Chapter 55 Ningdu Conference: The most painful experience of my life 1932

Journalist: “Did the Ningdu Conference aim to remove you from power?”

Mao: “Yes. Towards the end of 1931, some high-ranking officials trained in the Soviet Union arrived in Jiangxi. I displayed my authoritarian style in front of them, but they didn’t buy into it. Wang Jiaxiang said, ‘Old Mao’s verbal abuse won’t work, we need to find an opportunity to struggle against him.’ They labeled me with severe accusations, even claiming that I represented the ‘rich peasant line.’ It was a dreadful accusation, and I stopped issuing unilateral commands. When Zhou Enlai first arrived, I still conducted meetings in my usual manner, but now, the people present requested that I step aside and let Zhou preside. Unable to continue presiding, I pretended to be upset and requested a ‘sick leave.’ Everyone readily agreed, and in January 1932, I went to Donghua Mountain.”

Journalist: “So, in reality, Mao, you were removed from your position, and you chose to leave because you couldn’t preside over meetings anymore?”

Mao: “Yes, Donghua Mountain is a stone mountain near Ruijin. There is a temple where He Zizhen, a group of bodyguards, and I stayed. The winter was bitterly cold, and my mood was dark and gloomy. Confidential high-level documents were still sent to me regularly, as well as newspapers, including those from the Kuomintang. I saw an article in the Shanghai-based ‘Shen Newspaper on February 16, 1931, titled ‘Notice of Wu Hao and others’ Departure from the Communist Party.’ ‘Wu Hao’ was Zhou Enlai’s alias. It was undoubtedly fabricated. Coincidentally, it was published when Zhou replaced me as the top figure in the Red Zone. In my capacity as the Chairman of the Soviet Zone, I immediately issued a ‘refutation’ to deliberately spread the ‘Wu Hao notice’ throughout the Soviet Zone where the Shanghai newspapers couldn’t be accessed.”

Journalist: “So, you intentionally used the ‘Wu Hao notice’ to create trouble?”

Mao: “Yes, the notice tarnished Zhou’s name and raised doubts about his authority, which made Zhou uneasy. He couldn’t help but suspect whether it was a coincidence or if I was playing tricks. That’s how doubt and fear towards me started to grow within Zhou. What I wanted was military power. The Red Army had been besieging Ganzhou for a long time, and in early March, a high-level meeting was held near the city. As soon as I received the notification, I got up and left. It was pouring rain, but I arrived at the meeting venue and criticized the military command. However, they didn’t give me the military authority. When the troops withdrew from Ganzhou, Zhou Enlai made the final decision. One-third of the troops went west, and two-thirds followed me east, including Lin Biao’s First Army Corps.”

The Red Army that followed me didn’t head northeast as originally planned. I suddenly changed the itinerary and moved towards the southeast coast. On April 20, 1932, I seized the Zhangzhou City, which was close to the coast. Taking Zhangzhou brought me even greater fame. The Red Army marched into the city in four rows, and the sound of military trumpets shook the heavens. I deliberately rode a white horse. I calculated that the greater my reputation, the more Moscow would rely on me. Indeed, the Moscow representative in Shanghai, Arthur Ewert, reported, ‘Mao Zedong is a highly renowned leader,’ and Moscow opposed removing me from my position.”

Journalist: “Wow, so you just took it upon yourself to lead the troops and capture Zhangzhou?”

Mao: “Yes, winning a battle means you’re in the right. Zhangzhou’s prosperity also allowed me to amass some personal wealth. A truck loaded with heavy boxes traveled from Zhangzhou to the Red Zone in Jiangxi. People said it was books bought or confiscated by Chairman Mao, but there were more gold and silver treasures. Under the supervision of my younger brother, Zemin, porters secretly carried the treasures to the top of a mountain and stored them in a sealed cave.”

Journalist: “Wow, so you secretly hoarded a truckload of gold and silver treasures?”

Mao: “Yes. In May 1932, while I was staying in Zhangzhou, Chiang Kai- shek mobilized 500,000 troops, preparing for the fourth ‘encirclement and suppression’ campaign. That year, on January 28, Japan attacked Shanghai, and the Chinese military rose up in resistance. The Communist Party verbally ‘declared war against Japan,’ but in reality, it was more accurate to say that they were fighting against Chiang Kai-shek. Toppling Chiang was the prerequisite for directly confronting Japan. Chiang Kai-shek understood that the Communist Party wouldn’t join forces with him against Japan, so he resumed his attacks on the Red base areas.”

After receiving intelligence about Chiang Kai-shek’s upcoming encirclement and suppression campaign, the Central Committee ordered me to lead my troops back to the Jiangxi Soviet Zone to confront the enemy. I replied that I didn’t believe Chiang would launch a large-scale attack and refused to leave Zhangzhou. I stayed there for nearly another month until Chiang’s intentions became public. Only then, on May 29, 1932, I have had no choice but to depart. We engaged in a fierce and devastating battle with the Kuomintang Army at Shuikou.”

Journalist: “You acted independently in Zhangzhou, and no one could control you?”

Mao: “While I was lingering in Zhangzhou without following orders, the Central Committee under Zhou Enlai’s leadership couldn’t do anything to me. They even collectively sent a telegram to Moscow, complaining that I was ‘ 100% right-wing opportunism’ and ‘completely contradicting International’s instructions.’ But Moscow replied, insisting on cooperating with me and maintaining my prestige and position. Obviously, Moscow considered me indispensable, so I had confidence and no fear.”

Journalist: “Oh, Stalin protected you, and you had a strong backbone?”

Mao: “Yes. Later on, I went on the offensive and extended my reach for power. I proposed the establishment of a General Political Commissar for the Red Army, with myself taking on the role. On July 25, 1932, Zhou Enlai suggested accepting my demand by appointing me as the General Political Commissar. The leaders in Ruijin disagreed and wanted to give the position to Zhou. However, Zhou found various reasons to support me. On August 8, I became the General Political Commissar of the Red Army.”

Journalist: “With Stalin’s support, you regained military authority?”

Mao: “Yes. With Moscow’s support, I regained military authority. In the summer of 1932, Chiang Kai-shek concentrated his forces to attack the Communist base areas in Hubei, Henan, Anhui, and western Hunan. Moscow instructed all Red Army units to support these two base areas. My task was to lead the Red Army northward to attack several towns and divert the enemy’s attention. However, whenever I encountered a strong enemy, I would stop. The Central Committee demanded my cooperation, but I hesitated, remained idle, and prioritized preserving my strength.”

Journalist: “You were clever, always prioritizing the preservation of your strength?”

Mao: “Yes. The next target for Chiang was the Central Soviet Zone. Moscow’s strategy was a head-on counterattack. But once again, I refused to execute the plan and insisted on dispersing our forces to avoid Chiang’s army. I always sought to preserve my strength. I didn’t believe the Red Army could defeat Chiang Kai-shek’s hundreds of thousands of troops. I pinned my hopes on Moscow. The other leaders in the Central Committee regarded my approach as ‘extremely dangerous.’ But I remained stubborn, and Zhou Enlai had no choice but to accept it.”

Journalist: “You didn’t obey the party’s command?”

Mao: “Yes, I didn’t. In October 1932, an emergency meeting was held in Ningdu, chaired by Zhou Enlai, and all eight leaders of the Central Soviet Zone attended. From the meeting documents, it is evident that everyone was furious and condemned me. I was accused of disobeying orders, acting on my own, and committing the ‘error of not respecting the party’s leadership and organizational principles.’ The participants ‘engaged in an unprecedented struggle between two lines, breaking the previous accommodating state.’ If it weren’t for Zhou Enlai protecting me, the condemnation would have been even harsher. After the meeting, several leaders reported to Shanghai that Zhou ‘did not give Mao Zedong’s mistakes a clear criticism in the conclusion but instead explained and covered up for him.’ Bo Gu and others in Shanghai were furious and, without obtaining consent from the Moscow representatives, sent a telegram to the Ningdu meeting, stating that my behavior was ‘unacceptable,’ and that I should no longer command the Red Army, and even suggested expelling me from the party.”

Journalist: “Bo Gu was powerful, wanting to expel you from the party?”

Mao: “Yes. Before Moscow intervened to protect me, the Ningdu meeting had already stripped me of my military power and asked me to return to the rear. However, in accordance with Moscow’s regulations to protect my reputation, when announcing to the troops, it was stated that I was ‘temporarily returning to the central government to oversee all work.’ The reports received by Moscow stated that I returned to the rear ‘due to illness.’”

Journalist: “Moscow protected you?”

Mao: “Yes. During the Ningdu meeting, I sent two telegrams to Shanghai, requesting Moscow’s intervention. However, Moscow representative Arthur Ewert was apparently displeased with my actions and decided to convey the message to Moscow through a messenger instead of a telegram. Moscow did not agree to remove me from the military, and Ewert defended himself by saying, ‘I was unaware of the decision to remove Mao from his military position and condemn him in advance.’”

Moscow said to the CCP, ‘There is no doubt that Mao Zedong is wrong, but we can only friendly persuade him.’ ‘Regarding your differences with Mao Zedong, we emphasize once again: make efforts to friendly win him over to accept the line of active counterattacks. We oppose removing Mao Zedong from the army if he adheres to discipline.’ As for what to do with me, Moscow urgently consulted Stalin on November 2, 1932. Based on Stalin’s opinion, the Central Committee of the CCP was ordered to write a report explaining why I was kicked out of the Red Army. Moscow criticized those who condemned me and appreciated Zhou Enlai’s gentle approach toward me.”

Journalist: “Stalin protected you, and Zhou Enlai closely followed, so you passed the test?”

Mao: “Not quite. Moscow’s support came late. By October 12, 1932, I had already left Ningdu and left the Red Army. Zhou Enlai took over as the Political Commissar. I harbored resentment toward those who opposed me at the Ningdu meeting throughout my life, especially Zhou Enlai. Despite Zhou speaking up for me, he ultimately agreed to remove me from my position and replace me. After gaining power later on, Zhou wrote over 100 self-criticisms, with the greatest sin being the Ningdu meeting.”

Journalist: “So you had to leave the Red Army like that?”

Mao: “Yes, but I firmly refused to return to Ruijin to oversee the work of the central government. I went to Tingzhou to ‘recover from illness’ and entered the best-equipped hospital run by the church. The residence was a two-story villa situated in a lush small bay. This villa became my headquarters for counteracting Ruijin. I summoned my trusted comrades for meetings and instructed them not to resist when the Kuomintang attacked. They were to retreat from the front lines and were told to follow the central government’s instructions: ‘Execute them if they suit my taste, and ignore them if they don’t.’”

Journalist: “Oh, so you secretly went to Tingzhou? And set up a separate headquarters there?”

Mao: “Yes, in January 1933, Bo Gu came from Shanghai to the Central Soviet Zone. Bo Gu was young and talented, having been a party member for only seven years. He was exceptionally intelligent, with a faster and more agile mind than Zhou Enlai. His proficiency in Russian and English was excellent, having received training in the Soviet Union for three and a half years. His characteristic was decisiveness, daring to take action. Once in Ruijin, he was widely recognized as the top leader. Many leaders were disappointed with Zhou Enlai’s indecisiveness and my indulgence. They allowed Zhou to manage military affairs, and Zhou didn’t mind. He had no ambition to be the top leader and welcomed Bo Gu as the immediate superior.”

Journalist: “Bo Gu is bold and capable?”

Mao: “Yes, Bo Gu was determined to take action against me. Faced with the imminent threat of Chiang Kai-shek’s forces, he had to enforce strict discipline. Bo Gu also heard various feedback about me. Peng Dehuai, for example, said that I had a ‘twisted mind,’ ‘insulted Zhu De,’ ‘liked to provoke internal conflicts,’ and ‘was ruthless, always finding a way to overpower those who didn’t obey him.’

When Bo Gu left Shanghai, Moscow representative Arthur Ewert repeatedly reminded him to maintain a good relationship with me. However, Moscow allowed Bo Gu to target my trusted comrades. Starting from Februarya1933, including Deng Xiaoping, Tan Zhenlin, and my younger brother Zeqin, they were named and criticized in the Ruijin newspaper. This was actually directed at me, but it didn’t affect my public image. Bo Gu didn’t resort to harsh methods. Although the rhetoric of the criticism sounded intimidating, such as ‘cruel struggle’ and ‘relentless blows,’ it was limited to words only. I wasn’t treated as an enemy, and after the criticism, I was given important positions.”

Journalist: “Oh, Bo Gu didn’t ruthlessly strike against you?”

Mao: “No, he didn’t. But Bo Gu broke my independent system and made the entire party obey his command in counterattacking the encirclement. The result was surprisingly successful. For the first time, the Red Army fought as a large force and defeated nearly three divisions of Chiang Kai-shek’s loyalist troops. As a result, Chiang’s fourth encirclement campaign in March 1933 ended in failure. The victory in the Central Soviet Zone was thanks to the Soviet intelligence personnel. Moscow sent some secret military advisers, including a German named Otto Braun, who later arrived in Ruijin.”

Journalist: “Oh, Bo Gu achieved a great victory, and you had nothing to say?”

Mao: “Yes, Bo Gu and his forces achieved unprecedented victories. Zhou Enlai’s position and sense of security were greatly strengthened. Moscow favored success, and I became somewhat nervous, thinking that Moscow might shift its attention to Zhou Enlai, especially since I had previously opposed Moscow’s strategy. In February 1933, I stopped resting despite my illness and moved back to Ruijin from Tingzhou. Moscow’s attitude toward me remained the same, advising other leaders, ‘Regardless of anything, unity is necessary. Regarding Mao Zedong, you must make efforts to tolerate and reconcile with him.’”

Journalist: “Stalin continued to protect you, keeping you as a treasure?” Mao: “Yes, I continued to attend high-level meetings, presided over when necessary, and was not kept in the dark about top-secret information. However, I knew that Moscow’s trust in me was not as reliable anymore. The newspapers criticized my trusted comrades, and I felt extremely isolated. Hardly anyone came to see me. At that time, not even ghosts would visit me. I felt like a bodhisattva submerged in a chamber pot, giving off a strong stench after a few dips.”

Journalist: “So, you became a bodhisattva in a chamber pot? Did it stink?”

Mao: “Yes, I indeed fell out of favor. By early 1934, I lost the position of ‘Premier,’ although I remained the ‘Chairman.’ Moscow approved Zhang Wentian to replace me. As compensation, I was promoted to a full member of the Political Bureau. However, I couldn’t enter the leadership core of the Secretariat. When the Central Plenary Session announced the appointments, I didn’t attend, claiming to be ill. Bo Gu said, ‘Let him be.’”

Journalist: “In reality, you could still make a comeback, right?”

Mao: “Yes, I was waiting, and my fame didn’t diminish. The publications of the CCP and Moscow continued to promote me. Both in the Red Zone and the White Zone, they knew me as ‘Chairman Mao.’ But within the core of the CCP, Bo Gu compared me to the honorary chairman of the Soviet Union: ‘Old Mao will be like Mikhail Kalinin, haha!’”