Section I: The Complexity of India’s Relations with China, Pakistan, and Neighboring Countries

India’s relations with neighboring countries, particularly China and Pakistan, are shaped by historical legacies, border disputes, and geopolitical competition, influencing its aspirations to become a global power. In 2024, tensions with China persisted along the border, while relations with Pakistan remained strained due to the Kashmir issue. Relations with other neighbors, such as Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, were relatively stable.

India and China have long-standing disputes over the 3,488 km Line of Actual Control (LAC). After the 2020 Galwan Valley clash, which resulted in 20 Indian soldier fatalities and an unknown number of Chinese casualties, both countries deployed 100,000 troops in the Ladakh region, with full disengagement yet to be achieved in 2024. The 20th round of military talks in October 2023 led to partial troop withdrawal, but disputes in eastern Ladakh, including Depang and Demchok, remained unresolved. According to SIPRI 2024, China’s military expenditure was $296 billion, compared with India’s $80 billion, with advanced drones and missiles deployed along the border. India responded by purchasing French Rafale fighter jets and Israeli drones. Economically, bilateral trade reached $135 billion in 2024 (India had a $70 billion deficit), with China accounting for 15% of Indian imports, illustrating simultaneous interdependence and strategic rivalry. Historical disputes, China-Pakistan “all-weather friendship,” and India’s resistance to the Belt and Road Initiative contribute to tensions. Consequences include rising defense spending (2.5% of GDP in 2024) and diplomatic friction, such as India’s refusal to attend China-hosted Asian Cooperation Dialogue summits.

India-Pakistan relations remain hostile over Kashmir. Since the 1947 Partition, the two countries fought three wars over Kashmir (1947, 1965, 1999). India’s revocation of Article 370 in 2019, which annulled Jammu and Kashmir’s special status, led to Pakistan downgrading diplomatic relations. In 2024, there were no ambassador-level exchanges. Cross-border terrorism increased tensions, with 10 attacks in Kashmir (blamed on Pakistan) causing 50 fatalities. Pakistan’s military expenditure ($15 billion) and nuclear arsenal (170 warheads) remain comparable to India (172 warheads), maintaining military standoffs. Economic ties are minimal, with bilateral trade only $200 million in 2024. Historical hostility, territorial claims over Kashmir, and accusations of supporting terrorism underpin the conflict. The impact includes border instability (50 ceasefire violations in 2024) and domestic political pressure, with the BJP leveraging anti-Pakistan sentiment to consolidate votes.

Relations with other neighbors show relative stability. India-Bangladesh trade reached $10 billion in 2024, supplemented by $5 billion in infrastructure loans, though disputes over illegal migration and water sharing (Teesta River) persist. India provided $1 billion in aid to Sri Lanka in 2024 to offset Chinese influence in Hambantota, though fisheries disputes remain. Special relationships with Nepal and Bhutan were maintained, with $2 billion in aid in 2024 ensuring regional influence.

Border disputes consume resources (military spending 2.5% of GDP in 2024) and constrain economic growth, with Ladakh conflicts causing a 10% decline in tourism revenue. Social tensions are evident, with 5% of election-related violence in 2024 linked to Kashmir. By 2030, the government aims to resolve LAC disputes through diplomacy and strengthen economic ties with South Asian neighbors (SAARC trade target $50 billion). Persistent tension, however, could hinder India’s global influence.

Section II: Strategic Partnerships with the U.S., Russia, and the European Union

India’s strategic relationships with major powers such as the U.S., Russia, and the EU are central to its geopolitical positioning, balancing Western engagement with traditional alliances to enhance global influence. In 2024, India pursued flexible diplomacy among the U.S., Russia, and Europe to consolidate its superpower aspirations.

India-U.S. ties have strengthened in response to China’s rise. Bilateral trade reached $150 billion in 2024, with the U.S. accounting for 18% of Indian exports. U.S. arms sales totaled $20 billion, including F-16s and Apache helicopters. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), including Japan and Australia, facilitated ten joint military exercises in 2024, covering anti-submarine and cyber operations. The U.S. supports India’s bid for a permanent UN Security Council seat, while cooperation in climate (G20 summit, $5 billion financing) and technology (H-1B visas, NASA Gaganyaan program) reinforced ties. However, India’s reliance on Russian weaponry (60% of equipment) and domestic human rights concerns drew U.S. criticism.

India-Russia relations remain grounded in tradition. Bilateral trade reached $65 billion in 2024, with energy comprising 80%. Russian crude oil imports satisfied 40% of Indian demand, saving $10 billion due to post-Ukraine war discounts. Russia supplies 60% of Indian weapons, including the S-400 air defense system delivered in 2024. Joint counter-terrorism exercises (five in 2024) demonstrate collaboration. Yet, disruptions in Russian supply chains delayed weapon deliveries by 20%, prompting diversification toward France and the U.S. India remains cautious of Russia-China ties ($200 billion bilateral trade in 2024).

India-EU engagement included $120 billion trade in 2024, with the EU accounting for 15% of exports. France supplied 26 Rafale jets and three submarines ($5 billion), while the EU provided $2 billion in renewable energy financing. Free trade agreement negotiations stalled over agriculture and IP issues. EU criticism of India’s human rights record (restrictions on 17,000 NGOs) contrasts with cooperation on climate and technology (e.g., ISA).

Strategic benefits include enhanced geopolitical influence, reinforced through Quad and BRICS summits. Challenges involve balancing U.S. and Russian interests, CAATSA-related U.S. pressure on Russian energy imports, and domestic political imperatives. By 2030, India aims to expand trade with these powers to $300 billion and diversify military procurement (reducing reliance to 30%). Successful execution will solidify India’s Indo-Pacific leadership.

Section III: India’s Role and Influence in Multilateral Organizations

India actively leverages multilateral forums to enhance global influence and superpower ambitions. In 2024, India demonstrated leadership in BRICS, G20, and the Quad, promoting the interests of the Global South.

As a core BRICS member, India accounted for 25% of the bloc’s $4 trillion GDP in 2024. India advanced digital economy and sustainable development agendas, promoting “Digital South-South Cooperation” benefiting 50 developing nations. At the 2024 BRICS summit in Russia, India facilitated $5 billion in climate financing for African renewable energy projects, competing with China over leadership within the bloc while gaining $2 billion in loans from the BRICS New Development Bank for rural infrastructure.

Within the G20, India, as a 2023 host and 2024 “troika” member, promoted climate and digital agendas, advocating for Global South inclusion and supporting African Union participation. India secured $10 billion in climate financing for its 450 GW renewable energy goal and leveraged cultural diplomacy (yoga, cuisine) to attract 50 world leaders in 2024. Disagreements with China over fund allocation ($1 billion) and domestic human rights criticism limited influence.

The Quad remains central to India’s Indo-Pacific strategy, with ten joint exercises in 2024 covering maritime security, cyber defense, and disaster relief. India provided $1 billion aid to Southeast Asia and Pacific island nations to counter Belt and Road Initiative influence and supplied 100 million vaccine doses to 20 countries. However, India’s cautious stance on Quad militarization and reliance on Russian weapons occasionally caused friction with the U.S.

India’s multilateral engagement enhanced soft and hard power, attracting $20 billion in foreign investment and strengthening Global South leadership. Constraints include China competition, domestic economic pressures ($100 billion trade deficit in 2024), and human rights disputes. By 2030, India aims for a permanent UN Security Council seat, leading BRICS and G20 climate agendas, requiring careful balance of U.S., China, and Russian interests alongside domestic stability.

Section IV: Evolution of the Non-Aligned Principle and Flexible Indian Diplomacy

India’s Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) principle has evolved into a flexible “multi-alignment” strategy, adapting to 21st-century geopolitics to enhance superpower aspirations. In 2024, India maintained strategic autonomy among the U.S., Russia, and China, enhancing global influence.

NAM originated at the 1955 Bandung Conference, emphasizing opposition to Cold War bipolarity. Post-Cold War, the 1991 economic liberalization prompted India to pursue strategic autonomy and multi-alignment. By 2024, India remained a NAM leader (120 countries) while pragmatically engaging with the U.S. (Quad), Russia (arms trade), and China (economic cooperation). MEA reports indicate India adopted a neutral stance in 60% of international affairs (e.g., Russia-Ukraine conflict) and leaned West in 40% (e.g., Quad initiatives).

Flexible diplomacy includes balancing major powers (U.S. trade $150 billion, Russia $65 billion, China $135 billion), regional leadership (SAARC $5 billion aid to Bangladesh and Sri Lanka), multilateral participation (BRICS, G20, Quad climate, digital, and vaccine diplomacy, $10 billion financing), soft power projection (Yoga and Bollywood), and military autonomy (domestic weapons 40% in 2024; 2030 goal 70%).

Outcomes include improved global standing (soft power ranking 8th, $20 billion FDI attracted), leadership in ISA (121 countries), and G20 climate agenda influence. Challenges involve balancing U.S.-Russia pressures (CAATSA), domestic nationalism (BJP emphasizing autonomy), and border tensions (LAC disputes consuming 2.5% of GDP in military spending).

By 2030, India aims for a permanent UN Security Council seat and leadership of the Global South, requiring $50 billion investment in diplomacy and defense while managing domestic conflicts (5% of protests in 2024 involved foreign policy issues). Successful execution will consolidate India’s superpower status; failure will limit its influence in great power competition.