Chapter 60 A major defeat at Tucheng, going around in circles 1935

Mao: “Yes. On January 28th, I ordered the establishment of an ambush at Tucheng. However, the enemy turned the tables and launched a fierce attack, causing the Red Army to suffer a disastrous defeat. The Red Army was backed against the Chishui River. I stood on a distant hilltop, witnessing the devastating defeat of our troops. It was raining heavily, and the mountain roads were slippery. The retreating soldiers rushed ahead, pushing wounded soldiers and women to the back. The enemy pursued closely behind. 4,000 Red Army soldiers were either killed or seriously wounded, accounting for 1/10 of the entire Red Army. The Battle of Tucheng was a major defeat, with losses in a single day surpassing those suffered during the crossing of the Xiang River. As the Red Army retreated westward across the Chishui River, we had to abandon heavy weapons, X-ray machines, and other medical equipment.”

Journalist: “The Battle of Tucheng resulted in heavy losses, and you obtained the excuse you needed?”

Mao: “Yes, this defeat provided me with a justification for not entering Sichuan. It was also during this time that I and Zhang Wentian eized power from Bo Gu. Two days later, on February 7th, the plan to enter Sichuan was declared invalid. By then, the Red Army had already entered the territory of Sichuan, with the area west of the Chishui River being part of southern Sichuan. Most military commanders agreed to continue northward and join forces with Zhang Guotao. Even Lin Biao was unhappy with me for provoking the Battle of Tucheng.

I ordered the Red Army to cross the Chishui River again and return to Guizhou. Thousands of wounded soldiers were left in the deep forests on the western side of the river, without clothes, food, or medicine. During the Long March, wounded soldiers were typically left in the homes of ordinary people, with some money left behind.”

Journalist: “So, you forcibly ordered the Red Army to retreat to Guizhou?”

Mao: “Yes, on February 27th, 1935, the Red Army regained control of Zunyi. Chiang Kai-shek wanted the Red Army to go to Sichuan and not establish a foothold in Guizhou. He sent two divisions to attack the city and ordered airstrikes. However, the Red Army successfully repelled the attacks and held their ground. I was overjoyed because these two divisions were strong enemy forces. If the Red Army could withstand them, we could maintain our position in Guizhou. I was so elated that I composed a poem expressing my emotions: ‘The road ahead is truly like iron, but now we stride forward from the beginning.’”

Journalist: “So, you gained some capital by winning a battle?”

Mao: “Yes, with this victory as a foundation, Zhang Wentian and I announced to the Central Red Army and Zhang Guotao that Zhang Wentian was now the General Secretary and I was the Secretary of the Secretariat. Zhang Wentian immediately appointed me as the ‘Commander-in-Chief of the Frontline’ of the Red Army.

But the price of my victory was devastating. Peng Dehuai expressed his heavy-heartedness, saying that the Third Army Group had suffered heavy casualties, with only one regiment maintaining its original strength, with only 50-60 soldiers per company. Other regiments had only 4-5 platoons per company. He also said that two regimental commanders were injured and six battalion commanders were killed or injured, leaving the regimental headquarters and army corps staff empty. Huang Kecheng said that there were not many troops left. Preserving our strength was crucial, and we should avoid engaging in direct confrontation with the enemy as the Red Army couldn’t sustain further losses.”

Journalist: “Oh, so despite the victory, the casualties of the Red Army were still heavy. What did you do next?”

Mao: “In order to stay in Guizhou, I needed to confront the Central Army in Guizhou once again. On March 5th, I ordered the elimination of two divisions of the Central Army, which sparked strong protests. Lin Biao sent an urgent telegram opposing the attack on this formidable enemy.
In the early morning of the same day, Zhang Wentian held a meeting with over 20 participants, including Lin Biao and Peng Dehuai, to discuss the battle plan. I found myself completely isolated during the meeting, and even Zhang Wentian couldn’t support me. I threatened to resign. Seizing upon my words, the others immediately said, ‘The minority should obey the majority. If you don’t want to do it, then don’t do it.’ I was relieved of my command, and Peng Dehuai was selected as the new Frontline Commander.”

Journalist: “Oh, so you wanted to take action against the Central Army, but ended up being removed as the Frontline Commander by the others?”

Mao: “Yes. I knew I had misspoken, so I immediately took action to regain my military authority. That evening, I took a lantern and went to find Zhou Enlai, who was still the highest military leader. I suggested to Zhou that we hold another meeting the next morning, with the commanders unable to attend as they had already returned to their respective units.

I proposed to Zhou that we simply abolish the position of Frontline Commander and establish a new ‘Three-person Group’ composed of Mao, Zhou, and Wang Jiaxiang. Zhou accepted the proposal. With this move, I didn’t damage Peng Dehuai’s reputation, pacified Wang Jiaxiang, who was dissatisfied with his lack of actual power, and elevated myself to an equal position with Zhou Enlai in terms of military command.”

Journalist: “Wow, you devised a strategy to make Zhou Enlai listen to you, formed a new Three- person Group, and sidelined Peng Dehuai?”

Mao: “The next day, during the meeting, everything was done according to my will. Peng Dehuai’s position as the former overall commander against the enemy was canceled, and the decision not to attack the Central Army was overturned.

The ‘Three-Man Group’ decided to launch an attack on the Central Army near Lüban Field, the hometown of Maotai liquor. Peng Dehuai said, ‘The enemy’s fortifications are strong, and the terrain is unfavorable to us. There is no possibility of breakthrough. We should quickly disengage from the current enemy.’ But I insisted, saying, ‘With all our strength, we will decisively and unwaveringly annihilate the enemy at Lüban Field by the 15th of the month.’

When the Red Army obeyed the order to attack the Central Army, the Kuomintang forces greeted them with machine guns, causing a major defeat for the Red Army with over 1,000 casualties. The heavily damaged troops crowdedly crossed the Chishui River and were forced back to southern Sichuan. The Kuomintang Army blocked the Red Army’s path back to Guizhou. I stubbornly ordered the Red Army to turn around, recross the Chishui River, and forcefully return to Guizhou. This decision was unpopular, so I ordered its secret execution.”

Journalist: “Peng Dehuai was right, and you were wrong. You suffered a defeat and then made blind commands, making the Red Army go back and forth?”

Mao: “Yes, it has been two months, and the Red Army crossed the Chishui River four times, going in circles. Li De became puzzled, saying that the Red Army was going in circles and getting smaller, passing through some places two or three times, exhausted and achieving no results, just wandering aimlessly. Seeing the heavy casualties in the Red Army, he believed it was ‘strange and irrational.’ In fact, I had fallen into the trap of making blind commands.”

Zhang Guotao, leading the Fourth Red Army, had already left the base area to come and support, but it was uncertain where to go. I disregarded the life and death of the Red Army for the sake of personal power. Later, the Party propaganda even called the ‘Four Crossings of the Chishui River’ my ‘brilliant strategy,’ making up stories.”

Journalist: “You confused Chiang Kai-shek too?”

Mao: “Chiang Kai-shek, like Li De, didn’t understand what the Red Army was doing in this desperate situation. He thought the Red Army would definitely go to Sichuan, and the Central Army could follow suit. Chiang had already flown to Chongqing on March 2, planning to unify Sichuan.”

Chiang spared no effort to drive the Red Army into Sichuan. He flew back to Guiyang and sent planes to bomb the Red Army, preventing them from gaining a foothold in Guizhou. At the same time, Chiang openly announced that he would withdraw the troops guarding the Sichuan border, effectively telling us: there are no soldiers stationed there, hurry up and go to Sichuan! But I led the Red Army in the opposite direction, heading south. Chiang couldn’t understand what the Red Army was doing and even suspected that they wanted to attack Guiyang. However, the Red Army didn’t stay in Guiyang and hastily moved south, bypassing it.”