Chapter 44 Developing towards the East, subduing Zhude 1929

Journalist: “You were the king of Jinggang Mountain, weren’t you? So why did you leave?”

Mao: “As soon as I received the appointment from the Central Committee, I prepared to expand my territory. The Kuomintang’s army was also preparing to attack. In June 1928, Chiang Kai-shek defeated the Beijing government, unified most of China, established Nanjing as the capital, and began to eradicate the Communist base areas. On January 14, 1929, I led the Zhu Mao Red Army to leave Jinggang Mountain. At that time, the Zhu Mao Red Army had 3,000 soldiers.

I operated in Jinggang Mountain for 15 months, leaving behind a land filled with wounds and scars. Yang Kaiming, the Central Committee’s inspector, said that before the Red Army arrived at Jinggang Mountain, the peasants lived peacefully, working at sunrise and resting at sunset. Since the Red Army came, everything changed. The Red Army relied solely on confiscating from landlords for its economic sustenance. Even the lower middle class, rich peasants, and small businesses were among the targets of confiscation. After the massive destruction, no attention was paid to the economic crisis, resulting in the complete bankruptcy of the countryside. Jinggang Mountain could no longer sustain the survival of my forces, so I had to leave and seek survival and development elsewhere.”

Journalist: “Oh, so you basically drained Jinggang Mountain dry, and now you have to wander elsewhere?”

Mao: “That’s correct. After I left, the Kuomintang’s army captured Jinggang Mountain. The wounded soldiers, sick soldiers, and local cadres we left behind were gunned down by machine guns. Those captured by anti- communist militias seeking revenge were brutally executed. However, the general population did not harbor much hatred towards the Kuomintang.

When I left Jinggang Mountain, Moscow was discussing how to provide specific assistance to Zhu Mao. It was the first time Moscow had dedicated discussions on aid for our army. My reputation was already prominent, and newspapers called me the ‘giant among the Communist Party.’

The government army pursued us relentlessly, and during a fierce battle, Zhu De’s wife was captured. She was later executed, and her head was displayed in Changsha. In such a precarious situation, I initiated a power struggle against Zhu De. Less than two weeks after leaving Jinggang Mountain, I used the pretext of unifying military commands to cancel Zhu De’s position as secretary of the military committee, depriving him of his command authority and consolidating all power in my hands. However, in my reports to the Central Committee, I never mentioned the deprivation of Zhu De’s power. I only highlighted positive aspects and aimed to please the Central Committee. Zhu De did not resist me, nor did he lodge a complaint against me to the Central Committee. He did not possess strong power ambitions and was not adept at conspiracies. He endured it.”

Journalist: “Oh, Zhu De is really accommodating, isn’t he? His wife was killed, and you took away his power, yet he endured it?”

Mao: “Yes, Zhu De is a good person. In March 1929, the Kuomintang’s attacking forces suddenly retreated, allowing me to easily capture the western part of Fujian, including the provincial capital, Tingzhou. The Ting River here had busy shipping traffic, attracting merchants from all over. I had a significant campaign against the ‘local tyrants,’ enriching our resources. Logistics was no longer a problem, and morale was greatly boosted. I confiscated a military uniform factory and wore a neat military uniform for the first time. The new uniform was gray, just like the Kuomintang’s, except it had a red cap badge and red collar insignia.

The commander of the defending city, Captain Guo Fengming, was captured alive and then killed. His body was hung upside down on a tree while I stood beside it, pointing at the corpse and giving a speech at a mass rally. After the meeting, Guo’s body was paraded through the streets. The city government was set ablaze and reduced to ashes.”

Journalist: “So wherever you went, it was a rampage of burning, killing, and looting?”

Mao: “Yes. I set up my headquarters in a building overlooking the Ting River, and life was comfortable. But soon, the good times were disrupted by a visitor from the Central Committee. His name was Liu Angong, recently trained in the Soviet Union and sent from Shanghai to be the third-in- command of the Zhu Mao Red Army. Liu Angong discovered that I had ousted Zhu De and was extremely angry. He accused me of seizing power, practicing secretarial dictatorship, operating a paternalistic system, and going against the Central Committee. He claimed that Zhu De was supportive of the Central Committee, while I opposed it.

With Liu Angong’s arrival, I could no longer control the flow of information to Shanghai. Zhu De began to resist me. He had the support of Liu Angong and the majority of the troops. I lost popular support and felt isolated. Only the 28th Regiment led by Lin Biao stood by my side. Chen Yi reported to Shanghai, stating that many people criticized me for being too dictatorial, undemocratic, practicing paternalistic rule, and having a temper and abusive language. There were also some criticisms of Zhu De, saying that he often spoke to soldiers, saying things like ‘march to Nanjing’ and ‘live in foreign houses,’ and that he had a tendency toward thuggish behavior, lacking dignity.

On June 22, 1929, the party representatives of the Zhu Mao Red Army held a meeting in Longyan, Fujian, to debate the Zhu Mao issue and conduct a vote. I was voted out as the Secretary of the Political Bureau, and Chen Yi took over the position, while Zhu De regained his military command authority. I threatened them, saying that if they attempted to disarm the Political Bureau by force, I had a battalion of troops that could resist. They disarmed my bodyguard before the meeting.”

Journalist: “Oh, you were voted out, and Zhu De took over. What did you do then?”
Mao: “I retreated and fought a guerrilla war, aiming to regain the lost power. My plan was to first seize control of the local government “Special Committee” in the newly established base in western Fujian. This newly opened base was rich and had a population of 1.25 million and a local force. Since I was voted out, I couldn’t stay in the Red Army anymore, so I hoped to do something in the local area. No one realized my scheme.

I lay on a stretcher and left the Red Army headquarters, accompanied by He Zizhen and a few trusted confidants. We headed straight to Jiaoyang, the location of the Special Committee in western Fujian. Deng Zihui, the Secretary of the Special Committee, followed my orders, and I told him to convene the First Party Representative Conference in western Fujian. I planned to use this conference to establish a new Special Committee and place my trusted allies in key positions.”

Journalist: “Oh, so you went to western Fujian to seek new opportunities?”

”Mao: “Yes. On July 10, 1929, more than 50 delegates from western Fujian gathered in Jiaoyang, and the conference was scheduled to begin the next day. But I instructed them to conduct various investigations, and after a week of delay, the conference finally opened. I used various excuses to prolong the meeting for 20 more days. However, when the Kuomintang launched an attack, the conference had to conclude on the 29th. Just as the delegates left, I immediately designated a new Special Committee, considering it the result of the conference’s election. Deng Zihui remained as the Secretary, and I brought in people from Hunan: one as the Secretary- General, one as the Head of the Organizational Department, and one to control the local forces. They were all people I brought along and couldn’t speak the local dialect. When the Communist Party members in western Fujian realized that I had imposed my own people on them, they became extremely angry. Whenever they had a chance, they rose up in resistance, sparking a bloody purge led by me in western Fujian.”

Journalist: “Oh, you used tactics to install your own people.”

Mao: “Yes, I always find a way. Once I gained control of the base in western Fujian, I started to entangle with Zhu De. There was a person named Lin Biao in Zhu De’s ranks. Lin Biao was in his twenties at that time and had military talent. He had a passion for military affairs, had attended the Whampoa Military Academy, and enjoyed studying military strategy. However, he lacked discipline and hadn’t received training in the Soviet Union or been nurtured within the strict discipline of the Communist Party. Lin Biao had questionable actions, often keeping captured items for himself. He had a strong ego and couldn’t tolerate criticism. Zhu De, as his superior, had criticized him, and he held a grudge against Zhu De. Soon after Lin Biao arrived in Jinggang Mountain, I approached him and established a special relationship. In dealing with Zhu De this time, in late July 1929, the Kuomintang army launched an attack. Zhu De formulated a combat plan, ordering all troops to assemble on August 2nd. But when the time came, Lin Biao didn’t show up. He stayed with me and the Red Army in a different location. Zhu De had to lead only half of his forces to counter-attack the Kuomintang army. Half of the Red Army didn’t follow orders, and Zhu De relied on the central leadership for guidance.”

Journalist: “Oh, Lin Biao didn’t listen to Zhu De, and you came to win over Lin Biao.”

Mao: “That’s right. At that time, the General Secretary of the Party, Xiang Zhongfa, had no real capabilities. His appointment was purely based on his working-class background, having worked as a sailor and dockworker. The actual responsibility rested with Zhou Enlai, and decisions were made by the Moscow representatives in Shanghai. These representatives issued orders through Zhou Enlai. Moscow valued Zhou Enlai and gave him crucial tasks. In 1924, he was sent back to China and served as the Political Commissar at the Whampoa Military Academy, and he organized the Nanchang Uprising. After the failure of the uprising, he went from Hong Kong to Shanghai and took charge of the daily work of the Chinese Communist Party.

Zhou EnlAiditrectly dealt with the issue of Mao and Zhu. According to the instructions of the Moscow representatives in China, on August 21, 1929, he issued an order to the Red Army, fully supporting me. He said that I was definitely not practicing paternalism, and it was right for me to dissolve the Military Committee on my own. There was no need to reorganize the Military Committee, and I should be restored to my previous position. He also criticized Liu Angong for criticizing me wrongly. Liu was recalled to Shanghai and soon died in battle.”

Journalist: “Oh, Zhou Enlai was ordered to support you, and you gained the upper hand?”

Mao: “Yes, the Party supported me because I had a strong desire for power, which made Stalin take notice of me. To seize power in China, it is impossible to succeed without a leader who has a strong desire for power. Stalin also needed me. At that time, the ‘Middle East Route’ incident was taking place in Northeast China. The Chinese government took back control of the Middle East Railway, which had been in the hands of the Soviets. Moscow was extremely angry and formed a special Far Eastern Army, which invaded the northeastern region, advancing as far as 125 kilometers inside Chinese territory. Stalin wanted to occupy Harbin and establish a revolutionary government. He wanted the Chinese Communist Party to cooperate with him. In the letter Zhou Enlai wrote to me, he immediately mentioned the Middle East Route issue and asked me to develop guerrilla areas, expand the Red Army, and prepare to defend the Soviet Union by force.

There was another reason why Moscow supported me. Stalin’s number one political enemy, Leon Trotsky, had been exiled by Stalin, but his influence still posed a threat. Trotsky had a small group of followers in China and was trying to win the support of Chen Duxiu. Stalin was worried that Chen Duxiu’s support for Trotskyism would grow, and he was concerned that I, who had old ties with Chen, would follow Chen’s path. These considerations led Moscow to decide to support me.”

Journalist: “With Stalin backing you, you must have been quite confident?”

Mao: “Indeed. Zhou Enlai took my letter, delivered it to Zhu De, and Zhu De obeyed. He sent someone to deliver the letter to me. I was living in Liujiaopo, a beautiful place surrounded by mountains and rivers, in a small two-story building. Every day, I enjoyed nutritious milk, beef stew, and a hen. Life was leisurely. After receiving Zhou Enlai’s letter, I didn’t immediately return to the Zhu Mao Red Army. I stayed in Liujiaopo for over a month, exerting pressure on Zhu De. Zhu De became anxious, and at the end of November, he sent troops to welcome me, and that’s when I set off.

I immediately wrote a letter to Shanghai, making a clear statement to Moscow, drawing a clear line with the ‘Trotskyites,’ and labeling Chen Duxiu as a ‘counterrevolutionary.’ I presided over the resolution opposing Trotsky. During daily military exercises, the troops would shout ‘Armed Defense of the Soviet Union.’”

Journalist: “Did you completely align yourself with Stalin to gain his trust?”

Mao: “Yes. I kept Zhu De as the nominal highest military commander, and our forces continued to be called the Zhu-Mao Red Army. This satisfied Moscow’s requirements for unity and allowed me to leverage Zhu De’s reputation. Zhu De was subdued, but for a long time, he frequently got angry. The Moscow Archives recorded that Zhu De was nothing more than a ‘plaything in Mao’s handswith no real power, and that Mao merely used him.’ Red Army General Gong Chu also noticed the difference between Zhu De and me. Gong said that I ruled with dictatorship, making all military and political decisions personally and being stubborn. He said that Zhu De had a democratic style, consulting with everyone in all matters. Gong also said that I always saw myself as the leader, placing myself above all others. Zhu De, on the other hand, was humble in all situations, disregarding personal gains and losses. Gong Chu further stated that I was hypocritical towards others, being evasive in all matters, while Zhu De was an honest person who approached everything with sincerity and transparency.”

Journalist: “Was Zhu De honest and easily manipulated by you?”

Mao: “That’s correct. I utilized his reputation throughout my life. In December 1929, during the Gutian Conference in Fujian, I announced the abolition of executing deserters. I was afraid of opposition from the soldiers since I knew they despised the execution of deserters. Every time I set out, I would execute some deserters and display their bodies along the road as a public spectacle, but it still couldn’t stem the tide of desertions. At the Gutian Conference, I proposed a resolution to stop executing deserters, which gained widespread popular support. However, just a few months later, after firmly securing my position, the resolution was revoked, and deserters continued to be executed.

I used the goodwill generated by the resolution against executing deserters to ensure the passage of other resolutions. I criticized the ‘narrow military viewpoint’ to undermine Zhu De’s authority. I also stopped elections and condemned voting, which was unfavorable to me, as ‘extreme democratization,’ and canceled the elections.

The demand for equality within the Red Army was particularly high, and the main rallying cry of the Communist Party was equality. However, I preferred comfort and a more privileged lifestyle. Among the soldiers at Jinggang Mountain, there was a popular rhyme that went: ‘General Zhu carries rice uphill, while Mao Zedong fires cannons from behind.’ At the Gutian Conference, I invented the label of ‘absolute egalitarianism’ to suppress such voices.

Journalist: “You employed various means, and Zhu De could only be manipulated by you?”

Mao: “Yes. After leaving Gutian, I was satisfied with my achievements and hummed a verse on horseback: ‘Narrow roads, dense forests, slippery moss. Which direction shall we take today?’ I had already devised strategies to merge with other Red Army forces.”