Chapter 07: Reassessing Li Hongzhang: Empress Dowager Cixi’s Foremost Statesman

Li Hongzhang (1823–1901), a native of Hefei, Anhui, was born in 1823. From childhood he devoted himself to the Confucian classics and histories, passing the county-level examination at the age of seventeen. His father, Li Wen’an, was a jinshi who passed the metropolitan examination in the same year as Zeng Guofan and served in Beijing as a supervising secretary in the Ministry of Justice. At twenty, Li Hongzhang went to Beijing, befriended many eminent scholars, broadened his horizons, and built an extensive network.

I. A Jinshi at Twenty-Four — A Talent Fit for Great Use

At twenty-one, Li passed the provincial examination and studied under Zeng Guofan, cultivating practical statecraft. At twenty-two, he was appointed an editor in the Hanlin Academy. Zeng Guofan praised him as “a talent of great capacity, worthy of major responsibility.” At twenty-four, Li passed the metropolitan examination and entered Zeng Guofan’s circle, emphasizing learning for practical governance. After Zeng Guofan, Li Hongzhang became Empress Dowager Cixi’s foremost minister.

At thirty, Li returned to his hometown to organize local militias and joined the war against the Taiping forces. The following year, his father also returned home to assist in militia organization. A scholar leading troops, “a Hanlin scholar turned bandit-fighter,” he relied on relentless combat. At thirty-two, he led the Huai Army to recapture Luzhou, and the following year took Chaoxian and Hezhou, earning fame across the realm. At thirty-four, his father died; Li observed mourning and temporarily ended four years of military life. The next year, the Taiping forces again captured Luzhou. Li fled with his family to Nanchang and later entered Zeng Guofan’s headquarters in Jiangxi, where he absorbed Zeng’s moral influence like a compass finding its true north. Zeng Guofan was cautious and hesitant by nature, often deliberating repeatedly over major plans, while Li was decisive and clear-minded, frequently resolving matters with just a few words at Zeng’s side.

In 1861, after the Taiping forces twice broke through the Jiangnan encampments, Zeng Guofan ordered Li back to Anhui. Li gladly accepted and returned to organize the Huai Army, training it at Anqing. The initial Huai Army consisted of fourteen battalions, each nearly seven hundred men, totaling close to ten thousand troops. The following year, Zeng inspected the Huai Army accompanied by Li. With financial support from Shanghai gentry, seven British merchant steamships were hired to sail to Shanghai. On Zeng’s recommendation, Li was appointed Governor of Jiangsu. When the Taiping forces launched their second major assault on Shanghai, Li led the Huai Army through three fierce battles and successfully defended the city.

II. Three Campaigns Against Hong Xiuquan — Defending Shanghai

After arriving in Shanghai, the Huai Army reformed its old system, modeled itself after the American army, equipped Western rifles and artillery, and hired foreign instructors, greatly enhancing its combat effectiveness. Li also accepted defectors and expanded forces, growing the Huai Army to over sixty thousand men within two years. He promoted capable, pragmatic officials familiar with Western affairs, such as Guo Songtao and Ding Richang, establishing a Huai Army headquarters. With humility and endurance, he learned from foreigners. On the eve of the attack on Nanjing, the Huai Army numbered over seventy thousand troops, cooperating with the foreign-led “Ever Victorious Army” to attack the Taiping forces.

In 1863, after capturing Changshu, Taicang, and Kunshan, the Huai Army advanced on Suzhou along three routes. After entering the city, eight Taiping generals who had surrendered refused to disarm and demanded official posts and troop incorporation. Li lured and executed the eight surrendered generals and dispersed the remaining troops. The execution of surrendered officers in Suzhou provoked strong dissatisfaction from Gordon of the Ever Victorious Army. In a letter to his mother, Li admitted, “This matter was excessively inhumane, but it concerned the overall situation and could not be avoided.” Zeng Guofan, however, praised him as “exceptionally sharp-eyed and ruthless.”

III. Sharp-Eyed and Ruthless — Capturing Nanjing with the Xiang Army

In 1864, the Xiang Army captured Nanjing, and together the Huai and Xiang armies suppressed the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom. In 1865, the Nian Rebellion erupted in Shandong. The court appointed Zeng Guofan as Imperial Commissioner to suppress it, while Li Hongzhang served as Acting Viceroy of Liangjiang, responsible for troop deployment. Since most Xiang Army forces had been disbanded after the fall of Nanjing, Zeng led northward an army of 35,000, mostly Huai troops, with only 8,000 Xiang troops. Later, with additional Huai contingents, total forces exceeded 60,000. After a year and a half with no success, the court replaced Zeng with Li as Imperial Commissioner. Li adopted a strategy of “blocking and encirclement,” and by the end of 1867 annihilated over 30,000 Nian troops in northern Jiangsu and Shandong. The following year, he eliminated the western Nian forces in Hebei through a strategy of “controlling movement through stillness,” and was appointed Viceroy of Huguang.

IV. Promoting Westernization — Enrich First, Then Strengthen

Li Hongzhang’s Westernization efforts began in 1863, when he founded the Shanghai Foreign Languages Institute. That same year, he established China’s second modern military-industrial enterprise, the Shanghai Foreign Rifle Bureau (the first being Zeng Guofan’s Anqing Arsenal in 1861). In 1865, as Acting Viceroy of Liangjiang and with Zeng’s support, Li acquired the American-owned Qiji Iron Works in Shanghai’s Hongkou district and merged it with two other bureaus under Ding Richang and Han Dianjia, expanding it into the Jiangnan Manufacturing Bureau. The Suzhou Machinery Bureau was also relocated to Nanjing and expanded into the Jinling Machinery Bureau. After being transferred to serve as Viceroy of Zhili, Li took over the Tianjin Machinery Bureau founded by Chonghou and expanded its production. Of China’s four major early military-industrial enterprises, Li founded three. He stated, “Training troops must begin with manufacturing weapons,” and advocated learning foreign technology without necessarily employing foreign personnel, so that industries could succeed, skills could be refined, and talent could be gathered.

Understanding that “wealth and strength are mutually dependent, and wealth must come first,” Li shifted the focus of Westernization to economic development. He supervised the founding of the China Merchants Steam Navigation Company, the first privately run shipping company and the largest civilian enterprise of modern China. It carried half of all government cargo and outcompeted the British-American jointly operated Qichang Company, establishing the policy of “official supervision and merchant operation.”

Throughout the 1870s and 1880s, Li successively founded or promoted numerous enterprises: coal and iron mines in Cizhou (Hebei), Xingguo (Jiangxi), and Guangji (Hubei); the Kaiping Mining Bureau; the Shanghai Machine Weaving Bureau; coal mines in Fengxian (Shandong); the Tianjin Telegraph Administration; the Tangxu Railway; the Shanghai Telegraph Bureau; the Jinggu Railway; the Mohe Gold Mine; copper mines in Sidaogou (Rehe); the Sanshan Lead-Silver Mine; and the Shanghai Huasheng Textile Mill, most of them jointly operated by officials and merchants. The first telegraph cable line in China, between Tianjin and Dagukou, was completed with his support.

V. Managing Foreign Affairs — Using Barbarians to Check Barbarians

Li Hongzhang was renowned in the Qing dynasty as a master diplomat. He believed that self-strengthening required “peace abroad and reform at home,” and advocated “using barbarians to control barbarians.” Foreign powers often insisted that he personally conduct negotiations. In 1871, after resolving the Tianjin Missionary Incident, he negotiated and signed the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Amity, establishing equal and reciprocal relations. In 1874, when Japan sent troops to invade Taiwan, Li supported the court’s appointment of Shen Baozhen as Imperial Commissioner to lead a fleet to Taiwan and dispatched 6,500 Huai troops stationed in Xuzhou. The crisis was resolved through negotiations resulting in the Sino-Japanese Taiwan Agreement.

In 1874, Li negotiated and signed the Sino-Peruvian Commercial Treaty, protecting Chinese laborers abroad. In 1876, following the Margary Affair, Sino-British relations became tense. The British minister Wade threatened war. Li skillfully applied international law to avoid rupture, leading the court to send Guo Songtao to Britain to offer apologies. Guo thus became China’s first resident minister abroad, and the two sides signed the Chefoo Convention, opening Yichang, Wuhu, Wenzhou, and Beihai as treaty ports and allowing British entry into Tibet.

In 1883, the Sino-French War erupted in Vietnam. Li negotiated with the French minister Bourée, signing the Li–Bourée Agreement, and in 1884 with Fournier, signing the Li–Fournier Agreement. Ultimately, after Qing military victories and instructions from Empress Dowager Cixi, Li signed the Sino-French Treaty on Vietnam with Patenôtre, ending the war. France gained protectorate rights over Vietnam, and Sino-French peace was restored.

VI. The Sino-Japanese War — The Greatest Pain of His Life, Assassinated in Japan

In 1895, after China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese War, Li Hongzhang went to Japan and was forced to sign the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the greatest agony of his life. The treaty ceded Taiwan and the Liaodong Peninsula and imposed an indemnity of 200 million taels of silver. Russia, France, and Germany intervened, forcing Japan to return Liaodong, but China paid an additional 30 million taels. Subsequently, Russia, claiming credit for the return of Liaodong, leased Port Arthur and Dalian.

Before the treaty was signed, Li argued repeatedly with the Japanese delegation, striving to reduce territorial losses and indemnities. After the third round of negotiations, Li was assassinated en route and seriously wounded, shocking world opinion and leading Japan to moderate its demands. Once Li recovered slightly, the fourth negotiation reduced the indemnity from 300 million to 250 million, and eventually to 200 million taels. Later generations praised him for saving the government 100 million taels of silver at the cost of his own blood and tears. The bullet struck his left cheek, blood soaking his official robes, but he survived. Li regarded the Treaty of Shimonoseki as a national humiliation and vowed “never to set foot on Japanese soil again.” Two years later, while on a diplomatic mission to Europe and America, he passed through Yokohama and resolutely refused to disembark. During negotiations, when Japan threatened renewed war, Li tearfully told his American adviser John W. Foster: “If peace cannot be achieved by May 1, we will move the capital to Shaanxi and wage a protracted war. China can resist indefinitely; Japan will eventually be forced to seek peace.”

VII. Demoted and Transferred as Viceroy of Liangguang

After the Treaty of Shimonoseki, public outrage surged nationwide. Li Hongzhang became the scapegoat, and the court removed him from his post as Viceroy of Zhili and Beiyang Minister after twenty-five years, transferring him to serve as Viceroy of Liangguang.

Was the complete defeat in the Sino-Japanese War solely Li’s fault? Japan learned comprehensively from the West in institutions, strategy, and tactics, while China learned only technology. During the naval war, British naval instructors served on Japanese ships, while China had already dismissed its foreign instructors. Japan was an excellent student; China merely passed. Reform had begun but was unfinished. The defeat cannot be blamed on Li alone. New armies trained soldiers but not officers, with old officers leading new troops, leaving the army essentially traditional. Japan’s samurai ethos permeated all levels, officers were tactically proficient, and every detail was exemplary. China lacked comprehensive reform; defeat was inevitable.

Educational reforms produced institutions like the Tongwen College and translation bureaus, publishing many books. Yet most people remained focused on the imperial examinations, and society’s evaluation system remained unchanged. Li proposed limited scientific reforms to include Western studies in examinations, but received no response.
Li organized the Beiyang Navy, adopting British systems and hiring British officers to train it. Ding Ruchang was appointed admiral; though a former Huai cavalry officer with some foreign experience, he lacked experience commanding a large fleet in naval warfare. A land-based mindset prevailed, and the fleet rarely ventured far from the coast. China’s four fleets—Beiyang, Nanyang, Fujian, and Guangdong—operated separately without unified command. When the Beiyang Fleet fought Japan, it was treated as Li Hongzhang’s personal responsibility.

Soon after learning basic operations, the British chief instructor Lang Weili was dismissed, training slackened, and management deteriorated. Japanese spies freely entered bases to photograph ships; the Beiyang Fleet’s vulnerabilities were fully exposed. Discipline among officers was lax—concubines, brothels, corruption, nominal training, indulgence in vice. Soldiers enlisted mainly for pay, relying on connections rather than skill.

The Westernization Movement, advocated by Cixi and Li, sought self-strengthening through Western learning, revitalizing the Qing dynasty. Wei Yuan summarized it as “learning the superior techniques of the barbarians to control the barbarians.” The Qing was ruled by Manchus but administered by Han officials; responsibility for all major affairs fell on Li. He signed the most treaties and received the most criticism.

In 1900, the Boxer Rebellion led to the invasion of Beijing by the Eight-Nation Alliance. Li, then Viceroy of Liangguang, joined Liu Kunyi, Zhang Zhidong, and others in promoting “Mutual Protection of the Southeast,” refusing to obey the court’s declaration of war to prevent chaos in southeastern provinces. Secretly, they agreed that if Beijing fell and the Emperor and Empress Dowager died, Li would be elected president to stabilize the situation.

VIII. The Disaster of the Eight-Nation Alliance — Li Again Called to Clean Up

In June 1900, the court reappointed Li as Viceroy of Zhili and Beiyang Minister, urgently summoning him north. Li traveled to Shanghai by ship, delaying on grounds of illness. On August 15, Beijing fell and the court fled. On October 11, Li arrived in Beijing, fell ill with pneumonia, yet persisted in negotiating peace with foreign ministers to salvage the situation. On January 15, 1901, Li and Prince Qing Yikuang signed the Protocol for Peace. Public denunciation erupted again, accusing him of betraying the nation.

Li’s health deteriorated; he began coughing blood but continued directing negotiations, reducing indemnities from an initial demand of one billion taels to 450 million taels, payable over thirty-nine years at four percent interest, funded by increased tariffs on luxury imports. After signing, Li returned home and vomited blood, dying shortly thereafter in Beijing at the age of seventy-eight. The court granted 5,000 taels for his funeral and established shrines in his home province and the capital. Empress Dowager Cixi praised him as one who “restored the cosmos.”

IX. Thirty-Five Years of Diplomacy — Over Thirty Treaties

Li Hongzhang managed diplomacy for thirty-five years, striving to safeguard China’s interests and argue on principle, though national weakness forced humiliating concessions. His greatest fault was his command errors in the Sino-Japanese War, which warrant criticism. The Treaty of Shimonoseki, however, was unavoidable. When Cixi learned of his death, she wept and sighed, “The situation remains unsettled; if misfortune strikes again, there will be no one left to share the burden.”

Liang Qichao wrote: “When enemy troops pressed the borders, the words of endurance were painful even to observers—how much more so for Hongzhang himself.” Liang said, “I respect Li Hongzhang’s talent, regret his judgment, and mourn his fate.” Li stood alone against an entire nation of Japan; even the humiliation of Shimonoseki was heroic. The Draft History of Qing praised him: “He undertook affairs with a broad vision, never clinging to petty integrity. From youth to old age, he never spoke of retirement. He bore the great responsibilities of the state until death. For decades he stood alone at the forefront of domestic and foreign affairs, renowned worldwide, admired at home and abroad, bearing the world as his own duty and enduring humiliation without betraying the state.”

X. The Only Man Able to Compete with the Great Powers

Japanese Prime Minister Itō Hirobumi regarded Li as “the only man in the Qing Empire capable of contending with the great powers.” Japanese evaluations described him as understanding global trends, recognizing foreign civilizations, aspiring to self-strengthening, with exceptional vision and swift execution.

Li Hongzhang’s merits outweighed his faults. His shortcomings lay in the limitations and mistakes of reform. His greatest failure was the Sino-Japanese War, but it was not his alone—it was the failure of the entire leadership under Cixi, which reformed technology but not institutions.

Li was a capable and meritorious minister. His three major achievements were suppressing the Taiping Rebellion, promoting Westernization, and managing diplomacy, signing over thirty treaties. His greatest fault was defeat in the Sino-Japanese War. A stain on his record was accepting a 500,000-tael Russian payment, arguably bribery, and benefiting his family through Westernization enterprises. In personal integrity, he fell short of Zhang Zhidong.

XI. Learning from the West — Japan the Top Student, China the Average One

The Westernization Movement lasted thirty years and created many industries. Yet after defeat in 1894, it was declared a failure—judging solely by victory or defeat. Qing defeat was inevitable because Japan was stronger. Both began learning from the West in the 1860s, but Japan learned comprehensively and solidly, becoming a top student, while China learned incompletely and superficially, remaining average. An average student losing to a top student is inevitable. Defeat does not negate the achievements of Westernization.

After the defeat by the Eight-Nation Alliance in 1900, Cixi initiated the Late Qing Reforms, recognizing that Westernization had addressed only surface technology, not the core of Western governance. The New Policies reformed administration, civil service, military, finance, education, and examinations—learning at the marrow level.

XII. Westernization as Surface, Cixi to the Marrow

After Li’s death, Cixi pushed toward constitutional monarchy, penetrating reform to the core. Unfortunately, her death was followed by the Xinhai Revolution, and the reforms were aborted.

Institutions Li established, such as the Jiangnan Manufacturing Bureau and the Fuzhou Naval Yard, were already producing firearms, artillery, naval guns, and steel warships. In 1919, the Fuzhou Naval Yard produced China’s first biplane seaplane, followed by trainers, patrol aircraft, torpedo bombers, and a total of seventeen aircraft.

During the War of Resistance against Japan, China mass-produced rifles, semi-automatic rifles, machine guns, mortars, and aircraft. In 1958, Minister Zhao Erlu admitted, “Our submachine guns are still inferior to those produced by Yan Xishan’s arsenal.”

In 1960, the Communist government produced its first domestically designed 10,000-ton ship, the Dongfeng, hailed as a national achievement.

Yet as early as 1920, the Jiangnan Shipyard founded by Li had already built China’s first 10,000-ton ship and four such vessels within two years, commissioned by the United States. In 1940, all four were still operating on transoceanic routes.

XIII. Toiling All One’s Life, Never Leaving the Saddle

Li Hongzhang’s writings—memorials, telegrams, official correspondence, private letters, poetry, and essays—total 165 volumes and over six million characters, compiled in The Complete Works of Li Wenzhong and The Collected Works of Li Hongzhang.

When entering Beijing for examinations, Li wrote a poem expressing his ambition:

“With one hand I grasp the blade of Wu,
My spirit towers above a hundred-story hall.
Who in ten thousand years will write the histories?
Three thousand miles away, I seek to be enfeoffed.”

Empress Dowager Cixi and Li Hongzhang — Final Poem

“My weary horse and carriage never leave the saddle;
Only at the brink do I know how hard it is to die.
Three hundred years of grief over the nation’s fate,
Eight thousand miles away I mourn the people’s suffering.
Autumn wind, jeweled sword, a lone minister’s tears;
Setting sun, banners falling at the general’s altar.
Dust and turmoil overseas have not yet ceased—
Gentlemen, do not take this lightly.”