Chapter 69 I set a trap, Zhang Guotao’s Western Route Army was annihilated 1936-1937

Journalist: “What happened with the destruction of Zhang Guotao’s West Route Army?”

Mao: “To explain it fully would take a long time. In short, it was a trap I set for him that led to his downfall. In October 1936, the main force of the Fourth Red Army, consisting of 21,800 soldiers, crossed the Yellow River to engage in operations as ordered by the Central Committee. They aimed to occupy Gansu and Ningxia and establish a route to Xinjiang. However, due to frequent changes in the central strategic intentions, the West Route Army found itself in a precarious situation. Combined with command mistakes and a lack of popular support, the majority of the army was annihilated by the Ma clique after five months.

At that time, the publicized objective of the westward campaign was to control the Hexi Corridor and establish a Northwest passage for Soviet military aid. However, due to the West Route Army fighting alone without reinforcements, it ultimately ended in failure.”

Journalist: “Did you intentionally expose Zhang Guotao’s forces to the Ma clique’s danger, using their own blade to kill them? Can you start from the beginning?”

Mao: “Yes, I did use the Ma clique’s forces to eliminate the hidden danger of Zhang Guotao. In October 1936, after more than 20,000 people Yellow crossed the River, on November 3rd, the Central Committee agreed to the Red Army’s westward advance. On the same day, the Communist International telegraphed the CCP Central Committee, deciding to provide assistance from Xinjiang. On November 6th, Chen Changhao and Xu Xiangqian decided on the westward advance. On November 8th, the Central Committee decided to abandon the plan to fight in Ningxia and proposed a ‘new operational plan.’ The Southern Route Army, consisting of the First and Second Front Armies, would head south into southern Shaanxi, and the Northern Route Army, consisting of two armies from the Fourth Front Army in Hedong, would enter Shanxi as a reserve force. The West Route Army, composed of the Red Army in Hexi, would establish a base in Hexi, open up a route to the Soviet Union, and thus the West Route Army was officially formed. Xu Xiangqian was appointed as the Commander-in- Chief, and Chen Changhao as the Political Commissar.

On November 11th, 1936, the Central Committee inquired whether the West Route Army had the confidence to advance alone, approach Xinjiang, and join forces with the Sheng Shicai’s troops, with the intention of having the West Route Army return east. On November 12th, the West Route Army replied, ‘We can complete the mission.’ Xu Xiangqian stated that the West Route Army could no longer afford to stay in the Hexi Corridor and waste troops and time, and they should make every effort to attack Xinjiang and advance towards Liangzhou first. On November 13th, the Red 9th Army launched an attack on Guluang, attracting the main force of the Ma clique’s army but suffering heavy losses. Meanwhile, the Red Thirtieth Army besieged Liangzhou and continued westward to occupy Yongchang and Shandan. At this time, the Central Military Commission sent a telegram requesting the West Route Army to halt its westward advance and establish a base in Yongchang and Liangzhou. Xu Xiangqian advocated for the troops to seize the opportunity to continue the westward advance, while Chen Changhao believed that stopping and establishing a base was the better option. The two sides argued intensely, but as Chen Changhao was the Political Commissar, Xu Xiangqian could not act on his own. Both sides sent telegrams to the Central Committee, and the Central Committee responded, still requiring the West Route Army to fight in place. At this time, the Ma clique adjusted its forces and launched a strong attack. Both sides suffered heavy casualties, with the Ma clique’s army and the Red Army each losing 6,000 people. The West Route Army was left with only 15,000 soldiers.”

Journalist: “The Central Government instructions were to move westward, eastward, stay in place, and be uncertain. Xu Xiangqian and Chen Changhao didn’t know what to do?”

Mao: “That’s correct. On December 12, 1936, the Xi’an Incident occurred, and the Ma clique ceased their attack on the West Route Army. However, within the West Route Army, there were still debates and disagreements about whether to move eastward or westward. Xu Xiangqian and most of the West Route Army commanders advocated for continuing the westward advance. On December 24th, the Central Committee sent a telegram requesting an eastward movement to relieve pressure on the Red Army in northern Shaanxi, while waiting for a peaceful resolution to the Xi’an Incident. On December 27th, the Central Committee sent another telegram to the West Route Army, reaffirming the plan to continue the westward advance.

By the end of December 1936, the West Route Army began its westward advance and quickly captured Gaotai and Linze. However, at this time, the Central Military Commission suddenly telegraphed the West Route Army to halt the westward advance and establish a base in Gansu. The West Route Army’s halting and resuming of its movements gave the Ma clique enough time to prepare for pursuit and encirclement.”

Journalist: “So the Central Government instructions were to continue moving eastward and westward, without a clear direction?”

Mao: “That’s correct. On January 12, 1937, the Ma clique captured Gaotai, resulting in the complete destruction of the Red Fifth Army. On December 16th, the Central Committee telegram requested the West Route Army to move eastward. On December 23rd, the Ma clique, with a force of 70,000 soldiers, began to encircle the West Route Army moving eastward. In mid-February 1938, the Central Committee telegraphed the West Route Army, instructing them to abandon the eastward movement plan and instead move westward, opposing the West Route Army’s eastward movement into Datong at Qinghai.

On February 21, 1937, the West Route Army broke through from Nijiayingzi and headed eastward, annihilating the Ma clique’s military police unit in Xidongbao and seizing a significant number of spoils. At this point, Xu Xiangqian and Chen Changhao once again disagreed on the direction of the march. Chen Changhao advocated for returning to Nijiayingzi to establish a base in northern Gansu, and he accused Xu Xiangqian of ‘rightist leaning escapism.’ After returning to Nijiayingzi, the West Route Army faced renewed encirclement by the Ma clique. After seven days and nights of fighting, the West Route Army broke through once again, with only over 3,000 remaining.”

Journalist: “After four months of back and forth, there were over 20,000 people, and now there are only over 3,000 left?”

Mao: “That’s correct. On March 14, 1937, a meeting was held at Shiwoshan, and the Military and Political Committee decided that Chen Changhao and Xu Xiangqian would return to Yan’an, while the remaining forces would disperse and engage in guerrilla warfare. The remaining forces split into three groups, led by Wang Shusheng, Zhang Rong, and Li Xiannian, respectively. Li Xiannian and Cheng Shicai led their forces southward, deep into the Qilian Mountains for guerrilla operations. Among them, only Li Xiannian’s group, consisting of over 700 soldiers, managed to traverse the Qilian Mountains and reach Xinjiang. The rest of the West Route Army in Hexi was completely annihilated.”

Journalist: “Wow, after deciding to disperse and engage in guerrilla warfare, only Li Xiannian’s group of over 700 people remained?”

Mao: “That’s correct. The West Route Army of 21,800 soldiers in the Hexi Corridor suffered near-total annihilation. Over 7,000 soldiers were killed in action, and over 9,000 were captured. Among the captured, more than 5,600 were executed, over 2,000 returned to their hometowns, over 4,000 were rescued and brought back to Yan’an, and over 2,000 were scattered throughout the northwest.

Due to the devastating losses, Zhang Guotao faced criticism in March 1937 and was removed from his position as the Red Army’s General Political Commissar, being appointed as the Deputy Chairman of the Border Region instead. With Zhang Guotao’s downfall, my leadership position was firmly established. I labeled Zhang Guotao with accusations of opportunism and escapism.”
Journalist: “With the West Route Army’s demise and the blame placed on Zhang Guotao, did he actually command the army?”

Mao: “No, Zhang Guotao was already marginalized. Looking at the tragic defeat of the West Route Army, the responsibility lies with the central leadership, and at that time, the Central Military Commission was under my leadership. It is a false accusation to claim that Zhang Guotao’s escapism led to the failure of the West Route Army. While Chen Changhao, as the leader of the West Route Army, bears some responsibility, the primary command responsibility rests with the Central Military Commission. What responsibility does Zhang Guotao have? He didn’t command anything. When the West Route Army was destroyed, I had no words but silent delight, as a major source of trouble had vanished. In fact, from the beginning of the westward campaign, I knew it would inevitably end in failure. I deliberately sent Zhang Guotao’s people into the mouth of the Ma clique, allowing them to be devoured.”

Journalist: “So, Zhang Guotao became completely isolated, and you had free rein to deal with him. When you met with him in Sichuan, he had 80,000 troops, while you had less than 8,000, and yet within such a short time, you managed to eliminate him entirely. How did you accomplish that?”

Mao: “First, I left the group without permission and headed north, and he let me go, showing great kindness. Second, he fell for my scheme and was tricked into changing his route from the left to the right, which forced him to stay in Sichuan. That’s when I took him down. I had already established a firm foothold in Shaanbei half a year earlier. Third, when he arrived, I ordered Zhou Enlai and Peng Dehuai to set a trap, causing Zhang Guotao to separate from his main forces. This made him my captive, and I could manipulate him at will. These three factors led to Zhang Guotao’s fatal downfall.”

Journalist: “Why couldn’t Zhang Guotao, with ten times your military strength, defeat you?”

Mao: “In short, he wasn’t as ruthless as I was. He was too kind-hearted. I didn’t care if his tens of thousands of troops were wiped out, as long as they weren’t mine or the party’s. He also followed the directives of the Party Central Committee too closely, but in reality, the Party Central Committee at that time was under my control.”

Journalist: “Why did you insist on eliminating over 20,000 soldiers of the West Route Army?”

Mao: “Those over 20,000 soldiers under Zhang Guotao’s command posed a significant threat to me. When I arrived in Shaanbei, I only had a few thousand soldiers left, and they were in a sorry state. If Zhang Guotao’s over 20,000 soldiers entered Shaanbei, wouldn’t he be the one in charge? My few thousand soldiers would have to yield to him. I had no choice but to eliminate his large army and make Zhang Guotao a lonely figure. I could then criticize and denounce him in anyway I pleased, making him unable to stay in Yan’an, forcing him to flee. Excellent! I labeled him a ‘traitor’ and resolved the issue completely.”

Journalist: “During the Cultural Revolution, there was a ‘West Route Army Orphan Group’ at the Central Institute of Nationalities in Beijing, which established a rebel liaison station and demanded recognition of their status as martyrs’ families and proper treatment for them.”

Mao: “Yes, there were many orphans and descendants of the West Route Army who ended up as street beggars. But I couldn’t show them any pity or give them proper recognition. I could only let them pass through ambiguously. Soon, their liaison station was driven back to Gansu. The annihilation of the West Route Army was essentially my doing, sending them to be consumed by the Ma clique. The Ma clique completed the task of eliminating them on my behalf.”

Journalist: “If Zhang Guotao had been more ruthless and smarter, and hadn’t fallen for your tricks, how would the eventual fate of the Red Army have been different?”

Mao: “Then leadership would have fallen to Zhang Guotao. Once in Shaanbei, Chiang Kai-shek would have allowed him to establish a stable position. The Xi’an Incident wouldn’t have occurred. Zhang Guotao would have followed Stalin’s advice and cooperated with Chiang Kai-shek against Japan. After the victory in the war, they would have formed a united government. There would have been no Liberation War, no establishment of a new China. The Chinese United Government would have pursued peaceful development, and there would have been no major disasters or hardships for 30 years. Mainland China would have been similar to Taiwan, prosperous and strong, much more prosperous and powerful than it is now.”

Journalist: “Do you think Zhang Guotao was qualified to lead?”

Mao: “Of course, he was qualified. In fact, he presided over the 1st Congress of the Party and spent several years in Moscow, where he met Lenin and represented China in the Communist International. And now he had 80,000 troops. In all aspects, he was stronger than me.”

Journalist: “Unfortunately, Zhang Guotao wasn’t as ruthless as you and didn’t possess your strategic cunning.”

Mao: “Leading the army to seize power required ruthless tactics. Within the Communist Party, no one could compare to me. That’s why I was able to ascend the throne.”