Chapter 46 The Second Battle of Changsha, Incorporating Peng Dehuai 1930

Journalist: “How did you later decide to attack Changsha?”

Mao: “In August 1930, Li Lisan, a leading figure in the CCP, ordered me to attack Nanchang. I knew that Nanchang couldn’t be captured, and even if it were, we wouldn’t be able to hold it. But later on, I thought that Li Lisan’s order gave me an opportunity, an opportunity to merge with the Red Army led by Peng Dehuai.

Peng Dehuai joined the Communist Party in early 1928. In July, he led a mutiny in the Hunan Army and broke away from the Kuomintang forces with over 800 soldiers. In December, he arrived at Jinggang Mountain. At that time, I was planning to leave. Large numbers of Kuomintang troops were advancing towards Jinggang Mountain, and I needed someone to defend the mountain. So, I asked Peng to stay, although his men were reluctant to undertake this dangerous task. Peng convinced them to accept it. He didn’t want to confront me. When the Kuomintang troops attacked, Peng’s forces broke out in the heavy snow. In April 1929, while I was in western Fujian, Peng’s forces joined me. I didn’t allow Peng to stay in the prosperous western Fujian and sent him back to the Jinggang Mountain area to restore the Hunan-Jiangxi border Soviet region. Peng silently accepted it. However, the central leadership never explicitly placed Peng under my command.”

Journalist: “Oh, so you wanted to get Peng Dehuai under your control?”

Mao: “Yes. In early 1930, Moscow and Shanghai unified and reorganized the Red Army. By this time, Peng’s forces had grown to 15,000 soldiers, equal to the Zhu-Mao Red Army, and Peng was organized as a separate army parallel to the Zhu-Mao forces. Peng was greatly loved by his subordinates. Inspectors found that Peng’s troops ‘followed orders, obeyed discipline, showed mutual affection, fought bravely, and had a strong personal loyalty to Peng Dehuai. After recovering from injuries or illness, soldiers insisted on returning to Peng’s Fifth Army, and very few deserted from the Fifth Army.’

I was determined to bring Peng’s forces under my control, but his army was hundreds of kilometers away. The central leadership ordered me to attack Nanchang, which provided me with an opportunity to merge with Peng Dehuai. Peng wasn’t far from Nanchang. I headed north, all the way to the outskirts of Nanchang. I had no intention of besieging the city; it was a feint. I then ordered an advance toward Changsha. Peng Dehuai had just captured Changsha in a surprise attack on July 25th and held it for 11 days before withdrawing to rest and regroup.”

Journalist: “On August 9, 1930, you wrote a letter to Shanghai stating that Peng Dehuai’s situation was very dangerous, with potential sacrifices and losses, and you decided to abandon the attack on Nanchang and go to Changsha to assist Peng. When Peng received the message, he sent someone to inform you that assistance was not needed. However, you wanted Peng to coordinate an attack on Yonghe City, situated between Nanchang and Changsha. Peng had no choice but to lead his troops there.”

Mao: “Yes, that’s correct. On the day Peng’s forces arrived in Yonghe City, August 23, I immediately announced the merger of the two armies, forming the First Front Army. I appointed myself as the Secretary of the General Preparatory Committee and the Political Commissar, Zhu De as the Commander-in-Chief, and Peng Dehuai as the Deputy Commander-in-Chief. In order to obtain approval, the next day I sent a letter to Shanghai stating that the merger of the two armies was for the purpose of launching another attack on Changsha. I was confident that we could capture Changsha, Yueyang, advance on Wuhan and Jiujiang, establish governmental institutions, and promote a nationwide general uprising.”

Journalist: “Capture Changsha and attack Wuhan? You have grand ambitions!”

Mao: “In reality, I was just talking. I had no intention of actually capturing Wuhan; it was impossible, and even capturing Changsha again would not be successful. Peng’s success in capturing Changsha relied on the element of surprise, but now the defending enemy is prepared. Zhu De and Peng Dehuai were also well aware of this and opposed launching a second attack on Changsha. But I insisted on attacking. If we didn’t, I wouldn’t have a reason for Shanghai to agree to the merger with Peng and place him under my control. During the second attack, the casualties suffered by the Red Army were devastating, with far greater losses in Peng’s forces compared to mine. I remained idle.”

Journalist: “Your ambition resulted in heavy casualties for the Red Army. How did it all end?”

Mao: “Three weeks passed, and I lifted the siege on Changsha and planned to withdraw with Peng’s forces. However, Peng’s officers objected. They didn’t like me and didn’t want to be under my command. Peng didn’t want internal strife to occur with me and managed to convince his troops.

I also took advantage of the second attack on Changsha, and it was widely publicized in national newspapers, portraying me, ‘Mao Zedong, who originally only commanded one army, as the leader of the entire Red Army in the country.’ On the day the siege of the city began, August 23, I issued a proclamation announcing the establishment of the Chinese Revolutionary Committee for Workers and Peasants, commanding the national Red Army and local political authorities, and I self-proclaimed myself as the Chairman.”

Journalist: “So, you became the emperor of Jiangxi. What did the central leadership do about it?”

Mao: “The central leadership did not punish me. Moscow wanted to establish a red political power in China and needed a leader with a strong desire for power, and I fit the bill. With my audacity and cunning in seizing power, Moscow felt that I was capable of getting things done. On September 20, 1930, I was restored as a candidate member of the Politburo, and Moscow had already designated me as the head of the Chinese red political power.

The casualties and failures of the second attack on Changsha were attributed to Li Lisan. Li Lisan had requested Soviet intervention to help the CCP establish political power. In October 1930, the Communist International ordered him to go to the Soviet Union. There, he was frequently called upon at meetings to publicly confess and denounce the “Li Lisan Line,” and he spent two years in prison afterward.”

Journalist: “You certainly know how to maneuver! You’re pushing all the blame onto Li Lisan.”

Journalist: “What did you learn from your time in Jinggang Mountain?”

Mao: “I learned guerrilla tactics from the mountain bandit chieftain. I shouted beautiful slogans for the Communist Party, employing clever deceit, but in reality, I engaged in banditry activities that were even more ruthless than the bandits themselves.”