Chapter 66 The Xi’an Incident Zhang Xueliang saved Mao 1936

Journalist: “The Xi’an Incident was beneficial to you, right?”

Mao: “Yes, it was very beneficial. In October 1935, when I arrived in northern Shaanxi during the Long March, my goal was survival and establishing communication with the Soviet Union. Chiang Kai-shek wanted to trap the Red Army within his designated area, and he assigned this task to the ‘Young Marshal’ Zhang Xueliang in Northeast China. The Young Marshal was stationed in Xi’an, about 300 kilometers away from me, with his 300,000-strong army stationed in Shaanxi.

Zhang Xueliang’s father, Zhang Zuolin, was assassinated in June 1928.

After his father’s death, Zhang Xueliang pledged allegiance to Chiang Kai-shek and continued his presence in Northeast China. In 1931, when Japan invaded Northeast China, he led his 200,000 Northeastern Army troops to retreat to the interior. Zhang Xueliang, being 14 years younger than Chiang Kai-shek, had a good relationship with both Chiang and Chiang’s wife. However, the Young Marshal was not content with being subordinate. He was not accustomed to taking orders. He understood that whoever wanted to replace Chiang’s position depended on the support of the Soviet Union, so he sought to establish good relations with them.

In 1933, Zhang lost control of Jehol (now named Rehe) and was forced to resign, after which he traveled to Europe. He made every effort to go to the Soviet Union, but his entry was refused. Stalin did not like the Young Marshal. In 1929, the Young Marshal had recaptured the Middle East Railway, which was under Soviet control, and this greatly angered Stalin, who sent troops to invade Northeast China and fought against Zhang’s forces. The Young Marshal also had a fondness for fascism and had met with Mussolini and Hitler during his time in Europe. In August 1935, Moscow declared Zhang Xueliang a ‘traitor’ and a ‘sellout’ through the Chinese Communist Party’s publication of the ‘August 1st Declaration’.”

Journalist: “Zhang Xueliang didn’t have a good relationship with the Communist Party, right?”

Mao: “Initially, the relationship was not good. Zhang Xueliang was appointed by Chiang Kai-shek as the commander to suppress the Communist Party, and he became valuable. He could help us, the Chinese Communist Party, to survive and establish communication with the Soviet Union. Shortly after I arrived in northern Shaanxi, Soviet diplomats secretly communicated with the Young Marshal. At that time, Zhang Xueliang frequently flew from Xi’an to Shanghai and Nanjing in secret, ostensibly to visit his girlfriends. He expressed to the Soviets his desire to establish an anti- Chiang alliance with the Communist Party, engage in decisive battles against Japan, and hoped for Moscow’s support, indicating his intention to replace Chiang.”

Journalist: “Oh, Zhang Xueliang wanted to rally the Soviet Union against Chiang Kai-shek?”

Mao: “Yes. Chiang Kai-shek also didn’t want to fight Japan openly. He knew he couldn’t win and tried to maneuver and buy time with Japan. Chiang hoped that Japan would turn its attention to its archenemy, the Soviet Union, and spare China. Stalin was concerned about this. He wanted Japan to be trapped in China and actively encouraged Chiang to engage in a decisive battle against Japan. However, Stalin didn’t trust the Young Marshal and doubted his ability to lead China in a war against Japan. Moreover, if China descended into a civil war, it would only accelerate Japan’s conquest of China, posing a greater danger to the Soviet Union.

Moscow didn’t directly refuse Zhang Xueliang. Instead, the Soviet Union created an illusion of cautious consideration, intending to use Zhang to assist the Chinese Communist Party. The Soviet Union wanted Zhang Xueliang to establish direct contact with the Communist Party. The secret negotiations between the Young Marshal and us began on January 20, 1936.”

Journalist: “Oh, Moscow wanted Zhang Xueliang to collaborate with you?”

Mao: “Yes, the Soviet Union wanted to keep Zhang Xueliang engaged, but I genuinely wanted to form an alliance with him to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek and rely on the Soviet Union. It was my ideal for Zhang to replace Chiang, as this would make me a significant force behind the scenes. I instructed our negotiator, Li Kenong, to express support for Zhang Xueliang’s replacement of Chiang Kai-shek. I even told Li Kenong to say, ‘There are ways to solve the issue of military salaries and ammunition.’ What ability did I have to provide the Young Marshal with military salaries and ammunition? It was an implied indication that Moscow would support the Young Marshal.”

Journalist: “Oh, did you deceive Zhang Xueliang by giving him a big promise?”

Mao: “Yes, but Zhang Xueliang trusted the big boss and not the little guy. He insisted on direct negotiations with Moscow. In the spring of 1936, there was a delicate opportunity to establish contact with the Soviet Union. Sun Yat-sen’s liaison officer informed Zhang Xueliang that my son in Shanghai was secretly planning to be sent to the Soviet Union and asked Zhang Xueliang to provide an escort. Moscow had a school specifically for the children of foreign communist leaders. Stalin personally took an interest in sending my son to the Soviet Union, and I had no objections.

Zhang Xueliang saw this as an agreement from the Soviet Union to negotiate with his representatives in Moscow. He immediately dispatched

Li Du, who had been in contact with Soviet officials, as an envoy to escort my son to the Soviet Union. Li Du took charge of the entire group of nine people throughout the journey. On June 26, 1936, Li Du, accompanied by my son, the nanny, and others, left China by boat and headed to the French port of Marseille. They planned to obtain visas to the Soviet Union in Paris. However, Moscow delayed for several months and had no intention of allowing their representative to enter.”

Journalist: “So, Zhang Xueliang was deceived?”

Mao: “Yes. In June 1936, the provinces of Guangdong and Guangxi launched a joint anti-Chiang war under the pretext of resisting Japan to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek. I advised Zhang Xueliang to seize the opportunity and unite with the Red Army, just like Guangdong and Guangxi, to split and establish a ‘Northwestern Defense Government.’ I wanted to separate the Northwestern region from China and turn it into another Outer Mongolia. I told the Politburo, ‘The Sino-Soviet Treaty signed in March tells us that the Chinese Communist Party can do this, and the China and the Soviet Union can form an alliance.’”

Journalist: “Oh, so you came up with the idea for Zhang Xueliang to split the Northwestern region so that you could control it?”

Mao: “Yes, but Zhang Xueliang wasn’t interested. Moscow was still watching. In late June, the Chinese Communist Party sent a telegram to the Comintern requesting Moscow’s support for the independence of the Northwest and asking for a monthly subsidy of three million US dollars. Stalin was displeased when he read it. He needed China to engage in a full-scale war against Japan, to delay Japan and prevent China from falling apart, allowing Japan to swiftly conquer China.”

Journalist: “Oh, your idea didn’t align with Stalin’s strategic plan?”

Mao: “No, it didn’t. Shortly after I sent the telegram, in July 1936, the anti-Chiang campaign in Guangdong and Guangxi failed. Public opinion vehemently opposed the splitting of China. Stalin realized once again that Chiang Kai-shek was the only person capable of uniting the entire country to resist Japan. On August 15, Moscow sent a significant telegram to the Chinese Communist Party, ordering them to stop treating Chiang Kai-shek as an enemy and to cooperate with him. The telegram stated, ‘Treating Chiang Kai-shek the same as the Japanese is incorrect. You must make efforts to stop hostile actions between the Red Army and the Kuomintang Army and work together to fight against Japan. All efforts must be devoted to the cause of resistance against Japan.’ Stalin wanted the CCP to support Chiang Kai-shek as the leader of China.”

Journalist: “Stalin wanted you to cooperate with Chiang Kai-shek against Japan. What did you do?”

Mao: “Moscow ordered the CCP to immediately negotiate and cooperate with Chiang. I had no choice but to accept. Negotiations between the CCP and Chiang’s representatives began in early September. As soon as the Long March ended, Chiang Kai-shek had already mentioned to Moscow the need to improve relations with the CCP. Moscow wanted Chiang to directly negotiate with the CCP to elevate the CCP’s status.

Zhang Xueliang was deceived, thinking that Moscow supported his replacement of Chiang. When he told Soviet Ambassador Bogomolov that he hoped to receive Soviet support for his anti-Chiang-Japan alliance with the CCP, the ambassador humored him and fostered his illusion. And what did I do? After receiving the pivotal telegram from Moscow on August 15, I immediately sent Ye Jianying to stay in Xi’an, reassuring Zhang Xueliang not to worry that our policy had changed just because we were negotiating with Chiang Kai-shek. Our support for Zhang’s anti-Chiang stance remained unchanged.”

Journalist: “Oh, so you were playing both sides, playing Zhang Xueliang?”

Mao: “Yes, Stalin supported Chiang Kai-shek as the leader on one hand, and assisted in strengthening the Red Army on the other. In early September 1936, the Soviet Union began transporting military supplies through Outer Mongolia. My list of goods included planes, artillery, shells, rifles, anti- aircraft machine guns, pontoon bridges, as well as Soviet pilots and artillerymen. On October 18, the Comintern sent a telegram saying, ‘We don’t have as many goods as requested in your second telegram, no planes or artillery. We will provide 150 cars, drivers, and fuel for two round trips, each carrying 550 to 600 tons.’

In October 1936, the Red Army began its operation to reach a desert outpost near the border of Outer Mongolia to receive the Soviet military supplies. However, it was not easy to reach the border, as the Kuomintang had strong forces blocking their way. Chiang Kai-shek wouldn’t allow Soviet weapons to fall into the hands of the Communist Party. On October 22, he flew to Xi’an to personally oversee the war.”

Journalist: “Oh, Chiang Kai-shek came to Xi’an in person?”

Mao: “Yes, Zhang Xueliang was in a dilemma. He secretly shared Chiang’s battle plans with the Red Army, provided them with cash and winter clothing, but he couldn’t disobey Chiang’s orders. Within a week, the Red Army was pushed back to Shaanbei by the Kuomintang forces, and the plan to receive Soviet supplies fell through. I urgently requested money from Moscow, saying, ‘Whether it’s 50,000 or 100,000, we need it quickly.’ The Comintern immediately sent $550,000 through Soong Ching-ling, via the United States. But this still couldn’t solve the long-term problem.

Zhang Xueliang considered the opportunity to replace Chiang. With Chiang Kai-shek coming back and forth to Xi’an, Zhang could boldly seize him, saving the Communist Party in the process, and Stalin might place his bet on him. It was a gamble, and Zhang Xueliang liked high-stakes gambling. His philosophy was to seize opportunities.

Zhang Xueliang told Ye Jianying that he was preparing for a coup, which was pronounced as ‘kudieda’ (correct spelling ‘coup d’état’) in French. On October 29, Ye Jianying used coded language to telegram me, saying, ‘The principal has mentioned capturing Chiang.’ In November, Ye Jianying and Zhang Xueliang discussed the plan to capture Chiang, and Ye quickly left Xi’an to return to Baoding and meet with me to discuss the ‘kudeda’ plan.

I kept this plan hidden from Moscow. I knew Stalin wouldn’t agree.

Stalin needed Chiang Kai-shek at that time. On November 25, 1936, Germany and Japan signed the Anti-Comintern Pact, putting the Soviet Union in a situation of being threatened from both the east and the west. Japanese forces were moving from the southern border of Outer Mongolia toward Central Asia. On the day the pact was announced, Stalin urgently ordered the General Secretary of the Comintern, Georgi Dimitrov, to sternly warn the Chinese Communist Party to abandon its anti-Chiang policy and support the central government. We needed a national government.”

Journalist: “So Stalin wanted you to cooperate with Chiang Kai-shek against Japan, but you wanted Zhang Xueliang to overthrow Chiang?”

Mao: “Yes, I knew I was going against Stalin’s wishes, so I kept my distance from the plan to capture Chiang. Before the operation, Zhang Xueliang sent a telegram asking Ye Jianying to return to Xi’an, saying, ‘There is an important matter to discuss, I hope you can come here as soon as possible.’ I kept Ye Jianying with me and told Zhang that ‘he has already left.’ I urged Zhang Xueliang to capture Chiang and sent a telegram stating that the negotiations between the Communist Party and Chiang Kai-shek were not going well, and that ‘we are determined to seek peace through war, and will not make any unconditional concessions.’ I wanted to create an impression in Zhang’s mind that the Red Army could only cooperate with him, and that Moscow would eventually support him.”

Journalist: “Oh, so you were playing both sides, deceiving Zhang Xueliang?”

Mao: “Yes. On December 4, 1936, Chiang Kai-shek arrived in Xi’an again and stayed at Huaqing Pool on the outskirts of Xi’an. He had dozens of guards with him, but Zhang Xueliang’s troops were guarding the gates and courtyard. Zhang assigned the people who were supposed to capture Chiang, and they went in and inspected every place, even Chiang’s bedroom.

In the early morning of December 12, 1936, Chiang Kai-shek was kidnapped. He had just finished his morning exercises and was getting dressed when he heard continuous gunfire. Zhang Xueliang sent over 400 people to attack his residence, and Chiang’s guards fought back, resulting in some casualties. Chiang fled to the back mountain and was captured in a cave. He was only wearing pajamas, lost his shoes, and sustained some minor injuries, while some of his attendants were killed.”

Journalist: “So Zhang Xueliang actually acted on your deception and carried out the operation?”
Mao: “Yes. When the operation to capture Chiang began, Zhang Xueliang sent me a telegram, informing me that they had taken action. The beginning of the telegram stated, ‘The counterrevolutionary nature of Chiang has been fully revealed,’ and then he mentioned wanting to ‘reorganize the united government.’ These two sentences indicated that Zhang Xueliang intended to treat Chiang Kai-shek as a counterrevolutionary and, with my and Moscow’s support, he wanted to take the first seat in the ‘united government.’ Capturing Chiang was not a plea to force him to resist Japan.

When I received Zhang’s telegram, I smiled and said to my secretary, ‘Oh, go to sleep, we will have good news tomorrow.’

When the news of Chiang’s capture spread, the Communist Party leaders gathered in my cave, and everyone was ecstatic. I burst into laughter. All I had in mind was to eliminate Chiang Kai-shek. Once Chiang was gone, China would experience a power vacuum, and that would be a rare opportunity for me and Moscow to show our abilities.”

Journalist: “Oh, you burst into laughter, the stage for the hero has arrived?”

Mao: “Yes. I sent a telegram to the Communist International, pleading with Moscow to get involved, saying, ‘Please support us,’ ‘provide strong assistance to China.’ I hinted at Moscow to allow the killing of Chiang, asking if it was possible to ‘demand Nanjing to remove Chiang Kai-shek and hand him over to the people’s trial.’ I knew that my goals conflicted with Stalin’s, so I pretended that I only heard about the capture of Chiang after the fact and assured Moscow that the Communist Party would not issue a public statement for a few days.”

Journalist: “So you played both sides between Zhang Xueliang and Moscow?”

Mao: “Yes, I deceived Moscow and tried every means to get Zhang Xueliang to kill Chiang. Immediately after Chiang’s capture on December 12, I sent a telegram to Zhang Xueliang saying that it was ‘urgent to execute Chiang in times of crisis.’ At the same time, I sent Zhou Enlai to Xi’an to persuade Zhang Xueliang to kill Chiang.

The Communist Party headquarters in Yan’an was 300 kilometers away from Xi’an, and it would take several days to travel there by horse. So I asked Zhang Xueliang to send a plane to Yan’an to pick up Zhou Enlai. At that time, Yan’an was under Zhang Xueliang’s control and had an airfield. To encourage Zhang Xueliang to send the plane as soon as possible, on the 13th, I hinted that Zhou Enlai would bring supportive words from Moscow, saying, ‘We have made arrangements on the international front, and I will provide details later.’”

Journalist: “So you deceived Zhang Xueliang first?”

Mao: “Yes, but what Zhang Xueliang needed was not just a private message from me, but public support from Moscow. On December 14, 1936, the Soviet newspapers ‘Truth’ and ‘News’ published front-page articles strongly condemning Zhang Xueliang, stating that his coup was serving Japan and unequivocally supporting Chiang Kai-shek. Within two days of capturing Chiang, Zhang Xueliang realized that he had been deceived by the Communist Party, and that Moscow was unreliable. He had lost the gamble, it was over.”

Journalist: “When the Soviet newspapers published those articles, Zhang Xueliang was stunned?”

Mao: “Yes, the blow from the Soviet Union was very heavy. Zhang Xueliang refused to invite Zhou Enlai and ignored all the telegrams from me asking him to send Zhou to Xi’an and provide a plane. So on December 15, I sent Zhou directly, while telegraphing Zhang Xueliang, ‘Enlai left this morning and will arrive in Yan’an on the evening of the 16th. Please send a plane to the airport on the morning of the 16th for inspection. If you see the words ‘Tian Xia’ (meaning ‘Under Sky’), then land to pick up Zhou.’

When Zhou arrived in Yan’an, there was no plane to pick him up. The city gates were even closed, so Zhou had to spend the night outside the city. Zhang Xueliang was furious and vented his anger on Zhou Enlai. On December 17, I sent two more telegrams to Zhang Xueliang: ‘Enlai arrived outside Yan’an yesterday, but the militia guarding the city refused to open the gates and ignored negotiations,’ and ‘Enlai is waiting outside Yan’an, please instruct the militia to allow his entry into the city.’”

Journalist: “Zhang Xueliang realized that he was deceived by you, and even ignored Zhou Enlai?”
Mao: “Yes, on that day, Zhang Xueliang had calmed down and made up his mind to release Chiang. For this, he needed cooperation from the Communist Party. Because there were many key figures around the Young Marshal who were under the control of the Communist Party, without their approval, Chiang could not be released. Leaving secretly would pose a threat to his life.

The Young Marshal dispatched Leonardo to fly a plane to pick up Zhou Enlai. Zhang Xueliang appeared as if nothing had happened, and he was still friendly with Zhou, going along with what Zhou said. When Zhou urged him to kill Chiang, he pretended to agree. Zhou reported to me, saying, ‘Zhang agrees that during the inevitable stage of the civil war, we should besiege Xi’an and use subsequent methods.’”

Journalist: “Zhang Xueliang planned to release Chiang, and he also needed your cooperation?”

Mao: “Yes. I hoped to instigate a war between Nanjing and Xi’an. I once considered sending the Red Army to attack Nanjing. On December 15th, I secretly planned to ‘maneuver and crush the enemy Nanjing government.’ However, I quickly abandoned this plan as it would be futile for the Red Army. It was uncertain whether we could incite a civil war. On December 16th, Nanjing declared war on Zhang Xueliang and sent troops to advance toward Xi’an, bombing the outskirts of the city. This played right into my hands. I strongly urged Zhang Xueliang to counterattack and advance to Nanjing. I said, ‘The key targets are Nanjing, Jinghan, and Longhai. If we use 20,000 to 30,000 troops to flank and launch a surprise attack on Jinghan and Longhai, achieving victory, the overall situation will change. Please consider this.’ I longed for a major war that would cut off Zhang Xueliang’s retreat, forcing him to kill Chiang.”

Journalist: “You continued to play both sides and were determined to instigate a civil war?”

Mao: “Yes, if the war broke out, I would have an opportunity. Just when I was actively pushing for Zhang to kill Chiang, Stalin made up his mind to save Chiang. On December 13th, the second day after Chiang was captured, Kong Xiangxi, the Chairman of the Executive Yuan, met with the Soviet representative in Nanjing and said, ‘The Xi’an incident is rumored to be related to the Communist Party. If General Chiang’s safety is in danger, the anger of the whole nation will be directed not only at the Communist Party but also at the Soviet Union. It will force me to join Japan in opposing the Soviet Union.’ Stalin became anxious.

On midnight of December 14th, 1936, the General Secretary of the Comintern, Dimitrov, received a phone call from Stalin. Stalin asked, ‘Did you decide what happened in China?’ Dimitrov quickly replied, ‘No! It’s doing a great favor for Japan. We have repeatedly warned the Communist Party, but they still established a very close relationship with Zhang Xueliang. It’s hard to imagine that Zhang Xueliang would do such a risky thing without coordinating with them. They are very likely to be involved.’ These words meant that I claimed to be ignorant in advance, all of them were lies. It meant that I openly disregarded Stalin’s orders.

At this moment, Stalin began to suspect my connections with the Japanese. Stalin had already been suspicious and interrogated almost all of the Soviet ‘China experts.’ Four days after Chiang was captured, one of the detainees confessed to being involved in a Trotskyist conspiracy to provoke Japan to attack the Soviet Union. My name was mentioned in his testimony. I was piled up with a bunch of incriminating materials, which could be used at any time to accuse me of being a Japanese spy.

On December 16th, Dimitrov sent me a sternly worded telegram, condemning the capture of Chiang and stating that this action ‘will only harm the anti-Japanese united front and promote Japan’s aggression against China.’ The telegram pointed out, ‘The Communist Party must resolutely adopt peaceful means to resolve the issue.’ This was an order for me to help release Chiang Kai-shek and restore his position as the national leader.”

Journalist: “Stalin personally ordered to let Chiang fight against Japan. What did you do?”

Mao: “After receiving this telegram, I was furious and cursed in frustration. My way of dealing with it was to pretend that I hadn’t received the Moscow telegram, keeping it secret from Zhang Xueliang and the Politburo. I didn’t even inform Zhou Enlai, who was on his way to Xi’an to persuade Zhang Xueliang to kill Chiang. I continued my efforts to get rid of Chiang.”

Journalist: “So you acted contrary to your intentions, using tricks?”

Mao: “Yes. Later, I lied and claimed that the Moscow telegram of December 16th had been mishandled by the telegraph office and couldn’t be translated. On December 18th, I requested Moscow to resend it. This was just an excuse. If the telegram couldn’t be translated, the telegraph operator would immediately request Moscow to resend it, it wouldn’t take two days. On December 19th, I lied to the Politburo and said, ‘The international instructions haven’t arrived yet.’

I was engaging in a dangerous confrontation with Moscow. But for me, the opportunities that would arise after getting rid of Chiang were worth the risk.”

Journalist: “So you still harbored the delusion of killing Chiang to create opportunities for yourself?”

Mao: “Yes. But once Zhang Xueliang realized that Moscow wasn’t backing him up, he immediately decided not to kill Chiang. He had to protect Chiang Kai-shek because he was still one of Chiang’s people. He could no longer trust me. He had only one way out, which was to release Chiang and go along with him. Otherwise, he would be killed by many people who hated him for capturing Chiang. Sending Chiang back would earn Zhang a goodwill and make Chiang forgive him.

On December 14th, after the news of Moscow’s condemnation of Zhang Xueliang’s coup was announced, Zhang Xueliang went to meet Chiang Kai-shek. He stood there, shedding tears and admitting to Chiang that he had realized the rashness of his actions. He promised to find a way to secretly send the Chairman Chiang back to Nanjing. Chiang Kai-shek was cooperative as well. After Nanjing declared war on Xi’an on December 16th, Chiang immediately sent someone with a letter, ordering Nanjing not to engage in conflict and to cease the bombings. Nanjing complied. Chiang Kai-shek understood that if he wanted to regain his freedom, some semblance of negotiations was inevitable. Nanjing sent Song Ziwen to Xi’an for negotiations in a personal capacity. On December 20th, Song arrived in Xi’an, and two days later, Chiang’s wife, Soong Mei-ling, also came.”

Journalist: “So you couldn’t play both sides anymore?”

Mao: “I had exhausted my methods. On December 20th, Moscow sent me another telegram regarding a peaceful resolution of the Xi’an Incident. I couldn’t pretend anymore that I hadn’t received any telegrams, so I had to pass the telegram to Zhou Enlai, asking for his help in ‘restoring Chiang Kai-shek’s freedom.’

I was forced to align with Stalin at this time. Stalin demanded that Chiang ‘stop the policy of exterminating the Communists’ and insisted that Chiang meet with Zhou Enlai. Chiang meeting Zhou was not a trivial matter; it was equivalent to the government acknowledging the Communist Party rather than treating them as the bandits that must be eradicated.

Journalist: “Did Stalin help you become legitimate?”

Mao: “Yes. On December 23, 1936, Zhou Enlai had a meeting with Song Ziwen and Zhang Xueliang. Song Ziwen said he had no personal objections to the conditions set by the Communist Party and would convey them to Chiang Kai-shek. However, Chiang Kai-shek refused to meet with Zhou. Zhang Xueliang was extremely anxious because without Chiang meeting Zhou, they couldn’t leave. They were deadlocked.

Moscow knew what bait to use to make Chiang meet with Zhou. On the eve of Christmas, December 24, 1936, Bo Gu arrived in Xi’an, bringing Moscow’s message. On Christmas day, Bo Gu told Chiang that Moscow would release Chiang Ching-kuo. This statement allowed Zhou Enlai to enter Chiang Kai-shek’s bedroom. With this commitment, Chiang agreed to the Communist Party’s conditions and wanted Zhou to negotiate ‘directly’ after his return to Nanjing. The deal of ‘exchanging the Communist Party for his son’ was thus reached. The Chinese Civil War came to an end.”

Journalist: “Oh, so in the end, Stalin agreed to send back Chiang Ching-kuo in exchange for Chiang Kai-shek’s recognition of the Communist Party?”

Mao: “Yes, on the afternoon of December 25, 1936, Chiang Kai-shek and his wife left Xi’an. Zhang Xueliang accompanied them and voluntarily became a prisoner. After going through these hardships, Chiang Kai-shek’s prestige soared. When the car entered Nanjing, the people warmly welcomed them, and the sound of firecrackers was incessant. Chiang Kai-shek seemed like the winner, but the true winner was me.

The Communist Party henceforth gained a legitimate status and nominally cooperated in the resistance against Japan. I obtained a great opportunity to vigorously develop my influence and pursue my grand plans. Zhang Xueliang saved me. If he had cooperated with Chiang, I would have had to board the plane sent by Stalin and live in Moscow as a guest, spending my remaining years there. Stalin’s demands were also met. Chiang Kai-shek fought Japan head-on, and the Soviet Union avoided the threat from Japan.”

Journalist: “Oh, the Xi’an Incident, you were the real winner, and Zhang Xueliang saved you.”