
A Concise Reinterpretation of Modern Chinese History · Communist Party of China
Chapter 42: Reassessing Li Keqiang: Biden Let Xi Jinping Go, Xi Jinping Did Not Let Li Keqiang Go
Li Keqiang (1955–2023) was a native of Dingyuan County, Anhui Province. He grew up in Hefei, was sent down to the countryside as an educated youth, and later served as a brigade Party secretary. In the 1970s, he was admitted to the Department of Law at Peking University, where he successively served as President of the Student Union and Secretary of the University Youth League Committee.
In 1993, Li Keqiang became First Secretary of the Communist Youth League Central Committee. In 1998, he was appointed Governor of Henan Province, serving for seven years, during which Henan’s economy rose to fifth place nationwide, promoting the “Rise of Central China,” urbanization, and agricultural modernization. In 2004, he was transferred to serve as Party Secretary of Liaoning Province, where he led large-scale shantytown reconstruction.
In 2007, Li Keqiang entered the Politburo Standing Committee, ranking seventh. In 2012, he succeeded Wen Jiabao as Premier of the State Council, ranking second among Standing Committee members. In 2017, he was reappointed Premier, ranking second only to Xi Jinping.
At the 20th Party Congress in 2022, Xi Jinping excluded Li Keqiang and Wang Yang—both not members of the “Xi faction.” Li Keqiang and Wang Yang were forced into political “lying flat,” while Wang Huning and Cai Qi, both born in 1955 like Li Keqiang, entered the Standing Committee.
Li Keqiang was considered a liberal-oriented leader. While serving as Party Secretary of Liaoning, he proposed policies of “streamlining administration and delegating power” and “mass entrepreneurship and innovation.” He was a politician inclined toward free-market economics. The core of what became known as “Li Keqiang Economics,” including the advocacy of the street-stall economy, was to return power and profits to the market.
Since 2020, Xi Jinping’s “zero-COVID policy” severely impacted people’s livelihoods. Li Keqiang repeatedly introduced measures to ease economic decline, advocating the “street-stall economy” and emphasizing that “employment is the greatest livelihood issue.” He publicly stated that 600 million people in China earned only about 1,000 yuan per month, contradicting the official narrative of completed poverty eradication.
At a press conference in 2020, Li Keqiang revealed that about 600 million Chinese earned only around 1,000 yuan per month—at the very time Xi Jinping was announcing the completion of poverty alleviation—effectively delivering a public slap in Xi Jinping’s face.
In August 2022, after the Beidaihe meeting, Li Keqiang traveled south to Shenzhen, attempting to preserve Deng Xiaoping’s political legacy of reform and opening. He stated that “the Yellow River and the Yangtze River will not flow backward,” encouraging Shenzhen. The message was immediately deleted and banned on WeChat under Xi Jinping’s control.
I. “Li Keqiang Economics” and GDP Evaluation
In 2010, during his time in Liaoning, Li Keqiang exposed that China’s GDP figures were artificially manufactured and unreliable. He argued that three indicators should be used instead: electricity consumption, railway freight volume, and bank lending—indicators that are difficult to falsify.
Li Keqiang’s wife, Cheng Hong, is an English professor at the Capital University of Economics and Business. They have one daughter, who was admitted to Harvard University for overseas study. No economic scandals have been reported regarding the family.
Li Keqiang possessed strong English proficiency, capable of conversing with foreign guests in English, delivering speeches, and reading English-language materials—rare qualities among senior CCP officials.
In August 2023, Li Keqiang appeared in public at the Mogao Grottoes in Dunhuang, where tourists on site shouted, “Hello, Premier.”
II. Possible Return if Xi Jinping Had Stepped Down
Li Keqiang’s lifetime of experience made him, after Zhu Rongji and Wen Jiabao, one of the rare talents suitable for the position of premier. Had Xi Jinping stepped down in 2027, Li Keqiang still had hope of returning to power.
Unfortunately, in October 2023, a sudden obituary announced that Li Keqiang had died of a “heart attack while swimming.”
III. House Arrest and a Mysterious Death by Heart Attack
According to online WeChat disclosures, on October 25, 2023, Li Keqiang entered Shanghai’s Dongjiao State Guesthouse for “rest.” His wife was not with him. He was reportedly under house arrest and isolated investigation.
The next day, after breakfast, at around 11 a.m., Li Keqiang went to the swimming pool. Shortly thereafter, it was announced that he had suffered a sudden heart attack. Guards attempted rescue; his breathing reportedly stopped for five minutes before doctors were notified. Cardiopulmonary resuscitation was performed while waiting for an ambulance.
Shanghai Zhongshan Hospital is China’s strongest cardiovascular emergency center and an international rescue facility. However, Li Keqiang was not sent there, but instead taken to Shuguang Hospital of Traditional Chinese Medicine, accompanied by only one nurse. Later, it was announced that “rescue efforts lasted ten hours,” claiming that “all efforts had been exhausted.”
Online reports suggested that food poisoning at breakfast triggered myocardial infarction, leading to drowning, pulmonary edema, and respiratory arrest.
Li Keqiang’s house arrest could not have occurred without Xi Jinping’s approval. It is believed that Li Keqiang’s original team of 7–8 secretaries and guards had already been replaced by personnel appointed by Xi’s faction, who strictly followed Xi’s directives. Under isolation, Li Keqiang had no choice but to comply.
The CCP Central Committee quickly transported Li Keqiang’s body to Beijing. A farewell ceremony was held on November 2, attended only by Xi Jinping and the six Standing Committee members.
Exceptionally, Xi Jinping’s wife, Peng Liyuan, was brought along to bow three times together, apparently to placate Li Keqiang’s wife, Cheng Hong, and silence her. Under Xi Jinping’s control, Cheng Hong was powerless.
IV. Fear of Public Unrest and Maximum Internet Surveillance
On the day of the farewell ceremony, tens of thousands of police were deployed under the highest level of alert. All online videos and posts related to Li Keqiang were deleted.
Public mourning spread across more than 50 cities, including Anhui, Henan, and Liaoning. Countless flowers and memorial texts appeared; in Henan, people performed three kneelings and nine prostrations.
Citizens carried Li Keqiang’s portraits on their bodies and took to the streets, venting dissatisfaction with Xi Jinping’s authoritarian rule. Beijing forbade the public from attending the farewell. Along the route of the hearse, thousands of vehicles sounded their horns in unison. Many citizens viewed Li Keqiang as a counterbalancing force against Xi Jinping’s dictatorship.
V. Parallels with Mao Zedong’s Killing of Liu Zhidan
Li Keqiang’s death reminds people of the 1936 death of Liu Zhidan in northern Shaanxi. Liu Zhidan enjoyed greater prestige in Shaanxi than Mao Zedong, obstructing Mao’s consolidation of authority.
In 1936, at the Sanjiaozhen Yellow River crossing, Mao Zedong instructed Pei Zhouyu of the Security Bureau to pretend that Kuomintang machine guns killed Liu Zhidan. In reality, Pei Zhouyu shot Liu Zhidan from behind. The enemy’s machine guns were over 200 meters away—how could they have precisely struck Liu Zhidan’s heart? Moreover, the bullet entered from the back.
Liu Zhidan’s wife demanded an exhumation, which was refused. Mao Zedong later arranged a grand funeral and personally inscribed the words: “Heroically sacrificed, due to an accident.”
After Liu Zhidan’s death, two other leaders, Yang Qi and Yang Sen, were also killed within two months, all under Mao’s arrangements. From then on, Mao Zedong slept peacefully in northern Shaanxi.
Through his father Xi Zhongxun, Xi Jinping would have known how Liu Zhidan died. On the mainland, the truth of Liu Zhidan’s death remains concealed by Mao Zedong.
VI. Biden in 2021–2022: Letting Xi Jinping Off
When President Biden took office in 2021, he declared in May that the origins of the virus would be thoroughly investigated. He ordered dozens of national supercomputers to participate and demanded a report within three months, placing enormous pressure on Xi Jinping.
Panicked and unable to respond, Xi Jinping allegedly resorted to secretly bribing Biden’s son, who had business interests in China.
By August 2021, the deadline passed quietly. The White House stopped mentioning the investigation. Virus tracing disappeared without a trace. The media was puzzled, and the White House brushed it off with “insufficient evidence.”
Soon after, in November, the “Biden–Xi” virtual summit was arranged.
In the autumn of 2022, Xi Jinping’s ten-year term expired. Xi forcibly arranged to become a lifelong ruler. Across the country, opposition intensified. Banners reading “Xi Jinping Step Down” appeared in Beijing, calling for a reformist premier to succeed as General Secretary.
Had President Biden expressed support, Xi’s reappointment would have been extremely difficult. From April to August, I personally sent five letters urging President Biden to invite Li Keqiang to visit the United States. Even if blocked by Xi, such an invitation would have greatly strengthened anti-Xi momentum.
With strong domestic demand and U.S. presidential backing, Xi Jinping would have been forced to step down. But Biden remained silent, effectively indulging Xi Jinping’s lifelong rule.
VII. Xi Jinping Did Not Let Li Keqiang Go
Even after Li Keqiang obediently “lay flat” and relinquished the premiership in March 2023, Xi Jinping still feared that “the man is alive, and his heart is not dead.” To ensure peace of mind, Li Keqiang had to be eliminated—repeating Mao Zedong’s tactic used against Liu Zhidan.
By exploiting his absolute power, Xi Jinping orchestrated Li Keqiang’s death, shocking both the nation and the Party. Xi controls the secretaries and security personnel of all senior officials; they have no choice but to obey him.
Li Keqiang’s death chilled all senior officials. Any sign of dissent from Xi Jinping now carries the risk of death. Such actions have accelerated elite alienation and hastened Xi Jinping’s downfall.
Times have changed. Eighty years ago, Mao Zedong could murder Liu Zhidan under conditions of total information blockade. Today, despite censorship and internet control, leaks are inevitable.
Xi Jinping may control domestic opinion, but he cannot control international opinion. Japanese newspapers have published “conspiracy theory” commentaries, stating that Xi feared an unexpected incident forcing early retirement, after which Li Keqiang—still young—could succeed him.
Xi Jinping never relaxed his vigilance against Li Keqiang, and therefore moved against him in advance.
