Chapter 73 Advocating the partition of China between the Soviet Union and Japan, Mao gained control over half of the country 1939

Journalist: “Stalin colluded with Hitler, did you also want Stalin to collude with Japan?

Mao: “Yes, that was my hope. On August 23, 1939, the Soviet Union and Germany signed a non-aggression pact and divided Poland. Chen Duxiu deeply hated Stalin’s collusion with Hitler. Chen was abandoned by Stalin and spent six years in Kuomintang prison. Out of grief and indignation, Chen wrote a poem, using the metaphor of a demonic plague to criticize Stalin, condemning him as someone who ‘changes right and wrong at will, and treats black and white with indifference. In the turbulent clouds, he flips his hand, and treats trust and loyalty lightly.’

The signing of the Soviet-German pact opened the door to the Soviet-Japanese pact. Chiang Kai-shek was worried that China would become another Poland and warned the Soviet Union. But I was very pleased. I hoped that the Soviet Union would sign a treaty with Japan and divide China. With the support of Stalin, I could control half of China.”

Journalist: “That American journalist Snow is here again? Is he promoting you?”

Mao: “Yes. In late September 1939, Snow visited China and asked me about my reaction to the possible Soviet-Japanese treaty. I replied, ‘It can be signed.’ Snow also asked if the Soviet Union’s assistance to the Chinese Communist Party would take the form of occupying half of China, to which I affirmatively responded, ‘According to Leninism, such a possibility exists.’ The Polish model was exactly what I hoped for. If Stalin and Japan divided China, I naturally would become the ruler of half the country.

My conversation may have been too explicit, causing dissatisfaction in Moscow. Dimitrov telegraphed me, saying, ‘This visit has had a destructive impact. We urgently request that you refrain from making such statements to foreign journalists, as they have been used to cause damage.’ I understood that I had let slip some sensitive information, and from then on, I distanced myself from Snow. It wasn’t until the open rupture between China and the Soviet Union in 1960 that I accepted Snow’s visit again, but that’s a story for another time.”

Journalist: “You let slip some sensitive information to Snow?”

Mao: “Yes. In 1940, I was excited about the Soviet Union seizing a large portion of Finnish territory through the Soviet-Finnish Treaty. I said, ‘The Soviet-Finnish Treaty guarantees the victory of world revolution and the Chinese revolution.’ When France was divided into German-occupied zones and the Vichy government, I saw another example of a country being divided. I said, ‘It is possible for the Soviet Union to adjust Sino-Japanese relations. If China wants to achieve a relatively advantageous position, only with the intervention of the Soviet Union and our continued efforts, will it be possible.’ I envisioned Japan supporting the Kuomintang government while the Soviet Union sent troops to assist the Communist Party. The country would be divided by the Yangtze River, with each side governing its own territory, creating a ‘North-South Dynasty’ scenario.

Following the Polish model and dividing China with Japan was precisely Stalin’s China policy at the time. After the signing of the Soviet-German pact, the Soviet Union began negotiations with Japan, with China being a key issue. The stronger the Chinese Communist Party became and the more territory it occupied, the greater bargaining power Stalin had. I saw the advantages of expansion for Stalin. From 1939 to spring 1940, in my reports to Moscow, I openly discussed the civil war with the Kuomintang forces. Before the signing of the Soviet-German pact, I always portrayed the conflict as the Kuomintang forces taking the initiative to annihilate the Communist Party, and we were merely acting in self-defense. Now, I was quite provocative. In my report on February 22, 1940, I stated, “In the civil war, victories are generally on our side. We annihilated 6,000 troops in Hebei and 10,000 troops in Shanxi.”

Journalist: “Did you take advantage of the situation to provoke a civil war?”

Mao: “Yes. Stalin did not stop me; he showed his tacit approval through practical actions. Three days later, he approved a monthly subsidy of $300,000 to the Chinese Communist Party. When Zhou Enlai returned from Moscow, he brought me a new radio station exclusively for communication with Moscow. Only I had the authority to use it, to send and receive messages, and I decided who they were transmitted to or circulated among.

With the prospect of the Soviet-Japanese pact, I began cooperating with Japanese intelligence agencies, aiming to strike against Chiang Kai-shek and develop the Communist Party. Pan Hannian was in charge, and he contacted the Deputy Consul General of Japan in Shanghai, Iwai Hideo. Iwai gave Pan Hannian a special identification issued by the Japanese Consulate General. Intelligence personnel dispatched from Yan’an even set up a radio station at Iwai’s residence, preparing to establish communication with Yan’an.”

Journalist: “Did you send Pan Hanian to collude with Japan?”

Mao: “Yes, Pan Hanian provided Iwai with intelligence on the military strength of the Kuomintang forces in the resistance against Japan, the conflicts between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, the relations with Western powers, and the activities of British and American intelligence personnel in Hong Kong and Chongqing. Japan highly valued this intelligence, and some of it even made the Japanese ambassador ecstatic. When Japan occupied Hong Kong, Iwai sent someone to safely evacuate the Communist intelligence personnel. Pan Hanian told Iwai that some of these people would go to the interior to continue gathering intelligence, while others would go to Shanghai to assist in the peace movement. The so-called ‘peace movement’ was a non-military movement that flirted with Japan and aimed to surrender to Japan. There was a ‘Committee for the Promotion of Asian Nationalism’ organized by Pan Hanian, with most members being sent by the Communist Party.”

Journalist: “Pan Hanian’s activities were quite successful, weren’t they?”

Mao: “Yes, besides targeting Chiang Kai-shek, Pan Hanian had another task, which was to ensure that the Japanese would spare the Communist Party.

Based on my instructions through Zhou Enlai, Pan proposed a ceasefire in North China to the Japanese. However, the Japanese did not respond. Nevertheless, in Central China, Pan Hanian reached a tacit understanding with the Japanese: ‘the New Fourth Army guaranteed the smooth and safe operation of railway transportation, and the Japanese did not interfere with the New Fourth Army’s development in rural areas.’ Over the years, Japanese trains passed without hindrance, and the New Fourth Army grew stronger. The Japanese considered the Communist Party insignificant and only capable of causing trouble. Chiang Kai-shek was seen as the main enemy.”

Journalist: “Oh, Pan Hanian reached a tacit understanding with Japan, and they refrained from fighting each other?”

Mao: “Yes, in the spring of 1940, a large area of North China was already under the control of the Communist Party. In March, with the tacit approval of Stalin, the 8th Route Army concentrated forces of 30 to 40 thousand soldiers and completely annihilated 6,000 Kuomintang troops. At this time, Zhu De and Peng Dehuai felt that it was necessary to fight against Japan; otherwise, it wouldn’t be justified. On April 1st, they planned to massively disrupt the Japanese transportation lines. I did not approve and ordered them to seize territory in Central China instead. Zhu and Peng’s plan to destroy the transportation lines had to be abandoned.”

Journalist: “Oh, so you told Zhu De and Peng Dehuai not to fight Japan and instead seize territory from Chiang Kai-shek?”

Mao: “Yes, Zhu De was reluctant to continue the civil war. Chiang Kai- shek wanted to resolve the issue of the North China conflict and invited him to negotiate in Chongqing. On the way, I insisted that he make a detour to Yan’an, claiming that we needed to discuss the ‘7th Congress.’ When he arrived in Yan’an, there was no sign of the ‘7th Congress,’ and he was also not allowed to go to Chongqing. He could only stay in Yan’an. I asked him to sign on the documents I issued as a rubber stamp.”

Journalist: “So, you kept Zhu De in Yan’an and didn’t let him lead the troops against Japan?”

Mao: “Yes, I sent Zhou Enlai to Chongqing instead. From that point on, I stipulated that anyone who wanted to contact Chiang Kai-shek had to go through me and then through Zhou Enlai. In this way, I completely controlled the two critical channels, Moscow and Chongqing.

In May 1940, the war against Japan reached a critical point. Japan intensified its bombings of Chongqing and in a span of six months, Chongqing endured one-third of all the bombs dropped on Japan throughout the Pacific War. With each air raid, thousands of civilians died. The Japanese army was approaching Chongqing along the Yangtze River. Japan wanted France to close the Yunnan-Vietnam Railway and Britain to close the Burma Road, cutting off China’s external communication. Chongqing was filled with a pessimistic and disappointed atmosphere, and there was a strong air of seeking reconciliation with Japan. Chiang Kai-shek was facing a crisis.”

Journalist: “Chiang Kai-shek was in danger, what did you do?”

Mao: “For me, it was a heaven-sent opportunity. I hoped that the Japanese would continue fighting until they reached Chongqing. I anticipated Soviet intervention. After Zhu De left, Peng Dehuai took command of the 8th Route Army. He wanted to fight against Japan and planned a large-scale campaign to disrupt Japanese transportation routes in North China, called the Hundred Regiments Offensive. On July 22nd, he ordered the 8th Route Army to prepare for an uprising starting on August 10th and sent the plan to me twice by telegraph. I deliberately didn’t respond, and he knew I often used ‘silence as approval.’ When Peng telegraphed me for the third time and still received no response, he didn’t wait any longer and ordered the offensive to begin on August 20th.”

Journalist: “Oh, Peng Dehuai launching the Hundred Regiments Offensive went against your intention of not resisting Japan?”

Mao: “Yes. Peng knew I would scold him, accusing him of ‘helping Chiang Kai-shek’ and harming the interests of the Communist Party. He knew that Japan would definitely intensify their sweeping of the base areas. The Hundred Regiments Offensive lasted for a month, mainly focusing on disrupting transportation routes and strategic economic facilities rather than directly engaging Japanese troops. Japan suffered significant losses. The Jing Coal Mine, which supplied the Anshan Iron and Steel Plant, was heavily damaged and unable to produce coal for at least six months. Japan had to recall one division attacking Chiang’s forces and temporarily suspend the seizure of the two railways leading to South China.

The Hundred Regiments Offensive had a significant impact and greatly boosted Chinese morale. Kuomintang newspapers praised the proactive attack by the 8th Route Army. Zhou Enlai telegrammed me from Chongqing, saying, ‘The Hundred Regiments Offensive in North China has had a tremendous impact, and even Chiang Kai-shek speaks highly of it.’ In fact, the Hundred Regiments Offensive brought considerable glory to us.”

Journalist: “Didn’t Peng Dehuai perform well?”

Mao: “Yes, he did well, but I was still furious. The 8th Route Army also suffered tens of thousands of casualties. The Japanese, based on their painful experiences, learned their lesson and changed their perception of the Communist Party. They strengthened their security measures, leading to the reduction of the North China base area by half, with the population decreasing from 44 million to 25 million. However, over the next two years and more, not only did we recover, but we also experienced significant growth. The 8th Route Army surpassed its size before the Hundred Regiments Offensive, reaching 400,000 soldiers.

What angered me was that the Hundred Regiments Offensive reduced the possibility of Chiang Kai-shek’s collapse, and thus reduced the possibility of Soviet intervention. Peng Dehuai disrupted my strategic plans.”

Journalist: “So, your priority was to fight against Chiang Kai-shek first and Japan second?”

Mao: “Yes. Despite the Japanese launching a major offensive and failing to force Chiang Kai-shek to surrender, I had to find another way to bring the Soviet Union into the picture. In order to stop the ongoing hostilities between the Kuomintangs and the Communists, Chiang planned to separate the two armies and have them stationed in different areas. By that time, the 8th Route Army in North China had occupied all the territory it could, and there was no significant fighting left against the Kuomintangs. The focus of the civil war shifted to the Yangtze River Basin in Central China, where the New Fourth Army was active. Chiang Kai-shek wanted the New Fourth Army to withdraw from the Yangtze River Basin and move north to the territory controlled by the 8th Route Army. On July 16, 1940, Chiang formally proposed that the New Fourth Army complete the relocation within one month.

I immediately rejected Chiang Kai-shek’s request. I didn’t want to peacefully give up the prosperous Yangtze River Basin, and I wanted Chiang Kai-shek to forcefully drive out the New Fourth Army. By doing so, a full- scale civil war could possibly erupt. I estimated that if a civil war broke out, the Russians would assist the Communist Party. I wanted the situation to develop in that direction.”

Journalist: “The more intense the fighting with Chiang Kai-shek, the happier you are?”

Mao: “Yes, that summer, I sent numerous telegrams to Moscow, constantly asking for Moscow’s help in severely damaging the Kuomintang. Instead of moving north, the New Fourth Army, in early October, annihilated 11,000 Kuomintang troops at Huangqiao and killed two generals. Chiang Kai-shek remained silent because he was afraid of things escalating and triggering a full-scale civil war. He only reiterated on October 19th that the New Fourth Army must move north to the designated area within one month.”

Journalist: “Oh, you launched the Battle of Huangqiao and annihilated over 10,000 troops of Chiang Kai-shek?”

Mao: “Yes. I ignored Chiang. I wanted to provoke Chiang Kai-shek and make him resort to force, thus initiating a full-scale civil war. I told Zhou Enlai that when that happened, the Soviet Union would ‘come out and make adjustments.’ Chiang Kai-shek was also afraid, afraid that the Soviet Union would intervene and divide China with Japan. The one-month deadline passed, but Chiang still did not take any action. I knew Chiang’s weak points, and on November 3rd, I telegraphed Zhou Enlai saying, ‘Chiang Kai-shek fears internal disorder, fears the Soviet Union; we can bully him on this.’

On November 7th, the anniversary of the October Revolution, I strongly pleaded with Moscow to approve launching a large-scale civil war. The telegram was signed by me, and the recipients included Dimitrov, with a special note that it was also copied to Stalin and the Minister of Defense, Timoshenko.”

Journalist: “So, you requested Stalin to send 150,000 troops to help fight against Chiang Kai-shek?”

Mao: “Yes, my open request to provoke a full-scale civil war was based on the new developments in the situation. The Soviet Union was actively negotiating with Japan. My proposal was essentially to cooperate with Japan and attack Chiang Kai-shek from both sides. This way, Chiang was very likely to be overthrown, and the division of China according to the Polish model would become a reality. I would then have half of China.

At that time, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov was about to depart for Berlin, with the aim of seeking Hitler’s assistance for Moscow to intervene in the Sino-Japanese War and discuss the realization of a ‘glorious peace’ in China. In order to achieve this peace, the Soviet Union was prepared to mediate together with Germany and Italy, but Hitler was not interested in this matter.”

Journalist: “Hitler didn’t want to intervene in China?”

Mao: “Yes, and Japan also had no intention of dividing China with the Soviet Union. Japanese documents from October 2, 1940, showed that Japan only agreed that ‘Outer Mongolia and Xinjiang would be within the sphere of influence of Russia.’ Japan considered ‘recognizing and accepting the continuation of Communist base areas in the Northwest Three Provinces (Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia),’ on the condition that the Soviet Union would ‘restrain the Communist Party’s resistance against Japan.’ However, only giving Shaanxi, Gansu, and Ningxia was far from enough, as the territory already occupied by the Communist Party was much larger.”

Journalist: “So, Japan was interested in reaching an agreement with the Soviet Union?”

Mao: “Both sides negotiated and haggled. Moscow was unable to reach an agreement with Japan. This meant that Japan still had the possibility of turning around and attacking the Soviet Union. Stalin’s urgent task was still the cooperation between the Kuomintangs and the Communists to hold back Japan, and I couldn’t initiate a full-scale civil war. Cui Kefu, the military adviser who was just sent to Chiang Kai-shek, asked Stalin why he was sent to ‘help Chiang Kai-shek instead of the Red Army.’ Stalin replied, ‘Your task is to firmly tie the hands of the Japanese aggressors in China.’

On November 25, 1940, the Kremlin ordered me: ‘For now, do not take action and strive for time. Regarding the issue of the northward movement of troops in the Central China region, try to negotiate and bargain with Chiang Kai-shek, but never be the first to initiate military action.’ At the same time, Moscow agreed that if I were attacked by Chiang, I could carry out self-defense counterattacks: ‘If Chiang Kai-shek attacks you, you must counterattack with all your strength. In this situation, the responsibility for division and civil war will fall entirely on Chiang Kai-shek.’

Journalist: “Moscow didn’t want you to be the one to start the war?”

Mao: “Yes, this order disappointed me, but there was also hope: if Chiang Kai-shek fired the first shot, then I could take action. The problem was that Chiang Kai-shek adamantly refused to start the war. The deadline for the New Fourth Army to move north was repeatedly extended, and Chiang Kai-shek did not use force. I reached the conclusion that it was impossible for Chiang to launch a major offensive. I made up my mind to create a situation where Chiang Kai-shek would have no choice but to pull the trigger.”

Journalist: “You devised a plan to make Chiang Kai-shek use force?”

Mao: “Yes, I deliberately provoked Chiang to use force.”

Journalist: “Stalin’s policy of appeasing Japan, does it coincide with your policy of appeasing Japan? Do you have shared interests?

Mao: “Stalin’s policy of appeasing Japan was advantageous for stabilizing the eastern part of the Soviet Union. My strategy of feigned resistance and appeasement towards Japan was advantageous for overthrowing Chiang Kai-shek and seizing power. So, in terms of our policies towards Japan, Stalin and I had shared interests.

On April 13, 1941, the ‘Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact’ was signed.

Stalin told the Japanese Ambassador Matsukata, ‘Now Japan can proceed southward peacefully’ (meaning attacking China). In the Soviet-Japanese Pact, the Soviet Union recognized Manchulia, and Japan recognized Mongolia as a Soviet territory. When Matsuoka left Moscow, Stalin was very satisfied and personally saw him off at the train station.

In February 1945, the secret behind-the-scenes division of spoils took place with the Soviet Union, the United States, and Britain in the Yalta Agreement. Chiang Kai-shek didn’t even know about it. It was pragmatism replacing idealism. It allowed Stalin to devour all of Eastern Europe. After several years of World War II, the United States achieved a minor victory, preserving Britain and Western Europe, defeating Germany. The Soviet Union achieved a major victory, and for the next 40 years, Eastern Europe was under communist rule. Eastern Europe was rescued from the tiger’s den but thrown into the wolf’s lair. Four years later, China fell into the hands of communist rule, and China has suffered under communist disaster for 70 years. I was practically responsible for the calamity for 30 years. The United States suffered a great defeat, and communist enslavement replaced German enslavement, resulting in even more horrific consequences than the Holocaust. When the Soviet Army occupied Germany, two million women were raped. Women in Northeast China also suffered greatly.

When the Soviet Union sent troops to the Northeast, Stalin played it cunningly. On August 6, 1945, the United States dropped the atomic bomb on Japan. On August 8, 1945, the Soviets finally sent troops, although it was no longer necessary as Japan had already surrendered. The Soviet Army invaded the Northeast and looted machinery and treasures. Stalin began to tell the Kuomintang that he would never support the Communist Party and promised to withdraw troops within three months, but in reality, it took half a year to withdraw. It was a ploy to support me in fighting against Chiang Kai-shek.”