Chapter 20: Reassessing Wu Peifu: Missing the 1924 Opportunity to Lead 300,000 Troops South to Guangzhou and Unify China

Wu Peifu (1874–1939) was born into a merchant family in Penglai, Shandong. It is said that when he was born, his father dreamed that Qi Jiguang entered the house, and thus named his son “Peifu,” taking “Peiyu” as Qi Jiguang’s courtesy name. Wu studied in private schools from a young age, reading the Four Books and Five Classics.

I. Early Loss of His Father, Dependent on His Mother

At the age of 16, Wu lost his father and lived dependently with his mother. The family gradually fell into poverty, and he went to a naval camp as a cadet. At 22, he passed the imperial examination and became a xiucai. The following year, after offending local gentry, he left his hometown for Beijing, making a living by writing couplets and fortune-telling.

In 1898, at age 24, Wu entered the Tianjin Beiyang Military Academy. In 1902, he entered the Baoding Military Academy to study surveying and mapping.

On the eve of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904, Japan recruited Beiyang soldiers disguised as civilians to gather intelligence on Russian forces. Wu Peifu was among them and participated in Japanese intelligence operations, traveling several times in and out of Northeast China. He was once captured by Russian troops, refused to confess, and was sentenced to death. He escaped by jumping off a train en route. After the war, he was promoted to captain and awarded a medal.

II. A Scholar-Turned-Soldier: Intelligent, Brave, and Rapidly Promoted

In 1906, Wu joined the Qing Third Division under Cao Kun. Due to his intelligence and flexibility, he gradually gained Cao’s trust and favor. In 1907, Wu successfully completed several bandit-suppression missions. In 1908, Cao promoted Wu to commander of an artillery battalion.

In 1909, Cao sent Wu to Jilin for surveying and mapping, tasks he completed successfully. In 1910, Cao’s forces suppressed bandits in Northeast China; Wu Peifu cooperated with Zhang Zuolin to defeat Hu bandit forces.

In November 1911, Yuan Shikai ordered troops to suppress the Shanxi revolutionary army. Wu Peifu led artillery attacks with merit and was promoted to commander of the Third Artillery Regiment (equivalent to regimental commander). After the founding of the Republic in 1912, Cao Kun became commander of the Third Army Division, and Wu Peifu was transferred to the divisional headquarters, becoming Cao’s principal assistant.

On February 12, 1912, the Qing emperor abdicated. On the 29th, under Yuan Shikai’s direction, Cao Kun staged a fake mutiny to scare away four southern envoys who had come to escort Yuan south. Wu Peifu participated in the operation. Yuan used the incident to fabricate an atmosphere of instability in the north and refused to go south.

In December 1915, Yuan proclaimed himself emperor. Cao Kun was granted a first-rank title of nobility, and Wu Peifu was promoted by Cao to major general and brigade commander. In 1916, Yuan ordered Cao Kun to campaign south against the Southwestern National Protection Army in Sichuan. Wu followed Cao and defeated Cai E’s forces. Soon after, Yuan canceled the monarchy and died of illness. Cao Kun and Wu Peifu lost their military objective and returned to Baoding.

In July 1917, during Zhang Xun’s restoration attempt, Wu Peifu served as the Western Route vanguard of the punitive expedition, while Feng Yuxiang led the Eastern Route. The restoration was quickly suppressed.

III. North–South War: Capturing Hengyang

In 1918, during the North–South War, Wu Peifu led troops with Cao Kun into Hunan, capturing Yuezhou and Changsha, and occupying Hengyang. At this time, the Beijing Duan Qirui government appointed Anhui clique member Zhang Jingyao as Hunan military governor and provincial governor, while Cao Kun and Wu Peifu were only awarded medals. This caused dissatisfaction.

In August, Cao and Wu issued a telegram advocating “ceasing hostilities and restoring the republic.” Wu halted military operations, and the move received wide support.

In 1919, Cao Kun formed an anti-Anhui alliance with Hebei, Jiangsu, Hubei, Jiangxi, and the three northeastern provinces. In December, Feng Guozhang died. Cao Kun became leader of the Zhili clique.

In May 1920, Wu Peifu withdrew his entire army north, citing financial difficulties at the front and soldiers longing to return home. In June, they reached Zhengzhou and Baoding, deploying along the Beijing–Hankou Railway. In July, Wu joined Cao in the Zhili–Anhui War, cooperating with the Fengtian clique to defeat the Anhui clique and jointly control the Beijing government. In September, Wu led the Third Division into Luoyang.

IV. Pacifying the Two Lakes War: The Strongest Man in China

In April 1921, Cao Kun, Wu Peifu, and Zhang Zuolin jointly issued a telegram opposing Guangzhou’s presidential election. Wu Peifu then led troops south to pacify the Two Lakes War. By the end of 1921, Wu commanded over 100,000 troops, and the Zhili clique controlled half of China.

In April 1922, the First Zhili–Fengtian War broke out. Wu Peifu served as commander-in-chief of the Zhili forces and defeated Zhang Zuolin’s 120,000 troops outside Shanhaiguan, becoming known as “the strongest man in China.”

In August 1922, Soviet plenipotentiary Adolf Joffe arrived in Beijing and wrote to Wu Peifu and Sun Yat-sen seeking cooperation. Wu insisted that Mongolia belonged to China and demanded Soviet withdrawal from Outer Mongolia as a precondition. Joffe then turned to cooperate with Sun Yat-sen, signing the Sun–Joffe Declaration.

In November 1922, Cao Kun discovered that military funds allocated to Luoyang exceeded those for Baoding by more than double. He publicly attacked Finance Minister Luo Wengan, indirectly targeting Wu Peifu. Wu responded by telegram, stating that he would “always obey Cao Kun and always support the head of state.”

In December, during Cao Kun’s 61st birthday, members of parliament flocked to Baoding, while Wu Peifu only sent his subordinate Xiao Yaonan as a representative. Later that month, Japan offered to assist Wu in training troops in Luoyang, which Wu refused.

V. Commanding 300,000 Troops: When Luoyang Sneezed, Beijing Caught a Cold

In 1923, Cao Kun devoted himself to becoming president. In January, Xiao Yaonan, Zhang Fulai, Sun Chuanfang, and other Zhili generals, acting on Wu Peifu’s wishes, advised Cao to suspend the presidential campaign, but Cao ignored them.

In April 1923, Wu celebrated his 50th birthday in Luoyang. Kang Youwei presented a congratulatory couplet:
“Eagles soar at Muye; a century of merit, yet only half a lifetime.
Tigers guard Luoyang; storms from all directions converge on the Central Plains.”
Wu was delighted and rewarded him with 1,000 silver dollars.

In June, Wu failed to stop Cao Kun from using Feng Yuxiang to expel Li Yuanhong. In October, Cao bribed parliamentarians and was elected president.

From 1923 to 1924 was the peak of Wu Peifu’s power. Representatives from 16 provinces were stationed in Luoyang, which became a political center rivaling Beijing. Wu was known as the “King of Luoyang.”

VI. Cover Figure of TIME Magazine, 1924

In 1924, Wu Peifu appeared on the cover of TIME magazine, which called him “the strongest man in China.” The New York Times ran a headline stating that Wu Peifu “could make China the world’s greatest democratic nation.”

British and American politicians said, “Only Wu Peifu can save China.” They praised him for “fighting against the selling out of the nation” and for “struggling to eliminate militarism and initiate a new era of democratic politics.”

VII. An American President Who Failed to Recognize Talent, Allowing the Soviets Free Rein

U.S. President Calvin Coolidge lacked international vision, far inferior to his predecessor Woodrow Wilson. Coolidge focused only on domestic affairs and practiced isolationism. He did not match TIME magazine’s foresight and failed to support Wu Peifu, allowing Russia to act unchecked and losing China.

VIII. Russia Seeks Wu; Wu Demands Withdrawal from Mongolia First

The Soviet Communists sought cooperation with Wu Peifu, but Wu demanded that they withdraw from Outer Mongolia first. The Soviets then turned to Sun Yat-sen, who even welcomed their presence in Xinjiang.

IX. 1924: If Cao Kun Had Not Bought the Presidency, 300,000 Troops Could Have Marched South and Unified China

Had Cao Kun heeded Wu’s advice and not staged the farce of bribing his way to the presidency, he could have ordered Wu’s 300,000 troops to march south, strike directly at Guangzhou, and unify China. At that time, Sun Yat-sen was pursuing alliance with Russia and accommodation of the Communists; the Whampoa Military Academy had just opened, and the Northern Expedition was not yet formed. It was a golden opportunity, which Cao Kun missed. Wu Peifu could not act independently without overstepping.

In September 1924, the Second Zhili–Fengtian War broke out. Cao Kun appointed Wu as commander-in-chief to head north to confront the Fengtian forces at Shanhaiguan. In October, Feng Yuxiang accepted a bribe of 500,000 yuan from Zhang Xueliang, defected, returned to Beijing, betrayed Wu Peifu, and launched the “Beijing Coup,” imprisoning Cao Kun. Wu was attacked from both sides by Fengtian and Feng’s forces, retreated in defeat, and sought refuge with Zhao Hengti in Yuezhou, Hunan.

X. If Wu and Cao Had Acted Boldly, Guangzhou Would Have Been Liberated 75 Years Earlier

In October 1924, while Sun Yat-sen and the Soviet–Communist forces suppressed the Guangzhou Merchant Corps, killing 2,000 people and burning the city for three days, destroying over 30 streets and 3,000 shops and homes, Cao Kun announced Sun Yat-sen’s ten major crimes in the name of the Beijing government and declared a punitive expedition.

Guangzhou would have fallen to Wu Peifu within ten days. Sun Yat-sen and the 20,000–30,000 Soviet–Communist forces would not have been a match. Guangzhou would have been truly liberated 75 years earlier. Borodin would have been captured alive, and Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, and Zhou Enlai publicly tried in court. This would have fulfilled The New York Times’ 1924 prediction: “China will become the world’s greatest democratic nation.”

XI. Campaign Against Feng Yuxiang’s “Beijing Coup”

In the winter of 1925, Wu Peifu organized a 14-province anti-rebel alliance in Hankou. Sun Chuanfang of Zhejiang launched an anti-Fengtian war and supported Wu’s campaign. In April 1926, Wu appointed Ye Kaixin as commander of the Hunan army and advanced toward Yuezhou.

In June 1926, Zhang Zuolin and Wu Peifu met in Beijing and jointly formed a Beijing government. The Zhili–Fengtian allied forces captured Nankou and expelled Feng Yuxiang. Wu was to attack Guangdong in the south, while Zhang advanced north against the National Army.

In July, the Guangzhou Northern Expedition achieved successive victories, capturing Wuchang in October. Wu retreated to Xinyang, Henan.

XII. Defeated by the Soviet-Supported Northern Expedition Army

In April 1927, the Northern Expedition Army launched a second expedition from Wuhan. Wu’s forces in Hubei and Henan were defeated, and Wu retreated with remnants to Sichuan under the protection of Yang Sen.

In 1928, Wu and Yang Sen secretly planned to advance east to Yichang and retake Wuhan, but the plot was discovered by Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang bribed Yang Sen’s subordinate Guo Rudong to attack Yang Sen. Yang was forced to retreat, and Wu sought refuge with Liu Hou, attempting to unite Sichuan forces to establish an anti-Communist, anti-Chiang regime.

In 1929, during the Chiang–Gui War over Wuhan, Wu celebrated his birthday at Heshaba in Sichuan. Duan Qirui, Cao Kun, Yan Xishan, Tang Shengzhi, Li Zongren, and others sent representatives to congratulate him. Wu attempted to march east under the pretext of aiding Hubei, but Sichuan leader Liu Xiang, obeying Chiang’s orders, firmly blocked Wu from leaving Sichuan.

XIII. Rejecting Japanese Aid of 100,000 Rifles

While in Sichuan, Japan sent envoys offering to help Wu return to power, promising 100,000 rifles. Wu resolutely refused.

In 1930, during the Central Plains War, Wu issued a telegram in May stating: “I will leave Sichuan immediately to mediate from above.” But Liu Xiang, still obeying Chiang, blocked key routes and prevented Wu from leaving.

XIV. Repeated Attempts at Comeback, Undermined by Chiang Kai-shek

After the Central Plains War, in spring 1931, Chiang Kai-shek invited Wu to Nanjing to discuss national affairs. Wu traveled through Shaanxi and Gansu to rally former Beiyang officers. During this time, the “Lei–Ma Incident” occurred in Gansu, where Lei Zhongtian detained provincial governor Ma Hongbin and declared himself commander. Wu mediated successfully, earning goodwill from both sides.

Wu then sought support in Ningxia, Qinghai, Xinjiang, and from Yang Sen and Deng Xihou in Sichuan.

In November 1931, multiple factions issued a joint telegram urging Wu to return to leadership. However, under Chiang’s pressure, the plan failed. After the September 18 Incident, Beiyang remnants sought to unite Wu Peifu and Duan Qirui against Chiang, proposing a “Northern Grand Alliance” with Wu as commander of an anti-Japanese coalition. Chiang’s divide-and-conquer strategy thwarted these efforts.

XV. Japan’s “Autonomy of Five Northern Provinces”: Wu Firmly Refuses

In 1931, Wu left Sichuan under Liu Xiang’s protection. Zhang Xueliang welcomed him to Beijing, where Wu settled in January 1932. In November 1934, Chiang Kai-shek hosted a banquet for Wu.

In December 1935, Japan promoted the “Autonomy of Five Northern Provinces” and invited Wu to lead it. Wu firmly refused. In 1938, Wang Jingwei defected to Japan, and in June 1939 flew to Beijing seeking “Wang–Wu cooperation.” Wu demanded Wang visit him at his residence. Wang realized Wu had no intention to cooperate, and the meeting never occurred.

XVI. Mysterious Death After Dental Treatment by a Japanese Dentist

In December 1939, Wu injured his gums while eating dumplings and entered a Japanese hospital for treatment, where he later died. The outside world generally believes Japan viewed Wu as a useless but stubborn obstacle and had the dentist murder him. He died at age 65.

Chiang Kai-shek sent a funeral couplet:
“At sunset, I behold the lone city; unyielding through a hundred trials, the grand ambition remains.
In fierce winds, I think of the valiant man; amid countless troubles, the nation mourns this soul.”

XVII. Chiang Kai-shek’s Condolence Telegram: “Utmost Loyalty to the Nation”

Chiang sent another telegram praising Wu: “Utmost loyalty to the nation, shining righteousness; revered across the land, fragrance eternal.” Chiang allocated 200,000 yuan for a state funeral.

In December 1946, the Nationalist government held Wu’s state funeral in Beijing, presided over by Li Zongren, with tens of thousands attending. Wu was buried at Yuquan Mountain. Chiang added another couplet:
“Three times calling to cross the river, Zongze’s heroic will never faded;
One song reveals the heart, Wen Tianxiang’s righteous spirit forever endures.”

XVIII. Wu Peifu’s Self-Composed Military Song: Man Jiang Hong

Chiang’s phrase “one song reveals the heart” refers to Wu’s 1925 military song Ascending the Pavilion at Penglai, composed during his northern retreat. Set to Yue Fei’s Man Jiang Hong, the lyrics read:

(Original poem preserved as-is in translation omitted per original structure)

XIX. A Lifetime of Integrity and Fidelity to His Wife

From this song, people see Wu Peifu’s national spirit and heroic resistance to foreign enemies, earning him the title “the modern Yue Fei.” Wu was famed for bravery; his appearance radiated righteousness and authority. He was upright and incorruptible, not greedy for wealth or lust, never took concubines, never visited prostitutes, and had only one wife, Zhang Peilan, throughout his life. After defeat, he did not live in foreign concessions or go abroad.

Dong Biwu said of him:
“He served as an official for decades, ruled several provinces, commanded hundreds of thousands of troops, yet left no private savings or land. His reputation for integrity is truly rare.”