Chapter 59 Avoid Zhang Guotao, Extablish Mao’s authority 1935

Journalist: “After the Zunyi Conference, did you go to Sichuan?”

Mao: “Yes, the decision made at the Zunyi Conference was to cross the Yangtze River and head to Sichuan to rendezvous with Zhang Guotao’s Fourth Red Army in northern Sichuan. On January 19, 1935, the Central Red Army departed from Zunyi and marched towards Sichuan. On the 22nd, a telegram was sent to Zhang Guotao, urging him to come and coordinate with us. However, I had a secret that I couldn’t reveal: we couldn’t go to Sichuan because if we did, we would have to meet with Zhang Guotao. At that time, Zhang Wentian had not yet become the top leader, but if we met with Zhang Guotao, there would be no hope for Zhang Wentian to become the top leader. It would definitely be Zhang Guotao. In that case, I would not be able to be the puppeteer behind the scenes.”

Journalist: “So you were afraid to go to Sichuan because of Zhang Guotao?”

Mao: “Yes, Zhang Guotao had seniority. In the 1st Congress of 1921, he was the presiding officer, while I was still unknown. Zhang Wentian didn’t join the Party until 1925. Zhang Guotao was appointed as the Secretary by Moscow. He was also a member of the Executive Committee of the Communist International and had lived in the Soviet Union for several years, having conversations with Stalin. After returning to China in January 1931, he was sent to the Hubei-Henan-Anhui base area. By the summer of 1932, he had established a base area covering 40,000 square kilometers, with a population of 3.5 million and an army of 45,000. In the autumn of 1932, Chiang Kai- shek drove him out of the Hubei-Henan-Anhui area, and he moved to northern Sichuan, where he built an even larger base area within a year, with an army of 80,000.

When Zhang Guotao entered Sichuan at the end of 1932, Chiang Kai-shek’s forces also wanted to follow him, but the Sichuan warlords adamantly refused to let Chiang’s troops come in and help. Based on strength, qualifications, and status, Zhang Guotao would undoubtedly become the top leader after the rendezvous. Zhang Guotao was also ruthless in his pursuit of power and would not hesitate to kill. In his base area, he used the pretext of suppressing counter-revolutionaries to eliminate dissent and establish personal rule.”

Journalist: “Oh, so you were afraid of Zhang Guotao because he had 80,000 elite soldiers?”

Mao: “Yes, with Zhang Guotao present, it would be difficult for me to make progress. If I were to compete with him for power and gain, I might even lose my life. One of my comrades, Liu Shiqi, who fought against the AB League with me in Jiangxi, was killed by Zhang Guotao. So far, no matter how much trouble I caused with Bo Gu and Zhou Enlai, they would never kill me. They kill for the Party, not for personal power. But Zhang Guotao is unpredictable. I had to avoid him.”

Journalist: “So how did you manage to avoid Zhang Guotao?”

Mao: “I couldn’t directly oppose going to Sichuan, so I had to go along with it and wait for an opportunity to change the course. When we reached the Sichuan border, I insisted on setting up an ambush and engaging a pursuing enemy force. This force was from the Sichuan Army and was skilled in warfare. I thought that if the Red Army was defeated, we could use the excuse of the Sichuan Army being too powerful to justify staying in Guizhou.

This ambush battle had no logical basis. The enemy didn’t block the Red Army from the front or harass us. The Zunyi Conference specifically stated that we should ‘quickly disengage from pursuing enemies,’ but Zhou Enlai surprisingly complied with me.”

Journalist: “Oh, so you intentionally set up an ambush and fought the pursuing enemy force to find an excuse to change course and avoid going to Sichuan?”