Chapter 50 Luring the enemy deep into territory, disregarding the life and death of peasants 1930

Journalist: “So, you were simultaneously fighting against the AB League and countering the encirclement campaigns?”

Mao: “Yes. Zhu De and Peng Dehuai did not rise up against me for another reason as well. In December 1930, during the Futian Incident, Chiang Kai-shek was planning the first encirclement campaign against the Red Army. Zhu and Peng were concerned about the fate of the Red Army and feared that opposing me directly could destroy it. Meanwhile, I never ceased to fight against the AB League even during the encirclement. In fact, I intensified the attacks during lulls in the war. Some soldiers who had just been fighting against the Kuomintang troops on the battlefield were ordered by me to be executed immediately upon returning.”

Journalist: “Could you explain your strategy of luring the enemy deep and then annihilating them?”

Mao: “My ruthless and merciless treatment of the peasants allowed me to devise an effective strategy to resist Chiang Kai-shek: lure the enemy deep and then annihilate them when they are exhausted. The Kuomintang troops were unfamiliar with the terrain, had limited transportation, and relied on local provisions. I had control over the local population, so I ordered all the peasants to practice ‘burning their own homes to deny them to the enemy.’ They would hide food and cooking utensils, seal off wells with large stones, and hide in the mountains, depriving the Kuomintang troops of food and water. The strategy of burning their own homes brought great suffering to the peasants and destroyed their homes.”

Journalist: “Wow, you completely destroyed the living conditions of the peasants. How could they survive when they returned?”

Mao: “Indeed, it was very difficult for them. I couldn’t concern myself with the life and death of the peasants. My priority was to preserve my own strength and win the war. My methods were not popular, but they were effective. Wherever the Kuomintang troops passed through, there were no signs of people, houses were empty, and there was no food or cooking utensils. Chiang Kai-shek said, ‘Suppressing bandits is more challenging than fighting a large-scale war. They utilize their familiarity with the terrain and rely on the coerced local population to strike at will.’

But the key to my victory was the assistance of the Soviet Union.

During the first encirclement campaign, Moscow sent a military advisory group and established a Military Commission in Shanghai. A Russian-German mixed-blood named Richard Sorge came to Shanghai and took charge of a spy network consisting of 100 personnel, providing intelligence to the Red Army. One of Sorge’s assistants was my trusted comrade Zhang Wenqiu, and Agnes Smedley, a spy for the Communist International, was also involved. Sorge gained worldwide fame for accurately providing intelligence to Stalin that Japan, after invading the Soviet Union from Germany, would not launch an attack in the Far East.

Zuo Erge’s main contribution in China was infiltrating the German advisory group in Chiang Kai-shek’s Nanchang headquarters. He managed to obtain the Kuomintang’s codes, including those used for communication between their combat units. These intelligence networks provided me with accurate information about the actions of the Kuomintang’s army. On December 30, 1930, I set up an ambush with 40,000 soldiers and civilians, specifically targeting 9,000 troops from the Kuomintang. I knew in advance which unit would come and when. The ambush began at dawn, and by the afternoon, the majority of the Kuomintang’s army had surrendered, including their commander, Zhang Huizan, who became our prisoner. I held a mass assembly where Zhang Huizan was publicly displayed, and the slogan was, ‘Kill Zhang Huizan! Eat Zhang Huizan’s flesh!’ Zhang Huizan’s head was severed, nailed to a wooden board, and thrown into the river, flowing downstream to Nanchang.”

Journalist: “Wow, you fought against Chiang Kai-shek, thanks to the intelligence provided by Soviet spies about his army’s movements?”

Mao: “Yes, indeed. The victory in this ambush battle led to the failure of Chiang Kai-shek’s first encirclement campaign. My reputation soared. People knew about my strategy of ‘luring the enemy deep,’ but winning battles relied on ambush warfare, and the key to successful ambushes was accurate intelligence. The decisive role played by the Soviets in the anti-encirclement campaign is not well-known. At that time, I even requested Moscow to provide poison gas.”