Chapter 88 The United States pressured Chiang to cease fire, and Mao gained a breathing space to reverse the situation 1946

Journalist: “The Central Army pressed you into Heilongjiang?”

Mao: “Yes, in order to get the United States not to support Chiang and to be friendly to the CCP, I formulated the policy of “neutralizing the United States. I claimed that the Communist Party was only a moderate rural reformer, not communist, and could cooperate with the United States.

In 1944, Roosevelt sent an observation team to Yan’an. I said, ‘Let’s consider changing the name of the party, not the Communist Party. Call it something else.’ That would be more beneficial to us, especially with the United States. But I cautioned the party cadres that this was just a tactic in the struggle against Chiang.”

Journalist: “Oh, you played moderate and friendly to deceive the United States? Even to change the name of the Communist Party?”

Mao: “Yes, my strategy blinded President Truman’s special envoy, Marshall. Marshall came to China in December 1945 with the mission to stop the civil war. He was particularly impressed by my statement that the Communist Party had many similarities with the United States. When he first met with Zhou Enlai, Zhou said that the Communist Party ‘expects American-style democracy. A month later, Zhou added that I liked the United States better than the Soviet Union and told Marshall, ‘Recently there have been rumors that Chairman Mao wants to visit the Soviet Union, and Chairman Mao laughed when he heard that and said that if he really had a chance to go abroad, he would like to go to the United States.’ Marshall took this completely seriously and relayed the remarks to Truman. Years later he also said that the Chinese Communist Party was more cooperative with him than the Kuomintang.”

Journalist: “You said you wanted American-style democracy? Like America better than the Soviet Union? And that you wanted to visit the United States?”

Mao: “Yes. The trick was to get Marshall to say to Chiang, ‘It is important to find out precisely whether the Soviet government has anything to do with the Chinese Communist Party or not, and whether it is giving them ideas.’ In February 1948, Marshall also told the U.S. Congress, ‘In China we have no conclusive evidence that the Chinese Communist army has outside Communist support.’ How could the U.S. be totally unaware of this, when they and the British were constantly listening to the Soviet Union’s telecommunication links with the CCP, many of which went straight from Moscow to Yan’an, clearly showing the close relationship between the two. The head of the U.S. Army Observation Group in Yan’an also cautioned Marshall: ‘Communism is international!’”

Journalist: “Ha ha, did you deceive Marshall thoroughly?”

Mao: “Yes, Americans are easily fooled. Marshall visited Yan’an on March 4, 1946. I was afraid that my son, Anying, would talk out of turn, because he could speak English, I sent him to the countryside. One Saturday night dance party, I introduced my son to an Associated Press Journalist, who interviewed him on the side of the dance floor. The Journalist translated the interview into Chinese and asked me to read it and send it out. Without reading it carefully, I crumpled up the script and sternly criticized Anying: ‘How can you make casual remarks to a foreign Journalist?’

Marshall reported to Truman, ‘I had a long talk with Mao, and I could not have been franker, and he showed no dissatisfaction and assured me of his cooperation to the best of his ability.’ Marshall claimed that the ‘Communist forces in the Northeast were no better than a rabble ’ and that ‘it was simply impossible to contact the local Communist Party in the Northeast from the base camp in Yan’an.’ This shows that he did not have the facts.”

Journalist: “Haha, you tricked the great American general?”

Mao: “Yes, Marshall made a key contribution to my success, and in the late spring of 1946, when my army was in full rout in the Northeast, Marshall put decisive pressure on Chiang to stop pursuing the Chinese Communists in the Northeast. Marshall threatened that if the pursuit continued, the United States would no longer help transport troops to the Northeast. Chiang had to give in and agreed to a 15-day cease-fire. This decision brought me back from the brink. I had just been forced to agree to abandon Harbin on June 3. As soon as I got the news of the armistice, I immediately changed my deployment: I asked the Northeast Bureau to hold on to Harbin and keep the area north of the Songhua River in my hands.”

Journalist: “Haha, Marshall saved you?”

Mao: “Yes, including Lin Biao, said Chiang Kai-shek stopped pushing north of the Songhua River, is a great blunder. Chiang’s army could have at least prevented us from establishing a base in northern Manchuria on the Soviet border and cut off the railroad transport line between the CCP and the Soviet Union so that Soviet heavy weapons could not be shipped in as long as they were pursued.

After Chiang Kai-shek agreed to a 15-day ceasefire, Marshall put further pressure on Chiang to extend the ceasefire to four months and even cede the whole of North Manchuria to the Chinese Communists. In mid-July, two anti-Chiang intellectuals, Li Gongpu and Wen Yiduo, were shot dead in Kunming. On August 10, Truman wrote to Chiang, referring to the two assassinations, saying that the American people ‘abhorred them’ and threatening that if peace talks did not progress, the U.S. would have to reconsider its support for Chiang’s regime. He threatened to reconsider the U.S. attitude toward Chiang’s regime if peace talks did not progress.”

Journalist: “Haha, the U.S. continued to press Chiang for a truce and you turned over a new leaf?”

Mao: “Yes, under U.S. pressure, Chiang Kai-shek ceasefire in the Northeast had to continue. Chen Lifu said, anti-communist is to oppose to the end, fight to talk, useless. But Chiang could not leave the United States. Throughout the civil war, the United States gave him $3 billion in aid, of which $1.6 billion was allocated and about $850 million was arms aid.

The cease-fire in the Northeast enabled me to establish a base area in North Manchuria, 1,000 kilometers across and 500 kilometers long, an area larger than Germany. I liken this territory to a comfortable ‘sofa’ with the Soviet Union at its back and North Korea and Outer Mongolia on both arms.

The four-month ceasefire gave the Communist Party ample time to reorganize its forces, including the 200,000 troops of the former Manchukuo. All those who could not be trusted were ‘purged.’ 150,000 people fled and were purged during the 3-year war in the Northeast.”
Journalist: “4 months of truce, you fattened up again, a comeback?”

Mao: “Yes, I rectified the internal, the rectification method is ‘to complain of suffering conference,’ led by the cadres, the soldiers one by one on stage, complaining of their own and family suffering. They come from poor peasants, illiterate, starving, have a stomach full of bitterness. Their painful past was evoked and their discontent with the old society was aroused. The Communist Party told them that the suffering was caused by Chiang Kai-shek and they wanted to ‘take revenge on Chiang Kai-shek.’ Parallel to the political brainwashing was the military training.

North Korea not only gave the CCP arms, but also gave us a 200,000 strong army trained by Japan and the Soviet Union. North Korea was the ‘hidden rear’ of the Communist Party, and in June 1946, when the Communist Party was driven away by the Kuomintang, a large number of wounded, sick, logisticians and strategic supplies were transferred to North Korea. When the Kuomintang occupied the central northeast, North Korea became a corridor between North and South Manchuria, and the CCP set up offices in Pyongyang and four ports in North Korea.”

Journalist: “Oh, North Korea became your rearguard?”

Mao: “Yes, Stalin’s contribution was also in the railroad bridges. The Soviets repaired more than 10,000 kilometers of rail lines and 120 bridges, enabling the Communist Party to quickly transport large forces and Soviet heavy weapons to attack major cities. All assistance to the CCP from the Soviet Union, North Korea, and Outer Mongolia was carried out in absolute secrecy. I covered it up in various ways. I claimed that the fight against Chiang Kai-shek depended on “small rice and rifles”, which was a lie.

I did not want to owe Stalin a favor. In November 1946, I sent Liu Yalou to Moscow and reached a secret agreement that the CCP would give the Soviet Union one million tons of grain per year.”

Journalist: “Take grain in return for the Soviet Union?”

Mao: “Yes. At the time of the cease-fire in the Northeast, Chiang’s army was still far superior to the Communist army. The Kuomintang Army had 4.3 million men, the Communist army only 1.27 million. Chiang’s army drove the Communist army out of most of the cities in Guanzhou, and almost the entire Yangtze River valley. In October 1946, when Chiang Kai-shek re- attacked, the Communists had already used the four-month ceasefire to build up the ‘couch.’ That winter, the Communists and the Kuomintang fought badly. The Kuomintang found that the Communist army was not what it used to be and that the Communist army was tough and good at fighting. At -40 degrees Celsius, Lin Biao’s troops lay in ambushes in the snow and ice day and night. More than 100,000 people were killed or injured by frost. After several battles, the KMT initiative in the Northeast gradually changed hands.

In January 1947, Marshall left China and the American mediation was declared a failure. It was too late for the U.S. to help Chiang again. The Chinese Communist Party “through the Soviet Union”, has been a great success, I in the national victory, only a matter of time sooner or later.”

Journalist: “Marshall did you a great favor, and he went back to the United States in disgrace?”

Mao: “Yes. He wanted national-communist negotiations and a two- party government, just like the U.S. It was so naive and cute.”