Chapter 102 The start and end of the Korean War 1950-1953

Journalist: “How was the Korean War fought?”

Mao: “After the defeat of Japan in 1945, Korea was divided into two along the 38th parallel, with the U.S. military in the south and the Soviet Union in the north, and in March 1949, North Korea’s Kim Il Sung saw that the Communist army was about to seize all of China and rushed to Moscow to ask Stalin to help him fight South Korea. Stalin did not agree, fearing a fight with the United States. Kim Il-sung came to Beijing and asked me for help. I made it clear that I would support him and that he would wait until I had taken all of China before going to war, and that a full-scale offensive could be held in the first half of 1950. I said: If necessary, we can quietly send some troops to you. The Chinese and North Koreans have the same skin color, the Americans can’t recognize them.”

Journalist: “Oh, it was Kim Il Sung who came to you for help?”

Mao: “Yes, at this time, I meant to send troops in secret, disguised as North Koreans, not openly against the United States. I had a change during my visit to the Soviet Union to fight the U.S. openly, and the only way to get something from Stalin was to fight openly. The deal I envisioned was: I help you defeat your enemy, the United States, and you give me military industry and sphere of influence. I dare to fight because with millions of troops, I believe that America cannot race me to death and I will win.”

Journalist: “Oh, you want to defeat the United States to receive the credit and receive the prize at Stalin?”

Mao: “Yes, Stalin received reports of contact between Kim Il-sung and I. On January 19, 1950, Kim Il-sung again asked permission to launch an offensive, stressing that I had made him a promise to come and help him fight as soon as the war in China was over. on January 30, Stalin told Kim Il-sung that “he could be helped”. This is the first document in which Stalin agreed to start the Korean War. In March 1950, Stalin summoned Kim Il- sung to Moscow and told him: “The Chinese can now concentrate on the Korean issue, we have the key to success or failure, the support of Beijing, and we can act to reunify Korea. Stalin told Kim that he “must rely on Mao, who could not be more skillful in Asian affairs”.

Journalist: “Oh, the big boss has asked to rely on you?”

Mao: “Yes, from Stalin’s point of view, it would be to his advantage for China and North Korea to fight a big war with the United States. Firstly, he could be an arms dealer. Secondly, he could test new equipment, MiG aircraft, and indirectly obtain certain American military technology. Third, he could feel the bottom of the U.S., and the Communist camp against the U.S. in the end, how far the U.S. will go.

Stalin was more motivated by the fact that China could eliminate and hold back a large number of American troops and turn the European side in favor of the Soviet Union. Stalin’s global dream included seizing power in Germany, Spain, Italy and other European countries. In his telegram to me, he said that the Communist Party was faced with an overwhelming and fleeting opportunity. I was well aware of Stalin’s dream and repeatedly made it clear to him that he could be relied upon to realize it.”

Journalist: “You were dreaming the communist dream together. Stalin in Europe, you in Asia?”

Mao: “Yes. After Kim Il Sung invaded South Korea, the UN quickly passed a resolution to send UN troops to support South Korea. The Soviet Union could have exercised its veto and vetoed the resolution, but the Soviet representatives were deliberately absent and Stalin himself called to stay out of the meeting. He wanted U.N. troops led by U.S. troops to enter Korea so that I could enter the war and fight.

On May 13, 1950, Soviet planes sent Kim Il Sung to Beijing. Kim told me that Stalin had agreed. At 11:30 that night, I asked Zhou Enlai to check with the Soviet ambassador. Early the next morning, Stalin telegraphed, ‘North Korea can get its hands on the action; it should be discussed with Mao Zedong himself.’ On May 15, I expressed unreserved support for Kim Il Sung: ‘If the U.S. enters the war, China will send troops into North Korea.’ I specifically mentioned, ‘The Soviet Union has an agreement with the U.S. on the 38th parallel and is not in a position to participate directly in military operations; China is not bound and can fully assist North Korea.’ I took the initiative to propose the immediate deployment of a large army on the border between China and North Korea.”

Journalist: “Oh, Kim Il Sung went to Beijing first to ask for your permission?”

Mao: “Yes, Kim Il Sung worked out a plan with Stalin that was approved by me, and Stalin called on May 16 and gave his nod.

On June 25, 1950, North Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel and invaded South Korea. U.S. President Harry Truman announced on June 27 to send troops into North Korea. At the same time, he changed his “non-intervention” policy towards Taiwan.

In early August 1950, the North Korean army captured 90% of South Korea. On September 29, Kim Il Sung sent an urgent telegram to Stalin, asking the big boss to ask China to send “volunteer troops”.

On October 1, 1950, Stalin told me that the time had come to fulfill the promise. Stalin telegraphed: ‘I am now away from Moscow on vacation, and I am a little removed from the Korean matter. As far as I can see, if you think it is possible to send troops to help North Korea, you should send at least five or six divisions to the 38th parallel, which could be called a volunteer army.’ I responded immediately. at 2:00 a.m. on October 2, I wanted the troops already sent to the border with China and North Korea to be ready to move out and fight the enemy as originally planned.”

Journalist: “So your volunteer army was out in force?”

Mao: “I held a meeting of the Politburo just before the war to hear everyone’s views and see if there was anything I hadn’t thought of. For me, the Politburo is the think tank that gives reference and is the executor of my decisions. This time, I especially asked everyone to speak freely and lay out the disadvantages of sending troops. Most people were against sending troops. Zhou Enlai was ambiguous. The high voice of opposition was that of Lin Biao. The objections included the fact that the United States had complete air control, that the artillery advantage was 40 to 1, that the United States might bomb and destroy China’s major cities and industrial bases, and that it might even drop the atomic bomb.

I knew all these problems, and I could not sleep for many days. Destroying China was a big deal. I bet on the US not hitting China. Chinese cities and industries would also be defended by the Soviet air force. I did not believe that the United States would drop the atomic bomb. Still, I lived in Yuquan Mountain, which had strong air defense, just in case.”

Journalist: “Oh, only Lin Biao was against sending troops?”

Mao: “Yes. On October 2, 1950, I drafted a telegram to Stalin saying that a decision had been made to send Chinese troops to Korea to fight the Americans. But I realized that I had always seemed too aggressive about sending troops and had never talked about the difficulties, to the detriment of bargaining with Stalin. I suppressed the telegram and did not send it. I sent another one to Stalin, deliberately hesitant, saying: ‘China’s sending troops would have extremely serious consequences, and most comrades believe that a cautious attitude is necessary.’ Therefore, for the time being, no troops will be sent. I added: ‘We have not yet made a decision and wish to consult with you.’

On October 5, 1950, the UN troops had pushed into northern Korea, and Stalin became impatient with me. A phone call reminded me that I was the one who first actively wanted to fight the Korean War. In fact, I was just trying to raise my profile. By the time I received this telegram from Stalin, I had already designated Peng Dehuai, the commander-in-chief of the entry into Korea, and on October 8, I ordered the formation of a volunteer army, which was swiftly sent out to Korea, and on the same day telegraphed to Kim Il Sung: We have decided to send volunteer troops to Korea to help you. At the same time, I sent Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao to the Soviet Union to ask Stalin for weapons. On the way, Lin Biao sent me a long telegram, again urging me to give up sending troops. I sent Lin Biao, who was strongly opposed to sending troops, to Stalin because I wanted Lin Biao to tell Stalin more about the difficulties of sending troops in order to get as much as possible from Stalin.”

Journalist: “Oh, you delayed sending troops in order to ask Stalin for something? Sending Zhou Enlai, Lin Biao to ask for something?”

Mao: “Yes, on October 10, 1950, Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao arrived at Stalin’s villa on the Black Sea, and talked all night that night. Stalin promised to sell China planes, artillery, tanks, etc. Zhou EnlAiditd not even ask the price, and had to buy them no matter how much they cost. Stalin promised to send ‘an air division with 124 planes to provide air cover.’ But he soon said that he could not send them, the Soviet air force was not yet ready and had to wait for two months. Without air cover, the volunteers had to wait to be bombed. Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao insisted that Soviet air cover was indispensable, and Stalin would not relent in his arguments. Later, Stalin cabled to me and said, ‘Forget it!’ He knew that I wanted to send troops and had to do so. I had to stop arguing and say, ‘Whether the Soviets send airpower or not, let’s go.’ On October 13, I cabled to Zhou Enlai: ‘We must go to war, and the benefits of going to war are enormous.’ I also informed the Soviet ambassador in China, Roshen, that China would definitely send troops. In this way, on October 19, 1950, I sent troops into the Korean War.”

Journalist: “Why did you go against Stalin’s idea to send troops?”

Mao: “I thought it would be in my absolute best interest to send troops, I had 4 million soldiers in my hands, so what did I do if I left them alone? I like the word ‘war power’ the most, which makes me happy, dead people? I do not care, weapons can not beat the American army? Yes, but I don’t care how many people died because of the tactics of the sea of men, and as a result, the U.S. Army died more than 50,000 people, and we died 1 million people, 20 times, I don’t care, I never read the death report.

Although the Korean War was a draw, but still saved Kim Il-sung, otherwise he died and could only come to the northeast to retire, I and the U.S. Army even if the truce and a draw, my prestige in the communist camp greatly increased, and once Stalin died, the international communist leader is me.”

Journalist: “You did not ask for much, but still hastened to send troops.”

Mao: “Did your sending troops to Korea cause public panic? Apprehension of a world war? Yes, especially in the northeast, very sensitive, Shenyang folk talk, the United States entered the war, China sent troops, a world war is going to break out, but also the device rumors: the Soviet Union surrendered, will be arrested war criminal Mao Zedong. When the U.S. forces approaching the Yalu River, Shanghai people ridiculed me that the United States is a paper tiger, that China is worse than a cat, afraid that the United States will bomb Chinese cities, and even hit the northeast, thousands of people in Shenyang fled, more than 1,200 people gave up their jobs in the May Day factory, 1/5 of the workers in the tool factory fled, the folk appeared anti-Party slogans. When I found out about these situations, I ordered to suppress all of them, and propagandized with great fanfare that we should ‘resist the U.S. and defend our country’ and launch an ‘anti-American campaign.’”

Journalist: “Did you also launch a ‘donation campaign’ to support the war?

Mao: “Yes, the war cost a lot of money, in 1951 the military expenditure accounted for 55% of the national financial outlay, the supply was very tight, I launched a donation, rich people donated gold, jewelry, foreign currency, employees donated half a month’s salary, cadres donated 1/3 of the salary, peasants were forced to pay 1/3 of the harvest, and another 1/3 for taxation, forcing peasants to starvation and death engawa. In Sui County, Hubei Province, five people committed suicide because they could not afford to donate food. Those who resisted the donation were criticized, causing terror.”

Journalist: “With so many casualties on the Korean battlefield, you launched a draft campaign, right?

Mao: “Yes, I want to replenish the pool of soldiers, people are tired of war, do not want to be soldiers, the northeast to avoid the draft, Dehui County, thousands of people fled to the city in hiding, Shandong Wenying County, young people hide in the mountains, Shanxi Dai County, some villages young men ran away 1/3, Shanxi Gao Gan County draft cadres falsely claim to hold a villagers meeting, raids to catch strong men locked up, more than 100 people escaped at night, caught in the hundreds of people, only 10 people Willing to become a soldier, Henan, Hebei, Shandong are casualties due to draft evasion.”

Journalist: “You conscripted soldiers and increased food collection, the peasants were the worst off, right?”

Mao: “By the end of 1950, 1/3 of the peasants in the Northeast were in trouble, lacking food, fodder, etc. Some did not even have seeds for the next year. 1/3 of the peasants in the Northeast did not have enough to eat, and the peasants in Huai De County could only eat wild vegetables and bean cakes, which were all fodder. Sichuan Ya’an 80,000 starving people subsist on grass roots, more than 1 million people in Yunnan starve and eat bark and dirt, in November 1951 Deng Xiaoping reported that 2 million people in the southwest were starving and there were tragic signs of cannibalism.”

Journalist: “You are defying all odds to fight?”

Mao: “Yes, when the volunteers entered the war in North Korea, Kim Il Sung was in a state of defeat. Two months later, the volunteers drove the UN forces out of North Korea. I had 450,000 men in North Korea, and Kim Il Sung was left with 75,000 remnants. on December 7, the volunteers recaptured Pyongyang, and Kim handed over command of the war to Peng Dehuai. Peng telegraphed me, ‘Kim agreed to form a joint command and not to interfere directly with command in the future.’ The joint commander was Peng Dehuai, and I took over Kim Il-sung’s command.

When the volunteers hit the 38th parallel, Peng Dehuai asked me to stop, saying that the transportation line was too long, the troops could not receive food, ammunition, shoes, oil, and salt on time, and without aircraft cover, they bombed as they repaired. I refused to stop, and on December 13, 1950, I replied to Peng Dehuai: ‘Our troops must cross the 38th parallel.’
The volunteers soon captured Seoul. Stalin sent me a congratulatory telegram whose heat was higher than congratulations on my capture of China. Stalin made a point of noting that my victory was ‘against the Americans.’

Journalist: “You defeated Seoul and Stalin congratulated you for defeating the Americans?”

Mao: “Yes, on December 16, 1950, President Truman declared a national emergency. In grim terms, Truman told the American people that their families and their nation were ‘now in great danger.’ For weeks, the Chinese drove the Americans 200 miles through freezing temperatures in the tens of degrees below zero. Secretary of State Acheson said the U.S. military had suffered a ‘crushing defeat’ in 100 years.

Journalist: “You went to Korea, the U.S. Army counter-attacked, occupied Pyongyang, hit 80 kilometers from the Yalu River, looking at the northeast, who saved you?”

Mao: “It was Truman, brother Du removed MacArthur commander-in- chief, Mac Marshal is a hard general, to fight until I surrender, if stubborn resistance atomic bombs, like against the Japanese. Truman was afraid to provoke the Soviet Union to enter the war and expand the war, in fact, Stalin was determined not to send troops, he preferred to give up North Korea, let Kim Il Sung to China for refuge, the actual has begun to retreat. But when Truman gave the order, everyone was happy, there was salvation, again Truman saved us. Truman was abandoned by the American people in 1952, his approval rating dropped to 26%, and he was not even qualified to run for a second term as president, haha. I really met a good man, and the good man was Truman.

The Chinese won the war at a heavy cost. 19 December 1950, Peng Dehuai reported to me: ‘Most of the coats and cotton shoes have not arrived, cotton clothes, blankets, mostly burned by enemy aircraft incendiary bombs, many soldiers wear single shoes, and even barefoot. At present it is snowing heavily, the temperature drops to minus 30 degrees, the warrior in physical weakened, frozen feet can not walk and camping along the way, may occur unimaginable losses.’ On Jan. 2, 1951, Li Fu-chun, head of logistics supply for the volunteer army, told the Soviets that some entire units died from the cold.”

Journalist: “Wow, you disregarded the frostbite and freezing death of the volunteers?”

Mao: “Yes, I can’t worry about so much. The People’s Volunteer Army relies on ‘human wave tactics’ in combat. The only advantage is the large number of people, facing Western firepower head-on. Chinese soldiers charge forward like waves in the sea, using their bodies to absorb Western bullets. The Chinese army couldn’t sustain its victory, and on January 25, 1951, the United Nations forces launched a counteroffensive, turning the tide of the situation. The Chinese side suffered extremely heavy casualties. On February 21, Peng Dehuai rushed back to Beijing to meet with me. As soon as he got off the plane, he went straight to Zhongnanhai. When he learned that I was staying at the Yuhua Villa on Jade Spring Mountain, he hurried over. The guards told him that I was resting, but in his anxiousness, Peng Dehuai pushed past the guards and burst into my bedroom, waking me up, and telling me about the seriousness of the situation in Korea. After listening, I said, ‘If the Korean War can be won quickly, then let it be won quickly. If it cannot be won quickly, then let it be won gradually. There is no need to be hasty in seeking final victory.’

On March 1, 1951, I told Stalin about my approach to the war: ‘The enemy will not withdraw from Korea until it is largely destroyed, and it will take time to destroy the enemy in large part. There is a possibility of prolongation of the Korean War.’ I told Stalin that I was going to use Chinese manpower and compete with the United States in terms of attrition. In the past four battles, the volunteer army has lost more than 100,000 casualties and will replace 120,000 soldiers; this year and next year, we are prepared to lose another 300,000 casualties and replace another 300,000. In short, our army is prepared to fight for a long time, to consume hundreds of thousands of U.S. men in a few years, so that it knows how to retreat.”

Journalist: “You employ the tactic of human wave attacks, disregarding casualties. How many deaths and injuries do you consider acceptable?”

Mao: “I do not care. There are people in the country. As soon as the Chinese army entered Korea, I immediately asked Stalin for military industry. I sent the commander of the navy to Moscow to talk about naval construction. The aviation industry delegation went next. The aviation talks were successful, and an agreement was signed in Moscow to help China build factories to repair and maintain aircraft first, and then transition to manufacturing in 3-5 years, when 3,600 fighter planes will be produced annually. Bomber manufacturing was also under discussion. China had 3,000 aircraft at the end of the Korean War.

In May 1951, I sent Xu Qianqian, Chief of the General Staff, to lead a ‘military delegation’ to the Soviet Union to ask for blueprints for the manufacture of various weapons and ammunition used by China in Korea and to request the Soviet Union to help the military industry. The delegation proposed to buy 60 divisions of weaponry, Stalin agreed. But the construction of the arsenal was pushed back. Xu Qianqian said: for several months, the issue of military production delayed the answer, left and right, no results. Xu asked me what to do, I replied: ‘no matter what, wait patiently.’ Later, the Soviet Union agreed to transfer only a few military technology information, but nothing else.”

Journalist: “Your most important thing is the military industry?”

Mao: “Yes, the Korean War had been fought for a year, the U.S. air force had bombed North Korea into ruins, and Kim Il Sung was anxious to end the war. on June 3, 1951, he came to China secretly and proposed to agree to the armistice negotiations proposed by the United Nations long ago.

I did not want an armistice; Stalin was still far from meeting my demands for a military industry. But I was not opposed to a temporary cease-fire. The Volunteers were suffering defeat and desperately needed a breather. I sent Gao Gang, the head of the Northeast, to meet with Stalin along with Kim Il Sung, both to discuss a temporary cease-fire and to press for help in building military industry. After the talk, Stalin telegraphed me, avoiding mentioning the military industry and only saying something that made me happy, considering Kim Il-sung as my subordinate saying, ‘I met your representatives in the Northeast and North Korea today.’ Stalin agreed to a temporary cease-fire. The Korean armistice talks were held on July 10, 1951.”

Journalist: “When all was said and done you were most concerned about wanting the Soviet military industry, and Stalin just recused himself?”

Mao: “Yes, within a few months in 1951, most of the issues in the armistice negotiations were quickly resolved, but Stalin and I held on to one issue: the issue of repatriation of prisoners of war. At the time, the United Nations had 20,000 Chinese prisoners of war, most of them former Kuomintang officers and soldiers, unwilling to go back to the mainland. The United States insisted on voluntary repatriation, and I wanted all of them to be repatriated, ordering the negotiators, ‘Not one of them can be released!’ This one sentence caused the Korean War to be fought for another year and a half, with over 100,000 more Chinese dead and even more North Korean dead. Kim Il Sung was bent on accepting the American terms and advised me that there was no need to fight over the few captured soldiers. The U.S. position was based on the tragedy brought about by the repatriation of prisoners of war after the end of World War II, when many of those sent back to Stalin by the West were later killed or imprisoned by Stalin, causing a strong shock in the West. So the U.S. did not accept forced repatriation, whether from humane or political considerations.”

Journalist: “During the Korean War, you denounced the U.S. germ warfare, which was exhibited all over the country, was it true about the U.S. germ warfare?”

Mao: “False, in order to launch the national anti-American campaign, I approved the manufacture of ‘evidence’ of U.S. germ warfare, germs are abhorrent to everyone and most conducive to the anti-American campaign, and in 1952 created a large number of ‘evidence’ of germs in the northeast, which marked U.S. aircraft dropped The New York Times published a report on April 6, 1952, stating that it was a forgery.

The germ warfare exhibition caused people to worry about World War III and fear disaster, and some people were angry with me, complaining that I had sent troops to fight in Korea and that my leader’s statue had been destroyed in Miu County, Henan Province.

As a byproduct of germ warfare propaganda, a nationwide ‘sanitation campaign’ was launched. In Northeast China, people suspected of being infected with the virus were asked to drink DDT insecticide to kill the virus, 5,000 people inAndong wore masks and gloves to search for suspicious bugs in the mountains day and night, 20,000 people were organized in Shenyang to clean up the streets and disinfect the streets, and in Tianjin, a citywide pest control operation was launched. In Tianjin, 5,000 insect extermination teams caught bugs and buried them, and insect samples were sent to Beijing laboratories. Anyone who did not swat flies was a germ war criminal. The germ scares dried up the environment, but it also caused damage to the natural environment. People set fire to large areas of the jungle to drive away flies and mosquitoes, and many places were painted with lime powder, which killed the plants. The nationwide campaign against the ‘five pests,’ flies, mosquitoes, bedbugs, fleas, rats, the target was completed.

In Beijing, in July 1952, each district was required to kill 50,000 rats and cut off their tails and turn them in for proof. Those who failed to do so even bought rat tails on the black market and turned them in, causing the price of rat tails to rise. Shanghai required citizens to turn in tons of insect larvae, and those who failed to meet the requirement even took trains to the countryside to collect the bugs. The Ministry of Health pointed out that the 1952 sanitation campaign was forced, wasted many resources, hindered the production of the masses, caused public discontent, and did not use medical resources to actually improve the health of the masses.

On May 2, 1953, the Soviet Union officially withdrew the charges of germ warfare, and the Soviet Union also sent a special envoy to pass on instructions for me to immediately stop all charges.

Journalist: “You do not agree to a truce, and the volunteers die another 100,000?”

Mao: “Yes, a year after the side talks and fighting, on July 14, 1952, Kim Il Sung telegraphed me, begging me to accept a compromise and end the war. There was nothing left to bomb in North Korea under U.S. bombing. North Korea’s population was declining heavily and about 1/3 of adult men were dead.

I immediately sent a telegram back to Kim Il Sung refusing: “‘Do not accept voluntary repatriation of the enemy. Just more dead people. There are advantages to the death: the people are forged and gain experience in the struggle against the U.S. Empire.’ At the end of the return telegram, I said I would report to Stalin and see what the big boss said.

Fearing that the Big Boss would say he was not firm, Kim Il Sung, without waiting for me to inform him how Stalin would reply, immediately telephoned me back, saying that I was of course right and that he was determined to fight to the end.”

Journalist: “Kim Il Sung does not want to fight, but you are the one who said it?”

Mao: “Yes, the key is me. On July 17, 1952, Stalin cabled me back: ‘Your position on the armistice negotiations is completely correct. We have received reports from Pyongyang that Kim Il Sung also approves of your position.’

A month later, Stalin and Zhou Enlai had a conversation that implied a murderous tone. According to the record of the meeting, Zhou first said that China was prepared for the war to continue for another 2-3 years, and Stalin asked, ‘The Americans did not scare China, can we say that they did not scare North Korea either?’ Zhou Enlai said truthfully, ‘North Korea is shaken, they are panicking.’ Stalin said, ‘Already the panic is evident from Kim Il Sung’s telegram to Mao Zedong.’ But Stalin and I had to be listened to, and the war went on like that.

In August 1952, I sent Zhou Enlai to Moscow to see Stalin, and on August 20 Zhou said to Stalin, ‘Mao believes that it is to our advantage for the war to continue, to keep the United States chained to Korea so that it cannot fight a new world war.’ Stalin quipped, ‘Mao is right, this war has the Americans on the edge of their seats.’ Zhou went on to emphasize China’s role: ‘China is spearheading the war in Korea, making the U.S. unable to fight World War 3.’ Stalin appreciated: ‘The United States is simply incapable of fighting a large-scale war, especially after the Korean War. They wanted to conquer the world, but there was nothing they could do with the tiny Korea.’”

Journalist: “Stalin praised you greatly, you are pleased with yourself?”

Mao: “Yes, my participation in the war allowed Stalin to defy the United States, and it was time for Stalin to give me something in return. Zhou Enlai then asked Stalin for aid to build 147 projects, all for military needs, for the production of fighter planes, ships, tanks, and asked for 1,000 light tanks a year, and medium tanks in 4-5 years.

Stalin put off with nice words, saying that ‘China must be well armed,’ and that ‘China must become the flagship of Asia.’ He went on in this perfunctory manner and did not nod to Zhou Enlai’s request until his death.”

Journalist: “You were one to ask Stalin to aid the military industry and Stalin just avoided it?”

Mao: “Yes. Another purpose of Zhou Enlai’s meeting with Stalin was to establish my sphere of influence. Since Stalin decided to fight the Korean War, he agreed to my reaching into Japan, the Philippines, Malaya and other Asian countries. Japanese communists came to Beijing to prepare for the organization of armed operations in conjunction with the Korean War. In Southeast Asia, Burmese communist guerrillas were particularly active and were moving toward the Chinese border, fighting their way through China and receiving military aid and training. Also coming to China for training was Pol Pot, a Cambodian Khmer Rouge leader.

When Zhou Enlai spoke of Southeast Asia, China was already playing a dominant role, and on September 3, 1952, Zhou said, ‘In its relations with Southeast Asian countries, China’s policy is to exert influence peacefully, not to send troops in. This is true with Burma, and it is true with Tibet as well.’ Stalin said, ‘Tibet is a part of China, and of course Chinese troops have to go into Tibet. As for Burma, you should be careful. Burma should have a pro-Chinese government.’”

Journalist: “You have a sphere of influence in Asia, and Stalin approved of it? “

Mao: “Yes, Zhou mentioned the ‘peace conference’ for the Asia Pacific region to be held in Beijing. Stalin agreed that China should take the lead. Zhou went on to say that he hoped to take advantage of the ‘Nineteenth Congress’ of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in October 1952 to have Liu Shaoqi meet with the leaders of the Asian Communist Parties present at the Congress. Zhou asked Stalin: ‘Would it be possible to use this opportunity to talk about the party issue with representatives of the Indonesian Communist Party in Moscow?’ Stalin replied vaguely, ‘It is difficult to say yet ……’

Zhou Enlai further requested, ‘The Japanese comrades will also be there, and they will probably want to discuss the party question as well.’ Stalin evaded by saying, ‘Of course the big brother cannot refuse to help the little brother. Let’s wait until Liu Shaoqi arrives.’ Zhou Enlai pressed on: ‘Liu Shaoqi’s intention in coming is to talk, and he will bring the relevant material.’ Stalin had to say, ‘If the Chinese comrades want to talk, of course we will not object.’ But then he tried to push back and said immediately afterwards, “If you don’t want to talk, then there is no need to talk about anything.”

Journalist: “It seems that Stalin was not so hands-off with you?”

Mao: “In early September 1952, Pang Dehuai and Kim Il Sung came to Moscow to attend a trilateral meeting on the Korean War between the Soviet Union, China and North Korea. After the meeting, Stalin called Pang Dehuai aside and talked alone for a while, without calling Zhou Enlai. Zhou reported it to me, and I was furious. Peng Dehuai explained that Stalin had talked only about the North Koreans’ mistreatment of prisoners of war. My suspicions were not dispelled.

In October 1952, Liu Shaoqi went to Moscow to attend the Nineteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and Stalin treated him with an extraordinary degree of intimacy. Liu’s interpreter Zhe noted that Stalin ‘even talked about his personal situation, his mood.’ Zhou Enlai later said that Stalin was “not as enthusiastic about my visit to the Soviet Union as he was about Shaoqi’s visit”.

Journalist: “Oh, Stalin talked to Peng Dehuai, Liu Shaoqi, and caused you doubts? “

Mao: “Yes, on October 9, 1952, Pravda published Liu Shaoqi’s congratulatory message to the 19th Congress on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party, with a large-print headline referring to Liu as the ‘General Secretary’ of the Communist Party. This title is the No. 1 person, and Moscow knows very well that there is no ‘General Secretary’ of the CCP. Such an entry was not a mistake. Liu Shaoqi immediately declared to Malinkov that there was no general secretary of the CCP, and that the whole party was “under the leadership of Mao Zedong, with Comrade Mao Zedong as chairman.

After the Nineteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1952, Liu Shaoqi stayed in the Soviet Union to meet with the leaders of the Communist Party of Asia, as originally planned. I wanted to get involved with the Indonesian Communist Party, and the Indonesian Communist Party was late in coming, so I wanted Liu to meet with the Indonesian Communist Party before he left. On that night, under the auspices of Stalin, Liu met with D. N. Aidit, the leader of the Indonesian Communist Party, and others, and the Chinese Communist Party officially “took over” the Indonesian Communist Party. The meeting did not end until early in the morning of the second day. Aidit went out into the snow and threw snowballs to celebrate. Little did he know that in 1965, I would send him and half a million Indonesian communists to their deaths. This is an afterthought.”

Journalist: “It was at this time that you took over the Indonesian Communist Party?”

Mao: “Yes. As the Korean War continued to be fought, I asked Stalin for more and more military industry. on December 17, 1952, I sent him a long telegram with a series of demands. on February 2, 1953, the new U.S. President Eisenhower, hinted that he might use the atomic bomb against China. I immediately asked Stalin for atomic bomb technology.

Eisenhower thought his words would frighten me, not knowing that this was exactly what I wanted to hear. I had an outward contempt for the atomic bomb, saying that it was just a ‘Paper tiger.’ In fact, I was fascinated by the atomic bomb. When I visited the Soviet Union, I watched a documentary on the Soviet Union’s atomic bomb tests, and it was a real eye- opener! It seems that the atomic bomb can scare a lot of people.

After Eisenhower mentioned the possible use of the atomic bomb, I sent nuclear expert Qian Sanqiang to the Soviet Union to meet Stalin and ask for this coveted treasure. This move put Stalin’s army.”

Journalist: “You were most concerned about taking the opportunity to ask Stalin for the atomic bomb technology?”

Mao: “Yes, Stalin didn’t want me to have the bomb, but he was afraid that Eisenhower would really drop it. This prompted Stalin’s determination to end the Korean War. on February 28, 1953, Stalin decided to end the war, telling the Soviet Communist Party leaders that he would act on the second day. That very night, he suffered a sudden cerebral hemorrhage and died on March 5, 1953.

The stress that caused Stalin’s cerebral hemorrhage may have had a part in mine, to say the least. At his last dinner, Stalin talked about the Korean War, linking his failure to win in Korea with his failure to keep Tito in Yugoslavia in the communist camp. Stalin also talked about the work of the Comintern in the Far East in its early years and mentioned the failure of the Comintern in Japan. The last report that Stalin read after dinner was the failed assassination of Tito.

From the topic of Stalin’s talk to the documents he read, it all had something to do with me.”
Journalist: “Oh, what about the death of Stalin at a critical moment in the Korean War?”

Mao: “I went to the Soviet Embassy to condole with Stalin. I had tears in my eyes, a little unsteady on my feet, and Zhou Enlai, who accompanied me, cried out in pain. But the truth is that Stalin’s death was my liberation.

On March 21, 1953, the new leaders of the Soviet Communist Party, led by Malinkov, had an overnight meeting with Zhou Enlai, and the Soviet Union decided to end the Korean War, and if I cooperated, the Soviet Union was willing to sell me 91 large military industrial enterprises. These were the ones that Stalin refused to sell. The new leaders of the Soviet Communist Party, unlike Stalin, saw me as a threat to his personal authority; they saw a militarily strong China as a good thing for the Communist camp.”

Journalist: “Once Stalin died, the Soviets agreed to help you build 91 arsenals?”

Mao: “Yes, but I don’t take the armistice lightly. I wanted the atomic bomb and had not yet gotten it. When Zhou Enlai attended Stalin’s funeral, he had made this request again. A delegation of Qian Sanqiang, still in the Soviet Union at this time, repeatedly requested the transfer of nuclear technology, all of which were rejected by Moscow. In May 1953, the new leader of the Soviet Communist Party gave me an ultimatum.”

Journalist: “Oh, 91 arsenal aid, you are not satisfied, but also must be the atomic bomb technology?”

Mao: “Yes, but to be honest, Stalin does not die, I may not have to 91 arsenal aid. Apart from that, during the Korean War, the Communist side accused the United States of using germ warfare in China and North Korea. Captured U.S. airmen were forced to confess to dropping bacteriological bombs. To this day, the Communists accuse the U.S. of ‘spreading germs 804 times,’ while only 81 deaths were announced. Two Soviet generals who were in Korea at the time said they had not seen any signs of germ warfare. If germ bombs had been dropped, he could not have been unaware of them. Other Soviet generals and diplomats also said in the same breath that no bombs had been dropped.

Stalin gave the nod to ‘fabricated germ warfare,’ but now the new Soviet Communist Party leaders are turning it into a crime and putting pressure on me to stop the war in Korea. Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov said that the germ warfare was ‘deliberately fabricated’ by the Chinese. North Korean officials told the Soviets, ‘The bacteriological bombs were probably dropped by Chinese planes themselves.’

Journalist: “Oh, the so-called germ warfare, you deliberately fabricated it?”

Mao: “Yes. On May 2, 1953, the new Soviet ambassador to China, V. V. Kuznetsov, handed me an unprecedentedly harsh letter saying that the Soviet government, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, had been given wrong information. The newspaper propaganda about the use of bacteriological weapons by the United States in Korea was based on false sources. The accusations against the United States were fictitious.

The letter ‘advises’ Beijing not to mention these allegations and says that the Soviet side ‘will severely punish those who participated in fabricating this allegation. The Soviet ambassador to North Korea, V.N. Razuvayev, has been recalled and placed in a KGB prison.

Wu Zhili, the health minister of the volunteer army, published in the 1980s in the magazine Yanhuang Chunqiu: ‘Bacterial warfare in 1952 was a false alarm’ restoring the truth that the so-called U.S. Army germ warfare in the Korean War was in fact nothing of the sort, testifying that the whole process of faking germ warfare was a messy propaganda that I intentionally launched.

Journalist: “The Soviet Union sternly pointed out that you fabricated germ warfare?”

Mao: “Yes, late at night on May 11, 1953, Ambassador Kuznetsov handed me the letter, with Zhou Enlai present. I said that the propaganda about germ warfare was ‘based on reports from the front’ and that ‘it is very difficult to ascertain the accuracy of these reports.’ ‘If you find falsification, then these reports from below are false.’ I was a little nervous and kept snuffing out my cigarette, and only towards the end of the meeting did I calm down and start talking and laughing. Zhou Enlai, on the other hand, was deliberately serious and somewhat uneasy.”

Journalist: “You were overwhelmed by the Soviet Union’s unmasking of you?”

Mao: “Yes, from the denial of germ warfare to the vocal phrases used in Moscow, I could see that it was not going to work without ending the Korean War. In the early hours of the next morning, after the Soviet ambassador left, I made the decision to end the Korean War.

The new leader of the Soviet Communist Party was bent on easing tensions with the United States, and I knew I would not get the atomic bomb. He recalled Qian Sanqiang and accepted the military industry program. I informed the armistice negotiators to accept the voluntary repatriation program for prisoners of war that the U.S. side had insisted on for 18 months.”

Journalist: “So you were forced into an armistice?”

Mao: “Yes, of the 21,374 Chinese war prisoners, 2/3 refused to return to the mainland and most went to Taiwan. Those who returned to the mainland were treated as ‘traitors’ and ‘spies’ and were subjected to many hardships in one campaign until my death.

I also suggested to Kim Il Sung to detain 60,000 South Korean prisoners of war who were secretly held in North Korea at that time. Kim Il Sung scattered them in remote areas of North Korea for hard labor.

On July 27, 1953, the Korean Armistice Agreement was signed. The war, which lasted three years and resulted in millions of deaths and injuries, was finally over. A total of 3 million Chinese troops went to war in North Korea and 400,000 died. Official Soviet documents put the number of Chinese dead at 1 million. The U.S. death toll was 37,000, the British Commonwealth 1,263, and other countries 1,800. In this war, it is estimated that about 1 million died in South Korea, including civilians, and 2.5 million died in North Korea.”

Journalist: “You are 400,000 dead volunteers and the Soviet Union says 1 million dead?”

Mao: “Yes, I don’t care how many died. According to Wang Yazhi, former director of Peng Dehuai’s office, the volunteer army lost 978,000 men (killed in action, sick, captured, missing), accounting for 51% of the 1.9 million troops who entered North Korea to fight. It was about the same as the Soviet Union’s claim of 1 million. This great war was fought and Kim Il Sung’s country turned into a scorched earth. What did I gain? An expanded sphere of influence, a start in the aviation industry, and dozens of military projects signed with the Soviet Union. But the war gobbled up 60% of China’s annual national economy and left it with a heavy burden of loans from the Soviet Union to buy arms. Not to mention the millions of Chinese who were killed and maimed.

Among the countless Chinese who were buried in foreign lands was my eldest son, Anying. He was working as a Russian interpreter at the volunteer headquarters when he was killed in an American air raid. It was November 25, 1950, and he had just arrived in Korea for a month, only 28 years old.”

Journalist: “Oh, your son was killed too, how unfortunate!”

Mao: “For two and a half years, the news of his death was not told to his wife Liu Siqi. In the summer of 1953, when the armistice agreement was signed, there was still no news from Anying, and she came to ask me, and only then did I tell her that Anying had died long ago. In these two years, winter and summer holidays she also spent a piece with me, I never showed any sadness, I also joked from time to time.”