Chapter 57 The Long March: Chiang allows passage in search of survival 1934

Journalist: “You must have felt quite triumphant at the start of the Long March, right?”

Mao: “Not exactly. In October 1934, the 80,000-strong Central Red Army began the Long March. The march was divided into three columns, with Lin Biao’s First Army on the left, Peng Dehuai’s Third Army on the right, and the Central Headquarters consisting of 5,000 personnel, including myself and more than 10 central leaders, staff members, support personnel, and a large number of guards.

The army slowly marched westward. Factories, printing presses, and silver treasures were carried by thousands of coolies on their shoulders. Most of these coolies were forcibly recruited and monitored by the Security Bureau. Many of them were released from labor camps and had poor physical strength, some of whom couldn’t continue halfway. The autumn rain was continuous, and the ground turned into muddy clay. Carrying heavy loads on their shoulders and backs, it was difficult for several people to synchronize their steps. Some of the weak patients fell asleep and never woke up again. Many had their feet covered in blisters, wrapped in rags, enduring excruciating pain. As they marched, more and more people became unable to continue. Some coolies deserted, while the honest ones shed tears, pleading to be allowed to go back. Soldiers kept deserting, and exhausted officers couldn’t do much.”

Journalist: “It sounds quite desperate. Didn’t the Kuomintangs attack you?”

Mao: “They did and didn’t. The Red Army had to pass through four layers of heavily fortified blockades. The first blockade was guarded by the Guangdong Army. Chen Jitang, a Guangdong warlord, had previously conducted tungsten trading with the Red Army and had made a deal with them, allowing the Red Army to pass without hindrance. Chiang Kai-shek was well aware of this transaction and agreed to ‘open the net.’

In early November 1934, the Red Army reached the second blockade. The marching column extended for dozens of kilometers, making it an easy target for attacks. However, they didn’t face any substantial attacks. The third blockade was manned by the Hunan Army, commanded by staunch anti- communist He Jian. Yet, He Jian also allowed the Red Army to pass unharmed. Instead of reproaching He Jian, Chiang Kai-shek appointed him as the ‘Commander-in-Chief of the Pursuit and Suppression,’ responsible for guarding the fourth blockade. The fourth blockade was located on the western bank of the Xiang River, without any bridges. The Red Army had to ford the river and faced constant aerial bombardment from the Kuomintang Air Force. If the goal was to annihilate the Red Army, this location was most suitable.”

Journalist: “So, out of the four blockades, they let you pass peacefully through three. What about the fourth one?”

Mao: “The fourth one wasn’t as peaceful. On November 27th, the Red Army began crossing the river along a 30-kilometer stretch of the Xiang River. For four days, they encountered no harassment. The bunkers on the opposite bank remained quiet, and He Jian’s troops watched from nearby cities, while the Kuomintang planes circled above, only conducting reconnaissance without dropping bombs. On the 30th, the central leaders, including myself, crossed the river, and the Kuomintang troops didn’t obstruct us. By December 1st, the main force of 40,000 Red Army soldiers had successfully crossed the Xiang River.

Only at this time did Chiang Kai-shek send planes to bomb the Red Army and blockade the Xiang River. Over 3,000 people died on the eastern bank of the Xiang River, where the Red Army was cut off. Although only half of the troops crossed the river, this half consisted of the main force of the Red Army and the central organs. Of the remaining 40,000 people who did not cross the river, apart from those who were killed, injured, or scattered along the Xiang River, the rest got separated, fell ill, died from exhaustion, fled, or suffered casualties in small-scale encounters during the six-week journey before reaching the Xiang River. It is evident that Chiang Kai-shek deliberately let the main force of the Red Army and the central organs go free.”

Journalist: “Oh, that’s interesting. Chiang Kai-shek intentionally let go of half and only fought against the other half?”

Mao: “Chiang Kai-shek intentionally drove the Red Army westward, into Guizhou and Sichuan. The southwest regions, which appeared to be obedient to the central government, were actually independent kingdoms with their own armies and did not pay taxes to the central government. In order to unify the southwest, Chiang Kai-shek had to send the Central Army into those provinces. However, these provinces refused to accept the Central Army. If the Central Army forcibly entered, war would be inevitable. Chiang did not want to fight. He wanted to drive the Red Army into these provinces, making the warlords there fearful of the Red Army’s presence and forcing them to allow the Central Army to come in for assistance. By preserving the main force of the Red Army, Chiang Kai-shek made the warlords in the three southwest provinces feel a greater threat. This way, it was better than directly using force, as it would create a situation of unification. On the day when the Red Army began crossing the Xiang River and heading towards Guizhou, November 27, 1934, Chiang Kai-shek announced his blueprint for unifying China: the ‘Declaration of Central and Local Power and Responsibilities.’”

Journalist: “Oh, so Chiang Kai-shek allowed the Red Army to go to the southwest to seize the opportunity to unify the provinces there?”

Mao: “Yes. Chiang Kai-shek released the Red Army as a gesture towards the Soviet Union. Chiang wanted to improve relations with the Soviet Union to deal with the aggressive Japanese. The way to improve relations was to show tolerance towards the Communist Party. Chiang Kai-shek releasing the Red Army also had a hidden motive: he wanted Stalin to release his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, who had been held hostage in the Soviet Union for 9 years. In 1925, when Ching-kuo was 15 years old, Chiang sent him to Beijing to study. As soon as Ching-kuo arrived in Beijing, a Moscow agent named Shao Lizi found him and invited him to the Soviet Union. The young man was thrilled and set off just a few months after arriving in Beijing.

Shao Lizi took Chiang Ching-kuo to the Soviet Union. In 1927, when Ching-kuo finished his studies and wanted to return home, Moscow refused and forced him to publicly denounce his father. Stalin held him hostage, announcing to the outside world that Ching-kuo himself did not want to return home. The hostage status of Chiang Ching-kuo was revealed to Chiang Kai-shek by Song Qingling at the end of 1931. Song Qingling was the Communist International’s red agent in China. Madame Sun, on behalf of Moscow, proposed to Chiang Kai-shek that they exchange Ching-kuo for two important Soviet spies, Mr. and Mrs. Noulens, who were being held captive. Chiang Kai-shek refused. The trial and imprisonment of these two spies had already been publicly reported in the newspapers. However, Moscow’s proposal caused a great stir in Chiang’s heart, as he feared his son might be murdered by the Soviet Union, thus ending his bloodline.”

Journalist: “Oh, so Stalin held Chiang Ching-kuo hostage to ensure Chiang Kai-shek treated the Red Army well?”

Mao: “Yes. Subsequently, Chiang Kai-shek’s idea gradually matured: to make a deal with Moscow to ensure the survival of the Communist Party in exchange for Ching-kuo. But this deal couldn’t be exposed, it had to be handled discreetly. He wanted to weaken but not eliminate the Red Army, allowing them to temporarily survive in a confined area. Chiang knew that the war between China and Japan would break out sooner or later, and the Soviets wanted him to fight against Japan. Russia was Japan’s archenemy, and Stalin feared that if Japan occupied China, they would use Chinese resources to attack the Soviet Union. Allowing Japan to be bogged down in China was the core of Stalin’s Far Eastern policy. Once the war between China and Japan broke out, Chiang Kai-shek believed that Moscow would definitely order the Communist Party to fight against Japan.”

Journalist: “So Chiang Kai-shek and Stalin each had their own plans, and the Communist Party benefited from it?”

Mao: “Yes. Chiang didn’t want the Red Army to stay in the heartland of China. He had his eye on the area of northern Shaanxi, which was vast and sparsely populated. The Communist Party could survive there, but there would be no significant development. Chiang believed that he had the means to keep the Red Army confined there.

In April 1933, Chiang appointed Shao Lizi as the Chairman of Shaanxi Province. Chiang knew Shao’s true identity; he wanted to use Shao to create a foothold for the Communist Party. Shao’s predecessor was Yang Hucheng. Yang secretly collaborated with the Communist Party, and during his rule, the Red armed forces in northern Shaanxi remained weak. It was only after Shao took office that the Red Zone in northern Shaanxi began to grow stronger. Chiang later told Lauchlin Currie, the envoy of U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt: ‘I drove the communists from Jiangxi to northern Shaanxi, where their numbers decreased to a few thousand, but no one bothered them.’”

Journalist: “Oh, so Chiang Kai-shek wanted to drive the Communist Party to northern Shaanxi, and you called it the Long March?”

Mao: “Yes. I later invented the term ‘Long March,’ which sounded nice.

One of the methods used was to allow the Red Army to intercept and decipher the communications of Chiang’s forces because the Red Army always moved towards areas where Chiang’s forces were weak. During the Long March, the Red Army said, ‘We continuously intercept and decipher enemy telegrams, and our army is well aware of the enemy’s movements.’ In reality, Chiang’s forces intentionally allowed the Red Army to decipher their messages and even talked about changing the codes, but it was just talk.

Moscow understood Chiang’s intentions very well. They strengthened their control over Chiang Ching-kuo. At that time, Ching-kuo, who had worked as a laborer in rural areas and Siberian gold mines, was working at the Urals Heavy Machinery Factory. The Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs tightened their surveillance on him. He was followed by two people every day to ensure his safety and control.”

Journalist: “Chiang Ching-kuo became Stalin’s bargaining chip, which was also beneficial to the Communist Party, right?”

Mao: “Yes. In early December 1934, when the Red Army broke through the final blockade, Chiang Kai-shek immediately made a request to Moscow to release Ching-kuo. The Soviet government responded, saying that your son did not want to return to China. Chiang Kai-shek sighed and said, ‘The cunning and deceit of the Russian enemy knows no bounds.’ Chiang Kai- shek understood that his son was safe, but the Soviet Union wanted a higher price.”

Journalist: “So Chiang Ching-kuo remained under Stalin’s control?”

Mao: “Yes.”