Chapter 25: Reassessing Zhang Xueliang — The Xi’an Incident and How Stalin Saved Mao Zedong

Zhang Xueliang (1901–2001) was born in Haicheng County, Liaoning Province. In his early years, his father Zhang Zuolin was poor, but after winning battles and gaining a son, he named him “Xueliang” (Double Joy). In 1918 Zhang Zuolin became Commander-in-Chief. In 1919 he founded the Northeast Three Provinces Military Academy. At age 18, Zhang Xueliang became a regimental commander and was also transferred to the academy for training, where he met tactical instructor Guo Songling, who became both mentor and friend. In 1920 Zhang graduated from the artillery department and was promoted to commander of the Guards Brigade. He recommended Guo Songling to concurrently serve as a regimental commander, and the following year Guo was promoted again to brigade commander.

I. Zhang Xueliang Inherits His Father’s Career and Rises Rapidly

In 1922, the First Zhili–Fengtian War broke out. Zhang Zuolin served as Commander-in-Chief, and Zhang Xueliang was commander of the second echelon of the Eastern Route Army. After defeat, Zhang Xueliang became chief of staff. The actual reorganization and strengthening of the army was carried out by Guo Songling. After more than two years of military reorganization, the army’s morale and strength greatly increased.

In 1924, Zhang Zuolin launched the Second Zhili–Fengtian War. Zhang Xueliang led the Third Army through Shanhai Pass, bribed Feng Yuxiang with large sums of money to defect, and the Zhili Army collapsed completely. The Fengtian Army reached the peak of its power. Zhang Zuolin entered Beijing, and Zhang Xueliang was promoted to Commander-in-Chief of the Beijing–Yuguan region. In 1925, following his father’s orders, Zhang Xueliang led over 2,000 troops into Shanghai, bringing Fengtian prestige to its zenith.

In 1925, Guo Songling rebelled against the Fengtian clique, leading 70,000 troops to attack Mukden. Zhang Xueliang defeated Guo, who was captured. The father wanted Guo executed; the son wished to spare him but failed. In 1927, facing the Northern Expedition, Zhang Xueliang moved south and allied with Wu Peifu to resist, but was defeated.

II. Chiang Kai-shek Wins the Northern Expedition; Zhang “Changes the Flag and Supports Chiang”

In June 1928, Zhang Zuolin was assassinated by a bombing while returning from Beijing to the Northeast. Zhang Xueliang succeeded him as Commander-in-Chief of the Northeast. One week after his father’s death, at only 27 years old, Zhang decisively “changed the flag and supported Chiang,” bringing China to nominal unification.

III. The Chinese Eastern Railway Incident — Deceived by Chiang, Zhang Suffers a Crushing Defeat

In July 1929, with Chiang Kai-shek’s support, Zhang Xueliang took a hard line against the Soviet Union, attempting to revoke Soviet privileges in the Northeast. He sealed Soviet commercial institutions in Harbin and moved to recover the Chinese Eastern Railway. Chiang promised that if war broke out, the central government would send 100,000 troops and allocate several million yuan in military funds. In August, Stalin ordered Soviet forces to advance along the railway into the Northeast. Chiang broke his promise and gave Zhang no support. The Chinese Communist Party actively defended Soviet interests and raised the slogan “Defend the Soviet Union.”

In November, the Northeast Army suffered a disastrous defeat at the hands of Soviet forces. Zhang sued for peace and was forced to sign an agreement in Khabarovsk. The Soviets retained control of the Chinese Eastern Railway, everything returning to the status quo ante. Zhang also agreed to “disarm the White Russian forces and expel them.”

IV. The Central Plains War — Courting Both Sides, Secretly Supporting Chiang, Seizing the Opportunity to Enter the Pass

In May 1930, Chiang Kai-shek and the anti-Chiang factions (Yan Xishan, Feng Yuxiang, Li Zongren) clashed in the Central Plains War. Both sides sought Zhang Xueliang’s support. The anti-Chiang faction promoted Zhang as deputy commander-in-chief, promising half the cabinet posts to the Fengtian clique and granting the Pingjin region and the provinces of Chahar and Suiyuan to the Northeast Army. In June, Chiang also appointed Zhang as deputy commander-in-chief, promising the Pingjin region, territory north of the Yellow River, and offering tens of millions of yuan.

Zhang initially declared neutrality, selling Northeast weapons to both sides while secretly leaning toward Chiang and observing developments. In August, Chiang’s forces captured Jinan, the Shanxi Army was defeated, and the anti-Chiang coalition’s defeat was inevitable. In September, Zhang judged the moment ripe, telegraphed support for the central government, and promptly sent tens of thousands of troops through the passes to occupy the Pingjin region. By October, the anti-Chiang faction had collapsed. Yan Xishan, Feng Yuxiang, and Wang Jingwei jointly telegraphed Zhang agreeing to a peaceful settlement. Yan and Feng soon resigned, and their armies were absorbed by Chiang and Zhang respectively.

Zhang Xueliang emerged as the biggest winner of the Central Plains War. By selling arms and demanding military funds, he made a fortune. As soon as his troops entered the passes, Chiang allocated 5 million yuan in military funds. Zhang gained control over Pingjin and four northern provinces, reaching the peak of his power and reputation.

V. The September 18 Incident — Non-Resistance and the Abandonment of Jinzhou and Rehe

In January 1931, Zhang Xueliang accepted the Order of the Rising Sun awarded by the Japanese emperor in Shenyang. In July, Chiang secretly telegraphed Zhang: “In response to Japanese provocations, you must exercise utmost forbearance; this is not the time to fight Japan.” Chiang also appointed Zhang as commander of the Northern Route Army for suppressing the Communists. In September, Zhang telegraphed: “No matter how the Japanese provoke trouble, one must endure to the utmost and must not resist.” He also ordered: “Endure; no clashes allowed.”

On September 18, 1931, the Japanese Kwantung Army attacked Shenyang. Over 10,000 Northeast troops stationed at Beidaying were ordered not to resist. At midnight on September 19, the Kwantung Army launched a full offensive against Liaoyang, Shenyang, Changchun, and Anshan, encountering no resistance. On September 19, Zhang Xueliang stated in Beijing: “I had long ordered non-resistance; therefore our troops at Beidaying had already collected their weapons and stored them in warehouses.” On September 22, Chiang declared: “For now, we must accept humiliation and await the judgment of international justice, avoiding conflict with Japan,” tacitly endorsing Zhang’s non-resistance.

The Northeast Army retreated to Jinzhou. By December, all Northeast territory was lost, including the “Oriental Krupp Arsenal” long built up by Zhang Zuolin, along with tanks, aircraft, artillery, and other modern weapons.

In November 1931, Chiang gradually altered the non-resistance policy and telegraphed Zhang not to abandon Jinzhou, but Zhang insisted on withdrawal. In December, Japanese forces occupied Jinzhou without bloodshed, completing their control of the Northeast. Zhang led 400,000 troops through the passes into North China and Shaanxi.

In August 1932, Wang Jingwei urged Zhang to resign to apologize to the nation for losing the Northeast. Chiang advised Zhang to recover Rehe as the best policy. In February 1933, the Rehe Campaign broke out. Tang Yulin, commander of the Northeast Army and chairman of Rehe Province, retreated without fighting, abandoning Chengde. Chiang telegraphed Zhang to counterattack, but Zhang did nothing. In March, Zhang resigned and left Beijing for Shanghai. In May, China and Japan signed the Tanggu Truce, placing North China within Japan’s sphere of influence.

VI. Losing the Northeast and Rehe — Chiang Arranges Zhang’s Departure Abroad

In July 1933, Zhang accepted Chiang’s arrangement to go abroad for inspection, visiting Italy, Germany, France, and Britain. He met Hitler and Mussolini and admired the unity of Germany and Italy, believing that only fascism could save China. In December, he left Italy by ship to return.

In January 1934, Zhang returned to Hong Kong and told Hu Hanmin that only fascism could save China and that China could have only one leader—Chiang. In February, Zhang met Chiang in Hangzhou and pledged “complete obedience to the central government.” In March, Zhang was appointed commander of bandit-suppression forces in Henan, Hubei, and Jiangxi. In June, amid fierce fighting in the Fifth Encirclement Campaign against the Red Army, Zhang proposed cooperation between the Nationalists and Communists to save the nation.

VII. Won Over by the CCP’s United Front

In April 1935, Chiang ordered Zhang to suppress the Red Army. After suffering setbacks and losing two divisions, Zhang grew resentful of Chiang’s deployments. In September, Chiang established the Northwest Bandit Suppression Headquarters in Xi’an and again appointed Zhang as deputy commander-in-chief. In October, the Northeast Army was transferred to the Northwest and suffered losses fighting the Communists. In November, the CCP issued an open letter to compatriots, denouncing Zhang as a “traitor of non-resistance” and a “faithful running dog of Japan.”

In November, Zhang secretly met his old Northeast friend Du Chongyuan, then imprisoned in Shanghai, and confided his frustrations. Du advised him to abandon suppression of the Communists, ally with them, ally with Yang Hucheng and Sheng Shicai, and seek Soviet support. In December, Zhang sought out Li Du of the Northeast Volunteer Army, proposing contact with CCP leaders. Through Soong Ching-ling, contact with the CCP underground was established.

In January, Zhang flew to Luochuan, Shaanxi, to meet Gao Fuyuan, a Northeast regimental commander captured and released by the Red Army. CCP figure Li Kenong met Zhang for three hours, and Zhang agreed to work with the CCP. Li supported Zhang as commander-in-chief and hinted at Soviet arms aid. In February, Li Kenong again visited Luochuan, restoring trade between Red and White areas.

VIII. Conspiring with the CCP to Establish an Independent Northwest Government

In March 1936, Li Kenong brought Mao Zedong’s views to Luochuan. Zhang supported the CCP’s separatist policy and agreed to form a grand Northwest alliance, including a joint government with the Communists. It was agreed that CCP representatives would reside in Xi’an, and Zhang invited Mao Zedong or Zhou Enlai to meet personally in Fushi.

After the Luochuan talks, Zhang sent rifles and tens of thousands of rounds of ammunition to the Red Army, transported by truck, helped procure vital supplies, and eased hardships in Red areas. In April 1936, Zhang secretly met Zhou Enlai in Fushi. Zhou urged opposition to Chiang; Zhang said that if persuasion failed, he would establish a new government in the Northwest. Zhang would persuade from within, the Communists pressure from without. They agreed to send representatives to the Soviet Union and contact Sheng Shicai in Xinjiang, secretly reaching ceasefire and trade agreements.

After the meeting, Zhou said: “The talks went extremely well! I never expected Zhang Xueliang to be so forthright and resolute.” Zhang told Liu Ding: “I am extremely satisfied with the Fushi talks; China’s affairs will now be easier to handle.” Zhang donated 20,000 silver dollars and 120,000 francs to support Red Army winter supplies. Liu Ding, a CCP agent embedded within Zhang’s staff, frequently visited Zhang’s residence. Zhang issued him a pistol. Liu set up secret radio stations and transport networks in Xi’an, sending Edgar Snow and Dr. Norman Bethune to the Red areas. The CCP soon established an office in Xi’an.

IX. Zhang Xueliang Proposes Joining the Communist Party

In June 1936, Zhang proposed joining the CCP. The CCP said it needed to report to the Comintern, and the request was not accepted. In July, Zhang organized the “Anti-Japanese Comrades Association,” formally established in September as the secret core organization of the Northeast Army, with over 70 members. Zhang served as chairman. He once told Liu Ding: “My days are hard. I want to pull the troops out—however many I can—and fight alongside the Red Army. Better sooner than later.”

In July, Mao Zedong said at the CCP Central Committee: “Zhang Xueliang’s courage in meeting Zhou Enlai in Fushi is a great thing; we must use strategy and not provoke him.” Liu Ding reported back to Zhang, who said: “I have deep ties with the Generalissimo. I will accelerate efforts to advise him. Even if I hit a wall, lose my position, go to jail, or be executed, I will not hesitate.”

With Yang Hucheng’s consent, Zhang founded the “Xi’an Officers Training Corps,” emphasizing political training centered on anti-Japanese salvation, with over 300 cadets. In September, Zhang sent large quantities of cotton, medicine, and food to the Red Army. In October, Zhang secretly went to Taiyuan to tell Yan Xishan about plans to ally with the CCP and the Soviets. Yan agreed to persuade Chiang and promised to cede five counties to the Red Army.

X. Disobeying Chiang’s Orders to Suppress the Communists — Plotting Armed Remonstrance

On October 22, 1936, Chiang arrived in Xi’an. That night, Zhang urged Chiang to ally with the Communists against Japan; they argued fiercely. On October 29, Chiang flew to Luoyang, preparing to remove Zhang and Yang if they disobeyed. On October 31, Zhang and Yan met Chiang in Luoyang to urge cooperation; Chiang refused.

In early November, Zhang discussed matters at Ye Jianying’s residence in Xi’an, concluding: “There is only one method—coup d’état.” On November 27, Zhang submitted a letter requesting to fight Japan in Suiyuan; Chiang refused, insisting on suppressing the Communists. On December 3, Zhang again requested permission; Chiang rejected him and ordered him back to Xi’an. On December 7, Zhang tearfully remonstrated Chiang at Huaqing Pool; Chiang angrily declared: “Even if you shoot me dead, the suppression plan will not change.” That night, Zhang and Yang secretly decided to detain Chiang.

XI. Detaining Is Easy; Releasing Is Hard

Hours before the Xi’an Incident, Zhang announced his decision. Only Yu Xuezhong warned: “Young Marshal, detaining him is easy; how will you release him later?” On December 12, Chiang was detained. Zhang telegraphed Soong Mei-ling guaranteeing Chiang’s safety. On December 13, the Red Army advanced south. Zhang and Yang dissolved the suppression headquarters and formed a temporary anti-Japanese committee. Negotiations followed.

XII. The Xi’an Incident in Full — How Zhang Xueliang Was Deceived by Mao

At age 35, Zhang Xueliang launched the Xi’an Incident on December 12, 1936, detaining Chiang Kai-shek. The Nationalist government bombed Xi’an, bringing the country to the brink of civil war. Mao Zedong advocated immediately executing Chiang. Stalin, however, instructed that Chiang must be released. Stalin needed Chiang to resist Japan, who posed a direct threat to the Soviet Union, and also agreed to the return of Chiang’s son to China in exchange for Chiang’s safety.

Zhang Xueliang wholeheartedly trusted Mao, believing that the Soviets approved his plan to establish an independent Northwest government and oppose Chiang. In reality, Zhang had been deceived by Mao. Mao and the CCP hoped to exploit the anti-Japanese movement to their advantage. Stalin, however, saw that only Chiang could effectively resist Japanese advances into Soviet territory; Mao could not. If Chiang fell, Japan would gain the upper hand, which would threaten the USSR.

Once Zhang learned of Stalin’s position, he realized the grave mistake he had made and understood that he had been used by Mao. He immediately regretted detaining Chiang and stood before him in tears, signaling his willingness to resolve the matter peacefully.

Stalin agreed to release Chiang’s son under the condition that the Xi’an Incident be resolved peacefully. Chiang Kai-shek thus accepted cooperation with the CCP, allowing Mao and his forces to gain immense political benefit, transition from illegality to legitimacy, and receive military salaries. From this moment, the CCP’s growth and consolidation began, ultimately allowing them to expand into a formidable force.

XIII. Peaceful Resolution

On December 24, 1936, following Stalin’s guidance, both sides reached an agreement: Chiang was released, central government troops withdrew from the Northwest, and the suppression of the Communists ceased. The Red Army maintained its positions. That evening, Zhou Enlai met Chiang; Chiang agreed to cooperate with the Communists against Japan. On December 25, Zhang accompanied Chiang as he flew from Xi’an to Luoyang. Zhang issued military orders assigning Yu Xuezhong command of the Northeast Army. This concluded the peaceful resolution of the Xi’an Incident. Zhou Enlai attempted to pursue them at the airport but was unsuccessful.

On December 30, the Nationalist military court sentenced Zhang to ten years in prison. The next day, Chiang “granted a special pardon,” requiring Zhang to “atone while alive.” Zhang spent the remainder of his life under effective house arrest. Yang Hucheng was sent abroad for recuperation under the guise of study, but his family was later killed after Chiang retreated to Taiwan in 1949.

XIV. Memoirs: “Reckless Action, Immature Thinking”

In his 1957 memoir, Zaji Suogan Manlu, Zhang reflected on the CCP: “They harbor hidden intentions and ulterior motives.” He praised Chiang’s steadfastness during the incident and admitted his own errors: “My actions were reckless, my thinking immature, shameful and laughable.” Zhang recognized that his single greatest mistake was the Xi’an Incident, which he believed undermined China’s stability and allowed the CCP to exploit the situation.

XV. Refusing to Return to the Mainland — Ashamed to Face the People

Zhang Xueliang lived a life largely devoid of concrete achievements, unlike his father, who had established arms factories and founded Northeast University. Zhang had contributed to Chiang’s victory in the Central Plains War but lost the Northeast and Rehe, failed to resist Japanese aggression, and ultimately risked national stability in attempting to establish an independent Northwest government through the Xi’an Incident. At age 35, he had already sealed his fate, and for the following 65 years, his life was essentially wasted.

Chiang Kai-shek, despite being detained for two months, failed to anticipate Zhang’s disloyalty, demonstrating excessive confidence in his control. Zhang’s willingness to detain Chiang allowed Mao Zedong and the CCP to gain enormous advantage. If Zhang had followed Chiang’s orders to suppress the Communists, Stalin had prepared planes to transport Mao to Moscow. Instead, by trusting Mao, Zhang facilitated the CCP’s rise.

Ultimately, the only victor of the Xi’an Incident was Mao Zedong. Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng were losers, Chiang was a greater loser, and the greatest losers were the Chinese people.