Chapter 74 I set a trap for the Wannan Incident, provoking civil war and eliminating Xiang Ying 1940-1941

Journalist: “What was the Huangshan Incident about? Did you deliberately provoke it?”

Mao: “Yes, I wanted to provoke a civil war and also use Chiang Kai- shek’s hand to eliminate Xiang Ying. The New Fourth Army headquarters had 1,000 staff members and 8,000 troops, with Xiang Ying as the political commissar, stationed in the Yunling area of Anhui, near Huangshan. In December 1940, Xiang Ying’s headquarters was the only New Fourth Army unit south of the Yangtze River. I concentrated 90% of the New Fourth Army troops in the Jiangbei region, forming the Jiangbei Command under the leadership of Liu Shaoqi. Xiang Ying was left with the remaining 10%.

I wanted to hand over Xiang Ying’s isolated headquarters to Chiang Kai-shek for him to deal with, to force him to fire the first shot and encourage Stalin to agree to a full-scale civil war. In July 1940, Chiang ordered the New Fourth Army to move north to the Huabei region, leaving the Yangtze River valley to the Kuomintangs, but I ignored his order. Now, I ordered Xiang Ying to move north of the Yangtze River.”

Journalist: “Oh, so Xiang Ying was actually in charge of only 10% of the New Fourth Army in Jiangnan. How did he go to Jiangbei?”

Mao: “There were two routes to cross the river. One ferry crossing was in Fanchang and Tongling in eastern Anhui, and the other headed southeast to Jiangsu’s Zhenjiang for the river crossing. On December 10, 1940, Chiang Kai-shek decided that Xiang Ying should take the eastern Anhui route because the forces led by Han Deqin in the Zhenjiang area were engaged in combat with the New Fourth Army. He didn’t want Xiang Ying’s troops to get involved in the fighting. Xiang Ying was only allowed to cross the river from his original location in Jiangnan.

I didn’t object to Chiang’s decision. On December 29, I approved this route and told Xiang Ying, ‘Agree to move directly to the east of Anhui and cross the river in batches.’”

Journalist: “Oh, so you wanted Xiang Ying to cross the river in Anhui?” Mao: “Yes. However, the next day, I suddenly sent a telegram instructing Xiang Ying to take the alternative route in southern Jiangsu, which Chiang Kai-shek had vetoed. I didn’t inform Chiang Kai-shek about this change.

Chiang Kai-shek still thought that Xiang Ying would follow his request to take the eastern Anhui route. On January 3, 1941, he sent a telegram to New Fourth Army Commander Ye Ting, reiterating the eastern Anhui route and stating that he had ‘ordered all forces along the way to provide cover.’”

Journalist: “Oh, but then you suddenly told Xiang Ying to cross the river in Jiangsu?”

Mao: “Yes. Xiang Ying discovered that Chiang Kai-shek was unaware of the changed route, so he quickly sent a telegram to inform him on January 4, 1941. However, this crucial telegram never reached Chiang Kai-shek, and the reason was me. I had already ordered that no generals should directly contact Chiang Kai-shek, and all communication had to go through me and then be relayed by Zhou Enlai. I suppressed Xiang Ying’s telegram to Chiang Kai-shek. After Xiang Ying sent the telegram, he waited for several hours, assuming that Chiang Kai-shek should have received the news of the route change, and the Kuomintang troops stationed along the way should have received orders to make way for him. I suppressed Xiang Ying’s crucial telegram from January 4 until January 12, when I finally forwarded it to Zhou Enlai. By that time, the attacks on Xiang Ying’s forces had already been ongoing for a week.”

Journalist: “I understand. You deliberately trapped Xiang Ying, allowing the Kuomintang troops to attack him.”

Mao: “Yes, on the night of January 4, 1941, amidst the stormy weather, Xiang Ying and his 10,000 New Fourth Army troops entered the area where over 100,000 Kuomintang troops were stationed. These troops had not received any notice from Xiang Ying about his intended passage and thought that the New Fourth Army had come to provoke them, so they opened fire.
The Kuomintang General Gu Zhutong, who already held a grudge against th New Fourth Army due to the Huangqiao Battle, ordered on January 6 to ‘completely eliminate’ Xiang Ying’s forces. Thus, the Huangshan Incident erupted.”

Journalist: “The Kuomintang troops opened fire, what happened to Xiang Ying?”

Mao: “Xiang Ying, in a panic, sent multiple telegrams to Yan’an, asking me to negotiate a ceasefire with the Kuomintang. I remained silent and observed. On January 9, Liu Shaoqi, from the New Fourth Army’s Jiangbei Command, sent me a telegram discussing Xiang Ying’s situation. I replied pretending to be unaware of any situation.”

Journalist: “Oh, Xiang Ying sought help, and you played dumb?”

Mao: “Yes. From January 6 to 9, the Kuomintang troops surrounded Xiang Ying’s forces, and they fiercely battled for four days. Xiang Ying continuously sent distress signals, which Liu Shaoqi received. However, I lied and claimed that I hadn’t received anything, perhaps blaming it on radio malfunctions. I didn’t want to rescue the New Fourth Army. I wanted Chiang Kai-shek to annihilate them, as that would incite Moscow to approve a full-scale civil war. Killing two birds with one stone, eliminating Xiang Ying and inciting a civil war. I had despised Xiang Ying since he opposed my decision to attack the AB League and objected to my participation in the Long March.”

Journalist: “Chiang’s troops attacking Xiang Ying played right into your hands?”

Mao: “Yes. On January 10, 1941, the New Fourth Army headquarters informed me: ‘After four days and four nights of self-defense battles, we are now in a desperate situation, and all our cadres are prepared to sacrifice themselves. Please negotiate with Chiang and Gu on behalf of the Party Central Committee and Comrade Enlai. Threaten them with the possibility of a complete rupture to demand Gu’s withdrawal of the siege, which may save us.’ I still didn’t take any action.

On that same day, Xiang Ying himself sent a telegram to Chiang Kai- shek, pleading for the lifting of the siege. The telegram was supposed to be forwarded to me, but I suppressed it. I told Zhou Enlai that this telegram from Xiang Ying was even worse than the previous one, and it couldn’t be passed on.”

Journalist: “Xiang Ying sought help from you, and you pretended not to hear?”

Mao: “Yes. On the evening of January 11th, Zhou Enlai held a celebration banquet in Chongqing for the third anniversary of the New China Daily. It was during this banquet that Zhou made the announcement regarding the New Fourth Army Headquarters being besieged. However, the telegram he read was not a negotiation for a ceasefire with the Kuomintang, but rather a general situation report. It was only on January 12th that I instructed Zhou Enlai to make a serious protest and demand an immediate lifting of the siege. I deliberately downplayed the urgency of the situation by stating, ‘According to reports, they can still hold out for seven days,’ instead of acknowledging the New Fourth Army’s previous report of being in dire straits. It was on January 13th that Zhou Enlai formally protested to the Kuomintang. However, Chiang Kai-shek had already issued an order to stop the attack the day before.”

Journalist: “Oh, so you pretended to take action after the fact to release the news?”

Mao: “Yes, I always have to engage in external propaganda that benefits me! On January 13th, 1941, I suddenly became active and ordered Zhou Enlai to ‘appeal to the whole country for help.’ I commanded our troops to ‘immediately prepare for a large-scale counteroffensive.’ It was no longer a matter of threatening to reinforce our troops but rather how to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek’s rule. I declared my determination to advance as far as Sichuan and fight to the end.”

Journalist: “Haha, you really know how to play the game. Is it your turn to criticize Chiang?”

Mao: “Yes, but I knew that our army was no match for the Kuomintang.

Without Stalin’s military support, I would have suffered a crushing defeat. On January 15th, Zhou Enlai went to see Soviet Ambassador Pan Yuexin and explained the urgent need for Soviet assistance. Pan poured cold water on Zhou’s request. Pan Yuexin already suspected that the Huangshan Incident was intentionally orchestrated by me to send Xiang Ying to his death, and Zhou Enlai lied to him about it. Zhou told Pan that the communication between the New Fourth Army Headquarters and Yan’an had been cut off.”

Journalist: “So you intentionally had Zhou Enlai deceive the Soviet Union?”

Mao: “Yes, I had no choice but to bypass Pan Yuexin and directly appeal to Moscow. I sent one hysterical telegram after another. In the telegrams, I said, ‘Chiang Kai-shek plans to completely annihilate the New Fourth Army, destroy the 8th Route Army, and then exterminate the Communist Party of China. We are in danger of being completely wiped out.’ I wanted Stalin to send troops to help us in the full-scale civil war.”

‘The danger of civil war.’ Comintern’s Dimitrov didn’t believe in the danger of civil war, and Moscow didn’t believe my exaggerations or Chiang Kai-shek’s intentions to ‘exterminate’ the Communist Party. Dimitrov conveyed his view to me in a telegram. In response, I immediately sent another telegram, with a special request for it to be delivered to Stalin, so that he could assess the situation in China and consider providing us with concrete military assistance.”

Journalist: “Even Stalin didn’t believe the myths you created?”

Mao: “Yes, I wanted to forcefully involve Moscow in the war in China, which displeased Stalin greatly. On January 21st, Stalin expressed his discontent by condemning New Fourth Army Commander Ye Ting. Stalin referred to Ye as an ‘undisciplined guerrilla fighter’ and suggested investigating whether he had provoked the incident. Stalin said, ‘We also have some guerrilla fighters who are good people, but we have to execute them because they don’t follow discipline.’ Dimitrov understood that Stalin was indirectly pointing fingers at me, so he warned me again, more firmly, ‘Don’t provoke a rupture.’”

Journalist: “Haha, even Stalin realized that you intentionally provoked the incident?”

Mao: “Yes, Dimitrov informed Stalin, ‘Our Chinese comrades are pursuing a rupture regardless of the consequences. We have decided to point out Mao Zedong’s incorrect position to him.’ On February 13th, 1941, Stalin approved the order written by Dimitrov to me personally: ‘We believe that a rupture is not inevitable. You should not strive to create a rupture. On the contrary, you should make every effort to prevent a civil war. Please reconsider your position on this issue.’ I responded to Moscow on the same day, stating, ‘I will obey your instructions,’ but I still insisted that ‘a rupture is inevitable in the future.’”

Journalist: “Moscow saw through your intentions, and you had to comply?”

Mao: “Yes, I anticipated Moscow’s attitude, and I was very frustrated. I failed to incite a full-scale civil war, but I achieved some victories. First of all, Xiang Ying died. Xiang Ying had a deep-seated grudge against me. Ten years ago, he tried to stop me from brutally suppressing the Anti-Banditry Campaign, and I falsely accused him of being behind the Anti-Banditry groups. He opposed my Long March, claiming that I was plotting to seize power. After Chiang Kai-shek ordered a ceasefire, Xiang Ying escaped and on the night of March 14th, he was shot dead by his aide while sleeping in a cave. This aide was already dissatisfied with the Communist Party, and after killing Xiang Ying, he took the gold and valuables from Xiang’s body and later defected to the Kuomintang. I issued a resolution in the name of the Central Committee, charging Xiang Ying with crimes and portraying the Huangshan Incident as a result of his ‘consistent opportunist leadership,’ insinuating that Xiang was a traitor: ‘The investigation is still pending as to whether there was a conspiracy by traitors in this failure.’ Later, the blame for the Huangshan Incident was placed on Xiang Ying and Chiang Kai-shek.”

Journalist: “Haha, you really know how to manipulate things. Xiang Ying died, and you say he deserved it, that it was his own mistakes?”

Mao: “Yes. Another victory of mine was that Chiang Kai-shek, out of fear of a full-scale civil war, allowed the New Fourth Army to stay in the Yangtze River region. General Vasily Chuikov threatened Chiang, saying that if he wanted the Soviet Union to continue providing military supplies, he had to agree to this.

Pressure also came from the United States. Chiang wanted to break free from reliance on Soviet weapons and could only rely on the United States. President Franklin Roosevelt, like Stalin, wanted China to tie down Japan and trap them in the quagmire of China, so he didn’t want a civil war in China. The United States had no influence over the Communist Party, so Roosevelt put pressure on Chiang Kai-shek, warning him that if he wanted U.S. assistance, he must avoid a civil war. No one, whether it was Chiang or me, was allowed to start a civil war. During the Huangshan Incident, Washington planned to withhold the $50 million loan to China until the country stopped fighting. The U.S. stance was crucial for Chiang.”

Journalist: “Both the Soviet Union and the United States didn’t want you and Chiang to wage a civil war, but you still insisted on it?”

Mao: “Yes, if I didn’t start a civil war, how could I seize power? In the Huangshan Incident, over 2,000 people died. However, around 3,000 members of the New Fourth Army successfully returned after breaking the encirclement. They followed the designated route in the east of Anhui, crossed the Yangtze River, and faced no harassment along the way.

Chiang Kai-shek didn’t set any traps for the New Fourth Army; he wasn’t good at propaganda. He announced the disbandment of the New Fourth Army, creating the impression that they had all been killed. It made people believe that the Kuomintang was slaughtering innocent Communist Party members.”

Journalist: “In reality, you deliberately let Chiang’s forces kill the Communist forces. Why didn’t you feel sorry for killing your own people?”

Mao: “Xiang Ying was not my person. Even if we both belonged to the Communist Party, if someone is disloyal to me, they are mercilessly killed. In April 1941, the Soviet Union signed the ‘Neutrality Treaty’ with Japan, which allowed Japan to freely attack Southeast Asia and launch the Pearl Harbor attack. But I said, ‘The China issue is not resolved.’ Without the Soviet Union and Japan dividing China, China wouldn’t become like Poland. And then, I wouldn’t get half of China.”