Chapter 71 The 6th Plenum of the 6th Central Committee, countering Wang Ming 1938

Mao: “The 6th Plenum lasted for 38 days, and it can be summarized in four sentences:

‘Outwardly focused on the resistance against Japan, but in practice, it aimed at undermining Chiang Kai-shek’s power.

Secretly held Wang Ming accountable, subtly criticizing his leadership while bolstering my own position of authority.

Conducted under the guise of the anti-Japanese cause, it strategically targeted Chiang Kai-shek rather than solely fighting against the Japanese.

Utilized this opportunity to solidify my own position and consolidate power within the party.’”

Journalist: “Why was the 6th Plenum of the 6th Central Committee so important to you?”

Mao: “Yes, it was crucial, the meeting that established my leadership position. On April 4, 1938, Zhang Guotao fled, and I quickly expelled him from the party and tarnished his reputation. Some of his old followers in Shaanxi were extremely dissatisfied, and they held secret meetings in esponse. I ordered their complete encirclement and secretly buried over 200 of them. In June, Moscow also approved the expulsion of Zhang Guotao. With him resolved, the threat to my leadership position now comes from Wang Ming.”

Journalist: “Wow, you secretly buried over 200 Red Army soldiers alive?”

Mao: “Yes. From September to November 1938, the 6th Plenum of the 6th Central Committee was held. Wang Jiaxiang returned to Yan’an from the Soviet Union and brought a message from Dimitrov of the Comintern: ‘the Chinese Communist Party should be led by Mao Zedong, thereby solidifying my position as the party leader.’ When Wang Ming returned to Yan’an from the Soviet Union in 1937, I was worried that the Comintern wanted to make him the leader of the Chinese Communist Party. But at the 6th Plenum, the dust settled. I said, ‘The historical significance of the 6th Plenum is as significant as the Zunyi Conference. It is a crucial meeting in the history of the party that determines China’s destiny.’ The convening of the 6th Plenum was closely related to Wang Jiaxiang’s return. In early July 1938, Wang Jiaxiang flew from the Soviet Union to Lanzhou via Xinjiang, and returned to Yan’an by land at the end of August. As soon as Wang Jiaxiang returned to Yan’an, he immediately conveyed Dimitrov’s message to me. Now I believe it is the time to convene an important party meeting.”

Journalist: “Oh, Wang Jiaxiang brought a message from Moscow asking you to lead?”

Mao: “Yes. I was pondering over what kind of meeting to convene. Originally, the resolutions passed at the Political Bureau meetings in December 1937 and March 1938 called for the convening of the 7th Congress in the near future. Now that Wang Jiaxiang has returned with Dimitrov’s message supporting me as the leader of the CCP, and the cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party is going smoothly, it wouldn’t be difficult for delegates to come to Yan’an for the 7th Congress. The timing for convening the 7th Congress was ripe.

However, I didn’t want to convene the 7th Congress at this time because it would not be enough to eliminate Wang Ming and his influence in one stroke. Moscow did not have the intention of removing Wang Ming from power, and I could only operate within the limits set by Moscow. While Wang Jiaxiang brought Dimitrov’s message mentioning my leadership in resolving issues, it also emphasized the need for unity among the leadership and not to waste time on debates about the past ten years of civil war. The opportunity to isolate and strike at Wang Ming, using the banner of the Comintern, had not yet arrived. In the autumn of 1938, when Wang Ming was still strong, it would be difficult to ensure unanimous support from the entire party if the 7th Congress were hastily convened. Therefore, I decided not to convene the 7th Congress but to hold the 6th Plenum of the 6th Central Committee instead.”

Journalist: “What kind of meeting was it, and was it designed to benefit you?”

Mao: “Yes, the purpose of my meetings was not to promote democracy or engage in discussions, but to solidify my position of power. To ensure the success of the 6th Plenum of the 6th Central Committee, I made careful preparations. I promptly drafted a political report. I sent a telegram to the Yangtze Bureau, notifying Wang Ming, Zhou Enlai, Bo Gu, Xiang Ying, and others to come to Yan’an and receive instructions from the Communist International. Before their arrival in Yan’an, I tightly controlled the content of Dimitrov’s message.”

On September 10, 1938, I stood at the forefront, with a smile on my face, welcoming Wang Ming, Zhou Enlai, Bo Gu, Xu Teli, and others in the procession through various sectors of Yan’an.

On September 14, 1938, the Central Political Bureau held a meeting. Wang Jiaxiang conveyed the resolutions of the Communist International regarding Ren Bishi’s report and Dimitrov’s message. The message was of great importance, stating that I was the actual leader of the CCP, and I had obtained the ‘magic weapon.’ On September 26, the Political Bureau convened again to determine the agenda of the 6th Plenum of the 6th Central Committee. During this meeting, I decided to abolish the Yangtze Bureau and establish the Southern Bureau in its place, with Zhou Enlai as the Secretary and Wang Ming’s position as the Secretary of the Yangtze Bureau effectively terminated.”

Journalist: “Oh, you mentioned Zhou Enlai first to suppress Wang Ming?”

Mao: “Yes. On September 29, 1938, the expanded 6th Plenum of the 6th Central Committee of the CCP opened in Yan’an. There were 12 members of the Political Bureau in attendance, and the Presidium was composed of 12 members of the Political Bureau. Li Fuchun served as the Secretary-General. The meeting lasted a total of 40 days, making it the longest meeting.”

Journalist: “Why did it last for 40 days?”

Mao: “I employed a strategy of starting and stopping, only convening when it was advantageous to me. I began by delivering the political report titled ‘On the New Stage.’ I did not want this report to be included in the ‘Selected Works of Mao Zedong’ in its entirety.

The report contained numerous viewpoints that aligned with Wang Ming’s, and according to the interpretation of party history, it was during the 6th Plenum of the 6th Central Committee that I ‘completely criticized Wang Ming’s right-leaning capitulationist line.’ My speeches and actions during the plenum revealed my ever-changing, contradictory, and untrustworthy political nature. In order to consolidate my personal power, I adopted Wang Ming’s political positions. I could instantly change my stance, presenting an entirely different language and persona.”

Journalist: “Oh, so you used strategy, saying one thing but meaning another. Can you provide specific examples?”

Mao: “In my article ‘One the New Stage,’ I used language similar to Wang Ming’s. I said that ‘it is unimaginable to continue the resistance without the Kuomintang’ and praised ‘the two great leaders, Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek.’ I highly praised the ‘unity of leadership between the national leader and supreme commander, Chairman Chiang.’ I emphasized that China had ‘formed an unprecedented united front against Japan,’ with the ‘Kuomintang in a leading position.’ I solemnly called on the entire party to ‘wholeheartedly support Chairman Chiang.’

I proposed to the Kuomintang that Communist Party members openly join the party while retaining their party membership. I assured the Kuomintang that the CCP would not establish party branches within Kuomintang military forces, nor would it recruit Communist Party members from among Kuomintang members.”

Journalist: “Oh, so you expressed support for Wang Ming’s policies to confuse people?”

Mao: “Yes. On the opening day, September 29, 1938, I wrote a personal letter to Chiang Kai-shek, expressing my deep admiration for him, praising his virtues, and stating that ‘everyone in the country holds him in high regard.’ Zhou Enlai personally delivered this letter to Chiang Kai-shek on October 4 in Wuhan.”

Journalist: “Oh, so you specifically wrote a personal letter to Chiang Kai-shek to show your support?”

Mao: “Yes. I always said that in the united front, we should maintain a high degree of independence and autonomy. Am I suddenly making a 180-degree turn? No. These words of mine are insincere. They are carefully crafted strategies designed to deal with Stalin and internal dissent within the party and to appease Chiang Kai-shek.”

Journalist: “Oh, so you are being two-faced, saying one thing and doing another?”

Mao: “Yes. My ‘On the New Stage’ was a gift to Stalin. I knew that Stalin attached great importance to the anti-Japanese national united front, and given the situation where he had practically recognized me as the leader, it was necessary for me to show obedience to Stalin. By proposing that the CCP join the Kuomintang, I effectively silenced Stalin’s criticisms of my lack of cooperative sincerity toward the Kuomintang. As long as I could control the supreme leadership, it didn’t matter what kind of good words I said.”

Journalist: “Oh, so you were also trying to please Stalin, going along with him, and giving him gifts?”

Mao: “Yes. My ‘On the New Stage’ was also meant for Chiang Kai- shek’s ears. To deceive Chiang Kai-shek, I never trusted the Kuomintang. This time, Chiang Kai-shek saw through my intentions. He wrote in his diary, ‘Mao Zedong’s wording in this personal letter begins with ‘long-term cooperation between the two parties’ and ends with ‘the unity and solidarity of the Chinese nation,’ completely different from the usual Communist Party tone. It raises doubts in my mind. I know this is the Communist Party’s attempt to infiltrate our party on a large scale for the second time. Based on our past bitter experiences, we cannot be fooled again.’”

Journalist: “Haha, did Chiang Kai-shek see through your plot?”

Mao: “Yes. On December 6, 1938, Chiang Kai-shek met with Zhou Enlai. Chiang Kai-shek proposed that the Communist Party should not support the idea of crossing party lines and instead suggested that the Communist Party, since it already endorsed the Three Principles of the People, should merge with the Kuomintang into one organization. Chiang’s proposal was rejected by Zhou, who stated that apart from crossing party lines, it was impossible to join the Kuomintang.”

Journalist: “Haha, did Chiang Kai-shek want a merger between the Kuomintangs and the Communists?”

Mao: “Yes. I tested Chiang Kai-shek with a combination of truth and falsehood, half-truths and half-lies. Chiang responded with a neither firm nor soft attitude. In reality, both of us had our own calculations. It was a case of Jiang Taigong fishing, willing fish taking the bait. Chiang Kai-shek was unwilling to take the bait, so I set it aside without much effort.

During the Sixth Plenary Session, I maneuvered from all sides. I was busy dealing with various matters, leaving me no time to rest. On the one hand, I fabricated stories to deceive Moscow and the Kuomintang; on the other hand, I was more eager to utilize Dimitrov’s “message” to expedite the consolidation of my leadership position within the party. Perhaps Moscow would change its mind in the blink of an eye. The urgent task was to quickly establish my image and make it a fait accompli that I am the sole leader of the CCP.”

Journalist: “Oh, so the most important thing for you is your position within the party?”

Mao: “Yes. I must gather everyone and isolate Wang Ming. This is not an easy task. Most delegates cannot discern the difference between me and Wang Ming. Moreover, Wang Ming, Bo Gu, and others are in Yan’an. Finally, I came up with a clever plan. On September 30, I sent Zhou Enlai to Wuhan on the pretext of delivering a personal letter to Chiang Kai-shek. In early October, Zhou Enlai called from Wuhan and proposed that Wang Ming and others quickly come to Wuhan to attend the National Political Consultative Conference. I took advantage of the situation and also had Wang Ming and Bo Gu go to Chongqing in late October. With Wang Ming, Zhou Enlai, Bo Gu, and Kang Sheng not in Yan’an, I had complete freedom to do as I pleased.”

Journalist: “So, after sending Wang Ming and the others away to Wuhan, you were free to act in Yan’an?”

Mao: “Yes. On November 5th and 6th, 1938, in the absence of Wang Ming, Zhou Enlai, Bo Gu, and others, I delivered an important speech during the conference without directly naming them but criticizing them. I said that the slogan ‘Everything Must Go Through the United Front’ should not be raised.

Less than a month ago, I personally stated my support for Chairman Chiang, but now I criticized the ‘surrenderism’ towards the Kuomintang. Not a single person dared to raise any objections. I realized that my dominant position within the party was basically established. During the closing ceremony on November 6th, I even praised Liu Shaoqi and proposed a flexible strategy towards the Kuomintang, including ‘execute first, report later,’ ‘neither execute nor report,’ and ‘only execute without reporting.’ The goal was to strengthen the armed forces of the CCP and lay the foundation for future seizure of power.”

Journalist: “So, you change as you please, according to your own interests?”

Mao: “Yes. I change whatever benefits me. After the full-scale outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, Stalin ordered the CCP to actively participate in the war and sternly told them that serious cooperation with the Kuomintang was necessary, and they couldn’t give Chiang Kai-shek any excuse for not resisting Japan.

The 46,000 Red Army troops in the northwest were reorganized into three divisions called the ‘8th Route Army,’ with Zhu De as the Commander-in-Chief and Peng Dehuai as the Deputy Commander-in-Chief. The over 10,000 soldiers who remained in Central China during the Long March were organized into the ‘New Fourth Army,’ led by Xiang Ying. In late August, the 8th Route Army began crossing the Yellow River and advancing towards the Shanxi front line. The soldiers were eager to fight against Japan, and most of the CCP leaders also wanted to actively resist Japan.”

Journalist: “So, were you also forced to resist Japan in this way?”

Mao: “No, that’s not how I see it. I didn’t place much importance on fighting Japan. I saw it as a three-way competition: Chiang, Japan, and me — ‘The Records of the Three Kingdoms.’ It was a great opportunity to use the power of Japan to defeat Chiang Kai-shek. I am grateful to the Japanese for helping us so much.

I had hope in the Soviet Union. I hoped that the Soviet Union would advance and that I could bring Soviet troops into China to help me seize power. Before that day arrived, I wanted to expand the territory of my army. After the war against Japan broke out, I insisted that the Red Army should not participate in direct confrontations but operate as guerrilla forces on the sidelines. Chiang Kai-shek agreed to this. Actually, I didn’t even want to conduct side attacks. I ordered our troops to wait until the Japanese army broke the Kuomintang forces and continued to advance. Then we would occupy the territories behind the Japanese lines. The Japanese could only control the railway lines and major cities, while small towns and vast rural areas were there for us to seize. I also ordered the incorporation of scattered Kuomintang soldiers and promptly capture them. I constantly sent telegrams to the commanders, emphasizing that our focus should be on ‘establishing base areas’ rather than on fighting battles. When the Japanese army swept through Shanxi, I issued the order: ‘Establish base areas throughout the entire province of Shanxi.’”

Journalist: “Oh, so your focus was on expanding your own power rather than fighting Japan?”

Mao: “Yes. My policies encountered resistance from some generals who wanted to fight Japan. On September 25th, Lin Biao, at Pingxingguan in Shanxi, engaged in an ambush against the tail of a Japanese transport convoy. Although it was a small battle and not against combat units, if they had followed my orders, the Battle of Pingxingguan would not have taken place. Later, when Lin Biao was undergoing treatment in the Soviet Union, he said, ‘I requested the Central Committee’s approval multiple times to launch an attack on the Japanese army. But there was no response, so I had to take matters into my own hands and fought the Battle of Pingxingguan.’”

I was against fighting this battle because it didn’t contribute to the expansion of Communist Party territories. However, for propaganda purposes, I exaggerated the Battle of Pingxingguan as a great victory, even though we only killed one or two hundred Japanese soldiers. This battle was the only thing we could boast about in our propaganda.”

Journalist: “Oh, so Lin Biao fighting at Pingxingguan was also against your intentions?”

Mao: “Yes. Under my vigorous expansion of territories, in mid- November, the government of the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region was established, with a population of 12 million, far more than Shaan-Gan-Ning. First and foremost, I have to thank Japan.”

Journalist: “So, Japan’s invasion allowed your territory to expand, and that’s why you’re thankful to Japan?”

Mao: “Yes. In November 1937, Stalin sent Wang Ming back to Yan’an by plane. Before his departure, Stalin summoned him and said, ‘The current focus is on resisting Japan. After the anti-Japanese war is over, we can then engage in a civil war.’

Most of the CCP leaders agreed with Stalin’s opinion. At the December Politburo meeting, Wang Ming became the representative of the ‘first fight Japan’ policy. The meeting decided to cooperate with Chiang Kai-shek and accept the unified leadership of the Kuomintang government. I wanted the 8th Route Army to not accept Chiang Kai-shek’s command, but I knew that Wang Ming represented Stalin’s views. I didn’t dare openly insist on my position and could only express it covertly.”

Journalist: “Oh, so you pretended to agree with Stalin and Wang Ming, but had a different agenda behind the scenes?”

Mao: “Yes. The central leadership knew my true intentions. Moscow wanted the CCP to hold the 8th Congress because ten years had passed since the 6th Congress. The selection for delivering the political report at the 8th Congress was not me but Wang Ming.

According to the rules of the Comintern, the number one figure should deliver the political report, which implied that Wang Ming was the leader, not me. Although I was an essentially the leader of the CCP at that time and Moscow also recognized me, my position had not been formally established yet. Liu Shaoqi said at that time, ‘We still don’t have our own Stalin in China.’”

Wang Jiaxiang returned from Moscow with the message that I am the leader, which was of great significance. During the photoshoot, I had him sit in the center position. In the 9-member Secretariat, I also lost control. Wang Ming returned to the country, Xiang Ying emerged, and they both stood against me. Zhang Guotao held resentment towards me. Bo Gu and Zhou Enlai also supported Wang Ming’s resistance against Japan. The other three individuals, Zhang Wentian, Chen Yun, and Kang Sheng, were on my side.”

Journalist: “You only had 4 votes in the Secretariat, while Wang Ming’s side had 5 votes, so you delayed the convening of the 8th Congress?”

Mao: “Yes, convening the 8th Congress at that time would not have been favorable for me. Wang Ming had met with Stalin, was fluent in Russian, and had friendships with communist leaders from various countries. He carried himself with great confidence and authority from Moscow, posing a significant threat to me. I will never forget December 1937 when Wang Ming took away my position. The ‘Nanjing Massacre’ occurred in the same month, with the Japanese killing 300,000 of my compatriots, but I remained indifferent because it was not important to me.”

Journalist: “So, for you, maintaining power was more important than the lives of your compatriots?”

Mao: “Yes. Nanjing was occupied by the Japanese on December 13th, and Chiang Kai-shek moved the temporary capital to Wuhan. On the 18th, Wang Ming hurried to Wuhan as the representative of the CCP, with Zhou Enlai and Bo Gu as his assistants. They established a good working relationship with Chiang Kai-shek, and for a while, Wuhan replaced Yan’an as the center. I resented this and referred to Yan’an as the ‘remnant base.’”

Journalist: “So, Wang Ming and Zhou Enlai were in Wuhan fighting against the Japanese while you remained in Yan’an?”

Mao: “Yes. In February 1938, Zhu De called and said that the headquarters of the 8th Route Army would move southeast to Shanxi according to the decisions made in Wuhan. I wanted him to bring the troops back, claiming that the Japanese were going to attack Yan’an. Zhu De politely refused to return, stating that the Japanese movements in my intelligence reports were just a ruse to lure the 8th Route Army to cross the Yellow River and return to northern Shaanxi. It implied that I had been fooled by the Japanese. I insisted that Zhu De and Peng Dehuai return to Yan’an and sent a telegram on March 3rd, saying, ‘Both of you must come back.’ Zhu and Peng responded firmly but politely, saying, ‘No,’ and led their troops eastward.”

Journalist: “So, you wanted Zhu De and Peng Dehuai to bring their troops back to Yan’an instead of fighting against the Japanese?”

Mao: “Yes, but they didn’t obey. In order to stop such orders from me, the Politburo held another meeting at the end of February. Most people supported Wang Ming and once again confirmed him as the one delivering the political report at the 7th Congress. The Politburo resolution stated that there must be ‘unified discipline’ and ‘unified operational plans’ for the resistance against Japan, and the Communist Party’s military forces must be under the ‘supreme command and unified command of the Military Commission.’ The resolution also stated, ‘Today, only the Japanese and their collaborators, the traitors, attempt to overthrow the Kuomintang.’”

Journalist: “All the leaders of the Party Central Committee are advocating resistance against Japan, except for you?”

Mao: “Yes. Those anti-Japanese remarks are in line with Moscow’s views, so I had to clearly state the policy of ‘first strike against Japan’ and send a telegram to the commander-in-chief of the 8th Route Army, stating that I would not interfere with their actions. At the same time, I took measures to prevent Moscow from discovering my actions. After the December Politburo meeting, I sent people to collect all the notes from the attendees under the pretext of safety, to prevent anyone from reporting to Moscow with written evidence. When I sent someone to the Soviet Union, I sent someone I trusted, Ren Bishi. Ren Bishi told the Comintern that my war policy was the same as theirs.”

Journalist: “Are you trying to keep your actions hidden from Stalin?”