, and even Chiang’s administration was also in turmoil, and the area around Guanzhong, people were in fear and chaos. Chiang wanted to use the recovery of Yan’an to inspire the hearts of the people, this is broken.

Chiang Kai-shek wrote in his diary on March 2, 1948: “This loss, almost 1/3 of the main force of the entire Shaanxi Province, Zongnan negligence and rashness, repeat the same mistake”. Hu Zongnan destroyed the army, Chiang Kai-shek gave him troops from elsewhere.”

Journalist: “What did you mainly rely on to win the war in northern Shaanxi?”

Relying on intelligence. I stayed under Hu’s nose for a year. On March 23, 1948, I crossed the Yellow River and left Shaanxi. A month later, after suffering the loss of over 100,000 troops, Hu Zongnan abandoned Yan’an. My victory was largely due to our intelligence personnel within the ranks of Hu’s army. Xiong Xianghui served as Hu’s confidential secretary. Although he left Xi’an for the United States for training on May 21, 1947, we had other contacts as well. Xiong Xianghui was not the only one.