Chapter 45 The Beitou Meeting and the Usurpation of Power 1930

Journalist: “Were the leaders of the bandits at Jinggang Mountain later killed by you?”

Mao: “Yes. In March 1930, after we killed Yuan Wencai and Wang Zuo, the remaining members fled into the mountains. Red Army soldier Li Jukui, who was tasked with capturing them, reported that he witnessed the local masses being highly resentful of our actions while showing great care for Wang and Yuan’s forces. Clearly, the people of Jinggang Mountain, who had experienced life under both bandit and Communist rule, preferred the bandits. The disasters brought by the bandits were minor compared to those caused by the Communists.

Since leaving Jinggang Mountain in early 1929, for over a year, I had complete control over two armies: the Zhu-Mao Red Army and the Peng Dehuai Army, as well as the Red Zone in western Fujian. However, my eyes were always fixed on the Red Army and its base east of Jinggang Mountain in Jiangxi.”

Journalist: “Oh, so you wanted to devour the several thousand local Red Army forces in Jiangxi as well?”

Mao: “Yes. The leader of the Jiangxi Red forces was the charismatic and moderate Li Wenlin, commanding a few thousand troops. When I arrived in his territory from Jinggang Mountain in February 1930, he warmly received me. I immediately announced that I was their superior, appointing my younger brother Zeqin as the Party Committee Secretary of the capital city, Donggu, in Jiangxi. This was a self-appointment without central authorization. The people in Jiangxi were dissatisfied, but they didn’t argue with me because the Kuomintang Army was chasing us, and we needed to relocate.

Zeqin did not possess the same desire for power and competitiveness as I did. The Central Inspector once said that he worked like someone with malaria, putting in effort when he was happy but not doing anything when he was unhappy. He was somewhat childish and afraid of taking responsibility. After three months, I had to assign another trusted confidant as Zeqin’s superior. This person was from my hometown in Hunan and named Liu Shiqi.

Liu Shiqi immediately took away Zeqin’s girlfriend, He Yi. He Yi was the sister of He Zizhen, so Liu and I became brothers-in-law. Liu and I had many similarities in our personalities. The old Communists in Jiangxi said that I lacked organizational principles, had a bad temper, and loved to curse at people. He was also like me, with a long reach and would resort to any means to seize power. In less than half a year, he managed to secure several important positions. After the Gutian Conference in February 1930, the Zhu-Mao Red Army became my tool, and I returned to Jiangxi with the aim of swallowing up the Jiangxi Red Army in one fell swoop.”

Journalist: “How did you go about seizing power?”

Mao: “I announced the convening of a ‘Joint Meeting’ with the Red Jiangxi on February 10th at Beitou Village. After the notification was sent out, I moved the meeting date forward to February 6th. By the time the Jiangxi representatives who opposed Liu Shiqi’s power grab arrived, the meeting had already concluded on the 9th.

This is what Party history refers to as the ‘Beitou Conference,’ but in reality, it was Liu Shiqi and I putting on a show together. In harmony with each other, the ‘Joint Meeting’ authorized me to have ‘unified leadership’ over Red Jiangxi as the Secretary of the Central Preparatory Committee, while Liu Shiqi became the head of the Red Jiangxi local party organization (Secretary of the Southwest Jiangxi Special Committee). Li Wenlin, the founder of the Jiangxi Red Army, was relegated to a low-level position as the Secretary- General of the Soviet Government under the Southwest Jiangxi Special Committee.”

Journalist: “So, you and Liu Shiqi staged this performance together to seize power?”

Mao: “Yes, of course, the old Communists in Jiangxi didn’t accept it. So, I resorted to terror to intimidate them. At Beitou, four prominent Jiangxi leaders were labeled as the ‘Four Great Traitors’ and executed on charges of ‘counterrevolution.’ They were the first batch of old Communists that I killed in order to seize power. From then on, Liu Shiqi and I used the threat of execution to scare those who didn’t obey. The Central Inspector’s report mentioned that Liu Shiqi often resorted to vulgar language and frequently used the threat of ‘execution,’ which created a reign of red terror within the Party. The accusation we often used was ‘counterrevolutionary rich peasants,’ which was the period when Stalin was struggling against the rich peasants. I falsely claimed that the landlords and rich peasants in Red Jiangxi had infiltrated various levels of the Party’s organs, and many leaders came from wealthy families.”

During that time, there were already some individuals within the party who sought personal revenge under the guise of revolution. I was the first to kill people for the sake of power within the Communist Party. In Ninggang County, I ordered the arrest of Communist Party government chairman Wengen Zong, who had been in office for seven months, for the purpose of seeking revenge against Kuomintang county chief Zhang Kaiyang. Wengen Zong was subsequently killed.”

Journalist: “So, it was in this way that you initiated a culture of internal killings within the party in Jiangxi?”

Mao: “Yes, the central authority did not authorize me to have jurisdiction over the Jiangxi Red Army. The central leadership classified the Jiangxi Red Army as one of the 13 armies, parallel to the Zhu-Mao Red Army, with Cai Shenxi serving as the army commander. After Cai arrived in Jiangxi, I used means to undermine him, preventing him from taking office and instead appointing someone who would obey my order as the army commander, with Liu Shiqi serving as the political commissar. There was no telecommunication connection between Jiangxi and Shanghai, relying solely on the inspectors who visited and reported back. At one point, Liu Shiqi and I conspired to kill the inspector, Jiang Hanbo, who opposed our power grab. We even forged a report in his name, expressing support for our power grab, and sent it to Shanghai.

Another method I used to deal with the central authority was to no longer actively report to Shanghai. First, seize power, create a fait accompli, and then force the central leadership to recognize the existing reality. The central authority kept sending me letters urging me to attend meetings in Shanghai, but I ignored them.”

Journalist: “Oh, so you had free rein in Jiangxi, beyond the control of the central authority in Shanghai?”

Mao: “Yes, to some extent, the distance between the mountains and the emperor is vast. There was a period where it gave the impression that I no longer existed. During this time, there was a newspaper report claiming that I had died of an illness. Shanghai and Moscow, having heard nothing from me for a long time, believed it to be true. On March 20, 1930, the magazine of the Communist International even published a black-bordered obituary: ‘News from China: Mao Zedong, founder of the Red Army, passed away on the frontline in Fujian after a prolonged illness.’

However, within two weeks, the central leadership discovered that I was still alive and had taken control of the Jiangxi Red Army. The central leadership grew anxious, and on April 3, 1930, they issued a notice to the entire Red Army, ordering them not to obey anyone except the central authority: all command authority was to be completely unified under the Central Military Commission. The notice specifically criticized me without naming me, accusing me of arbitrarily managing the Jiangxi Red Army.”

Journalist: “You employed high-handed tactics, and the Red Army in Jiangxi was under your control?”

Mao: “Yes, they were completely under my control. However, the old Communists in Red Jiangxi received instructions from the central leadership, and by May, they turned against me. Some cadres even encouraged the peasants to rise up and oppose our rule, myself and Liu Shiqi. After I arrived, I emphasized production in Red Jiangxi, condemning their focus on ‘constructionism,’ and continuously pressured the peasants to hold meetings, greatly impacting agricultural production and causing great distress to the peasants. Liu Shiqi implemented a harsh and oppressive control. He ordered the common people not to consider family and friendship relationships, and if anyone came to their homes or noticed any suspicious behavior, regardless of their relationship, they were to report it to the Soviets.”