Chapter 86 The Chongqing Negotiations were nothing but a show 1945

Journalist: “Anti-Japanese victory you went to Chongqing to negotiate with Chiang Kai-shek?”

Mao: “In the autumn of 1945, after the victory of the War of Resistance, I didn’t want to go to Chongqing, but the Americans pushed for it. I went to Chongqing with the accompaniment of the American ambassador to negotiate with Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang even specially sent a plane to Yan’an to bring Jiang Qing to Chongqing to hold a wedding ceremony on my behalf. At the banquet, I raised my glass and shouted, ‘Long live Chairman Chiang!’ I haven’t forgotten abou my imperial dream. I had Hu Qiaomu’s ‘Qinyuan Chun: now’ published in the Xinhua Daily, and the line ‘Numerous talented individuals’ refers to none other than myself, Mao Zedong.

The Selected Works of Mao Zedong in Volumes 4 and 5 were mostly written by the likes of Hu Qiaomu and other members of the literati class. I made some modifications to them, and the Contradiction Theory, Practice Theory were also written by Zhang Wentian, Chen Boda, and others, yet I enjoyed all the royalties.”

Journalist: “Since you have made up your mind to fight the civil war, why did you still go to Chongqing to negotiate? “

Mao: “In February 1945, at Yalta in the Soviet Crimea, Stalin promised Roosevelt and Churchill that the Soviet Union would send troops to fight Japan within three months of defeating Germany. This meant that Soviet troops would enter China, which I had dreamed of. As early as 1923, I said: the Chinese Communist Party would come to power and the Russian Red Army would come in from the north. Now the dream was about to become a reality.

Roosevelt, fearing that Stalin would not enter the war, accepted Stalin’s demand to recognize Soviet control of Outer Mongolia, restore Russian privileges, and give the Soviet Union control of Middle East Road, Lushun, and Dalian. In fact, there was no need to make a deal. Stalin had long wanted to fight his way in and use the war against Japan as an excuse to seize a large part of China’s territory and create conditions for our seizure of power. These terms were about Chinese territory, but the Chinese government was kept in the dark. The U.S. said it was up to the U.S. to tell Chiang Kai-shek, but Stalin only told him when he was told to tell him. Chiang Kai-shek did not get the full text of the agreement from the United States until June 15, 1945.”

Journalist: “Oh, in effect Roosevelt went behind Chiang’s back and sold out China’s interests to Stalin, and you were happier the more you sold out?”

Mao: “Yes, I was exceptionally excited. How can I thank the Soviets? I remembered the sexual life of Sun Ping, the Soviet representative in Yan’an. on February 26, 1945, I said to him, ‘Don’t you like any of the beautiful girls here? Don’t be embarrassed.’ I mentioned it again on March 5 ‘Why, there are still some beautiful girls here, who do you like?’ In the evening, a young college girl appeared and came to clean up his room. (See Sun Ping: ‘Yan’an Diary’)”

Journalist: “Oh, to show your excitement, you gave women to Soviet delegates?”

Mao: “Yes. On April 5, 1945, the Soviet Union notified Japan of the abrogation of the Soviet-Japanese neutrality treaty. A month later Germany surrendered. When the news came, the Chinese Communist Party was holding its 7th Congress, and I inspired the delegates with the prospect of victory for the Chinese Communist Party. If they didn’t, they would kill my head! I repeatedly mentioned Stalin, saying: ‘Did Stalin lead the world revolution? Of course he is. Who is the leader? It is Stalin.’ I declared, ‘Every one of us, we are students of Stalin, he is our sir.’”

Journalist: “Stalin’s army is coming, so you talk big about Stalin as a mentor?”

Mao: “Yes. At midnight on August 9, 1945, the United States dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima. 3 days later, 1.5 million Soviet and Mongolian allied troops marched into China. I ordered the troops near Outer Mongolia in April to prepare to fight with the Soviets. Once the Soviet troops entered, I moved my troops around the clock to take over the lands swept by the Soviet army.

According to theYalta agreement, before the Soviet army entered China, it had to sign a treaty with Chiang Kai-shek and get Chiang’s approval. Chiang was reluctant to sign the treaty because it recognized the independence of Outer Mongolia and undermined Chinese sovereignty in the Lushun and Dalian issues. The Soviet army came in without a treaty. In one week Soviet troops had invaded several hundred kilometers and Chiang had to reluctantly agree to sign the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between China and the Soviet Union. Because he was afraid that without a treaty to bind him, Stalin would have no qualms about handing over the Soviet-occupied territory to the Chinese Communist Party, the treaty stipulated that the Soviet Union would recognize Chiang Kai-shek as the sole legitimate government of China, promising to give Chiang all the occupied land.”

Journalist: “The Soviets came in, but Chiang Kai-shek was still the legitimate government, and the Northeast was to be handed over to Chiang Kai-shek?”

Mao: “Yes, but Stalin had no intention of keeping his promise. To help me take over, he stalled the occupation for as long as possible, saying that he would withdraw his troops in three months, but the Soviet occupation was much longer than three months, and Stalin used various methods to obstruct Chiang Kai-shek’s takeover. Stalin even wanted to cut off Inner Mongolia, and the Soviets set up a provisional government of Inner Mongolia, ready to merge with the Outer Mongolian occupation.

On August 10, 1945, it was rumored that Japan was going to announce its surrender. Late that night, in the name of Zhu De, the commander-in- chief of Yan’an headquarters, I issued the first order for all troops to attack aggressively to force the enemy to surrender and seize the fruits of victory beforehand. Chiang Kai-shek, on the other hand, issued an order to Zhu De to stand by in place and not to act without authorization.”

Journalist: “When Japan surrendered, you issued orders to seize territory?”

Mao: “Yes, on August 15, 1945, Japan officially announced its surrender. The Chinese set off firecrackers, revelry, toast, and beat gongs and drums to celebrate. The war had been burning in China for eight years, in some cases 14 years, with Chinese dead, maimed, and as many as 95 million refugees in exile, and the Chinese longed for peace.

Chiang Kai-shek was eager to occupy the Northeast. But his troops were far away in southern China and Burma and wanted American warships to help transport them. The Americans wanted him to make peace with me. Pull us together anyway. If Chiang and I practiced peaceful nation-building, I would be invited to the White House together. Under American pressure, Chiang sent me three invitation telegrams from August 14 to 23, asking me to go to Chongqing for negotiations.”

Journalist: “Oh, the peace talks between the Communist Party, was the United States pressured out?”

Mao: “Yes, I did not want to go to Chongqing, I had made up my mind to fight and seize all of China, the first two invitations I refused. I was afraid Chiang would plot against me. I said I would send Zhou Enlai, but Chiang insisted that I go in person. Finally, I had to agree. Stalin also sent me three telegrams asking me to go. Stalin secretly helped me to seize territory on the one hand and asked me to play the game of peace talks on the other. If I insisted on not going to Chungking, I would give the impression that I did not want peace and that the United States would fully support Chiang Kai-shek.”

Journalist: “You were forced to go to Chongqing for negotiations? Stalin also pressured you to go?”

Mao: “Yes, Stalin told me that my life would not be a problem, guaranteed by the United States and the Soviet Union. The Americans would guarantee my safety. But I was still uneasy and insisted that Patrick Hurley, the personal representative of the U.S. President, fly to Yan’an and go to Chungking with me on the same plane, for fear that Chiang Kai-shek would shoot me out of the air.”

Journalist: “The U.S. representative went to Yan’an himself to pick you up and take you to Chongqing?”

Mao: “Yes, finally, on August 28, I was accompanied by Hurley and Chiang Kai-shek’s representative Zhang Zhizhong, who came toYan’an, and flew to Chongqing with Zhou Enlai and Wang Ruofei. After the plane landed, I ignored the others, I followed Hurley closely and put one foot in his car instead of taking the car Chiang Kai-shek sent to pick me up, for fear that he would create an accident halfway and blow me up.”

Journalist: “Wow, you are really fine, always follow the U.S. representative not to leave?”

Mao: “Yes, before going to Chongqing, I instructed the generals of the 8th Route Army who were about to leave Yan’an and go to the front to let go of the fight, and on August 25, I told Liu Bo Cheng and Deng Xiaoping, who was about to return to Taihang Mountains, that you should let go of the fight when you return to the front and not worry about my safety. The better you fight, the safer I am, the better the talks. Under my arrangement, during the negotiations in Chongqing, the 8th Route Army struck the Kuomintang army in Shangdang County, Shanxi Province, and won a great victory. I said happily, ‘Good fight! The greater the fight the greater the victory, the greater our hope.’”

Journalist: “Oh, you set it up early, you talk in front and they fight in the back?”

Mao: “Yes, talk is fake, fight is real. Negotiations with Chiang, I put forward 11 articles, 9 are political crowning provisions, the core two, one is the territory, the second is the army, I insist on independence and autonomy, command, under the my actual interests are not damaged. Chiang Kai-shek wants me to belong to the unified army and administrative regions. The two sides argued that they could never talk.

On September 27, Chiang Kai-shek and his wife flew to Xichang to rest. After thinking about it in Xichang, he wrote down 11 of my crimes in his diary, saying that I was a traitor, a traitor, and a scourge of the worst crimes, and that he wanted to eradicate the communists, detain me, and interrogate and treat me. The 11 sins listed by Chiang are all historically accurate. But Chiang was difficult to lay hands on me because the U.S. and Soviet Union had said they would guarantee my safety.”

Journalist: “Oh, Chiang Kai-shek is to see through you, but there is the United States, the Soviet Union to protect, can not deal with you?”

Mao:“Yes,in Chongqing for more than a month, I was most worried about my safety, I and Zhou Enlai several times to the Soviet Embassy, asked the ambassador if something happened how to do? The ambassador was very calm and did not give a clear response, but I always had lingering worries.

My trip to Chongqing was very fruitful. I talked to Chiang Kai-shek as an equal, and foreign envoys invited me as a guest, although Churchill’s envoy, even opened the door to me and said that he did not think the Chinese Communist Party played much of a role in defeating Japan at all, saying that the Chinese Communist army could only cause trouble for the Japanese. Instead of getting angry, I laughed heartily. His remarks were quite practical.

The Chongqing negotiations lasted for 45 days, but it was all a show from beginning to end. I shouted everywhere, ‘Long live Chairman Chiang!’ to promote my support for Chiang as the leader of China, but it was just talk. In reality, I wanted China to belong to me, and I had to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek. In the Chinese Civil War, Chiang was on the defensive while I took the initiative. I was the one who wanted to fight first, and even if they called me the number one war criminal, I accepted it.”

Journalist: “You are openly shouting Chiang Kai-shek long live! Behind the scenes deployment of civil war to defeat Chiang Kai-shek?”

Mao: “Yes, Chiang also realized that a full-scale civil war was inevitable. On October 10, 1945, Chiang and I signed the minutes of the meeting, the Double Ten Agreement. The minutes were drafted by Zhou Enlai and were favorable to me, a political victory for me. The ground and the army, the two lifebloods, were not damaged at all.

After the signing of the Double Ten Agreement, Chiang Kai-shek invited me to stay at his apartment in Linyuan that night, and on October 11, we had breakfast together early the next morning, and Chiang sent me back to Yan’an, with more than 500 people at the airport. Everything was polite and thorough. I had just left, Chiang that night, his true feelings, written in his diary: ‘The Communists not only have no faith, and no personality, sincere beasts of the unlike.’”

Journalist: “Chiang Kai-shek saw that you have no faith, no personality, beastly?”

Mao: “Yes. During the negotiations in Chongqing, an American journalist asked me: Do you really believe you can defeat Chiang Kai-shek? I smugly told the American Journalist: ‘Chiang Kai-shek read a lot of threadbare books, but did not read through them, he failed to endure to shamelessness and ruthlessness, so he is going to fail. What I meant beyond that was that I could be shameless and ruthless, so I had the confidence to defeat him. This was the biggest lesson I learned from reading the threadbare books. Sure enough, in 1949 I completely defeated Chiang Kai-shek and took over China.’”

Journalist: “Oh, you thought you could endure to shamelessness, ruthlessness to ruthlessness?”

Mao: “Yes. When I returned to Yan’an, it was like putting down a big stone in my heart that I had finally won.”