
MAO ZEDONG: MY CONFESSION 1893-1976 VOLUME 1
II. SEIZE POWER 1935—1949
Seize Party and Military Power
Chapter 58 Zunyi Conference: Mao begins to seize power 1935
Journalist: “So Chiang Kai-shek deliberately drove the Red Army into Guizhou?”
Mao: “Yes In mid-December 1934, Chiang Kai-shek intentionally drove the Red Army into Guizhou. Just as Chiang had expected, the arrival of over 40,000 Red Army soldiers frightened the warlord Wang Jialie in Guizhou. He knew that Chiang had long been planning to take control of Guizhou, and this was the perfect opportunity with the Central Army pursuing the Red Army. Wang Jialie had no choice but to comply with Chiang’s orders. On December 19th, eight divisions of the Central Army entered Guiyang and immediately started constructing airports and building roads. The tide had turned in favor of Chiang’s forces.
Chiang then aimed to drive the Red Army into Sichuan. His forces blocked off other escape routes, leaving only the path to Sichuan open. Chiang intended to follow a similar strategy as in Guizhou, taking control of Sichuan before pushing the Red Army towards northern Shaanxi. However, significant changes occurred within the Communist Party during this time. As soon as I arrived in Guizhou, I actively pursued seizing power. I had long desired to divide the central leadership and sought alliances with Wang Jiaxiang and Zhang Wentian. I made every effort to win them over as they both harbored discontent towards the top leader, Bo Gu.”
Journalist: “Oh, so you took the opportunity to disrupt and seize power?”
Mao: “Yes. Both Zhang Wentian and Wang Jiaxiang were classmates with Bo Gu in Moscow. They were dissatisfied with the fact that Bo Gu, who was younger than them, became the leader of the Party and excluded them from decision-making. One day before our departure, Zhang Wentian had a casual conversation with me, where he candidly expressed all his grievances. From then on, I grew closer to Zhang Wentian. During the Long March, we lived together with Wang Jiaxiang, and informally formed a ‘Three-person Group’ opposing Li De and Bo Gu. We marched together, lying on stretchers, secretly plotting how to seize power. When the road widened, we would carry the stretchers side by side, bringing our heads close together for conversations. During rest breaks, while the stretcher-bearers caught their breath, we would sit side by side on the ground to talk. Our goal was to remove Bo Gu and Li De from their positions and transfer military power to me. Party power would be given to Zhang Wentian, and Wang Jiaxiang would be promoted to a full member of the Political Bureau. Once everything was settled, we demanded a meeting of the Political Bureau to discuss why the Central Soviet Zone had collapsed.”
Journalist: “So you, along with Zhang Wentian and Wang Jiaxiang, launched an attack against Bo Gu?”
Mao: “Yes. Bo Gu readily agreed. He had been tormented by the loss of Jiangxi and had even pointed a pistol at himself, as if considering suicide.
From January 15th to 17th, 1935, the Political Bureau and over 20 military leaders held a meeting in Zunyi City, Guizhou. There were intense debates during the meeting, and the three of us placed the blame on Bo Gu and Li De. The result of the meeting was that Bo Gu remained as the top leader, while Li De was relieved of his military authority. Although Zhang Wentian and Wang Jiaxiang proposed that I should replace Li De, most people did not respond to that and wanted Zhou Enlai to continue as the highest military commander.
At the Zunyi Conference, I achieved a breakthrough: I finally entered the decision-making core, the Secretariat. The Secretariat approved by Moscow in January 1934 consisted of seven members, four of whom were on the Long March: Bo Gu, Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian, and Chen Yun. The other three were Xiang Ying, who remained in the Soviet Zone, Wang Ming, the head of the Chinese Communist Party delegation in Moscow, and Zhang Guotao, the leader of the Fourth Red Army. At the Zunyi Conference, Wang Jiaxiang proposed that I join the Secretariat, and it was realized.
Journalist: “Oh, so you achieved your first victory by entering the Secretariat and becoming part of the core decision-making body?”
Mao: “Yes, becoming the Secretary of the Secretariat meant that I only needed to deal with a few people to determine the overall situation. Zhang Wentian was my ally, and Chen Yun did not participate in power struggles, he often dealt with specific issues at the grassroots level. That left Bo Gu and Zhou Enlai. My strategy was to align with Zhou and confront Bo. At the Zunyi Conference, we needed to draft a resolution, which is usually the responsibility of the top leader. This time, Zhang Wentian was given the authority to draft it. The resolution was meant to be circulated throughout the Party and submitted to Moscow, which was crucial for Zhou Enlai. In Zhang Wentian’s draft resolution, the title was ‘Summary of Comrades Bo Gu, Zhou Enlai, and Li De’s Errors in Military Policies.’ Zhou Enlai’s name was mentioned, portraying him as one of the main culprits. Zhou became fearful and decided to cooperate with us. As a result, his name was struck off, and the criticism towards him in the resolution was significantly reduced.”
Journalist: “So are you trying to win over Zhou Enlai and isolate Bo Gu?”
Mao: “Yes. Li De realized that Zhou Enlai cleverly distanced himself from Bo Gu and him, allowing me to focus my attacks on Li De and Bo Gu while sparing Zhou Enlai. As a result, I had the majority in the Secretariat. Once the Zunyi Conference ended, participants returned to their respective units. I immediately made a decision within the Secretariat: ‘Comrade Zedong is the assistant to Comrade Enlai in military command.’ This way, I inserted myself into the military leadership.”
Journalist: “So you became Zhou Enlai’s military assistant, but in reality, you wanted to control the military?”
Mao: “Yes, I wanted to effectively control Zhou Enlai. In the new Secretariat, we then promoted Wang Jiaxiang to a full member of the Political Bureau. Three weeks after the Zunyi Conference, on February 5th, in the village of ‘Jiming Sansheng Cun’ (Cock-a-doodle-doo Over Three Provinces Village) at the junction of three provinces, we decided that Zhang Wentian would replace Bo Gu as the General Secretary. Prior to this decision, I had formed an alliance with Zhang Wentian and went to talk to Zhou Enlai, reaching an agreement. We then informed Bo Gu of this ‘majority decision.’ Under pressure, Bo Gu had no choice but to step aside.”
Journalist: “So it was through the collusion of a few of you that you pressured Bo Gu to step aside?”
Mao: “Yes. Since Zhang Wentian became the General Secretary, not as a result of the Zunyi Conference decision but as a ‘coup’ orchestrated by a few individuals, we waited for several weeks until we achieved a significant victory and gained reassurance before announcing this change. From then on, I became the puppeteer behind Zhang Wentian, able to influence his decisions.”
Journalist: “Oh, so Zhang Wentian became the General Secretary, and you sought to manipulate him?”
Mao: “Yes, Zhang Wentian was easily manipulatable.”
