Chapter 40 Deceiving the team and becoming bandits in the mountain 1927

Journalist: “How did you become a mountain warlord?”

Mao: “In April 1927, when Chiang Kai-shek started his anti-communist purge, Stalin formulated his policy towards China. He wanted the CCP to establish an army and base areas to conquer China by force. Using the barrel of a gun to seize power, Stalin had already considered this for the CCP as early as 1919 when the Communist International was founded. When cooperating with the Kuomintang, Moscow-directed CCP members infiltrated the Kuomintang Army and sought to control it. After Chiang Kai- shek launched the purge, Stalin ordered the CCP to immediately withdraw its members from the KMT Army and establish its own new armed forces.

Stalin sent his trusted confidant, Beso Lominadze, to China to oversee the matter. The top priority for the Soviet Union in China was to establish the Red Army. They dispatched Soviet military intelligence personnel to major cities to supply the CCP with weapons, funds, medicine, and intelligence. They also sent military advisors and intensified military training for CCP members within the Soviet Union.

The first step of Moscow’s plan was to withdraw the members from the Kuomintang Army and go to the southern coast to receive Soviet military supplies and establish base areas. They also instructed Hunan and three other provinces with peasant associations to initiate uprisings.”
Journalist: “Oh, so these are Stalin’s armed directives. How did you take action?”

Mao: “I fully supported this approach. At the Emergency Meeting of August 7th, I said, ‘Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.’ Moscow had just removed Chen Duxiu and blamed the split within the Kuomintang on him, replacing him with Qu Qiubai. I didn’t want to be a leader who could be replaced at will. I wanted to have my own forces, establish my own territory, and have the strength to demand power from Moscow. Having our own territory was also the best way to ensure our safety and survival.”

Journalist: “Your thinking was practical, relying on your own strength.”

Mao: “However, at that time, I didn’t have a single gun or soldier, and no one above me had assigned me to engage in military affairs. In order to possess an army, I had to resort to means.

In the summer of 1927, on August 1st, the Nanchang Uprising took place. A force of 20,000 soldiers, according to Moscow’s plan, immediately headed south towards Shantou, 600 kilometers away, in preparation to receive the weapons shipped from the Soviet Union.

I intended to seize a portion of this force. Their planned route of march approached the southern part of Hunan. So, in early August, I proposed to the Central Committee that I go to southern Hunan to lead the upcoming autumn uprising. I requested that the Central Committee assign me a regiment from the passing Nanchang Uprising forces, along with other peasant forces. With this, I had at least a certainty of occupying five counties. My intention was to use the leadership of the uprising as an excuse to form an armed force and take them under my command.”

Journalist: “You wanted to take a regiment for yourself. Very clever!”

Mao: “The Central Committee approved my plan for the uprising in southern Hunan. The leaders of the province-wide uprising in Hunan agreed to hold a meeting at the Soviet Consulate in Changsha on August 15th. I did not attend the meeting that day. I was staying at the home of Yang Kaihui’s mother in Changsha. Since I was a key figure, the meeting was postponed to the next day. But on the second day, when everyone had gathered, I still did not attend. It wasn’t until the 18th that I finally arrived at the meeting. Everyone was angry, and I made excuses, saying I was delayed because I was conducting investigations among the peasants.

The reason for my four-day delay was that I wanted to wait and see if the forces from the Nanchang Uprising were still likely to reach southern Hunan. If it was no longer possible, then I would not proceed with the uprising in southern Hunan.”

Journalist: “So, your real intention wasn’t about the autumn uprising, but rather to seize a regiment?”

Mao: “That’s correct. Three days after the Nanchang Uprising forces left Nanchang, one-third of the soldiers deserted, and half of the ammunition was lost. It was hot and humid in the summer, and the soldiers had no water to drink, so they had to resort to drinking polluted water from the fields, resulting in many deaths. The troops were in disarray and were only struggling to reach Shantou. It was no longer possible for them to detour to southern Hunan.

So, during the meeting at the Soviet Consulate, I made a sharp turn and firmly demanded the cancellation of the uprising plan in southern Hunan, focusing our efforts on capturing Changsha. Just as I wasn’t really interested in launching an uprising in southern Hunan, I also had no intention of attacking Changsha. I proposed to attack Changsha because there were three red armed forces nearby, and I could use the pretext of attacking Changsha to bring them under my command. These three forces consisted of active members from the original agricultural movement, unemployed miners and mine police due to the closure of the Anyuan coal mine, and troops originally stationed in Wuhan who were ordered to join the Nanchang Uprising but didn’t make it in time. Altogether, these three forces comprised several thousand people.”

Journalist: “You’re quite clever, changing the plan and pretending to attack Changsha as a diversion, all with the goal of seizing control of the troops.”

Mao: “Indeed, having real power is the core of my existence. I was approved to be the Secretary of the Front Committee in command of these forces, under the leadership of the Hunan Provincial Committee. Although I had no military training, I was appointed as the commanding officer because of my optimism and enthusiasm for the uprising and the trust bestowed upon me by the two Soviet individuals who presided over the decision-making meeting in Changsha. On August 31st, I left the Soviet Consulate, claiming to go to the troops, but in reality, I did not go.

On September 11th, the planned day for the uprising, I secretly stayed alone in Wenjia Market, which was 100 kilometers away from Changsha. I did not go to Tonggu. On the 14th, when the three forces had not yet reached Changsha, I issued orders for them to change their course and head to Wenjia Market. This action caught the Hunan Provincial Committee by surprise, and they had no choice but to cancel the entire uprising on the 15th. The Secretary of the Soviet Consulate, Maier, said, All of this is a shameful betrayal and desertion in the face of battle. They did not know that my previous encouragement of the uprising and the plan to attack Changsha was solely to move the troops into my hands. Later, the Hunan Provincial Committee submitted a report to the Central Committee stating that this was ‘purely a simple military operation and did not incite a revolutionary wave among the peasants to seize land.’ In reality, I dismantled the platform for the autumn uprising.

Journalist: “Haha, your entire plan was to move the troops into your hands. Forget about the autumn uprising and attacking Changsha, right?”

Mao: “Exactly. Wenjia Market was far from Changsha and had no radio communication, making it impossible for the Hunan Provincial Committee and the Soviets to command. I had already planned the destination for this force: the Jinggang Mountains, 170 kilometers to the south. The Jinggang Mountains, located on the border of Hunan and Jiangxi, had always been a place where bandits and outlaws roamed. There were two mountain warlords there: Yuan Wencai, who used to be a student, and Wang Zuo, who used to be a tailor. Under their leadership, they commanded 500 men and controlled most of Ninggang County, with a population of 130,000, by collecting rents and taxes. I wanted to take over their territory and establish it as my own base.”

Journalist: “You had planned it all along, to lead the troops up the mountain and become a bandit? Did you abandon your wife and children and solely focus on becoming a mountain warlord?”

Mao: “Yes, first become a mountain warlord. Once you have power, there will be no shortage of women. As for Yang Kaihui, I no longer cared about her, nor did I pay attention to my children. I understood that leading the troops up the mountain was not an easy task. Without the guidance of the Party, doing so would be no different from becoming a bandit. I was worried that once the truth was revealed, it would endanger our lives. So before convening the commanders’ meeting in Wenjia Market to announce the decision, I sought the help of a few familiar individuals to assist me. One of the people I approached was He Changgong, whom I asked to work alongside another person, Yang Lisan, to ensure my safety during the meeting. They would create distractions and handle trivial tasks at the meeting, coming and going. There was a heated debate during the meeting, and the commanders initially disagreed with going up the mountain. Eventually, they reluctantly obeyed me because I was the only Party representative present.

The troops proceeded towards the Jinggang Mountains. Along the way, I wore a long robe and tied a piece of coarse cloth around my neck as a long scarf. The soldiers didn’t recognize me and assumed I was a commoner, asking me to carry guns for them. When I announced that the purpose of the troops was to become ‘warlords’ on the mountain, they were all shocked. They had joined the revolution to fight against bandits, not become bandits themselves. But I reassured them in the name of the Party that they could trust us, as we were becoming ‘Red Mountain Warlords’ as part of the world revolution. Going up the mountain was the path to survival.”

Journalist: “So, you made it clear that you were going up the mountain to become a warlord?”

Mao: “It had to be made clear. Even so, many people still had doubts and concerns. Many of them ran away. I allowed those who wanted to leave to go, but I didn’t allow them to take guns. At that time, I couldn’t forcibly retain them. Both commanders left and went to the Central Party in Shanghai, later joining the Kuomintang Party. The troops were exhausted, with sore muscles, injured legs, and suffering from dysentery. After two weeks, the troops reached the Jinggang Mountains, with only 600 people remaining who followed me. Most of them had no other options. They became the core group that helped me establish my foothold.”

Journalist: “So, you went up the mountain with a ragtag group of 600 people to become bandits?”
Mao: “Yes, that was the core group that helped me establish myself. In early October, I arrived at the foot of the Jinggang Mountains, and the first thing I did was to meet Yuan Wencai. I wrote a letter expressing my intention to join and seek refuge on the mountain. Yuan Wencai politely declined in his reply, saying, ‘Our land is impoverished and barren, unable to accommodate a great whale like you. A small forest cannot shelter a great eagle. Your troops are charging ahead in the revolution; you should find another path.’

After being rejected, I wrote another letter sincerely expressing my willingness to ‘establish friendship and unite as one.’ I also selected three rifles and sent them to Yuan Wencai through a messenger. He recognized my sincerity and agreed to let me enter the Jinggang Mountains.

On October 3rd, 1927, I went to meet Yuan Wencai with Chen Hao, carrying a hundred rifles as a gift. Yuan Wencai warmly welcomed us.”

Journalist: “You certainly know how to play the game! Giving a hundred rifles to please the bandits?”
Mao: “That’s right. I only brought a few people with me to put Yuan at ease. He had over 20 people ambushed at the meeting place, but when he saw that there weren’t many of us, he came forward to greet us and ordered the slaughter of a pig to host a feast. He invited me to sit down, offered me melon seeds, peanuts, and tea, and we had a conversation. I lied to him, saying that I was just passing through and heading south to find the troops of the Nanchang Uprising. Yuan agreed to let me stay temporarily, and he took charge of the grain and oil supplies. After my troops rested for a while, we went to several surrounding counties to rob houses and gather provisions and funds. That’s how I set foot into the Jinggang Mountains.”

Journalist: “So, you deceived Yuan Wencai in this way. What about Wang Zuo?”

Mao: “On October 27th, I reached the main base of Wang Zuo at Dayin. Using the same method, I gave Wang Zuo 70 rifles and gained his trust as well. Thus, my troops were accommodated by Yuan Wencai and Wang Zuo, settling in Ciping and establishing a home in the Jinggang Mountains.

Yuan Wencai, from Yongxin County in Jiangxi, was an intellectual during the late Qing dynasty. He joined the Party in 1926 and was the founder of the revolutionary base in the Jinggang Mountains. His and Wang Zuo’s forces were peasant armed units under the leadership of the Communist Party. At that time, the combined strength of Yuan and Wang’s forces exceeded my 600 soldiers.”

Journalist: “You really have a way with tactics, using bandit methods to deceive the bandits.”

Mao: “Yes. Once I firmly established myself in the Jinggang Mountains and gained control over the revolutionary base by taking advantage of opportunities and seizing the main position, I betrayed their trust. After usurping the leadership of the base, I acted treacherously and turned against them. Yuan Wencai and Wang Zuo were labeled as ‘bandit leaders’ and were killed in February 1930. Yuan Wencai, who was kind-hearted and simple, fell for my sweet words and unknowingly invited disaster into his home, which also affected his friend Wang Zuo.

I showed ingratitude and repaid kindness with enmity. I entered their base and seized power, only to have them killed. In 1936, in Yan’an, I told the American journalist Edgar Snow, ‘Yuan and Wang were ‘bandit leaders.’ When they were left alone in the Jinggang Mountains, they reverted to their previous bandit-like behavior, and as a result, they were killed by the peasants.’ I falsely accused Yuan Wencai and Wang Zuo and shifted the blame for their murders onto the peasants.”

Journalist: “So, you kicked them aside afterward and only cared about yourself?”

Mao: “Yes, that has always been my strategy. Once someone is no longer useful to me, I discard them and only focus on my own success.”