
A Concise Reinterpretation of Modern Chinese History · Communist Party of China
Chapter 33: Reassessing Liu Shaoqi: The Earliest to Oppose Mao, Starved the People, Persecuted for Three Years During the Cultural Revolution
Liu Shaoqi (1898–1969), from Ningxiang, Hunan, participated in early labor movements, later entered the Red areas, and joined the Long March. In 1936, he organized the CCP Northern Bureau, returned to Yan’an in 1943, and by 1945 became the second-ranking leader of the CCP. He served as State Chairman after the founding of the PRC and was persecuted for three years during the Cultural Revolution, dying in prison.
I. Liu’s “Cultivation” and Emphasis on “Ren and Virtue”
During the Cultural Revolution, Liu Shaoqi was criticized as a “Cultivationist.” In 1939, in Yan’an, Liu published On the Cultivation of Communists in the periodical Liberation. He extensively quoted Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, but also referenced Confucius and Mencius.
He cited Confucius: “At fifteen I set my mind on learning”; Mencius: “When Heaven is about to confer a great responsibility on someone… everyone can become Yao or Shun”; Zengzi: “I examine myself thrice daily.”
Liu emphasized “obeying the principle of the majority” while also respecting the rights of lower-level organizations and individual party members. He wrote: “Can party members doubt or dissent from party resolutions? I believe under the following conditions, it is permissible: (1) obedience and compliance with resolutions…”
Clearly, Liu’s On Cultivation displayed a measure of democratic thinking and reasoned argument. The Cultural Revolution, however, did not value reason, so Liu was labeled a “Cultivationist.”
II. Mao Executes a Military Coup and Defeats Liu
The Cultural Revolution began as a military coup orchestrated by Mao, who hid in Hangzhou to direct it remotely. Fearing counter-coup attempts, Mao preemptively struck. In March 1966, he commanded the 38th Army to enter Beijing from multiple suburban points overnight, quickly taking control of over 30 key departments: the Beijing Garrison, Municipal Committee, Central Organization Department, Propaganda Department, radio stations, Xinhua News Agency, People’s Daily, and the capital airport.
The operation was completed within two hours, without a shot fired. Central Committee members became completely trapped. Liu Shaoqi, waking to the news, turned pale and trembled, saying: “We are busy with disaster relief; they are busy with military control.” Peng Zhen noted that the original security team had disappeared, replaced by the 38th Army, foreseeing imminent house arrest for Liu. Mao also guarded against Peng Zhen and Luo Ruiqing staging a counter-coup, striking first.
III. Mao Also Guards Against Lin Biao
Mao’s deployment of the 38th Army to Beijing was also meant to restrain Lin Biao. He assigned the 63rd and 65th Armies to Beijing for duty, counterbalancing the 38th. Lin’s residence was further guarded by a company under Wang Dongxing, preventing any attempt at military mutiny.
Guo Moruo, sensing an impending catastrophe from the Cultural Revolution, demanded the destruction of all his works.
On May 15, 1966, Mao ordered Ye Jianying and ten others to form the Beijing Working Group, replacing Peng Zhen to formally take control of the city.
IV. Confrontation at the Central Committee Meeting
In August 1966, a Central Committee meeting convened with 141 attendees. Mao invited 47 rebellious students and teachers to demonstrate. Mao wanted Liu to chair the meeting; Liu openly confronted Mao. Mao said: “Suppressing students is terror, coming from the center.” Liu replied: “I assume responsibility.”
Mao taunted: “You hold monopoly power in Beijing—how well you monopolize!” Liu responded: “It’s merely stepping down. Not afraid to step down, I have five things I’m not afraid of.”
Mao said: “Monsters and demons are here among us.” Mao also claimed: “90% of the Working Group did evil deeds in suppressing the masses.” Liu said: “I take responsibility for the Working Group.”
On August 5, 1966, Mao wrote the big-character poster “Bombard the Headquarters”, explicitly targeting Liu Shaoqi.
V. Liu’s Attempt at a Tiananmen Debate on Famine Came Too Late
In 1967, Mao allowed the rebels to criticize him, while Liu proposed a massive debate at Tiananmen, openly discussing the Great Famine over three years that killed 50 million. By then, he was powerless; no one listened. In 1961, Liu had the opportunity to sideline Mao or detain him but failed due to his “Cultivationist” moral restraint.
VI. Liu Died Without Legal Pretext; Death Announced Seven Years Later
In 1968, Zhou Enlai was appointed head of Liu’s special case team. Recognizing Mao’s intent to kill Liu, Zhou noted: “This person should be executed” in the files. Mao wanted Liu dead but lacked a legal pretext, as Liu was State Chairman.
Liu was sent to Qin Cheng Prison, which had decent conditions, preventing an immediate death. Mao’s method was to let rebels repeatedly persecute him, wearing him down. Liu’s health deteriorated over two years, effectively killing him, though he was sent to Kaifeng shortly before death to appear as “natural causes.”
Upon Liu’s death, Mao leaped from bed in delight, ordering a photo taken and a plane dispatched—showing his obsession with Liu’s death. The news was not publicly announced until Mao’s death seven years later.
Mao told foreign reporters: “Chiang Kai-shek failed because he was not ruthless enough. I defeated Liu Shaoqi by ruthlessness. Liu failed because he was not ruthless.”
VII. Historical Judgment
Liu Shaoqi’s life: seven parts merit, three parts fault; his achievements far outweighed his errors. Mao’s life: zero merit, ten faults—summarized in one word: ruthlessness.
At the 1961 conference of 7,000, Liu had courageously countered Mao’s “nine parts human achievement, one part error” with “seven parts human error, three parts natural disaster”, gaining over 90% support from cadres below, yet the leadership did not dare support him. Lin Biao commented: “Errors arise from not following Mao Zedong Thought.” Mao applauded immediately, satisfied. Zhou Enlai said: “The more difficult, the more the helmsman must take charge.” Mao nodded, requesting Chen Yun to speak; Chen wisely remained silent. Deng Xiaoping gave a vague talk on democracy without endorsing “seven parts human error”, effectively undermining Liu.
Despite support from 90% of cadres below, the leadership still proclaimed “Long live Chairman Liu!” alongside “Long live Chairman Mao!”—ultimately, only Mao’s longevity remained.
Liu Shaoqi died a tragic death but is historically remembered for openly attributing famine deaths to human failings rather than blindly following Mao. Mao remains revered; Liu’s suffering is forever a cautionary tale.
