Chapter 34: Reassessing Lin Biao: Midway Rebellion Against Mao, Brought Down by Mao?

Lin Biao (1907–1971), born Yu Rong in Hubei, changed his name to Lin Biao at age 19 when he enrolled in the Whampoa Military Academy in Guangzhou. In 1927, he participated in the Nanchang Uprising, joined the Red Army in Jiangxi, and took part in the Long March. In 1937, he fought in the Anti-Japanese War, disobeying Mao’s orders by ambushing a Japanese supply convoy and annihilating 1,000 soldiers—a feat later called the “Pingxingguan Victory,” which made him famous.

In 1938, Lin was injured by Yan Xishan’s Shanxi troops, damaging his spine, and went to the Soviet Union to recover. The nerve damage left lasting sequelae: he became sensitive to wind, prone to colds, and suffered diarrhea.

In 1940, Lin returned to the USSR for treatment, participating in the Soviet-German war and teaching at a Soviet military academy.

In 1941, he returned to China, working at CCP offices in Xi’an and Chongqing. Chiang Kai-shek ordered Dai Li to recruit him into the KMT, but the plan failed. In 1943, he returned to Yan’an with Zhou Enlai and over 100 others by truck.

In 1946, the Chinese Civil War broke out. Lin became Secretary of the CCP Northeast Bureau, commanding hundreds of thousands of troops to defeat Chiang Kai-shek’s forces. From May to October 1948, he besieged Changchun, imposing a “no food in, no one out” blockade that starved 300,000 people to death; the defenders were forced to surrender. Mao approved this strategy.

In 1950, the Korean War broke out. Mao proposed Lin Biao as commander, but Lin feigned illness and refused, opposing troop deployment.

In 1962, at the CCP 7,000-person conference, Liu Shaoqi criticized Mao for policy errors causing the famine that killed 50 million: “Seven parts human error, three parts natural disaster.” Lin defended Mao: “This precisely violates Chairman Mao’s guidance and caused the error.”

In 1964, Lin promoted the Quotations from Chairman Mao (Little Red Book), elevating Mao while consolidating his own position, building a “big tree of Mao.”

By 1966, the Cultural Revolution began. Mao promoted Lin Biao to second in command, replacing Liu Shaoqi, designating him as successor.

I. Mao-Lin Split Begins in 1969

At the 1969 “9th Party Congress,” Mao ignored the political report drafted by Lin Biao and Chen Boda. Lin’s draft focused on production and construction, while Mao’s report emphasized continued class struggle, marking the beginning of the Mao-Lin split.

In 1971, Mao launched a campaign to criticize Chen Boda, demanding Lin Biao self-criticize. Lin refused.

II. The “Project 571 Memo”

The “Project 571 Memo” (Chinese homophone: “armed uprising”) was authored by Lin Biao’s son, Lin Liguo (1945–1971), representing Lin’s intentions. It outlined a plan to assassinate Mao and launch a military coup, divided into nine sections: feasibility, necessity, conditions, timing, forces, slogans and program, implementation, policies and strategy, and secrecy/discipline.

The memo labeled Mao a modern-day Qin Shi Huang, a fascist feudal tyrant, calling the conflict a life-or-death struggle. The plan proposed exploiting high-level meetings, car accidents, assassination, kidnapping, poison gas, and other special tactics to force Mao from power while ensuring public stability and prosperity.

III. Lin Liguo’s “Small Fleet” Attempt to Assassinate Mao

In 1971, Lin Liguo’s “small fleet” executed Project 571 in Hangzhou, Shanghai, and Jiangsu. Mao became alert and altered his southern inspection schedule, returning early to Beijing by train without stopping.

On September 13, 1971, Lin Biao, Ye Qun, and Lin Liguo suddenly traveled to Beidaihe, boarded a plane at Shanhaiguan Airport, and attempted to flee. After entering Mongolia, the plane exploded in midair, killing all onboard.

IV. Beijing Sends False News to Cover Lin’s Death

Beijing initially released a statement: Wu Faxian asked Zhou Enlai whether to intercept Lin’s plane. Zhou replied: “We must ask Chairman.” Mao said: “Lin Biao is Vice Chairman. If heaven wants rain, or a girl wants to marry, let it be. Don’t stop him from flying.”

After the crash, Wang Dongxing and Zhou reported to Mao, who reportedly toasted: “Thanks to Lin Biao for a big favor.”

V. Plane Explosion Confirmed

The plane definitely exploded in the air. Mongolian herders saw it burning; it was not, as Beijing claimed, due to fuel exhaustion after landing.

Possible causes: a timed bomb or missile strike. Installing a timed bomb in advance was almost impossible, so a missile strike is likely.

In 2013, CCP publications (Mao Zedong Chronology, Zhou Enlai Chronology, Biography of Mao Zedong) described a “forced landing explosion,” noting the plane caught fire midair before crashing.

Rumors in the military suggested a missile strike. Zhou later told senior officials in Guangzhou: “I repeat, Lin Biao’s plane was not shot down on my orders. It self-exploded during forced landing, sealing its own doom.”

VI. Lin Biao Threatened Mao; Nixon Rescued Mao

Lin Biao’s death shocked China profoundly. According to Mao’s doctor Li Zhisui (1994 memoir), Mao suffered four months of bedridden illness, disturbed sleep, and lethargy. His blood pressure rose from 120 to 180; his legs were immobile, like wooden sticks. In January 1972, Mao barely attended Chen Yi’s memorial, needing assistance to get into a car.

Mao became paranoid, requesting two pistols for self-defense. Zhou Enlai provided unloaded firearms. Mao placed one on the bed, one on the sofa, to feel secure.

When Nixon visited in January 1972, he effectively “rescued” Mao, administering cardiac stimulants. Mao recovered, regained mobility, and resumed daily routines. Without Nixon, Mao’s health might have continued declining, possibly shortening his life to 1973. Lin Biao’s death thus heavily impacted Mao, but Nixon helped stabilize him.

VII. Lin Biao’s Six Merits and Four Faults

Historically, if judged by loyalty or opposition to Mao, Lin Biao, having opposed Mao and been brought down, could be considered martyr-like. Evaluating his life, he deserves approximately six merits and four faults (6:4) or seven merits and three faults (7:3).

By comparison: Zhou Enlai, loyal to Mao without opposition, merits seven faults and three merits (7:3). Deng Xiaoping, adhering to Maoist thought but shifting focus from class struggle to economic construction, can self-assess as five merits and five faults (5:5), an appropriate balance.