Chapter 27: Reassessing Chiang Kai-shek: Mainland Lost to the Communists, Truman’s Blame 6, Chiang 4

Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975) inherited Sun Yat-sen’s mission, defeated the Beijing government, unified China, and achieved victory against Japan. Yet he ultimately lost mainland China to Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), retreating to Taiwan where he rebuilt the government and developed the economy, laying the foundation for Taiwan’s rise. Chiang Ching-kuo succeeded him, transforming the party, instituting constitutional democracy, and turning the Republic of China into a de facto democratic state, becoming a beacon for future political transformation in mainland China.

Chiang was born in 1887 in Fenghua, Zhejiang. His father ran a salt shop and died when Chiang was eight, leaving him to be raised by his mother. He studied in private schools, graduated from high school at 19, and went to Japan, where he met Chen Qimei and was influenced by anti-Qing ideas. In 1907, at 20, he entered the Baoding Military Academy, studying artillery for one year. In 1908, he returned to Japan, enrolled in Tokyo’s Zhenwu Military Academy, and joined the Tongmenghui. Two years later, he graduated and became a candidate officer in the Japanese army.

I. Early Assassination of Tao Chengzhang

During the 1911 Xinhai Revolution, Chiang returned to Shanghai under Chen Qimei’s assignment, leading over 100 vanguard troops to Hangzhou to liberate Zhejiang. He later served as commander of the Shanghai army corps and became sworn brothers with Chen Qimei.

In 1912, on Chen Qimei’s orders, Chiang was tasked with assassinating Tao Chengzhang, the leader of the Guangfuhui, who opposed Sun Yat-sen. (Wikipedia notes: Tao Chengzhang [1878–1912] was a Guangfuhui leader. In 1908, he accused Sun of embezzling revolutionary funds and demanded Sun retreat. In January 1912, Chen ordered Chiang to assassinate Tao. Chiang fired [or another person did] the gun, killing Tao in a Shanghai hospital. Sun praised Tao posthumously and instructed Chen to capture the assassin. Chiang considered this successful assassination the start of Sun’s trust in him.)

Afterward, Chiang fled to Japan. In 1913, he returned to China to participate in anti-Yuan campaigns but was defeated in Shanghai and returned to Japan in November. In 1914, Sun established the Chinese Revolutionary Party in Tokyo; Chiang was dispatched to Shanghai to assist Chen Qimei in anti-Yuan activities. In 1916, after Chen Qimei was assassinated by Yuan’s forces, Chiang, under Sun’s orders, served as Chief of Staff of the Revolutionary Army in Shandong. Yuan soon died, the army disbanded, and Chiang returned to Shanghai, interacting with the Green Gang leaders Huang Jinrong and Du Yuesheng.

In July 1917, Sun Yat-sen moved south from Shanghai to Guangzhou to establish a military government. In March 1918, Chiang became Director of Operations of the Guangdong Army. Facing exclusion by the Guangdong Army, he often went to Shanghai to engage in stock trading with Chen Guofu and Zhang Jingjiang.

II. Gaining Sun Yat-sen’s Trust at 35 and Capturing Beijing in Five Years

In June 1922, Guangdong Army Commander Chen Jiongming rebelled against Sun. Sun took refuge on a warship, and Chiang served him there for over a month, earning Sun’s trust. In February 1923, Chiang became Chief of Staff and in August led a delegation to the Soviet Union for observation.

In January 1924, Sun established the Whampoa Military Academy and appointed Chiang as principal, concurrently Chief of Staff of the Guangdong Army. In October, Chiang successfully suppressed Guangzhou business factions; in February 1925, he led an eastern campaign against Chen Jiongming, and was concurrently appointed Guangzhou garrison commander.

After Sun’s death in March 1925 in Beijing, Chiang exploited the power vacuum, seizing military authority, expelling Xu Chongzhi, forcing Hu Hanmin and Wang Jingwei into exile, uniting the Guangxi clique, consolidating the two Guangs, and laying the foundation for the Northern Expedition. Following the assassination of Liao Zhongkai, Chiang suspected right-wing involvement, used it to remove Hu Hanmin abroad, and sent Xu Chongzhi to Hong Kong. In October, he led a second eastern expedition to pacify Chen Jiongming, significantly boosting his reputation.

In July 1926, Chiang led the Northern Expedition, defeating Wu Peifu and Sun Chuanfang, occupying Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi, and Fujian, and continued campaigns east and north. In December, the KMT central committee moved from Guangzhou to Wuhan; Chiang remained in Nanjing, causing a rift with Wang Jingwei.

In April 1927, Chiang initiated a violent anti-Communist purge in Shanghai, arresting and executing numerous Communist leaders. On April 18, he established a rival KMT government in Nanjing, confronting Wuhan. In June, he reached an agreement with Feng Yuxiang in Xuzhou to collaborate against the Communists. In August, under pressure from Wuhan, he resigned, went to Japan for international support, returned in November, and married Soong Mei-ling. After gaining support from Britain, the U.S., and Japan, he relaunched the Northern Expedition.

In January 1928, Chiang was reappointed commander-in-chief and, in February, elected KMT military commission chairman. In April, he allied with Feng Yuxiang, Yan Xishan, and Li Zongren to form four army groups, defeating Zhang Zuolin and capturing Beijing. In October, he proposed “demobilization and construction,” aiming to reorganize the forces of Feng, Yan, and Li, exacerbating internal tensions. In 1930, the Central Plains War broke out; Chiang emerged victorious. By the end of 1930, he launched five encirclement campaigns against the CCP in Jiangxi and other red areas.

III. Xi’an Incident, Stalin Control, and Exchange of Chiang Ching-kuo

In December 1936, Zhang Xueliang and the CCP jointly orchestrated the Xi’an Incident. Chiang was detained in Xi’an and, under Stalin’s control, was forced to compromise with the CCP, recognizing it as legitimate. Zhang released Chiang and accompanied him back to Nanjing, but Zhang was thereafter under house arrest, and the Northeast Army was reorganized. The only real beneficiary of Xi’an was the CCP.

Chiang’s failure began with the Xi’an Incident. From 1923, as Whampoa principal, until 1936, he had been largely successful. Chiang recognized the CCP as the greatest enemy, resolutely suppressing them from Jiangxi to northern Shaanxi. Yet, at Xi’an, he punished Zhang Xueliang and placed him under lifelong house arrest but spared Mao Zedong, the real architect, allowing the CCP to transition from illegal to legal, provide pay to tens of thousands of troops, and expand under the guise of anti-Japanese efforts. After Japan’s defeat, during the civil war, the CCP grew further under Stalin, while Chiang, receiving insufficient U.S. support, was defeated.

Stalin’s policy of taking CCP leaders’ children to the USSR as hostages gave him leverage; release required his approval. Chiang Ching-kuo was held in the USSR for ten years. This was a hostage exchange: Stalin released him, and Chiang had to cooperate with the CCP.

Chiang’s compliance at Xi’an—switching from anti-Communist campaigns to alliance—was not genuine. After returning to Nanjing, lacking courage, he did not repudiate the coerced agreement. Perhaps he was concerned about his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, still in the USSR. By 1937, Chiang Ching-kuo returned, ending the hostage issue. Chiang could have publicly declared he would no longer honor the coerced Xi’an agreement, revealing the CCP’s false anti-Japanese stance, resolutely purging Communists, and maintaining national unity, but he lacked the courage, allowing the CCP to revive. His five years of suppression had nearly eliminated 90% of CCP forces, but his inaction gave them a second chance.

IV. Resistance Against Japan and Insufficient Coordination with the U.S.

During the full outbreak of the Anti-Japanese War in 1937, Chiang commanded the Shanghai, Taiyuan, Xuzhou, and Wuhan campaigns, inflicting serious damage on Japanese forces. In 1938, he ordered the Yellow River dikes blown up to halt Japan, drowning 900,000 civilians.

In December 1941, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor; the U.S. entered WWII. Chiang allied with the U.S. and Britain, and in March 1942 sent an expeditionary force to Burma, but due to harsh conditions, the campaign failed. U.S. commander Stilwell demanded Chinese units withdraw to India, but only two divisions complied; the other four returned to Yunnan. Stilwell requested execution of noncompliant commanders; Chiang issued superficial punishments. Stilwell requested an additional 100,000 troops be sent for training; Chiang only sent 10,000, causing U.S. dissatisfaction.

In 1943, the U.S. requested an airbase in Chengdu. Chiang mobilized 400,000 civilians to build it in 60 days but demanded $800 million from the U.S., angering Roosevelt.

V. Glory with Roosevelt and Churchill

In November 1943, Roosevelt convened the Cairo Conference, planning the full-scale fight against Germany and Japan. Chiang was invited, with the U.S. expecting full Chinese participation and providing equipment freely. Chiang demanded $1 billion. By the end of 1943, the U.S. delivered $240 million, but $80 million went to Chiang’s minister Kong Xiangxi’s account, mixing public and private funds. Later, when asked for expense reports, $10,000 was spent on a public restroom, becoming a joke.

In June 1944, U.S. Vice President Wallace visited Chongqing, reporting to Roosevelt:

“Our support for Chiang may be short-term; he lacks the wisdom and political strength to govern postwar China.”

Roosevelt hoped to lure the CCP away from the USSR to the U.S., establish a joint KMT-CCP government, and treat the CCP as a “peasant democratic party.” Mao feigned “pro-U.S.” sentiment and promoted New Democracy, portraying CCP areas as democratic under the “Three-Thirds System” (CCP, non-party, and workers/farmers each occupying one-third), deceiving domestic and international opinion.

VI. Truman Forcing KMT-CCP Negotiations

After Japan’s surrender in 1945, Chiang controlled 4 million troops, while Mao commanded hundreds of thousands of militia. Despite this, the U.S. distrusted Chiang and opposed full-scale anti-Communist campaigns, pressuring him to negotiate with Mao in Chongqing. Chiang and Mao held ten private meetings; Mao’s words were insincere, and the agreements were meaningless, merely appeasing the Americans.

VII. Truman Forcing a Four-Month Ceasefire — CCP Rebounds

Chiang mistakenly removed Sun Li-jen from command. Mao later remarked that the first army, led by Sun Li-jen (U.S.-trained and victorious), was the main threat to the CCP.

In August 1946, Truman, dissatisfied with Chiang, halted military aid until April 1948. By then, it was too late. Truman commented:

“Even Greece’s corrupt government is more efficient than Chiang’s.”

In July 1947, the U.S. sent Wedemeyer to China, criticizing Chiang’s government as “apathetic, corrupt, incompetent; China’s revival requires capable leadership.” U.S. Ambassador John Leighton Stuart also said Chiang could no longer prevent Communist expansion.

By late 1948, the U.S. attempted to replace Chiang with Li Zongren as acting president. Chiang was forced to step down. Early 1949, the U.S. allocated $75 million to support Li Zongren in Guangzhou, hoping to resist CCP advances, but the funds never reached him, and Guangzhou fell.

At the end of 1948, U.S. naval forces withdrew from Qingdao. Chiang secretly invited over 100 Japanese officers to assist as advisors; these officers retreated with him to Taiwan in 1949.

VIII. Truman Lost the Mainland — Truman’s Blame 6, Chiang 4

In March 1949, the U.S. sent emissaries to Taiwan to negotiate independence with Chen Cheng, aiming to protect Taiwan from CCP invasion; Chen refused. In June 1949, plans were discussed for UN troops to enter Taiwan, signaling U.S. loss of confidence in Chiang, angering him.

In June 1950, Kim Il-sung invaded South Korea, triggering the Korean War. Truman swiftly responded, deploying the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait, preventing CCP attacks, dramatically changing the situation and saving Chiang.

In the 1950s, Chiang reformed the government, revamped the KMT, implemented land reform peacefully, won public support, opened the economy, attracted foreign investment, and by 1965, with $1.4 billion in U.S. aid, developed an export-oriented economy, propelling Taiwan’s rise as an “Asian Tiger.”

IX. Nixon Let Mao Replace Chiang in the UN — Chiang’s Dream of Retaking Mainland Shattered

In October 1971, Nixon leveraged U.S. influence to have the UN admit the PRC, forcing Chiang’s representatives to withdraw. Nixon’s abandonment of an ally was a severe blow. In February 1972, Nixon visited Beijing, acknowledging “One China,” marginalizing Taiwan.

In July 1972, Chiang suffered a heart attack and was bedridden. He died in Taipei on April 5, 1975, aged 88. Despite losing the mainland in his early life, he revived Taiwan in later years, governing as an enlightened autocrat and achieving Taiwan’s rise. Historians view him as a positive, capable ruler.

Chiang’s loss of the mainland stemmed from two major errors:

He was insufficiently harsh toward the CCP, softening at the Xi’an Incident, allowing Mao to revive and dominate China for 30 years.

He failed to fully rely on the U.S. and follow American guidance in anti-Japanese efforts, causing the U.S. to lose confidence and giving Mao room to manipulate U.S. perceptions.