Chapter 61 Mao’s blind leadership leads astray, heading south and lost direction

Journalist: “Oh, so you did everything possible to avoid going to Sichuan and had your mind set on heading south?”

Mao: “Yes, under the continuous bombings by the Kuomintang Army, the Red Army had to march 40-50 kilometers every day, enduring hardships and exhaustion. Many soldiers died each day, and the troops were physically drained. Although there were a few thousand recruits in Guizhou at the beginning of the year, the Red Army was still significantly undermanned. The people of Guizhou were extremely impoverished, which allowed the Red Army to recruit several thousand soldiers.”

“During this rapid march, the Red Army had to abandon the remaining medical equipment, and the hospitals were disbanded, leaving the wounded with little access to treatment. Besides bullet and bomb injuries, many soldiers suffered from scraped and infected feet due to walking tirelessly in grass shoes. Each step was painful.”

“If the Red Army had gone north to enter Sichuan, they would have been spared from experiencing these hardships. When the 9th Corps of the Red Army was heading south through the Wujian River in Guizhou, 2,000 soldiers who were serving as the rearguard were cut off on the northern bank of the river. They were unable to proceed south and had no choice but to go to Sichuan. Apart from a few small skirmishes, they faced no major confrontations. They marched confidently along the main road during the day and rested for several days whenever they stopped.”

Journalist: “Oh, so heading north was the way to survive, while heading south was a dead end?”
Mao: “Yes, heading south exacerbated our losses. For two months, we kept heading south without a clear objective, and everyone in the ranks was questioning, ‘Where are we going?’ The leadership understood that the plan was to advance to Sichuan and rendezvous with Zhang Guotao, and ultimately move north to approach the Soviet Union. However, our actual progress deviated from the plan. Lin Biao openly complained, ‘This will exhaust the troops. Can we rely on someone who commands like this?’ In April, Lin Biao wrote a letter to the ‘Three-Man Group,’ requesting that my command be handed over to Peng Dehuai for an immediate northward advance to meet Zhang Guotao. Zhang Wentian was also angry with me. One day, Zhang Wentian suddenly discussed with Li De, and they deliberated on the crisis of the Red Army, attributing it to my command without considering the consequences since the Zunyi Conference. In order to prevent the complete annihilation of the Red Army, they discussed that the ‘Three-Man Group’ should relinquish power to a capable military commander.”

Journalist: “Your flawed command was heavily criticized, so what did you do?”

Mao: “I was greatly angered by their criticisms. In mid-April, the Red Army entered Yunnan Province, and I ordered a halt. But halting meant dealing with the local Miao ethnic group, who were fierce and skilled in warfare, and it would create numerous problems that would prevent us from establishing a base there. I said we should continue ‘heading east and heading south.’ However, heading east was not possible as the Kuomintang forces were advancing in that direction, and heading south was a dead end that would lead us to Vietnam.

My directive of ‘heading east and heading south’ infuriated the commanders. On April 25th, the same day they received the order, Lin Biao telegraphed the Central Committee stating that we should immediately change our original strategy, cross the Jinsha River into Sichuan, and advance to the northwest of Sichuan to meet the Fourth Front Army. Peng Dehuai expressed the same opinion.”

Journalist: “Both Lin Biao and Peng Dehuai demanded to head north to meet Zhang Guotao. What did you do then?”

Mao: “I couldn’t delay any longer. Finally, on April 28th, I gave the order to redirect our march towards Sichuan. As soon as we set foot on the road heading north, it was a smooth path ahead, and there were even people secretly assisting us. That day, the Red Army found a large truck parked by the roadside, carrying 20 copies of detailed maps at a scale of 1:100,000, along with a large quantity of local specialties such as tea, ham, and medicine. It was likely the Yunnan authorities using this method to urge the Red Army to leave Yunnan quickly and head to Sichuan. When the Red Army reached the Jinsha River on the border of Sichuan, all three river crossings were open and unguarded, allowing the Red Army to cross without resistance. Food was even offered to us.”

Journalist: “You were forced to head north, and as a result, you survived?”

Mao: “Yes, it took us 7 days and 7 nights to cross the Jinsha River, with boats shuttling back and forth at unguarded crossings. The Kuomintang forces remained nearby without taking action. Aircraft circled overhead, conducting reconnaissance but not causing trouble. However, there were swarms of flies that were unbearable. When the sun came out, there were hundreds of thousands of them, even more annoying than the aircraft.

Although the Red Army had entered Sichuan, I didn’t want to proceed further to meet Zhang Guotao, so I decided to establish a base in the current location. I sent the Red Army to besiege the nearby Hui Li City, which was difficult to attack and easy to defend, with a moat and solid city walls. Local warlords fought desperately to defend the city, burning down houses outside the city walls to expose the Red Army during the siege. They also killed soldiers suspected of being pro-communist to prevent any information leakage. The Kuomintang forces resumed bombing once they saw the Red Army had halted. The Red Army suffered heavy casualties and lacked medical supplies. I couldn’t manage everything at that time.”

Journalist: “Oh, you wanted to capture Hui Li City and settle there?”

Mao: “Yes, but it failed. The significant losses suffered by the Red Army became unbearable for the commanders. Lin Biao compared the long detour I led the Red Army on to the ‘back of a bow,’ saying that we should have taken the bowstring route earlier. In order to suppress opposition voices under the name of the Central Committee, I had Zhang Wentian convene a meeting.

The meeting was held on May 12th in a straw shed outside Hui Li City.

I didn’t give an inch and accused Peng Dehuai, labeling him as ‘rightist,’ and claimed he was instigating Lin Biao to seize power. Lin Biao wanted to argue, but he couldn’t overpower me. More importantly, I had Zhang Wentian, who didn’t dare to disobey my instructions. Zhang Wentian reluctantly came to the conclusion I desired, using the opportunity to accuse Peng Dehuai, Lin Biao, Huang Kecheng, and others of opportunism. I held a grudge against the events at Hui Li for the rest of my life.”

Journalist: “Fortunately, you had Zhang Wentian to protect you and accuse Peng Dehuai and Lin Biao of opportunism?”

Mao: “Yes. But I also had to make concessions. I revoked the order to attack Hui Li City and explicitly agreed to ‘immediately head north and join forces with the Fourth Front Army.’ I was still afraid of meeting with Zhang Guotao, so I immediately prepared for this power struggle. The most important thing was to obtain recognition from Moscow. Since radio communication had not been restored, in late May, I sent Chen Yun, a trusted individual, to Shanghai and then to the Soviet Union. Chen Yun was a member of the Secretariat and was cautious and obedient. In his report to Moscow, Chen Yun deliberately used ambiguous language to create the impression that I became the leader through formal Politburo meetings and the endorsement of the majority.”

Journalist: “You truly had foresight, dispatching Chen Yun to Moscow to vie for support.”