Chapter 39: Reassessing Jiang Zemin: Good Sino–U.S. Relations, Keeping a Low Profile While Getting Rich, and the Grave Mistake of Elevating Xi Jinping

Jiang Zemin (1926–2022) was a native of Yangzhou, Jiangsu Province. He graduated from the Department of Electrical Engineering at Shanghai Jiao Tong University, studied in the Soviet Union, and later served as First Secretary of Shanghai. In 1989, after suppressing the student movement, he won the favor of Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, and Li Xiannian, and was brought to the central leadership to replace the dismissed Zhao Ziyang as General Secretary. After Deng Xiaoping’s death in 1997, Jiang gained full control of the Central Military Commission.

I. Securing U.S. Approval for WTO Accession Through Deception

Jiang Zemin established a cooperative relationship with U.S. President Bill Clinton. In 1998, Clinton visited China with a delegation of 1,200 people (Ronald Reagan’s 1984 visit had included 600), making it an exceptionally grand event. Several large transport aircraft carried 60 tons of communications equipment, 10 armored vehicles, more than one hundred officials, several hundred business figures, 370 journalists, and dozens of professional musicians. Jiang Zemin personally directed a choral welcome, while Clinton personally conducted the orchestra. The atmosphere was unprecedentedly friendly and cordial.

In 2000, the United States granted China Permanent Normal Trade Relations. In 2001, China formally entered the World Trade Organization (WTO) as a full member. Massive foreign investment flowed into China, increasing from USD 47 billion in 2001 to USD 124 billion within ten years. This enriched Jiang Zemin and fueled China’s rise over two decades, making it the world’s second-largest economy.

II. Frankly Admitting: “With Press Freedom, the Communist Party Would Collapse”

Clinton’s hope of “promoting political democracy through economic engagement” failed. Jiang Zemin invested enormous sums to build the “world’s largest firewall,” blocking large numbers of “undesirable” international websites. Domestically, Falun Gong was banned and democracy activists were imprisoned, while the strategy of “keeping a low profile” was maintained—remaining friendly with the United States and refraining from openly drawing the sword. In 1998 in Hong Kong, when reporters asked Jiang Zemin about press legislation and press freedom, he bluntly replied: “Press freedom? Once there is freedom, the Communist Party would collapse.”

III. Transferring Power to Hu Jintao Without Relinquishing Real Authority

In 2002, according to established arrangements, Jiang Zemin handed over power to Hu Jintao. However, Jiang relinquished only the position of General Secretary and retained the chairmanship of the Central Military Commission. In the CCP’s longstanding tradition, military power outweighs administrative power, and the Military Commission has the final say on major state affairs. By retaining the chairmanship, Jiang effectively transferred only half of his authority. Hu Jintao became General Secretary without final decision-making power. Moreover, Jiang set up two “Jiang Offices” within the Military Commission and Zhongnanhai, requiring major matters to be reported to and approved by the “Jiang Office,” over which Jiang held veto power.

Not until 2009 did Jiang Zemin nominally transfer the title of Chairman of the Central Military Commission to Hu Jintao. Yet the “Jiang Offices” in Zhongnanhai and the Military Commission remained unchanged, and Jiang had already installed his own network of people in positions such as vice chairmen of the Military Commission. Hu Jintao could only accept this arrangement and could not alter it, leaving him with only a nominal chairmanship. The United States had long recognized that Hu Jintao was the General Secretary with the least real power.

In 2011, during Hu Jintao’s final year in office, a 9.5-meter-tall statue of Confucius was erected east of Tiananmen Square, signaling an attempt to revive Confucianism. Within three months, Jiang Zemin ordered its removal, aborting Hu Jintao’s effort. This shows that throughout his tenure, Hu Jintao never possessed real power—he could not even keep a statue of Confucius without Jiang Zemin’s approval.

IV. A Grave Mistake in Handing Power to Xi Jinping

In October 2011, Hu Jintao intended to pass the General Secretary position to Li Keqiang, but Jiang Zemin favored princeling Xi Jinping. Xi appeared taciturn and obedient, which earned Jiang’s trust. Unexpectedly, within two years of assuming office, Xi aggressively centralized power, taking sole control of eleven central leading small groups. He no longer heeded Jiang Zemin’s views and removed the leaders Jiang had placed in the Military Commission under the banner of anti-corruption, replacing them with his own people. Jiang Zemin once attempted to have Zeng Qinghong mobilize CCP elders to remove Xi Jinping, but Hu Jintao did not cooperate, and the effort failed.

Xi Jinping even threatened Jiang Zemin with an investigation into Jiang’s corruption, forcing Jiang to accept Xi’s plan to extend his rule for another ten years and prepare for lifelong leadership. Jiang Zemin was powerless to resist.

Jiang Zemin’s merit lay in maintaining “keeping a low profile” in Sino–U.S. relations, allowing China to quietly amass wealth. His record amounts to six merits and four faults. His greatest fault was elevating Xi Jinping, enabling him to bring calamity upon China and, ultimately, the world.