Chapter 63 Broke away from Zhang Guo Tao and forcefully headed north alone 1935

Journalist: “How would you compare the meeting of the two Red Armies?”

Mao: “When the two Red Armies met in June 1935, the Central Red Army led by me was in a tragic situation. The remaining 8,000 soldiers were physically exhausted, we had lost all heavy weapons, and each rifle had an average of only five bullets. Zhu De said, ‘The Central Red Army used to be a giant, but now it has lost all its flesh and only a skeleton remains.’”

“Zhang Guotao commanded the Red Fourth Front Army, which initially had only 20,000 people during the early stage of the Long March, but now it has grown to 80,000. Their troops are strong, well-built, and well-trained. They possess machine guns and mortars, making them a formidable force.”

Li De said, “Zhang Guotao received us as if he were the host, exuding confidence. He holds military superiority and has ambitions no smaller than Mao’s.”

Journalist: “You were in a disadvantageous position? What were you worried about?”

Mao: “The moment I had been worried about has come. Zhang Guotao, both in terms of strength and experience, should have taken control of the party and the military. I confronted Zhang, and I was in a disadvantaged position. However, I had the upper hand in the Secretariat. Among the three Secretaries, Zhang Wentian, Zhou Enlai, and Bo Gu, all of them stood on my side at that time.”

Without me, Zhang Wentian couldn’t become the top leader. He nodded his head when we didn’t enter Sichuan. Zhou Enlai, out of fear of me, allowed himself to be manipulated by me repeatedly. Bo Gu, with his greatly diminished vitality, dragged down the Red Army, and he didn’t contend with me. In short, the Central Red Army was dragged down, and the entire Secretariat bears responsibility. Zhang Wentian, Zhou Enlai, and Bo Gu are still on my side, making it easier to deal with. As a result, Zhang Guotao is at a 1-to-4 disadvantage in the Secretariat.”

Journalist: “Were you concerned about having a ower position compared to Zhang Guotao?”

Mao: “Yes. In order to shift the blame, we unanimously claimed that the Central Red Army was crushed by the Kuomintang. However, the Red Fourth Front Army also suffered heavy blows from the Kuomintang, much worse than what the Central Red Army experienced. As a result, we labeled them with political accusations, calling them ‘warlordism,’ ‘politically backward,’ and ‘banditry.’ This infuriated the Red Fourth Front Army, and both armies engaged in arguments. The Red Fourth Front Army asked, ‘With this kind of Central leadership and Mao Zedong, can they still lead us?’”

Journalist: “So, you labeled Zhang Guotao as a warlord and bandit, but in reality, everyone was somewhat guilty?”

Mao: “Indeed. The cadres and soldiers of the Central Red Army also voiced their grievances, criticizing the leadership’s incompetence, saying we were ‘constantly wandering’ and ‘didn’t know where we were going.’ Soldiers complained about abandoning wounded and sick comrades along the way, and using soldiers as bearers to carry the leaders and their wives.”

“The soldiers’ complaints about leaders riding on stretchers and the unequal treatment seem valid. They said, ‘We talk about equality, but the leaders ride on stretchers, displaying the feudal landlord’s style. None of the high-ranking officials who were carried ever died, but many young stretcher bearers, nurses, and guards died from exhaustion. The Red Army now has more cadres and fewer soldiers.’”

Journalist: “The soldiers’ grievances are justified! How did your power struggle with Zhang Guotao turn out?”

Mao: “Regarding unified leadership, I only agreed to let Zhang Guotao be the Deputy Chairman of the Military Commission, but he was dissatisfied. His subordinates insisted that Zhang should lead the Red Army, resulting in a stalemate. The Central leadership couldn’t move the Red Fourth Front Army. Both armies were squeezed into the impoverished Tibetan areas and started running out of food. The local population couldn’t sustain such a large number of outsiders. The Red Army and the locals competed for food, even prematurely cutting the unripe barley in the fields, leaving the Tibetan people without food for the following year. Whenever they had the chance, the Tibetan people would attack the Red Army. Along the way, there were many corpses, most of whom were stragglers killed by the Tibetans.

I was struggling on what position should be given to Zhang Guotao? Zhang Wentian proposed giving him the position of Party General Secretary.

I disagreed. I would rather give him military authority and have the party command him, which is justified as ‘the party commands the gun.’ On July 18th, Zhang Guotao was appointed as the General Political Commissar of the Red Army, and he would ‘directly command and control all the armies.’

Journalist: “Ah, your approach was to give Zhang Guotao a military title and have the Party General Secretary command him?”

Mao: “Yes. In early August 1935, the Central Committee formulated the ‘Xiatao Campaign Plan’: the entire army would head north, reach Xiahe and Taohe in Gansu, and then proceed to Xinjiang via Suiyuan and Mongolia. According to the plan, the Red Army was divided into two forces. The main force on the left was led by Zhang Guotao and Zhu De, heading north through Amdo, while the right army, commanded by Xu Xiangqian and Chen Changhao under Zhang Guotao, took the eastern route through Banyu to go north. I chose to accompany the Central Committee and go with the right army. Lin Biao and Peng Dehuai, who were also part of the Central Red Army, were in the right army and took orders from Xu and Chen.

After nine days since Zhang Guotao’s forces set out, on August 15, I sent a telegram to Zhang Guotao in the name of the Central Committee, instructing him not to attack Amdo and change his route to join the right army, advancing towards Xiahe from Banyu.”

Journalist: “So, you used the name of the Party Central Committee to ask Zhang Guotao to switch from the left army to the right army?”

Mao: “Yes, on August 19, Zhang Guotao replied that he was near Amdo and could take it in a day or two. He claimed it was a sunny road with three or four parallel routes leading north to Amdo, abundant in both people and supplies, while Banyu was an unknown, and the road to Banyu was even more uncertain.

I used the power of the Party Central Committee to exert pressure on Zhang Guotao. The next day, the Politburo made a resolution stating that Zhang Guotao had leaned too much towards the West, following a “surrenderist opportunist line” and taking a ‘path of weak resistance’ that ‘objectively suited the enemy’s demands.’”

Journalist: “Oh, so you labeled Zhang Guotao with the hat of opportunist surrenderist?”

Mao: “Yes, I criticized him in such an absurd way because I realized that the path Zhang Guotao was taking was an easy one, and it was entirely possible for him to reach the north early and establish contact with the Soviet Union. I wanted Zhang Guotao to follow behind me.

At the same time, I also understood that the route I chose, led by Ban You, was extremely difficult. We had to traverse a treacherous grassland, a journey that would take a week. The grassland had low-lying swamps, and one wrong step could suck a person in. There were no signs of human habitation, no food or shelter. The climate was harsh and unpredictable, making it difficult to start a fire for warmth. In August, the temperature dropped below freezing at night. Crossing the grassland, at an altitude of over 3,000 meters, felt like passing through hell. If Zhang Guotao followed behind me, it would be even worse for him. Even wild vegetables had been eaten by the preceding troops, and the bushes had already been burned.”

Journalist: “You made Zhang Guotao suffer behind you in the name of the Party?”

Mao: “Yes, after sending the Politburo’s condemnation resolution to Zhang, I took a stretcher and set off on the journey, leaving behind all unnecessary belongings. On the first day of marching, Lin Biao said, ‘There are no signs of human habitation along the way. We need to cross five rivers, three of which have no bridges. Over 300 people have no rain gear and are completely soaked. Tonight, everyone will huddle in the rain.’”

Li De wrote, ‘The grassland looks green on the surface, but underneath is a treacherous black swamp. We followed the local cattle and horses, who instinctively found the safest paths. There were no houses or trees, so we squatted down to sleep. In the morning, there was always a cold that couldn’t be shaken off and exhausted sacrifices.’

Li Weihan wrote, ‘During the crossing of the grassland, there was nothing to eat. When a horse died, we would skin it and eat the meat. The leading troops ate horse meat, while the rear troops gnawed on bones. When there was nothing else to eat, we ate grass roots and boiled leather belts. Along the way, I saw a blanket covering several soldiers. I quickly got off my horse, lifted the blanket, intending to wake them up and walk together. But upon closer inspection, I realized that the four soldiers under the blanket had already stopped breathing.’

Liu Ying wrote, ‘Many people couldn’t hold on and fell down. By the fifth or sixth day, every morning when we woke up, we would see the bodies of our comrades around us. On the sixth day, I also started having diarrhea, but I gritted my teeth and made it through. We walked through the grassland for seven days and seven nights, with no signs of human habitation. On the 8th day, we finally emerged from the grassland and saw villages. We saw big radishes in the fields and felt overjoyed. You felt like returning from the world of death to the human realm.’

Journalist: “Wow, crossing the grassland sounds like hell on earth!”

Mao: “Yes, when we arrived in Ban You, the troops spent a night in this small village with only twenty houses. We stayed in cow dung houses, with walls and roofs made of plowed cow dung. We dried our clothes over the fire fueled by cow dung, a luxury enjoyed only by the survivors. In Lin Biao’s First Army Group alone, 400 people died, accounting for 15% of the army group’s personnel.

This is the route I wanted Zhang Guotao’s tens of thousands of troops to take, abandoning the easy path and diverting to the Ban You route. In the name of the Politburo, I sent telegrams to Zhang, urging him to quickly take the Ban You route. I lied, saying that the distance was short and there were plenty of places to camp. In my telegram, I said, ‘Maorgai connects Ban You, the route is short and is with many sheds, suggests that with 3-4 regiments, the wounded and supplies can be protected and proceed slowly.’”

Journalist: “So you continued to deceive Zhang Guotao and make him fall for it?”

Mao: “Yes, I wanted Zhang Guotao to bring the wounded and supplies, so they wouldn’t be abandoned. But in reality, it only burdened his troops and made them suffer even more. The Central Committee of the Party gave the order, and Zhang Guotao had no choice but to comply. He led his tens of thousands of troops into the grassland. Just a day or two later, they had already experienced the hardships of the grassland. On September 2nd, the troops reached a swollen river. Zhang sent me a telegram saying, ‘We have scouted for 30 miles upstream and downstream, but there is no suitable crossing point. It is difficult to build bridges, and each unit only has four days of food. We are currently continuing to search for crossing points and trying to build bridges.’”

Journalist: “Zhang Guotao was really deceived by you and followed your instructions?”

Mao: “Yes, he still couldn’t cross the river on the second day. Zhang Guotao decided not to proceed any further and sent me a telegram saying, ‘We have scouted for 70 miles upstream, but still couldn’t find a crossing point or build a bridge. Each unit only has three days of food, and the 25th Division has only two days. The radio station has run out of food. In this vast grassland, we cannot advance and can only wait for death. Without a guide, the suffering is immense. We have decided to return to Aba in three days.’

In this way, Zhang Guotao, after going through such twists and turns, made the decision to stop heading north and wait for the next spring. He telegraphed me, saying, ‘The opportunity for heading north has been lost. Two-thirds of his troops are suffering from foot diseases, making it difficult to march. If we continue, more than half of the troops will be reduced, and we will have to abandon the wounded.’”

Journalist: “Zhang Guotao was forced to stop heading north?”

Mao: “Yes, Zhang Guotao postponed his northward movement, which suited my intentions. I could seize the opportunity to establish a foothold in northern Shaanxi and establish contact with Moscow.

Zhang Guotao wanted the Right Route Army, which I belonged to, to also stop heading north and join him in the south. On September 8th, Zhang ordered the commanders of the Right Route Army, Xu Xiangqian and Chen Changhao, to lead the entire army southward. Xu and Chen obeyed Zhang’s orders. I didn’t want to go south; I was worried that the Central Red Army would be taken away. So, I quietly made up a lie. On the nights of September 9th and 10th, Zhang Wentian and I told a few members of the Central Committee that Zhang Guotao had ordered the leaders of the Right Route Army to harm the Central Committee. Therefore, we had to take the troops away overnight. We woke up the troops in the middle of the night and said, ‘Get up, get up! We need to leave immediately!’ Everyone asked, ‘What’s happening? Where are we going?’ We instructed them, ‘Don’t make any noise, don’t light torches, follow one another and keep going!’ We marched urgently for over ten miles until we reached a mountain pass and finally stopped to catch our breath. At the same time, I sent the trustworthy Ye Jianying to take away the Second Bureau responsible for communication and secretly took the military maps from the headquarters.

Journalist: “So you made up a lie and unilaterally led the troops away?”

Mao: “Yes. In the early morning of September 10th, Xu Xiangqian and Chen Changhao woke up and found that my people were missing, the Central Red Army was gone, and the military maps were missing as well. Reports from the peripheral troops indicated that the Central Red Army had stationed guards and was ready to open fire on any pursuers. The troops asked Xu and Chen whether they should engage. Following Zhang Guotao’s instructions, Xu and Chen decided not to fight the Red Army. We left smoothly.”

Journalist: “So you fabricated a lie, saying that Zhang Guotao intended to harm the Central Committee, and also forged a telegram from Zhang Guotao to Xu Xiangqian and Chen Changhao, instructing them to take action?”

Mao: “Yes, I had Ye Jianying forge a telegram from Zhang Guotao to Xu Xiangqian nd Chen Changhao, instructing them to take action. This was to make it appear that I forcefully left the group and headed north alone under duress, shifting the blame onto Zhang Guotao.”

Journalist: “Zhang Guotao showed leniency towards you and didn’t open fire to prevent you from leaving the group without permission. What happened after you left?”

Mao: “After the troops had traveled for a while, they saw the propaganda team of the Fourth Red Army waving and shouting from a distant hillside, saying, ‘Comrades, don’t follow the big-nosed ones! Turn back quickly!’ The term ‘big-nosed’ referred to Li De. It was the first time that the Red Army soldiers who had been taken away learned that they had separated from the Fourth Red Army. The Red Army was splitting apart. Fear and unease engulfed the troops. The political department immediately sent people to the companies, urging the soldiers to keep moving and preventing those who were wavering from running back.”

Journalist: “So Zhang Guotao easily let you go?”

Mao: “Yes at that time, I had less than 8,000 soldiers under my command. I stood by the roadside, silently observing them as they passed, gauging their emotions. I deliberately had Peng Dehuai stand beside me to show his support. This was the second time I appeared in front of the troops since the Long March began, the first time being at the Zunyi Conference with the masses.”

Journalist: “Why did you insist on struggling to head north alone?”

Mao: “I have told Snow that the days when my few thousand soldiers were mixed in with Zhang Guotao’s tens of thousands were the darkest days of my life. I saw my dream of dominating the world crumble, and I was relegated to a position of insignificance under others. I had to do everything possible, make a desperate effort, and break free. Only then would there be hope for my future achievements.”

Journalist: “You left without informing Zhang Guotao. What was your next move?”

Mao: “My next move was to ensure that the Kuomintang Army wouldn’t cause trouble. I had to find a way to inform Chiang Kai-shek that the northern-bound group was just a small weak force containing the Central Committee. The Kuomintang learned about our departure within a few hours. On September 11th, Chiang Kai-shek sent a telegram to the Chairman of Gansu Province, saying, ‘It is reported that the bandits Mao, Peng, Lin, and others, who were fleeing to the north, were all exhausted and famished.’

Zhang Guotao knew that this was intentionally leaked information by me to the Kuomintang. The next day, he sent me a telegram saying, “After you left, the next morning, Hu Zongnan became aware of Peng Dehuai’s troops heading north. Please be cautious, as the reactionaries might take the opportunity to inform on us. Regardless of any disputes within the Party Central Committee, we must not let the enemy know about our military actions.”

Journalist: “Did Zhang Guotao still care about you? Was he afraid that you would be harmed by the Kuomintang?”

Mao: “Yes, the leak of information allowed me to have a smooth journey for the next 1,000 kilometers. There was only a small skirmish at the mountain pass of Lazikou. There were just over 10 participants, but later it was exaggerated as the ‘Great Battle of Breaking through the Formidable Lazikou.’ Besides a few warning shots, there were no enemies in that section. The Central Army followed us like shadows, paralleling us to the south, with the aim of driving us northward.

The situation along the route in Gannan was quite good. In order to avoid turning the local people into enemies, I ordered strict discipline, with severe punishments for any violations. Sixty percent of the local population were Hui Muslims, so the Red Army prohibited the killing and consumption of pork. Even wealthy Muslims were not allowed to be beaten as if local tyrants.

The local conditions were good, but as a result, a large number of Red Army soldiers fled. In Min County alone, over 1,000 Red Army soldiers surrendered. I instructed the political security department to pay attention to accommodating those who fell behind. Along the way to northern Shaanxi, there were continuous cases of soldiers falling behind. Desertion was related to low morale, and those who fell behind were prone to surrender and betrayal. Therefore, we implemented harsh punitive measures. The soldiers were afraid of falling behind and facing punishment.”

Journalist: “So there were over a thousand Red Army soldiers who fled?”

Mao: “Yes. The following month of marching was actually relatively easy, but I lost half of the soldiers: desertion, falling behind, deaths due to illness, and at the hands of the political security department. When we arrived at Wuqi Town in northern Shaanxi, there were less than 4,000 soldiers left. They looked miserable, with tattered clothes. Many had no shoes or socks; they wrapped their feet in felt or wore grass shoes. Wuqi Town was a very poor place, and the local people saw the Central Red Army as a group of beggars.”

Journalist: “So, upon reaching northern Shaanxi, there were fewer than 4,000 soldiers left? What about Zhang Guotao’s side?”

Mao: “After our departure, Zhang Guotao declared the establishment of a separate Central Committee. However, on October 18, 1935, when I set foot on the land of northern Shaanxi, I was not lost or discouraged. Compared to Zhang Guotao, I was ‘just a step away’ from the Soviet Union. By escaping from Zhang Guotao’s threat, the darkest days of my life had passed.”

Journalist: “Do you consider it a victory to have escaped from Zhang Guotao?”

Mao: “Yes. In mid-November, the first Moscow emissary, Zhang Hao, arrived. His real name was Lin Yuying, and he was Lin Biao’s cousin. He crossed the Gobi Desert in Xinjiang, with communication codes memorized and engraved in his mind.

Zhang Hao also brought a Soviet-trained coding officer with him. Shortly after, communication with Moscow was reestablished, and I had control over the communication. Zhang Hao brought Stalin’s message that the Red Army could seek military assistance by approaching the Soviet Union’ through Outer Mongolia.

The envoy I had sent, Chen Yun, was already in Moscow at this time, and he presented a report to the Communist International on October 15, 1935. In November, the Soviet Union published Chen Yun’s report, referring to me as the ‘tested leader of the CCP.’ The Pravda (Пра́вда) published an article with the headline, ‘Leader of the Chinese People: Mao Zedong.’ It was the first official recognition from Moscow since the founding of the CCP, acknowledging me as the leader of the CCP.”

Journalist: “So, is it your victory to have established contact with Moscow?”

Mao: “Yes, the Emperor of Emperors is the most important. On the day the Long March ended, Chiang Kai-shek met with Soviet Ambassador Bogomolov. It was Chiang’s first meeting with Ambassador Bogomolov since the Long March. Chiang proposed signing a secret military agreement with the Soviet Union against Japan. However, the Soviet ambassador told Chiang that to form an alliance, he needed to ‘adjust relations with the CCP’ first.’ Chiang Kai-shek instructed Chen Lifu to secretly negotiate with Bogomolov to address the specific issues of dealing with the CCP.

During the negotiations, Chen Lifu requested the release of Chiang Kai-shek’s son, Chiang Ching-kuo, from Soviet custody. However, Stalin still held Chiang Ching-kuo. Chiang Ching-kuo had been held as a hostage for 10 years. That year, Chiang Ching-kuo was working at the Ulan Mountain Heavy Machinery Factory and had married a Russian technician named Fang Liang.”

Journalist: “Stalin holding Chiang Ching-kuo as a hostage and maneuvering with Chiang Kai-shek works to your advantage!”